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ABSTRACT

FROM ANTI-IMPERIALISM TO HUMAN RIGHTS: THE VIETNAM WAR AND RADICAL
INTERNATIONALISM IN THE 1960S AND 1970S
Salar Mohandesi
Warren Breckman
This dissertation explores changing forms of internationalism among the French and U.S. radical
left from the 1960s through the late 1970s. In the 1960s, Vietnamese resistance to U.S.
imperialism inspired French activists to forge an international antiwar alliance with U.S. activists
opposing their government’s aggression. Together, they created a form of anti-imperialist
internationalism based on the right of nations to self-determination. Despite transnational protest,
the United States escalated the war, leading many activists to argue that the best way to aid
Vietnamese national liberation was to translate that struggle into their own domestic contexts. In
so doing, they triggered a wave of upheaval that reached new heights in May 1968. But when this
anti-imperialist front faced repression and imprisonment in France and the United States, these
same radicals began to advance individual rights alongside anti-imperialist revolution in the early
1970s. Once they learned of South Vietnam’s heightened repression of political dissenters, they
grafted their new attention to rights onto the antiwar movement, demanding the restoration of civil
liberties. Yet in arguing that South Vietnam violated fundamental democratic rights, antiimperialist internationalism increasingly took the form of criticizing the internal affairs of a
sovereign state. In this way, anti-imperialists lent legitimacy to a rival form of internationalism that
shared the progressive aspirations of anti-imperialism but rejected nationalism in favor of human
rights. When genocide, internecine war, and refugee crises in Southeast Asia undermined faith in
national liberation in the late 1970s, former French radicals sided with the U.S. government to
lead a global movement championing human rights against the sovereignty of nation-states like
Vietnam. By tracing this history of solidarity with the Vietnamese liberation struggle from the
1960s to the 1970s, this dissertation explains how and why human rights came to displace antivi

imperialism as the dominant form of internationalism. It shows that the Vietnam War was a truly
global phenomenon, that the trajectory of the left in countries like France was powerfully shaped
by developments in what was then called the Third World, and that the rise of human rights was
closely connected to transformations within anti-imperialist internationalism.
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INTRODUCTION

In February 1968, as the Tet Offensive repulsed the U.S. military across Vietnam,
thousands of antiwar activists from North America and Western Europe met at the Technical
University in West Berlin to end the war. From the United States arrived activists representing
Students for a Democratic Society and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee. From
France came groups like the Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire and the Comité Vietnam
National. The organizations, collectives, and individuals that traveled to Berlin by plane, car, or
train represented a broad spectrum of the far left, from anarchism to Third Worldism, Castroism to
Trotskyism. Although divided by many political and ideological differences, what brought them all
together was a commitment to not only ending the Vietnam War, but overturning the very
international system that allowed wars like the one in Vietnam to happen in the first place. It was
this call for fundamental change, which hinged on connecting the war to imperialism, that turned
these antiwar activists into radicals.
In Berlin, beneath a giant flag of the National Liberation Front, this new international
network of radicals set to work. Committed to anti-imperialism, guided by the ideas of national
self-determination, and inspired by the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese against U.S.
imperialism, most radicals came to argue that the best way to support the Vietnamese liberation
struggle was to open a “second front” within the imperialist centers. Internationalism, these
radicals came to believe, meant worldwide revolution led by the Vietnamese. After the
conference, radicals return home and searched for ways to reproduce the distant struggle they
sought to support. In France, young radicals’ efforts to bring home the anti-imperialist revolution
of the Vietnamese triggered a series of events that would set off May ’68. Internationally, just as
the Vietnamese inspired the French, the events of May ’68 inspired radicals in other countries,
like the United States, who in turn tried to translate May ’68 into their own domestic vernaculars.
A decade later, a new generation of activists, led by many veteran antiwar radicals, once
again turned their eyes to Southeast Asia. But this time, they allied with the U.S. government in a
1

massive international campaign against human rights violations in the newly unified the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam. Against the backdrop of internecine war between Vietnam, Cambodia, and
China, tens of thousands of Vietnamese refugees risked their lives to escape state repression,
often in derelict boats floating across the South China Sea. Advocating humanitarian intervention
into the internal affairs of Vietnam to save the “boat people,” these new rights activists
championed a very different kind of internationalism – one that turned from the nation to the
individual, from violence to nonviolence, and from anti-imperialism to human rights.
This dissertation explores changing forms of international solidarity among the French
and U.S. radical left from the early 1960s through the very late 1970s to explain how and why
human rights displaced anti-imperialism as the dominant form of internationalism in the 1970s. I
argue that the success of Vietnamese resistance to U.S. imperialism made possible a renewed
internationalism that framed anti-imperialism as the dominant principle of radical politics. But
when the failures of nationalism in the 1970s crippled anti-imperialism, a rival form of
internationalism privileging human rights over national self-determination rose to dominate
mainstream political culture.

France, the United States, Vietnam
This project focuses primarily on French radicals because they played the most decisive
role in the international shift from anti-imperialism to human rights. In the 1960s and early 1970s,
French activists helped encourage a new radical internationalism, spearhead the turn to
revolution, and initiate a reconsideration of the value of civil liberties. Later in the 1970s, activists
in France, more so than anywhere else, abandoned anti-imperialism to lead a new kind of human
rights internationalism that rejected national sovereignty in favor of humanitarian interventionism.
But while the French emerged as the driving force in this history, they did not act alone. As
consummate internationalists, French radicals constantly looked to, and were transformed by,
developments abroad. Thus, the story of how human rights displaced anti-imperialism cannot be
told from a strictly national perspective, but must be firmly situated within a transnational
2

framework. This project sets the trajectory of the French radical left within two distinct,
reciprocally implicated sets of transnational relations.
First, I examine the relationships between French radicals and their peers in other
advanced capitalist countries in Western Europe and North America. As this project shows, the
French constantly interacted with comrades in neighboring countries, producing a number of
dense, overlapping networks across Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the
Federal Republic of Germany, among other countries. But the most important contacts for the
French were the Americans. Indeed, despite enormous national differences, the French
consistently learned from their American comrades. In the early years of the war, they borrowed
tactics, like the teach-in. Later in the 1960s, many French radicals prioritized U.S. struggles
because of their crucial strategic role in fighting U.S. imperialism from inside the “belly of the
beast.” In the early 1970s, French activists learned from black prison organizing, while also
following the Americans’ new emphasis on political prisoners in South Vietnam. And in the late
1970s, some activists collaborated with human rights advocates close to the administration of
U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Thus, while the French played the most decisive role in the
transition from anti-imperialism to human rights, their trajectory cannot be understood without
taking full account of the ongoing American connection. For that reason, this dissertation, while
focusing on French radicals, necessarily also tracks developments in the United States.
Second, I explore the transnational relationships between radicals in the advanced
capitalist world and developments in what was then called the “Third World.” One of my central
arguments, explored in greater detail below, is that struggles in the Third World transformed
politics in countries like France from beginning to end. While radicals looked to many struggles
abroad, such as Cuba, Algeria, Vietnam, China, Palestine, and Mozambique, in the 1960s,
Vietnam was the most important reference point. Indeed, Vietnam played such a profound role in
defining the very identity of the radical left in countries like France, that many radicals came to
see themselves as the “Vietnam Generation.” For that reason, this project focuses primarily on
developments in Vietnam from the early 1960s to the very late 1970s, using Vietnam as a window
3
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into international solidarity. I show how the Vietnamese revolution expanded the radical left,
reframed radicalism as anti-imperialism, and inspired radicals to embrace revolution. Moreover,
the successes of the Vietnamese, along with their fervent internationalism, led them to serve as a
kind of “binding element,” allowing otherwise separated radicals to come together. In this way,
this transnational relation between Vietnam and the advanced capitalist world helped make
possible the other set of relationships between North American and Western European radicals
mentioned above.
This dissertation therefore tracks the history of internationalism by zeroing in on moments
of encounter between events at home in France and those abroad. In the late 1960s, for
example, the encounter between growing domestic unrest in France, the militancy of black
radicals in the United States, and the audacity of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam led French radicals
to argue that the best way to aid the Vietnamese was to bring the war home to France. In the
early 1970s, domestic experiences with repression, incarceration, and left unity; black prison
organizing in the United States; and South Vietnam’s heightened repression of political dissenters
led French radicals to reframe antiwar solidarity as the demand to liberate the Vietnamese
political prisoners and restore civil liberties in South Vietnam. And in the late 1970s, the decline of
the French left at home, a new post-Vietnam foreign policy in the United States, and a
humanitarian catastrophe in Southeast Asia, all helped human rights internationalism bypass antiimperialism. By integrating developments in France, the United States, and Vietnam, therefore,
this dissertation presents a transnational and transatlantic history of how radical internationalism
transformed in the 1960s and 1970s.

The French Left

1

Of course, as Vietnam was by no means the only reference point, especially after 1968, it may
have been possible to tell parts of this story with reference to other struggles. I felt, however, that
keeping the focus firmly on a single struggle, rather than rapidly shifting the analysis to different
solidarity movements with different revolutions abroad, would be the best way to understand how
internationalism changed in this period.
4

In order to explain how human rights displaced anti-imperialism, my project bridges four
historiographies: literature on the French left, the Vietnam War, internationalism in the Global
1960s, and human rights.
In the 1960s and 1970s, a combination of factors led to the reemergence of the radical
left as a meaningful force in French politics. Activists breathed new life into Marxism, filled the
streets with protests, and called for revolutions in all spheres of life. During the “68 years,” an
expansive cycle of contestation that stretched from the early 1960s to the 1970s, radicals pushed
democracy in new directions, overturned social roles, challenged accepted forms of
2

representation, and redefined the very meaning of politics. Given the overall importance of the
radical left to French political life at this time, it is little surprise that the literature on this topic has
grown so expansive. There are now innumerable historical, sociological, and theoretical works
exploring various facets of the radical left.
In recent decades, scholarship has begun to situate the French radical left within a larger
global context. In particular, some historians have now begun to emphasize the importance of
3

what was then called the “Third World” to the development of the radical left. I build on this new
turn in the literature to argue that struggles abroad were not simply a source of inspiration; they
profoundly shaped the entire trajectory of the French radical left. But some struggles, I hope to
show, were more transformative than others. Indeed, one of my central arguments is that while
radicals looked to many different movements in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, it was the
Vietnamese revolution that played the most decisive role in defining the identity of French
radicals. Unfortunately, scholars have only recently begun to fully appreciate the enduring role of
France’s former Southeast Asian colony in shaping ideas, movements, and politics in Europe. As
2

For the concept of the “‘68 years,” see Geneviève Dreyfus-Armand et al. eds., Les Années 68:
Le temps de la contestation (Brussels: Éditions Complexe, 2000).
3
The most path breaking in this regard is Kristin Ross, May ’68 and its Afterlives (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 2002). Scholars have since explored the precise ways in which the
“third word” influenced the left. Christoph Katler, The Discovery of the Third World: Decolonization
and the Rise of the New Left in France, c. 1950-1976, trans. Thomas Dunlap (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2016) explores “the concept of the Third World”; Daniel A. Gordon,
Immigrants & Intellectuals: May ‘68 and the Rise of Anti-Racism in France (Pontypool, Wales:
Merlin Press, 2012) investigates the relationship between immigration from the “third world” on
the French left.
5

historian Bethany Keenan has argued, for the longest time, although “historians recognized that
Vietnam garnered large amounts of attention from the French in general, their presentation of the
time between the end of the Algerian War in 1962 and 1968 created the impression that for most,
interest in the Vietnam War was a way to pass the time until life at home kicked up again.”

4

Vietnam, it was assumed, captured attention, but did not play a fundamental role in shaping the
course of French politics.
That assessment began to change in the late 1990s. In 1997, Laurent Jalabert published
5

a perspicacious article connecting antiwar activism to the May events. In 1998, Nicolas Pas
penned an exhaustive dissertation tracking antiwar solidarity among the French far left up to the
6

events of May 1968. He followed this with an article on antiwar organizing, showing how Vietnam
7

helped the left secure an independent position to the left of the Communist Party (PCF). Soon
after, Kristin Ross showed how the Vietnam War played an enormous role in shaping the politics
8

of the activists who went on to spark the May events. In 2009, Bethany Keenan offered a
detailed account of Vietnam’s impact not only on the far left, but on other sectors of French
9

society, showing just how important Vietnam was to defining France’s postwar identity.

Taken together, these works have reshaped our understanding of the left. They
demonstrate how Vietnam radicalized a generation of activists, allowed radicals to bypass the
PCF, and created an opportunity for them to experiment with new tactics, strategies, and
organizations that would take center stage during May. In this way, these studies have forced

4

Bethany Keenan, “‘Vietnam is Fighting for Us:’ French Identities in the U.S.–Vietnam War, 19651973” (Ph.D. Diss., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2009), 4-5.
5
Laurent Jalabert, “Aux origines de la génération 68: Les étudiants français et la guerre du
Vietnam,” Vingtième Siècle: Revue d’histoire, no. 55 (July-September 1997): 69-81.
6
Nicolas Pas, “Sortir de l’ombre du Parti Communiste Français: Histoire de l’engagement de
l’extrême-gauche français sur la guerre du Vietnam, 1965-1968” (Mémoire DEA, Institut d’Etudes
Politiques, Paris, 1998). Pas’s was not the only dissertation on the Vietnam War to appear in the
1990s. See, also Sylvie Tigroudja, “Les Intellectuels de gauche face à la guerre du Viêt-nam,
1964-1973” (Mémoire de DEA, Université Charles de Gaulle-Lille-III, Villeneuve-d’Ascq, 1997)
and Sophie Boulte, “L’Influence de la guerre du Viêt-nam sur les comités Viêt-nam en France
entre 1966 et 1973” (Mémoire de DEA, Université Paris-I, Paris, 1996).
7
Nicolas Pas, “‘Six Heures pour le Vietnam:’ Histoire des Comité Vietnam français, 1965-1968,”
Revue Historique 301, no. 1 (January-March, 2000): 157-85.
8
Ross, May ’68 and its Afterlives.
9
Keenan, “‘Vietnam is Fighting for Us.’”
6

scholars to recognize the crucial role that the Vietnam War played in shaping radical politics,
social movements, and the broader left during this period. Scanning the anthologies published for
the 40th anniversary of May ‘68, it is now clear that no one can write the history of the radical left
without engaging with Vietnam in some way.

10

And yet, the impact that Vietnam had on the radical left has still not yet been fully
recognized. My dissertation adds to this literature by investigating three key areas that remain
underexplored. First, following Kristin Ross, I argue that Vietnam shaped the very political horizon
of the radical left in the 1960s. By situating the radical left within a wider transnational field, I show
how radicals saw themselves as junior partners in a worldwide anti-imperialist struggle. Indeed,
they regarded their struggles, which reached new levels of militancy during the vents of May
1968, as nothing more than another front in the revolutionary wave led by Vietnam. Thus, I argue,
political developments in western countries like France in the 1960s cannot be understood in
isolation; they were contingent upon a vast transnational struggle. In this way, we can say that the
Vietnam War was May ’68’s condition of possibility.
Second, I show how Vietnam allowed French radicals to connect with activists in other
countries. Following a number of scholars, I show that transnational connections were profoundly
important for the French radical left. I argue, however, that the key element allowing these
transnational connections to come into being was Vietnam. Indeed, Vietnam, I argue, acted as a
kind of “binding element,” creating the conditions that permitted radicals from different countries
to come together into an international alliance. My research shows that the French played a
leading role in this process. Recognizing the international nature of the war, French radicals tried
to internationalize antiwar opposition, reaching out to radicals in the United States and Western
Europe. Together, they shared information, coordinated actions, and learned from one another.
With the French in the lead, they created a number of intersecting antiwar networks: they creating
an underground transnational network to resisting and deserting U.S. GIs, they tried to organize
10

For example, Dominique Damamme et al., eds., Mai-Juin 68 (Paris: Les Éditions de
l’Atelier/Éditions Ouvrières, 2008); Philippe Artières et Michelle Zancarini-Fournel, eds., 68: Une
histoire collective 1962-1981 (Paris: La Découverte, 2008); Antoine Artous, eds., La France des
années 68 (Paris: Éditions Syllepse, 2008).
7

international brigades to fight the U.S. military in Southeast Asia, and convened the Bertrand
Russell International War Crimes Tribunal, which put the United States on trial for war crimes.
Through these networks, French activists picked up new forms of struggle, adopted new tactics
and strategies, and discovered new ideas. In this way, Vietnam, more than any other event,
encouraged not only the revival of a new radical internationalism in the 1960s, but precipitated
the formation of a functional radical international like those of the past.
Lastly, my dissertation takes the story all the way to the very late 1970s. As many
historians have shown, after May, radicals returned their attention to the “hexagon,” putting
antiwar solidarity on the backburner. As a result, most scholars tend to conclude their treatment
of Vietnamese solidarity in 1968. Of course, there are some exceptions, the most important of
which is Christine Sabine Rousseau’s account of Christian opposition to the Vietnam War, but
even this text focuses only on Christians, who opposed the war not out of any critique of
imperialism, but from a sense of religious values and duties.

11

I argue that contrary to

appearances, solidarity with Vietnam shaped the history of the radical left every step of the way.
Solidarity with the Vietnamese was not some kind of instrument that radicals simply discarded
once they achieved their ulterior motives; Vietnam continued to play a role even into the 1970s.
To take just one example, after the turn to revolution was met with state repression, South
Vietnam’s heightened repression of political prisoners had an effect on the left’s conception of
international solidarity, contributing to a general rethinking of the role of rights. By maintaining the
focus on Vietnam, I show how the trajectory of the radical left was always shaped by the constant
encounter between events at home with those abroad.
But this profound connection between the French radical left and the Vietnamese national
liberation struggle was double-edged. In the 1960s, as revolutions exploded across the globe, the
alliance with national liberation was a source of great strength. But since the radical left’s very
identity was so powerfully shaped by Vietnam, if the Vietnamese revolution were to ever fail to
deliver on the extraordinary emancipatory hopes that radicals expected, it would have devastating
11

Sabine Rousseau, La colombe et le napalm: des Chrétiens français contre les guerres
d’Indochine et du Vietnam, 1945-1975 (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2002).
8

consequences for the radical left. Indeed, this is precisely what happened in the 1970s: genocide
in Cambodia, internecine war between Cambodia, China, and Vietnam, and a catastrophic
refugee crisis in Southeast Asia shattered the radical left.
In this way, my project also challenges how we understand the decline of revolutionary
politics in France. Scholars variously blame state repression, argue that individual radicals
betrayed their politics, or show how the historical conditions for the left’s rise were eroded over
the course of the 1970s. All these factors no doubt played a part, but I argue that the events
abroad were just as important to the left’s decline. Indeed, since the radical left was not shaped
exclusively by events at home, but through complex encounters between developments in France
and those in the Third World, it should come as no surprise that simultaneous transformations in
the Third World played a crucial role in the radical left’s political decomposition in the 1970s. In
that decade, all the great hopes that radicals placed in national liberation struggles came undone:
liberated countries turned into dictatorships, governments repressed their citizens, newly
independent countries were still beholden to western capital, and the very countries that once led
the charge in a new internationalism soon turned on one another. Southeast Asia in 1979 was the
nail in the coffin. It is no accident that these events nearly coincided with the collapse of the
radical left as an organized force and the end of the long cycle of struggle in which May 1968
stood in the center. For if the Vietnam War helped generate the imaginary that made May ’68
possible; genocide, internecine war, and refugee crises in Southeast Asia in the late 1970s
helped sound its death knell. Vietnam not only stood at the origins of the radical left, but was also
a part of its end.

The Vietnam War
Although the literature on the Vietnam War, or the Second Indochina War, to be more
precise, is voluminous, much of this work has focused squarely on the United States, treating the
conflict as a largely American affair. But a new spate of scholarship on the war has taken

9

advantage of Vietnamese archives to produce a more inclusive account.

12

These historians have

also begun to look beyond Vietnamese and U.S. relations, insisting on the truly global nature of
the war. Scholars like Lien-Hang T. Nguyen have convincingly shown how the “war itself
transcended the borders of Vietnam.”

13

Indeed, the conflict centered not only on the United

States, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Republic of Vietnam, but directly involved
Laos, Cambodia, China, the USSR, Australia, and New Zealand, and indirectly affected dozens of
countries like Japan, Germany, or France.

14

The war, it is now becoming clear, played a key role

in a number of global historical trends such as the Sino-Soviet conflict, Sino-American
rapprochement, détente, and decolonization. Since the Vietnam War was a fully global event, its
story must now be told from a transnational perspective.
Yet much of the new transnational history of the Vietnam War remains within the subfield
of diplomatic history. To be sure, this approach has offered tremendous insights, radically
transforming our understanding of the war, but the literature often ignores non-state actors. The
oversight is significant not only because the conflict extended beyond the realm of states, but
because even at the diplomatic level, the Vietnamese practiced a kind of “people’s diplomacy”
that involved directly collaborating with non-state actors across the world, above all the vibrant
15

antiwar movements forming in the capitalist countries of North America and Western Europe.
My project therefore aims to deepen this transnational turn in Vietnam War historiography by
12

The best book on the war is William S. Turley, The Second Indochina War: A Short Political
nd
and Military History, 1954-1975, 2 ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009). For accounts that
draw on both perspectives, see Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists’ Relations with China
and the Second Indochina conflict, 1956-1962 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1997); Ang Cheng
Guan, The Vietnam War from the Other Side (London: Routledge, 2002); Andreas W Daum et al.,
eds., America, The Vietnam War, and the World: Comparative and International (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International History
of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); Pierre
Asselin, Hanoi’s Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2013).
13
Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, “Cold War Contradictions: Toward an International History of the Second
Indochina War, 1969-1973,” in Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and
Transnational Perspectives, eds. Mark Philip Bradley and Marilyn B. Young (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 219.
14
For France’s role in the Second Indochina War, see Pierre Journoud, De Gaulle et le Vietnam,
1945-1969: La réconciliation (Paris: Tallandier, 2011).
15
Harish C. Mehta, “‘People’s Diplomacy’: The Diplomatic Front of North Vietnam During the War
Against the United States, 1965-1972” (Ph.D. Diss., McMaster University, 2009).
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complementing the work of the diplomatic historians with research into the transnational antiwar
movements that bypassed, directly challenged, or collaborated with states.
To be sure, I am not the first to examine the transnational dimension of antiwar struggles,
but the existing scholarship remains painfully limited. Most American accounts of the antiwar
movement almost entirely ignore the fact that activists in other countries opposed the war.

16

Those that make mention of the international dimension merely describe examples of
international contact, but never explain connections across borders.
steps have been made in this direction.

18

17

Recently, however, some

Combining comparative and transnational approaches,

Geneviève Dreyfus-Armand and Jacques Portes offered a brief survey of antiwar movements in
different countries in 2000, suggesting that opposition to the war was not only widespread in
different European countries, but that these antiwar struggles often in dialogue with one
another.

19

Exploring the role that Europe played in the war, as well as the role the war played in

Europe, Christopher Goscha and Maurice Vaïsse’s anthology, La Guerre du Vietnam et l’Europe,
20

1963-1973, gathers a number of excellent essays about European antiwar activism.

Another

edited collection, America, The Vietnam War, and the World: Comparative and International,
includes a few essays about the international nature of antiwar activism.

21

Scholars now acknowledge that antiwar activity was always situated in a larger
international context, but there is still no systematic treatment of these international
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For representative examples antiwar movement, see Fred Halstead, Out Now!: A Participant’s
Account of the American Movement Against the Vietnam War (New York: Monad Press, 1978);
Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the
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connections.

22

My dissertation aims to fill this gap. Building on this earlier work, my project offers

the first transnational history of radical antiwar movements. Of course, it is not possible to survey
the entire field of antiwar movements in North America and Europe, let alone the entire world in a
dissertation. As a result, I have been forced to limit my analysis primarily to France, the United
States, and occasionally Great Britain, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Nevertheless,
by investigating the international antiwar convergences, exchanges between activists from
different countries, and the internationalist ideas that animated their solidarity, this dissertation
does begin the process of explaining how and why these different movements fit together.
By focusing on transnational antiwar movements, however, I do not intend to replace a
narrow focus on the diplomatic with an even more narrow perspective on movements “from
below.” On the contrary, I try to weave these different levels into a coherent story. Thus, I
complement my study of the antiwar movements with an analysis of Richard Nixon’s changing
justifications of the war, Jimmy Carter’s policies in Southeast Asia, The People’s Republic of
China’s shifting foreign policy, or the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s diplomatic efforts. This long
history from anti-imperialism to human rights, I argue in the dissertation, was the product of
complex interactions between movements from below and state power from above.

Internationalism
Until recently, work on the 1960s and 1970s was dominated by a methodological
nationalism that rendered transnational connections invisible. Thus, while some scholars traced
the trajectory of radical social movements from the 1960s to the late 1970s, their exclusive focus
on a single country led them to neglect the transnational relationships in which they were
embedded.

22

23

Even comparative studies still frame social movements around national boundaries,

For example, Michelle Zancarini-Fournel, “Le champ des possibles,” in 68: Une histoire
collective 1962-1981, eds. Philippe Artières and Michelle Zancarini-Fournel (Paris: La
Découverte, 2008), 40.
23
Much of this work, to be clear, has generated many rich insights about the 1960s and 1970s.
For example, Michael Scott Christofferson’s book on French politics in the 1970s remains
indispensible. Yet a more transnational frame could have enriched his account by highlighting the
crucial role that anti-imperialism played in the overall story of French politics in the 1970s.
12

obscuring the fact that these movements not only learned from one another politically, but saw
24

the fate of their diverse struggles as inextricably linked.

In recent decades, some scholars have adopted a “transnational turn,” producing new
work on these decades that aims to resolve this gap. Scholars now pay closer attention to
immigration, revolutionary tourism, or the circulation of symbols, texts, and ideas across
borders.

25

More commonly, in their search for international connections, many have turned to the

study of transnational activist networks.

26

While this attention to international exchanges has

generated many insights into the 1960s and 1970, much of this work remains limited. There is, for
example, a tendency for some historians to take international connections for granted, simply
unearthing innumerable connections across space without paying attention to their overall
significance. As a result, these histories often run the risk of generating a static representation of
links that happened to transcend national borders, with the mere detection of transnational links
effectively serving as an end in itself.

Michael Scott Christofferson, French Intellectuals Against the Left: The Anti-Totalitarian Moment
of the 1970s in French Intellectual Politics (New York: Berghahn, 2004).
24
The classic example is David Caute, The Year of the Barricades: A Journey Through 1968
(New York: Harper & Row, 1988). Caute brilliantly surveys developments in each country during
1968, but does not explain the connections between them. Subsequent histories began to
integrate the transnational with the comparative, see, for example, Arthur Marwick, The Sixties:
Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958-c.1974 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998); Gerd-Rainer Horn, The Spirit of ’68: Rebellion in Western Europe and
North America, 1956-1976 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
25
For immigration, see, for example, Gordon, Immigrants & Intellectuals; Burleigh Hendrickson,
“Imperial Fragments and Transnational Activism: 1968(s) in Tunisia, France, and Senegal,”
(Ph.D. diss. Northeastern University, Boston, Mass. December 2013); Quinn Slobodian, Foreign
Front: Third World politics in Sixties West Germany (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012). For
travel, see Richard Ivan Jobs, “Youth Movements: Travel, Protest, and Europe in 1968,”
American Historical Review 114, no. 2 (April 2009): 376-404. For the circulation of texts, see
Alexander C. Cook, Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2013).
26
For a few representative examples, see Michael Clemons and Charles E. Jones, “Global
Solidarity: The Black Panther Party in the International Arena,” in Liberation, Imagination and the
Black Panther Party: A New Look at the Panthers and their Legacy, ed. Kathleen Cleaver and
George Kastiaficas (New York: Routledge, 2001); Klimke, The Other Alliance; Manus McGrogan,
“Vive la Révolution and the Example of Lotta Continua: The Circulation of Ideas and Practices
between the Left Militant Worlds of France and Italy following 1968,” Modern and Contemporary
France 18, no. 3 (August 2010): 197-222; Robert Gildea, James Mark, and Niek Pas, “European
Radicals and the ‘Third World’: Imagined Solidarities and Radical Networks, 1958-1973,” Cultural
and Social History 8, no. 4 (2011): 449-71.
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More sophisticated studies, however, show how the discovery of transnational
connections can serve less as an end goal than as an approach, which, if properly employed, can
fundamentally transform our understanding of the decade, challenge our assumptions, or shift
conventional periodizations. This work carefully explains why these transnational connections
were formed, what they meant to those who forged them, and how they changed over time,
intersecting with major global transformations in the process. In this, many scholars, not only of
27

the 1960s and 1970s, but of earlier periods, have begun to return to the idea of internationalism.
But while much of this work has refined our knowledge of what these various internationalisms
meant, there is unfortunately still a tendency among many scholars to flatten the ideas,
motivations, and objectives shaping each of these very different forms of internationalism. For
example, some scholars still speak of some coherent “Third World internationalism,” a term that

obscures the fact that there were in fact many competing internationalisms with distinct objectives
in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s: Afro-Asianism, Non-alignment, Marxist anti-imperialism, or panIslamism were not equivalent.

28

Part of the difficulty stems from general confusion over the concept. In an age of
transnational history, one finds the word “internationalism” almost everywhere now, but rarely do
historians define what they mean by this word. Is internationalism simply a fancy way of saying
that connections exist across borders? How does it relate to the concept of international
solidarity? Can internationalism refer to a simple feeling or must it involve a more formally
organized network? Ultimately, what is internationalism? To answer that question, we need
recourse to another concept: articulation.

27

In fact, one of the best new historical works on internationalism looks to the 1920s. Michael
Goebel, Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). A good exploration of ideas of internationalism
in the 1950s and early 1960s can be found in Jeffrey James Byrne, Mecca of Revolution: Algeria,
Decolonization, and the Third World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
28
The best work on “Third World internationalism” remains Vijay Prashad’s The Darker Nations:
A People’s History of the Third World (New York: New Press, 2007). While Prashad remains very
attentive to important political differences, he sometimes exhibits a tendency to speak of a single
coherent “Third World” project.
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The term’s genealogy is well known, from the debates of the Russian Social Democratic
Labor Party to the carceral notebooks of Antonio Gramsci to the writings Stuart Hall, Ernesto
Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and others.

29

In this body of literature, articulation points to a political

problem. In capitalist social formations, individuals remain divided from one another, a condition
actively reproduced by the state, which disaggregates the horizontal unity of social forces and
decomposes social forces into a sea of individuals.

30

Articulation, then, refers to the pulling

together of distinct social forces through political construction and struggle into what is called a
form of unity. Perhaps the best historical illustration of this process remains the October
Revolution: recall how its success depended on articulating the diverse interests of the various
sectors of the working class, different layers of the peasantry, and the soldiers, a unity captured in
the slogan “Peace, Bread, Land.”
But as many have pointed out, articulation is a contingent process. Which social forces
end up in what form of unity, how they create such unity, and what they aim to accomplish are all
historical. Social forces are not compelled by “economics” to aggregate into a predetermined
unity. They may unite; they may not. Indeed, rival social forces with divergent class characters
might actually find themselves on the same side. Nor are forms of unity destined to follow any
preordained ideology; social forces may be articulated under the sign of social democracy or of
communist revolution or neoliberalism. In short, articulation does not reflect invisible laws of
history; it is a highly contingent, uneven, and contradictory process, that involves strategy,
programs, and organization.
Of course, social formations do not exist in isolation from one another. They are
connected by flows of capital, people, ideas. Developments in one will produce effects in others.
29

For articulation, see Christine Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the State (London: Lawrence
and Wishart, 1980 [1975]); Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism,
Fascism, Populism (London: Verso, 1987 [1977]); Chantal Mouffe, “Hegemony and Ideology in
Gramsci,” in Gramsci and Marxist Theory, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: Routledge and Kegan
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Journal of Communication Inquiry 10, no. 2 (Summer 1986): 45-61; Ernesto Laclau and Chantal
Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, second edition
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Thus, articulation cannot be limited to a single social formation. Internationalism is what I call the
articulation problem at the global level. It is the coming together of various social forces across
distinct social formations into a form of unity, or an international. As with the process of
articulation, it is a messy process. To begin with, there is never just one international. Indeed, at
any given movement there are dozens of competing internationals crisscrossing the globe. This
was especially true of the 1960s, a time of enormous international foment.
Furthermore, internationals need not only belong to dominated social forces. In other
words, when we think of internationals, we often think of bodies with oppositional politics, like the
Comintern, the Non-Aligned Movement, or the Tricontinental. But we must also recognize that
ruling blocs also have their own internationals. At the same time, some internationals may have
highly contradictory social compositions, uniting dominant social forces from one country with
dominated social forces from another. Moreover, the same social forces can belong to several
internationals, even if they compete with one another in some respects.
Different internationals possess different levels of strength: some are quite weak, while
others are more durable. At one end of the spectrum, internationals may consist of nothing more
than feelings of goodwill, epistolary exchanges, and the occasional solidarity action. At the other
end, some internationals are highly organized, endowed with a central apparatus, boast a
sophisticated communication network, and are flush with resources. Think, for example, of the
Comintern: an intricate international organization where different sections met regularly, pooled
resources, fought for one another, and followed orders. Indeed, no matter how weak an
international, internationalism always signifies more than a vague feeling of wanting to support
others; it exists in actions, or what can be called forms of solidarity. These can include everything
from propaganda campaigns, sharing resources, solidarity strikes, to military support. In this way,
each international has as its disposal a repertoire of forms of solidarity, the contents of which are
dependent on that international’s overall strength. The more developed and internally cohesive
the international, the more expansive the repertoire.
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That said, internationals are always guided by common ideas. They are shaped by basic
assumptions, a body of principles, a set of objectives. Of course, as conglomerations of distinct
social forces, internationals always exhibit a degree of incoherency. But underlying these
differences is what I call an internationalist imaginary. By this, I mean a semi-conscious system of
ideas organizing those more manifest interests. This concept allows us to better distinguish
between different kinds of internationals that may at first glance seem identical. Thus, by looking
at competing internationalist imaginaries, we can better understand the crucial differences
between, say, Che Guevara’s Marxist anti-imperialism and Gamal Abdul Nasser’s Pan-Arabism,
or between Afro-Asianism and Non-Alignment.
At the same time, it helps us avoid the opposite danger of total nominalism. Confronted
with so many differences, one may be tempted to simply catalogue hundreds of seemingly
distinct internationals, too afraid of organizing them into any greater unity for fear of doing
violence to their particularity. The concept of the “internationalist imaginary” allows us to see how
competing internationals may have actually shared the same core assumptions. To take an
example from this dissertation: the Maoist Gauche proletarienne and the Trotskyist Ligue
Communiste both belonged to distinct internationals. The GP worked with other Maoist groups
and expressed its loyalty to China while the Ligue represented the French section of the Fourth
International. The differences between the two internationals were not insignificant. That said,
beneath these differences, both groups held the same central assumptions, themselves rooted in
a Leninist problematic of the right of nations to self-determination.
This dissertation, therefore, advances the concept of the internationalist imaginary as a
way of adding some nuance to recent scholarship about internationalism in the 1960s and 1970s.
In the following pages, I identify, delineate, and follow the trajectory of a single internationalist
imaginary, one based in the Marxist-Leninist notion of anti-imperialism. I show how events in the
1960s seemed to validate the core assumptions of this imaginary. But events a decade later, in
the same part of the world no less, shattered those very assumptions, destabilizing this imaginary
and throwing into disarray all those radicals who operated within it.
17

Human Rights
The historical study of human rights has grown rapidly in the last two decades. However,
until very recently, much of this work tended to treated human rights in a linear manner, as the
unfolding or “cascading” of a continuous project whose origins were said to begin as far back as
the French Revolution. In 2010, Samuel Moyn’s highly polemical intervention, The Last Utopia,
began to unsettle these key assumptions, helping to usher a new phase in human rights
historiography. Criticizing the triumphalism of earlier accounts, Moyn set out to show that human
rights were in fact a highly contingent, and extremely recent, phenomenon.
Moyn makes several interventions, several of which have helped establish the conceptual
and historical parameters of the present study.

31

First, human rights and national self-

determination constituted two, radically distinct political projects. Second, that until the 1970s, the
vast majority of activists subscribed to the latter, not the former. Indeed, as my research confirms,
very few activists in France, and even in the United States, adopted the language of human
rights. In the rare cases they did, they meant something like national self-determination, not
individual rights that transcended the sovereignty of nation-states. Third, the rise of human rights
among activists was very much a product of the 1970s. Lastly, and most crucially, human rights
succeeded in this decade because other “utopias” failed. Thus, Moyn sees the 1960s and 1970s
as a field of competing “utopias,” or what I call instead “internationalisms,” arguing that the
relationship between them was one of “displacement, rather than one of succession and
32

fulfillment.”
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This book has unsurprisingly generated considerable debate. Some scholars are responding
that human rights and national liberation are in fact incompatible. Others, especially those
working on abolitionism, insist that human rights emerged earlier. Some are now trying to argue
the human rights emerged not in the conference rooms of the advanced capitalist countries but
from the Global South. On the question of human rights and decolonization, see Roland Burke,
Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights (Philadelphia, PA: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2011) and Steven L.B. Jensen. The Making of International Human Rights:
The 1960s, Decolonization, and the Reconstruction of Global Values (New York: Cambridge
Universit Press, 2016).
32
Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2010), 116.
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This dissertation deepens this argument about the rise of human rights. Against some
historians, like Julian Bourg, who seem to suggest that the initial politics of revolution was always
already based in ethics, and therefore the transition from former to the latter followed that of a
teleological unfolding, Moyn is absolutely right to insist that human rights did not “evolve” out of
33

anti-imperialism.

Nevertheless, the relationship between the two was far more complex than

one of simple displacement, especially when one looks at France. As Moyn himself suggests in
The Last Utopia, the transformation within the French left in the 1970s played an important role in
the overall shift to human rights. My project details this exact process, showing how antiimperialism played a crucial role in the rise of human rights in the 1970s.
While a number of writers have acknowledged this complex transition in France, pointing
to the fact that certain anti-imperialists became champions of humanitarian interventionism later
in the decade, much of this work is anecdotal and descriptive, and there are very few detailed
historical studies that explain exactly how this transition happened.

34

The best account by far is

Eleanor Davey’s Idealism Beyond Borders: The French Revolutionary Left and the Rise of
Humanitarianism, 1954-1988, which sets out to explain the process by which sans-frontiérisme
came to displace tiers-mondisme in France. But while there is some significant overlap with my
project, Davey’s book is crucially not a study of internationalism proper, but of different ways of
“approaching suffering.”

35

For this reason, she focuses on humanitarianism and Third Worldism,

not human rights and anti-imperialism – the latter of which she tends to completely subsume
under a very amorphous notion of Third Worldism. Nevertheless, the book offers important
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Julian Bourg, From Revolution to Ethics: May 1968 and Contemporary French Thought
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007). For a good critique of the
teleological tendencies in this book, see Warren Breckman, “From Revolution to Ethics: May
1968 and Contemporary French Thought. By Julian Bourg,” Journal of Modern History 81, no. 1
(March 2009): 207-209.
34
Paul Berman tracks this history, but remains too focused on celebrities. Power and the
Idealists: Or, the Passion of Joschka Fischer and its Aftermath (Brooklyn, NY: Soft Skull Press,
2005), chapter 2. Timothy Nunan, in his excellent book on development and humanitarianism in
Afghanistan, points to this crucial shift in France, but offers no explanation. Humanitarian
Invasion: Global Development in Cold War Afghanistan (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2016).
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Humanitarianism, 1954-1988 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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insights into the period as a whole, which I build on to explain the complex ways in which human
rights displaced anti-imperialism as the dominant form of international solidarity.
My contributions to the study of the rise of human rights are threefold. First, I argue that
after the turn to revolution was met by a wave of state repression in France, the United States,
and other countries in the late 1960 and early 1970s, anti-imperialist radicals who had only
recently shunned all talk of reformism began to reconsider the struggle for civil liberties. When
they learned of state repression outside France, these anti-imperialists began to advocate for the
liberation of political prisoners in countries like South Vietnam. Indeed, with regards to Vietnam,
antiwar solidarity increasingly focused on demanding that the government of South Vietnam
restore civil liberties and release all the political prisoners. Thus, anti-imperialists continued to
advocate the formation and defense of strong states in the Third World to fight against
imperialism while simultaneously beginning to criticize certain third-world states for violating the
rights of individuals. Through this new iteration of antiwar solidarity, in conjunction with domestic
experiences of incarceration, radicals grew more accepting of the idea of fighting for individual
rights against states. At the same time, anti-imperialists made certain tactical alliances with
human rights groups, like Amnesty International, in campaigns such as the one to free the South
Vietnamese prisoners. In this way, they effectively introduced human rights, which was quite
marginal among activists as compared to anti-imperialism, to a larger, more radical audience.
Thus, while very few radicals made the personal leap from anti-imperialism to human rights in the
early 1970s, they did help create the political terrain that allowed a rival form of internationalism
based in human rights to grow.
Second, my dissertation argues that when anti-imperialists defected to human rights in
the 1970s, they brought with them a repertoire of activism that helped human rights develop into
a truly rival form of internationalism. When anti-imperialism began to crumble in the 1970s,
human rights increasingly emerged as a viable alternative; but despite its purity, it could not offer
an attractive form of activism. To be sure, human rights groups like Amnesty International already
enjoyed their own forms of activism, such as letter writing, but these seemed uninspiring
20

compared to the dynamic activism associated with the anti-imperialist radicals of the 1960s and
early 1970s. In order to compete with anti-imperialism, human rights needed more than moral
purity, it needed a viable repertoire of activism. This was accomplished through the encounter
between human rights and a new kind of French humanitarianism. For many French radicals did
not leap directly to human rights; they first developed a form of humanitarianism, exemplified in
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), that channeled the aura of anti-imperialism, and preserved
many of the forms of activism traditionally associated with anti-imperialism, yet rejected the
foundational ideas of anti-imperialism, such as the right of nations to self-determination. In the
1970s, this new kind of humanitarianism began to fuse with the idea of human rights, and it was
precisely this encounter that elevated human rights into a substantial form of international
solidarity that could not only compete with anti-imperialism, but perhaps even beat it at its own
game.
Lastly, my dissertation shows that while the French played a decisive role in the overall
transition from anti-imperialism to human rights, the transition would not have happened without
crucial though unpredictable transnational encounters. In the late 1970s, catastrophe struck
Southeast Asia, and tens of thousands of refugees fled Vietnam. Human rights organizers sprung
into action, organizing an international campaign against human rights violations in Vietnam. In
the United States, activists collaborated with the Carter administration, which sensed a perfect
opportunity to divert attention away from the Vietnam War, restore American virtue, and
reestablish the United States’ leadership role in the international community.
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In the final

chapters of the dissertation, I show that the story of the transition cannot be told within a national
framework, that a study of the rise of human rights at this time must examine the complex
relationship between activists and state governments, and lastly, that we must recognize just how
critical the contingent, and opportunistic, transnational encounter between humanitarianism and
human rights in the very late 1970s and early 1980s were to shaping politics and state policy.
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Barbara Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014).
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Sources and Methods
The aim of my dissertation is to track how the transformation of the radical left allowed a
rival form of human rights internationalism to achieve hegemony on both the left and the
mainstream. In order trace to these changes, my dissertation focuses on what I have called the
37

internationalist imaginary.

There are many ways to grasp this imaginary, but I have found that

some are more effective than others. For example, reading refined theoretical tracts about
imperialism, although helpful in some respects, often do not provide the best window into the
imaginary: they are deliberately abstract, divorced from everyday organizing, and often intended
to accentuate differences between groups that otherwise shared the same core assumptions. Far
more useful, I have found, are close readings of posters, leaflets, pamphlets, agitational
materials, manifestos, programs, newspaper and magazine articles, journal essays, meeting
notes, membership lists, conference programs, films, political novels, letters, and diaries.
To access these texts, which are largely still undigitized, I conducted extensive research
in a number of archives. The Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine (BDIC)
in Nanterre, which has conveniently centralized archival materials from a broad spectrum of
French radical groups, served as my primary archive. I supplemented this with research in the
Bibliothèque nationale de France (BNF), the Archives nationales, and various online databases.
In the United States, I worked at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, the King Center in Atlanta, the
Bancroft Library at Berkeley, the Tamiment Library in New York, and in the archives of Columbia
University and Swarthmore College, among others. Since U.S. groups forged many international
contacts, I found that many of these U.S. archives contained valuable documents pertaining to
the various international convergences and networks, as well as important archival materials from
other countries.
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As I have explained above, by this term, I mean the semiconscious political assumptions that
informed concrete practices, overall strategy, and everyday organizing. Focusing my attention
here brings to light the core convergences between radicals of many stripes: despite their
palpable differences and minutely formulated positions, radicals came together on several crucial
issues and practices at certain points in time.
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To complete this project, I read these texts not only for their explicit content, but with an
eye to the imaginary that structured them. What did certain concepts mean? What goals were put
forth? What did these texts take to be self-evident? What were their limits, silences, and gaps?
Reading texts from different groups, I found that more often than not, groups shared similar goals,
converged on the same kinds of issues at the same time, and suffered the same limits. Of course,
this is not to ignore the explicit content, to treat the literal words as epiphenomenal; my goal
throughout this project has been to understand the larger intellectual system organizing and
making possible the specific ideas, arguments, and practices presented in these texts.
I also supplemented this archival work with memoirs and oral interviews conducted after
the events covered in this dissertation. I used these sources primarily to add richness, detail, and
color to the narrative. In addition, I found them essential in uncovering some of the lost
connections that made radical politics possible at this time. After all, when reading a text, one can
certainly suspect traces of international contacts; but memoirs, published testimonies, and
interviews are crucial for definitively proving their existence. In some cases, I used these kinds of
sources for their analytical value, but, like Kristin Ross, I am very cautious about relying on them
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to drive the argument.

In many cases, those interviewed had invested their entire lives in

making revolution, only for that project to fail. As anyone who has conducted oral histories will
know, this background will undoubtedly have a profound effect on how radicals remember that
period. Some aggrandize their role. Others completely reject what they had done. Still others
mutate the past to justify their actions in the present. Even the most modest and honest often
misremember what they were up to decades ago, the ideas that drove them forward every day.
Of course, since the shift from anti-imperialism to human rights cannot be told solely
through the trajectory of the radical left, my dissertation has relied on other sets of sources. I have
drawn on some documents produced by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the National
Liberation Front, and later the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. For the first few chapters the most
important of these has been the Courrier du Vietnam, the largest foreign language newspaper
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produced by North Vietnam. This paper not only illuminates the DRV’s internationalist strategy,
but allows me to see the ways in which this internationalist imaginary was shared by radicals
across borders. For later chapters, the Vietnamese produced a series of texts responding to the
charge of human rights violations. These are extremely useful for understanding how those
operating within the anti-imperialist imaginary conceptualized human rights, and especially the
relationship between individual rights and collective rights. In addition, I have worked with
documents from the Nixon and Carter administrations to see how radical movements intersected
with state power, to understand the course of the war affected U.S. policy, and to explain why the
United States adopted human rights as state policy in the late 1970s. Lastly, my dissertation
looks at material produced by human rights and humanitarian organizations – primarily Amnesty
International and MSF – to see how human rights advocates crossed paths with anti-imperialist
radicals, how human rights gained momentum in the 1970s, and the ways human rights
internationalism successfully absorbed some of the progressive aspects of anti-imperialism.

Chapter Summary
Chapter 1 begins by mapping the radical critique of the Vietnam War. Starting with the
antiwar struggle in the United States, I show how radicals argued that the war was not simply an
isolated affair, but the product of a larger system. As an international war, then, opposition
likewise had to be international. Thus, some U.S. radicals set about trying to internationalize
antiwar struggle, coordinating various movements in different countries. While they were primarily
looking to movements in the “Third World,” activists in Europe proved to be especially
enthusiastic about international antiwar unity. Although recognizing that most European countries
did not play a direct role in the war, these European activists, above all the French, argued that
Europe was nevertheless essential for U.S. imperialism: in order to pursue its foreign policy, the
United States needed the support, or at the very least neutrality, of capitalist countries in Europe.
Protesting in countries like France, or against international alliances like NATO, could help
destabilize the U.S. position. Led by the French, European activists set about creating a radical
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antiwar international. In this way, I argue, the Vietnam War made possible the revival of radical
internationalism in the 1960s.
Chapter 2 surveys the various forms of solidarity that anti-imperialist internationalism
assumed. Radicals set about building a number of intersecting international antiwar networks.
They coordinated protests, created a vast transnational network to assist resisting or deserting
U.S. GIs, and they even tried to form international brigades to fight the U.S. military directly in
Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese welcomed all these efforts, but as their response to the
international brigades indicated, they felt the primary goal of international solidarity should be
propagandistic. The ideological terrain, the NLF and DRV argued, was a crucial aspect of the
overall war effort: radicals abroad could play a decisive role in shifting the balance of forces by
trying to change public opinion. The prime example of ideological struggle, I argue, was the
Bertrand Russell Peace Tribunal, which put the United States on trial for genocide. While the
Tribunal had no power to enforce its verdict, it was able to generate considerable informational
materials for antiwar activity, and it did have an effect on public opinion in countries like France.
This chapter also explains exactly what activists meant by anti-imperialist
internationalism. As the war progressed, Marxism dominated the radical imaginary, not only in
France, but in countries like the United States. Indeed, radicals now came to see their struggle
against the war in solidly Marxist terms. Following V. I. Lenin, the vast majority of radicals came
to frame anti-imperialism as the fight for the right of nations to self-determination. In the context of
the 1960s, with successful national liberation struggles erupting across the globe, the alliance
between anti-imperialism and national liberation was a tremendous boon. But if nationalism were
to ever fail to deliver on its promises, the results could be disastrous for anti-imperialists.
In chapter 3, I show how some activists argued that the best way to assist their
Vietnamese comrades was to bring the war home to the imperialist centers. Despite coordinated
international protest, the U.S. military continued to escalate the war throughout 1967. In light of
this, some radicals felt that the kind of ideological struggle exemplified by the Bertrand Russell
Peace Tribunal was insufficient; they now had a duty to end the war by any means necessary.
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Black nationalists in the United States and revolutionaries in Latin America led the way. Because
they both faced the same enemy as the Vietnamese, U.S. imperialism, they were uniquely
positioned to aid the struggle. Che Guevara soon codified this strategy by calling for “two, three,
many Vietnams.” Representatives from the NLF and DRV welcomed Che’s new internationalist
strategy, and the General Secretary of the Vietnamese Workers Party, Le Duan, even called for a
worldwide anti-imperialist front.
Although they did not confront U.S. imperialism in the same way as African Americans or
Latin Americans, French radicals suggested that they, too, could play an important role in this
anti-imperialist front. Building on earlier arguments about how U.S. imperialism depended on the
support of other capitalist states, they argued that opening a “second front” in Europe would deal
a decisive blow to imperialism, relieving the pressure on the Vietnamese. In February 1968,
thousands of radicals from over a dozen European countries met in Berlin to coordinate their
efforts to open new fronts across the continent. As they met, the NLF launched a surprise attack
against the U.S. military throughout South Vietnam. If the Vietnamese could repel the most
devastating military machine in history, they thought, then surely they could make revolution.
Chapter 4 explores how, exactly, radicals tried to bring the war home. After the Berlin
Conference, French radicals heightened the antiwar struggle, which ultimately triggered the
events of May 68. For them, I argue, May 68 was one of those potential second fronts in the
Vietnam War. Just as the Vietnamese inspired the French, so too did the French inspire radicals
elsewhere. Indeed, May 68 showed that revolution was still possible in the advanced capitalist
world. Activists in other countries, like Great Britain or Italy, tried to reproduce the French
example in their own countries. The May events proved so extraordinary that they even
compelled the Americans to reconsider their attitude towards the Europeans. Whereas before
1968 the Americans largely ignored struggles in Europe, afterwards they saw European
struggles, above all the French, as paradigmatic. Activists everywhere, however, saw their
struggles as deeply interconnected to one another and to Vietnam. In this way, I argue that the
arc of radical upheaval not only in France, but in other countries, can be understood as the
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opening of other fronts in the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle. Lastly, this chapter ends with a
long discussion about the role of “translation” in politics at this time. While some activists tried to
simply duplicate the Vietnamese example, others tried to creatively translate the Vietnamese
revolution into the unique historical conditions of their particular country. In this, Vietnam emerged
by the late 1960s as a master symbol of revolt, coloring nearly every struggle in France.
Chapter 5 shows how the turn to revolution explored in the previous two chapters was
met with widespread state repression. In France, the United States, and other Western European
countries, governments infiltrated, subverted, or simply outlawed radical organizations, throwing
activists in prison. In this context of widespread repression some radicals began to reconsider the
fight for civil rights as a legitimate form of activism. Above all, experiences of imprisonment gave
rise to a vibrant transnational prisoners rights movement in France, the United States, and Italy
that pushed radicals to seriously reconsider the rights, status, and struggles of prisoners. This
process of rethinking led to a change in strategy as well: radicals now built alliances with more
moderate organizations, thought more seriously about the law, and demanded civil rights from the
very states they sought to abolish. Although some saw this move towards “democratic rights” as a
tactical expedient, it soon began to transformed the very imaginary of the French radical left.
In Chapter 6, I show how flagging domestic and international support for the Vietnam War
forced the U.S. government to find new ways of justifying its involvement in Southeast Asia.
Under President Richard Nixon, the United States tried to justify the war by drawing attention to
the POWs held in North Vietnam. In this way, he hoped to recast U.S. intervention as a just
humanitarian campaign to liberate prisoners. In response to Nixon’s instrumentalization of the
POW issue, antiwar activists, first in the United States, then France, and then throughout Western
Europe, drew attention to the hundreds of thousands of political dissenters rotting in South
Vietnamese jails. In this, they effectively grafted their new concerns with civil rights onto the
antiwar movement. Informed by their own experiences of incarceration, they called for the
liberation of all political prisoners in South Vietnam. This demand grew even more central to
radicals after the United States agreed to withdraw from Vietnam in January 1973, thereby
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depriving radicals of their main target. With this particular issue, they could maintain the antiwar
momentum despite the Paris Peace Accords. In fact, this common demand helped reunite the
radical left, which culminated in a massive anti-war demonstration in May 1973, when tens of
thousands of Western European and U.S. radicals, including Native American activists from
Wounded Knee, met in Milan, Italy.
However, in arguing that South Vietnam was violating fundamental democratic rights,
anti-imperialists increasingly began to criticize the internal affairs of a sovereign nation-state. In
this chapter, I trace this shift to the language of rights, which promoted the individual, rather than
the nation state, as the constitutive unit of sovereignty. While radicals did not adopt the specific
language of human rights, their own attention to rights, along with alliances with rival groups such
as Amnesty International, developed the intellectual and political terrain on which a competing
form of international solidarity could grow.
Chapter 7 tracks the collapse of the radical left in France in the 1970s. I show how the
decline of the workers’ movement, the restructuring of capitalist relations, the proliferation of new
social movements, a changed political horizon, and a crisis of Marxism all worked to destabilize
the radical left. One crucial, though overlooked, reason for the left’s decline, I argue, was the fate
of national liberation struggles abroad in the 1970s. Since the French left’s identity was so
powerfully shaped by these struggles, it should come as no surprise that their defeats would
redound on the left in catastrophic ways. In 1979, Vietnamese troops marched into Cambodia,
followed by a Chinese invasion of northern Vietnam. Three socialist countries once allied against
U.S. imperialism now found themselves embroiled in a bloody internecine war. The Third
Indochina War, as it was called, threw French radicals in disarray. Some defended Vietnam,
others Cambodia. Whichever side radicals chose, events in Southeast Asia shattered the core
assumptions of anti-imperialism. The failures of nationalism crippled anti-imperialism, leaving
internationalism open to capture.
This chapter also examines the rise of human rights interventionism in France. For while
some anti-imperialists remained steadfast in the face of crisis, a minority began to turn to a new
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idea of internationalism, one based not in national liberation but in human rights. In switching
sides, so to speak, they brought with them a set of techniques, a style of activism, and certain
radical credentials that helped human rights become a serious challenger to anti-imperialism.
When anti-imperialism began to crumble in the very late 1970s, this new kind of human rights
internationalism would rush to fill the void.
If chapter 7 explains the fall of anti-imperialism, chapter 8 shows how human rights
succeeded in achieving hegemony. The Third Indochina War aggravated a major refugee crisis in
the region. Faced with mounting state repression, tens of thousands fled the new Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, many by boats. In Cambodia, thousands more fled after the Vietnamese
invasion. While what remained of the anti-imperialist left stood paralyzed as tens of thousands of
Indochinese refugees fled communist governments in Southeast Asia, human rights activists,
working closely with Vietnamese refugee activists, sprung into action, organizing an international
campaign against human rights violations in Vietnam. The French took the lead, even sending a
hospital ship to rescue refugees in the South China Sea. Effectively interfering with the internal
affairs of a sovereign nation-state, this action inaugurated a new kind of humanitarian
interventionism that promised to surpass Cold War ideological divisions.
The campaign soon spread internationally, entering the United States through the efforts
of Joan Baez and Ginetta Sagan, who had led the West Coast branch of Amnesty International
and now directed their own human rights organization. For its part, the Carter Administration used
the crisis, and the international attention stoked by the humanitarians, to restore American virtue.
Although the Vietnamese, backed by anti-imperialist radicals, eventually fought back by
denouncing human rights as a mask for American imperialism, they offered no viable alternative.
This final chapter, then, explains the rise of this new “Human Rights International.”
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CHAPTER 1: THE VIETNAM INTERNATIONAL

On evening of May 26, 1966, Stephen Smale of the Vietnam Day Committee rose to
speak at the “Six Heures pour le Vietnam,” a colossal teach-in organized by French antiwar
radicals. Smale’s friend Laurent Schwartz, the event’s primary organizer, hoped the presence of
an American radical at Paris’ most spectacular antiwar action yet could deepen the feeling of
international solidarity beginning to emerge around the Vietnam War. After briefly surveying the
state of the American antiwar movement, Smale insisted on the importance of united action.
“People in France have asked me if there is any point in Frenchmen getting involved in the
Vietnam protest,” Smale said.
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“I tell them definitely yes.” Since the Vietnam War was an

international war, he explained, the antiwar struggle likewise had to be international. Only
international unity between activists in the United States, France, Vietnam, and across the world
could help halt the war. Affirming this new commitment to radical international solidarity against
war, Smale walked across the stage to shake hands with Mai Van Bo of the North Vietnamese
delegation in Paris. The auditorium erupted in applause.
Although most Americans initially supported the Vietnam War, some, such as Smale,
dissented from the outset. At the forefront of the antiwar struggle were radicals who advanced a
systematic critique, arguing that ending the war necessarily meant radically transforming the
system that had created it in the first place. Although marginal for decades, radicals increasingly
became a significant force in American politics, in part because of the political turmoil of the
Vietnam War. But these radicals not only took the lead in antiwar organizing at home, some tried
to internationalize the struggle, contacting antiwar activists across the globe. Although American
radicals prioritized connections with movements in the Third World, Western European radicals
proved especially responsive, organizing coordinated actions to support their American peers. In
France, some radicals hoped to translate this feeling of internationalism into an organized
international, in some ways like the radical Internationals of the past. Joined by other radicals in
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Western Europe, they also began to insist on the strategic value of organizing an antiwar
international among radicals in the advanced capitalist countries of North America and Western
Europe. While most Americans in the early years of the antiwar struggle paid little attention to the
struggles in Europe, French radicals arguing for the value of coordinated struggle in Europe
received tremendous encouragement from Steven Smale that night in 1966.
“What is going on in Vietnam affects the world,” he argued. The Vietnam War, he
continued, was part of a much broader global struggle between the United States and
movements for self-determination across the globe. But the United States was by no means
alone in trying to prevent the people of the world from “putting their own future in their hands.” To
continue its foreign policy, which had culminated in the Vietnam War, the United States depended
on the support of its “traditional allies,” namely, Western European capitalist countries such as
France. Thus, French antiwar activism could not only “reinforce American demonstrators,” but
also weaken the pro-American alliance that made the Vietnam War possible.
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French radicals, joined by others across Western Europe, articulated these insights into a
political strategy, arguing that radicals in North America and Western Europe had a special
responsibility to combat the international alliance of capitalist countries that made American
foreign policy possible. To that end, they met in Liège in October 1966, and then again in
Brussels in March 1967, to build a functional radical international to coordinate their actions,
which included a formal secretariat composed of various radical organizations. Over the course of
1967, it grew to include not only many radical organizations in Western Europe, but also in the
United States, such as SDS and SNCC.
While the encounter of domestic microsystems of struggle in North America and Western
Europe on the one side with a global political ecosystem of interconnected national liberation
movements made such a radical antiwar international possible, it was above all the specific
characteristics of the Vietnamese struggle that made it a reality. Indeed, without the Vietnam War,
there would have never been a new international of radicals. In serving as a binding element the
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Vietnamese struggle allowed otherwise isolated activists in not only the United States and
France, but throughout Western Europe and North America, to unite in a new international.
Fervent internationalists, Vietnamese revolutionaries, both in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
and the National Liberation Front, consciously played this uniting role, giving rise to a new radical
international in the 1960s.

Radicals Against the War
American involvement in Vietnam began long before 1965, when President Lyndon
Johnson dispatched U.S. Marines to the South and systematically bombed the North. In 1945,
American ships were used to transport French troops to overthrow the newly independent
41

Vietnam.

During the first Indochina War, the United States provided France with weapons,
42

supplies, and funds to help restore colonial rule.
percent of the French war effort.
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By 1954, the United States financed about 80

When the war ended in Vietnamese victory, the 1954 Geneva
th

Convention temporarily divided the country into two zones at the 17 parallel, with the North
governed by the communist Viet Minh, the South by Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem and Emperor
Boa Dai, who had collaborated with the Japanese and French. According to the Convention, both
zones were to participate in a July 1956 general election to form a unified Vietnamese state. But
the United States, convinced that the communists would win handily, blocked the election. As
President Dwight Eisenhower wrote in 1954, “I have never talked or corresponded with a person
knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the
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time of the fighting, possibly eighty percent of the population would have voted for the
Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bảo Đại.”
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For the United

States, the fiction of an independent South had to be preserved to halt the spread of communism.
American support only grew when South Vietnamese dissidents began to challenge
Diem’s rule. In December 1960, the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam (NLF) united all
those, including non-communists, wanting to overthrow what they saw was an illegitimate
government in the South.
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Though initially hesitant to involve itself in what would certainly slide

into a destructive war with the United States, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)
eventually backed the Southern rebels with troops, weapons, and supplies.
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The United States,

which saw the Southern insurgency as part of a Northern conspiracy to subvert the sovereign
state in the South, began playing a very active role in South Vietnam, engaging in a cover
actions, increasing the number of military advisors, and authorizing a coup against Diem once his
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unpopularity fell to irrecoverable levels.

Despite this aid, the government of South Vietnam enjoyed neither the popular support
nor the military ability to defeat the NLF on its own. In fact, in its attempt to crush the resistance
48

the government resorted to methods that only increased the NLF’s support among the people.

Desperate to save the United States’ failing client state, President Johnson took the fateful step of
49

throwing the United States into what would become a full-scale war.

On February 7, 1965,

Johnson ordered 49 retaliatory airstrikes across North Vietnam. On March 2, the U.S. military
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began a sustained bombing campaign of the North that would last over three years.
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Five days

later, Johnson dispatched 3,500 marines to the South. The U.S. government, despite studiously
51

avoiding the word, was at war.

Although the war in Vietnam initially enjoyed widespread approval in the United States,
some Americans loudly denounced their government’s policies.
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This early, fragmentary dissent

famously culminated in a massive demonstration on April 17, 1965 in Washington, D.C. The
organizers expected only a few thousand demonstrators; to everyone’s surprise 20,000 gathered
in the capital for the single largest antiwar demonstration in American history up to that point.
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The significance of these numbers cannot be overstated. Protesting one’s government during
wartime was still a punishable offense. During the First World War, antiwar activists were arrested
under the Espionage Act of 1917, and some, such as Socialist Presidential candidate Eugene V.
Debs languished in prison for years. In addition, the April 1965 march unfolded in a politically
charged Cold War atmosphere still shaped by widespread anticommunism, FBI’s COINTELPRO,
and the House Un-American Activities Committee. Protesting the government in its war against a
Liberation Front dominated by communists could be dangerous, even for those who were firmly
anti-communist.
Taking their chances, on April 17 demonstrators picketed the White House, and then
marched to the Sylvan Theater, on the grounds of the Washington Monument, where they
listened to a series of speeches on the war, interspersed by performances from Joan Baez, Judy
Collins, Phil Ochs, and the SNCC Freedom Singers.

50

54

In his speech, Senator Ernest Gruening,

John T. Smith, Rolling Thunder: The Strategic Bombing Campaign, North Vietnam, 1965-1968
(Walton on Thames, Surrey, England: Air Research Publications, 1994).
51
The best history of the Vietnam War, or the Second Indochina War, remains William S. Turley,
The Second Indochina War: A Short Political and Military History, 1954-1975, 2nd ed. (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 2009).
52
To take one measure of public opinion, a Gallup Poll conducted in late August 1965 found that
61 percent of Americans felt that sending troops to fight in Vietnam was not a mistake, while 24
percent said it was.
53
“SDS to Sponsor Vietnam March,” SDS Bulletin 3, no. 4 (January 1965): 14.
54
Paul Booth, “March on Washington,” SDS Bulletin 3, no. 7 (May 1965): 10. As it turned out, the
forces of order did not harass the demonstrators, though a group from the American Nazi Party,
clad in military uniforms and swastika armbands did interrupt the rally, chanting, “gas the peace
34

one of only two members of Congress not to vote for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, demanded
the “immediate cessation of our bombing in North Vietnam.”
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activists who opposed the Algerian War.
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Stoughton Lynd spoke of French

Paul Potter, the President of the Students for a

Democratic Society, ended the rally with a rousing call to build a mass movement to end the war.
“I believe that the administration is serious about expanding the war in Asia,” he said. “The
question is whether the people here are as serious about ending it.”
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The only way to do that, he

explained, was to build a “massive social movement,” a “movement rather than a protest or some
series of protests.”
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By 1965, something like an “antiwar movement” was beginning to take shape, though this
never approached anything like a singular, coherent movement. In fact, what is often
misremembered as “the antiwar movement” was a very amorphous collection of diverse political
currents united only by a general opposition to the Vietnam War.
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Although they occasionally

coordinated their actions, especially for large marches such as this one, groups remained fiercely
independent of one another. They issued from different political backgrounds, pursued different
tactics, opposed the war for different reasons, and championed wildly different courses of action –
from negotiated settlement, to gradual American withdrawal, to total communist victory. As the
April 17 march revealed, the American “antiwar movement” was a cacophonous hodgepodge of
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isolationists, pacifists, liberals, civil rights activists, black nationalists, anti-communists, social
democrats, Communists, anti-revisionists, and socialists of various stripes.
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Though most antiwar dissenters were politically moderate, some identified with the
61

radical left.

Contrary to the claims of American anti-communist propaganda, the most

conservative of these was in fact the Communist Party USA. For although the CPUSA survived
McCarthyism, the party emerged not only numerically diminished, but also far more moderate,
having effectively abandoned the goal of revolution. During the Vietnam War, the party opposed
immediate withdrawal with the slogan, “Negotiate Now,” which infuriated those further to the left
who felt that calling for negotiations implied that the United States had a right to be in Southeast
Asia in the first place. Organizationally, the CPUSA matched its reformist line by trying to channel
the antiwar movement into a narrow electoralism, at times supporting the Democratic Party. But if
the CPUSA was clearly no longer radical as a national organization, some individual communists
still were.
The largest of these radical formations was Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).
Originally founded as the youth affiliate of the League for Industrial Democracy, SDS won its
independence in the 1960s, emerging as a beacon for a new generation of activists hoping to
move beyond what they called the “Old Left.” Championing participatory democracy, the struggle
for racial equality, and a kind of anti-anti-communism, SDS became the premier organization of
the white “New Left” – by 1969, membership peaked at about 100,000. Although claiming a few
socialist members, in its early years SDS was rather moderate, especially at the national level.
For example, at the National Council meeting in December 1964, SDSers voted against two
antiwar proposals – one to organize draft resistance and the other to send medical supplies to
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Vietnam – for being too radical.
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That said, SDS was the one of the first to appreciate the
63

importance of Vietnam and organized the April 1965 event.

Also in attendance that day were members of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating
Committee. One of the leading civil rights organizations, SNCC was known above all for its
grassroots organizing, taking the lead in sit-ins, freedom rides, and voter registration campaigns
in the South. Although a primarily civil rights organization, many in the group connected the
struggle for rights at home with the war abroad. But while some individuals publicly opposed the
war – SNCC leader Bob Moses spoke at the April 17 demonstration – others in the group were
reluctant to formally condemn the U.S. government, fearing loss of state support and cuts in
funds. But in January 1966, after much debate, SNCC became the first civil rights organization to
formally condemn the Vietnam War, openly encouraging draft resistance.
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Another group that would play an enormous role in the American antiwar movement was
the Trotskyist Socialist Workers’ Party. The SWP, which advanced the slogan, “U.S. Out Now,”
advocated mass demonstrations, but consistently opposed civil disobedience, which the party
feared would alienate the broader American public – a stance that would put the SWP at odds
with others on the far left as the decade progressed. Through its youth affiliate, the Young
Socialist Alliance (YSA), the SWP exerted considerable influence over a number of antiwar
initiatives, winning near complete control of the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in
Vietnam, a coalition that would boast some 100,000 members.
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Unsurprisingly, the SWP and

YSA’s role raised many criticisms. Some felt the SWP’s influence proved vital to antiwar effort;
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others argued that the SWP was merely using the war to recruit members, discomfit rivals, and
impose its own agenda.
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Irrespective of one’s attitude to the SWP, it is undeniable that the party

worked its way to the center of antiwar organizing in the United States.
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Lastly, there was Progressive Labor (PL). Critical of their party’s growing moderation, a
number of Communists broke with the CPUSA in the fall of 1961, forming an anti-revisionist
organization by the name of Progressive Labor in 1962. PL was fiercely anti-imperialist, followed
the Chinese line, and organized illegal trips to Cuba. Although mostly comprised of older
militants, through its influence over the May Second Movement (M2M), PL also enjoyed contacts
with the burgeoning youth movement. For its part, M2M, which had emerged out of coordinated
demonstrations on May 2, 1964 in New York, San Francisco, and several other cities, became
the first far left youth group to focus on Vietnam.
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M2M soon earned a reputation as one of the

most militant pro-NLF groups. “We support the National Liberation Front of south Viet-Nam and
other revolutionary movements because we realize that their struggle is our struggle, that when
we aid our brothers in other countries, we are aiding ourselves,” a 1965 statement explained.
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But after attending the April 17, 1965 demonstration, PL quickly recognized SDS’s potential and
decided to dissolve M2M and send its members into the larger student organization.
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In spite of their common opposition to the Vietnam War, these groups fought bitterly.
They debated whether to carry U.S. or NLF flags at demonstrations; whether the movement
should focus exclusively on ending the war or aim to connect the war to other domestic issues;
whether activists should organize large, visible actions, such as marches, or promote more local
initiatives; whether the movement should adopt a more centralized structure or remain capillary;
and whether or not to pursue electoral politics. In addition to tactics, they disagreed over their
analysis of the situation abroad. Was the Vietnamese struggle a single, continuous revolution; or
would it have to follow a two-stage process, first a democratic revolution, then a properly socialist
one? Was the Workers Party of North Vietnam a progressive, international force; or would it
degenerate into a “Stalinist” bureaucracy once in power?
Yet as serious as these differences were, they belied a deeper unity. Indeed, beneath
these finely argued debates, many of these radical groups shared the same semiconscious
strategic assumptions about antiwar struggle. Even if they expressed it differently, they all argued
that since the war was the product of a much larger system, ending the Vietnam War necessarily
meant thoroughly transforming that system. For them, halting the bombing, withdrawing troops,
pursuing negotiations, electing a new President, or moving past Cold War rivalries – as more
moderate antiwar voices suggested – would not stop the Vietnam War. Even if, by some chance,
such actions did reduce hostilities in Southeast Asia, without a systematic change, the United
States would find itself involved in another “Vietnam” elsewhere. Instead, the strategic objective
was to change the system that had made Vietnam possible in the first place. It is precisely for this
reason that one can call these activists radicals – true to the word’s etymology, they sought to
grasp the fundamental “roots” of the issue. And it is this radical strategic perspective that
distinguished the radicals from other antiwar currents.
Of course, as the April 17 march revealed, there was some ambiguity over exactly how
radicals defined this “system.” Paul Potter, who helped inject the radical perspective into the
demonstration that day, raised this question when he spoke directly about the system:
We must name it, describe it, analyze it, understand it and change it … For it is only
when that system is changed and brought under control that there can be any hope for
39

stopping the forces that create a war in Vietnam today or a murder in the South tomorrow
or all the incalculable, innumerable more subtle atrocities that are worked on people all
71
over—all the time.
For many radicals in the audience, especially those of the older generation, the answer was
obvious. They defined the “system” as either “capitalism” or “imperialism,” and in some cases, the
two terms were used roughly synonymously or fused into a single concept, such as “capitalist
imperialism.” But Potter remained conspicuously silent on the word’s meaning, prompting some in
72

the crowd to clamor that he name the system he was describing.

Potter later explained his reticence that day: “I did not fail to call the system capitalist
because I was a coward or an opportunist. I refused to call it capitalism because capitalism was
for me and my generation an inadequate description of the evils of America – a hollow, dead
word tied to the thirties and a movement that had used it freely but apparently without
comprehending it.”
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In other words, instead of relying on inherited concepts, or getting mired in

antiquarian debates, Potter, along with many in the New left, hoped to embark on an open
journey to find the most accurate way to describe the system. This did not make his stance any
less radical. Indeed, although avoiding the words “capitalist” or “imperialist,” Potter, and those like
him, effectively agreed with other, more ideological radicals. It is precisely this shared assumption
about the need to transform the system, often buried under petty sectarian bickering or
terminological minutia, that allows us to speak of something like a radical Left. It should be added
that by the end of the decade, many in the New Left came to agree that “imperialism” and
“capitalism” were in fact the best ways to describe the system, lending the U.S. radical left a
74

common vocabulary rooted in Marxism.

To be sure, this radical left resided on the fringes of American politics in the early 1960s.
But that changed over the course of the decade as a number of struggles, such as the civil rights
and student movements, helped pull the radicals into the mainstream. But it was Vietnam, more
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than anything else, that presented radicals with the perfect opportunity to grow, consolidate, and
escape the political margins. First, the need for unity against the war prompted some activists to
resist the virulent anticommunism of earlier years. For example, in stark contrast with earlier civil
rights and nuclear disarmament demonstrations, where many organizers flatly banned
Communist participation, SDS activists, even liberal ones, did not exclude any current from the
April 17, 1965 march. This infuriated many of the anti-communist peace groups, such as SANE,
75

which refused to participate in any event with pro-NLF radicals.

Yet, after sensing the

importance of the march, SANE changed its mind and ended up rubbing shoulders with radicals.
In this way, the Vietnam War helped the radical left gain mainstream exposure and even
acceptance.
In addition, the war radicalized some Americans by prompting them to turn a more critical
eye towards their government, think more expansively about the United States’ international role,
and seriously consider the possibility of major systematic change. When the draft expanded, the
death toll soared, and victory continued to elude the United States, the radical left was there to
propose a coherent political analysis to help Americans articulate their frustrations, push their
ideas in more radical directions, and provide organizations to translate those feelings into action.
The Vietnam War, more than anything else, thickened the ranks of these radical tendencies.
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Lyndon Johnson, some joked, was their best recruiter.
Lastly, radicals filled the void left by traditional progressive organizations. Peace groups,
labor unions, and moderate Old Left formations could have likely taken the lead in antiwar
organizing, but the militancy of the Vietnamese struggle led them to hesitate.
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Groups like SANE

certainly participated, but adopted a lukewarm stance. Others, such as the AFL-CIO actively
supported the war – indeed, ALF-CIO President George Meany only admitted the war was a
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mistake in 1974, after the United States had already withdrawn.
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Sensing an opening, radicals

seized the initiative. Their organizing experiences, indefatigable efforts, and firm political
convictions more than made up for their miniscule size. Radicals came to play a leading role in
many antiwar initiatives, calling conferences, organizing marches, planning teach-ins, resisting
79

the draft, and presiding over national coalitions.

In fact, in the early years, when moderate

organizations only approached with caution, radicals proved themselves to be the most dynamic
element in the antiwar opposition. The Vietnam War gave the ghettoized radical left a chance to
become a visible force in American political life.

Internationalizing the Movement
Although antiwar radicals organized across the United States, certain parts of the country
emerged as national rallying points. One of these was Berkeley, California. Here, radicals
successfully channeled the energies of earlier struggles, such as the Berkeley Free Speech
Movement (FSM), towards antiwar organizing, founding one of the most militant radical antiwar
80

initiatives, the Vietnam Day Committee.

The VDC began when Barbara Gullahorn, then a

political science major, and her boyfriend, Jerry Rubin, met with Steven Smale about organizing a
massive teach-in at UC Berkeley. Rubin, who moved to Berkeley in January 1964 to pursue a
graduate degree in sociology, soon dropped out to join the civil rights movement, then traveled to
Cuba. There, he met Che Guevara, who allegedly explained that the “most exciting struggle in the
world is going on in North America. You live in the belly of the beast.”
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the United States to wage the struggle at home. Smale, a famous mathematician at the university
82

with a long history in radical politics, was eager to help.
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On May 21-22, 1965, the trio threw the largest teach-in to date.

Vietnam Day, as it was

called, rolled a debate, protest, and spectacle into a colossal 36-hour extravaganza to raise
critical awareness about the war. But because of the far more radical atmosphere of the Bay
Area, this teach-in was not only larger, attracting over 35,000 people, but far more militant than
others. Many of the major radical tendencies of the time participated. Paul Potter spoke on behalf
of SDS, Bob Parris of SNCC, Mario Savio of the FSM, Jack Barnes for the YSA, and Levi Laub of
the Progressive Labor Party, along with a number of famous personalities, such as Staughton
Lynd, the radical pacifist Dave Dellinger, and the famous biographer of Leon Trotsky, Isaac
84

Deutscher.

On the tables, one could find a host of radical literature, including copies of the black

nationalist journal, Soulbook. In addition to creating a space for some of the most radical views in
American politics, the organizers also hoped to foster a sense of unity.
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To that end, they hosted

a panel titled, “United Political Action,” which featured speakers from rival radical antiwar groups
such as the YSA, M2M, the W.E.B. Dubois Clubs of America (the Communist Party’s youth
affiliate), and the International Socialist Clubs (a small Trotskyist tendency). The VDC followed up
by publishing a pamphlet, Did You Vote for the War?, which collected the perspectives of nearly
all the radical groups of the time – from the IWW to the Sparticist League, the SWP to the
CPUSA.
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After Vietnam Day, Gullahorn, Rubin, Smale, and others decided to continue their efforts
as a formal organization, the Vietnam Day Committee, which quickly became the leading radical
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87

antiwar formation in the United States.

After the April 1965 march everyone expected SDS to

take the lead. As Paul Booth of SDS recalls with regret, “We had the opportunity to make SDS
the organizational vehicle of the anti-war movement,” but instead, he continued, “we chose to go
off in all kinds of different directions.”
89

leadership vacuum.
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With SDS preoccupied, the VDC filled the national
90

One of the group’s keys to success was its radical inclusivity.

True to its

roots, the VDC welcomed every radical current – the CPUSA, SWP and YSA, International
Socialists, along with many radicals who remained independent of formal organizations.
At the forefront of the antiwar struggle, the VDC made several contributions to radical
antiwar organizing in the United States. First, the committee served as a model for loose,
democratic, yet uncompromisingly radical grassroots antiwar organizing. For instance, the VDC
launched the Community Project as a way to organize antiwar sentiment outside the university.
Second, the VDC, far more so than most antiwar groups at the time, championed civil
disobedience. In August, for example, VDC activists tried to stop trains carrying troops through
the Bay Area, prefiguring the kind of militant confrontational politics that would characterize the
struggle several years later. Lastly, the VDC’s greatest contribution was its commitment to
internationalizing antiwar struggle. The VDC laid the most important foundations for the idea of
radical internationalism against the Vietnam War.
This internationalism appeared from the beginning. In selecting speakers for Vietnam
Day, Smale and Rubin invited foreign intellectuals, such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Bertrand
Russell. Sartre, whose vocal opposition to the French government during the Algerian War
became an important inspiration for American radicals, refused to visit the United States in
protest to the war; Russell, now in his eighties, could not make the trip, but recorded a speech for
the event. In organizing Vietnam Day, Smale also recalls receiving valuable international support
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from others abroad, above all Laurent Schwartz from France.

91

In fact, it appears that Schwartz,

one of the most recognized antiwar radicals in France, was one of the first to seriously suggest
organizing not only a coordinated day of international protest, but possibly some kind of radical
international network.
On May 14, 1965, before Vietnam Day, Schwartz wrote to Smale expressing his solidarity
with the forthcoming teach-in. Schwartz, who had protested the Algerian War, began by drawing
parallels between his experiences in France and the nascent American movement against the
Vietnam War. You will “know in the following months a situation very similar to ours during the
Algerian War,” he remarked. “The government will become more and more ferocious and
hypocritical; in a general climate of fear throughout the country, you will be rather isolated,
calumniated, accused of beeing [sic] enemies of the USA.” But, he added encouragingly, “your
cause is the right one, and is considered as much everywhere in the world.” Schwartz wanted
Smale to know that he and others like him would do whatever they could to support the American
struggle against the war, “You may be sure to receive from your colleagues in France any help
you want.” Although he doubted there was much they could do to directly assist the American
movement, Schwartz wondered if there might be a way to internationalize the movement by
inventing ways of ensuring continued international support for American efforts. “But perhaps,” he
suggested, “we could think of an international Committee against war in Vietnam.” And if not that,
92

at the very least, “an international day of protest, say in October; what do you think?”

The VDC did just that. Soon after Vietnam Day, the VDC prepared for what it called the
International Days of Protest for October 15-16, 1965, the first major, internationally coordinated
mass protests against the Vietnam War. As one of the VDC’s fliers explained, “People throughout
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the world must now move beyond single demonstrations and teach-ins to one massive
internationally coordinated action.”

93

Through a demonstration of this scope, supported by mass

protests throughout the world, the “full impact of world opinion can be brought to bear against the
policy of the American government.”

94

With that objective in mind, the VDC organized an

international committee in late June 1965 to contact activists in other countries. The committee,
largely composed of international students studying in the United States, released international
calls for support in seven languages and sent “hundreds of letters to foreign governments,
political parties, trade unions, student organizations, peace groups and individuals, asking their
95

support for the October 15-16 International Days of Protest.”
The response was “immediate and encouraging.”
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When October 15 arrived, activists

protested in dozens of countries on every habitable continent, from Mexico to Canada to Senegal
to Prague to Tokyo to Melbourne. In London, Bertrand Russell kicked off a weekend of protest by
“tearing up his Labour Party membership in front of a capacity audience, to show his disgust at
the Labour Government’s support for U.S. policy.”
coordinated demonstrations in seven cities.
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In Italy, activists organized sizeable,

In Brussels, home to a rapidly growing antiwar

movement, thousands participated in a weekend of antiwar events. Although the idea for an
international day of protest slated for sometime in October came from a Frenchman, the French
organizers chose not to organize any major events that day because of conflicts with the French
99

academic calendar.

Thinking they could reach more students, they postponed their action to

November. The change of date worked well since the VDC, buoyed by the resounding success of
the International Days of Protest, decided to call yet another coordinated international action for
November 1965. Thus, in anticipation of the November 27, 1965 march on Washington, D.C.,
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French activists of the Collectif Intersyndical Universitaire (CIU) organized an “International
University Week Against the Vietnam War” from November 18-25 to support their American
comrades. The CIU, which comprised the three major French academic unions, served as an
umbrella organization for those who opposed the Vietnam War in the university. But the CIU
hoped to use the International University Week to go beyond the university to reach the “wider
100

public” as well.

They succeeded – that week of action, organized explicitly to support the
101

American movement, proved to be the “first mass demonstration in France” against war.

By that point, the VDC had joined with several other radical antiwar organizations,
including SDS, the YSA, the CPUSA, and dozens of smaller antiwar collectives, to form a national
organization, the National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NCC).
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Together

with the VDC's international committee, the NCC published a pamphlet, The International Protest
Movement Against American Intervention in the War in Vietnam, to develop the international
movement. First, they aimed to “explain and document” the “international protest movement
against American intervention in the war in Vietnam.”

103

Second, the authors explained that since

the mainstream media had ignored the international protests, likely in order to lead Americans to
believe that the rest of the world somehow supported U.S. foreign policy, the pamphlet hoped to
educate the general public about antiwar opinion throughout the world. “It is most important,” they
clarified, “that American citizens be informed about these demonstrations and that the truly
worldwide, unified dissatisfaction with current U.S. foreign policy be adequately publicized.”
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Lastly, they hoped the booklet could contribute to the growth the international antiwar movement
by deepening contacts. As a sign of its commitment to internationalism, the NCC called for a
second International Days of Protest for March 1966, which proved even larger than the first.
Thus, by 1966 many American antiwar radicals were keen to build an international
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antiwar network. But in their minds, international connections largely meant forging links with
movements in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Diane Carole Fujino, who worked on the Asia
section of the report, spoke for many when she admitted, “I was most interested in Third World
people and politics.”
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After all, the Third World was where revolutions were unfolding. This was

where history was being made, where American activists looked for inspiration, ideas, and
models. If there were to be international links, they had to be with the Third World. This attitude
was explicitly theorized by Richard Aoki, another member of the international committee, who
explained the VDC’s efforts to internationalize the war in the Committee’s newsletter. In true
radical fashion Aoki argued that the Vietnam War was not some “unfortunate error,” but the result
of a deliberate “policy.”
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The United States, he explained, was determined to “crush national

liberation movements” across the globe through military intervention, economic exploitation, and
the creation of pro-American dictatorships. In this sense, Aoki explained, the Vietnam War was
just one part of a broader “international war” between the United States and “[r]evolutionary
struggles for self-determination” throughout the Third World. If “the war in Vietnam is an
international war,” he concluded, then “its opposition must be international.”
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But since the fight

was essentially between the United States and the Third World, then internationalization meant
real coordination with third-world movements.
Western Europe, by contrast, was not a battlefield in this international war. Thus, while
Americans certainly appreciated solidarity from Europeans, connections with those movements
were without question secondary. Indeed, before May 1968, most American antiwar radicals did
108

not pay serious attention to Europe, and certainly not to France.

Many drew inspiration from

the French resistance to the Nazis and later the Algerian War, and in some cases lionized that
experience as a model for antiwar struggle in the United States, but contemporary French anti-
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Vietnam War activism did not hold the interest of American radicals.

109

The French antiwar

struggle was tiny, and student radicals seemed harmless, especially compared with their
pugnacious German peers.

110

Of course, there were plenty of contacts on an individual basis, but

no sustained, international network linking American radicals with those in France or other
capitalist countries of Western Europe. For most Americans in early 1966, building an
international network between radicals in North America and Western Europe made little strategic
sense.
That said, these early American efforts to build an international movement, even if
focused on the Third World and not on Europe, did end up playing a crucial role creating a new
kind of international solidarity between radicals in North America and Western Europe later in the
decade. For if these early international connections with Western European activists may not
have been important for most Americans, they were for Europeans, who looked to the United
States for inspiration. The teach-in, for example, spread across Europe like wildfire. More
importantly, many Western European antiwar radicals, especially in France, initially
conceptualized their antiwar internationalism as a way of supporting U.S. activists, whom they
saw as the lynchpin. In this way, a feeling of internationalism had emerged by early 1966, but it
was highly asymmetrical and largely unidirectional. While U.S. radicals provided the
indispensable spark and laid the groundwork for future networks, the heavy task of not only
deepening that feeling of internationalism, but also building a functional international network
connecting radicals in the advanced capitalist world would be taken up by Western European
radicals, and especially the French.
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French Radicals Call for An International Front
In 1966 the teach-in washed onto the shores of France. The May 1966 “Six Heures pour
le Vietnam,” explicitly convened to show solidarity with American antiwar struggles, brought
together five thousand French antiwar activists from a variety of otherwise antagonistic political
111

tendencies for a six-hour marathon of speeches, discussions, music, and films.

The Collectif

Intersyndical Universitaire, which took the lead in organizing the event, called for “the union of all
forces who, in France and in the world, notably in the United States, fight against the Vietnam
War and support the fight of the South Vietnamese people for their independence, under the
direction of the National Liberation Front.”
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Indeed, French radicals not only heeded the call to

internationalize the movement, they worked even harder than their American peers to develop a
revived sense of internationalism among antiwar radicals.
For French radicals from a number of distinct currents, the war was not a localized affair
between the United States and Vietnam, but a global struggle. This perspective defined the
second mass meeting of radicals in Paris, the “Six Heures du Monde pour le Vietnam,” which
captured the internationalist emphasis in its very name.
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There, on November 28, 1966,

philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre argued that the French had a duty to support the Vietnamese
struggle since the NLF and North Vietnam were part of a much larger, common fight against
“American hegemony, against American imperialism.”
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In this context, the “defeat of the

Vietnamese people would be politically our defeat, the defeat of all free people.” “Vietnam,” he
115

concluded, “is fighting for us.”
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Sartre’s speech, which “caused unbridled enthusiasm,” gave
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perfect expression to the thoroughly internationalist vision of many French radicals, and his
words, “their struggle is ours,” would become the official slogan of the most dynamic radical
antiwar organization in France, the Comité Vietnam National (CVN), which emerged from that
meeting in November.

116

Just as important as defining an internationalist perspective on the antiwar struggle, the
Six Heures du Monde showed that radicals could, against all odds, organize independently of the
French Communist Party (PCF). Like their fraternal party in the United States, the PCF had
tempered its radicalism by the 1960s; but unlike the CPUSA, the PCF remained a mass party of
enormous consequence, casting a wide shadow over the entire left in France. Although involved
in the French antiwar struggle from the beginning, the PCF disliked anything it could not directly
control.
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The unparalleled success of the first Six Heures in May 1966, which originated outside

the party, seemed to confirm their fears that through antiwar organizing other radical currents
might outflank the Party. Thus, when the organizers of the original Six Heures approached the
PCF about organizing a second meeting, the PCF tried to sabotage the event, forcing the
organizers, Laurent Schwartz, Jean-Paul Sartre, Alfred Kastler, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, and Henri
Bartoli to take the enormous risk of not only organizing the next Six Heures independently of the
PCF, but to use the gathering to launch an autonomous organization, the CVN.
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As it turned out, their gamble paid off. As Ken Coates, a noted British antiwar radical,
reported, “The remarkable thing about the whole meeting is the way in which it was assembled
entirely by the independent socialist forces.”
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This success cannot be exaggerated. The primary

challenge of the French radical left after the Second World War had been to find a way to
organize outside the PCF without completely losing touch with the masses under the Party’s
control. Vietnam was their solution. As in the United States, the Vietnam War, more than anything
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else, allowed French radicals to develop into a major political force. But in the United States,
Vietnam brought radicals back into the mainstream by building a loose sense of unity that
overcame the anti-communism of the 1950s; in France, Vietnam strengthened the radical left by
120

allowing it to escape the hegemony of the PCF.

Vietnam was an issue where the radical left

could not only distinguish itself from the PCF, but even bypass the Party. Where the PCF’s
antiwar organizing was hierarchical, French radicals promoted grassroots, autonomous initiatives.
Where the PCF adopted a very ambiguous stance on the war, chanting “Peace in Vietnam,” the
radicals countered with the intransigent, “The NLF will Win!” Where the party apparatus
sponsored only the most moderate actions, the radicals called for militant struggle. And where the
PCF leadership saw Vietnam as only another tragic issue in need of resolution, the radicals saw it
as the focal point of a worldwide struggle. With Vietnam, the French radical left could truly come
into its own.
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Vietnam allowed radicals to organize independently of the PCF. But despite shared
opposition to the Communist Party, the radical left in France was just as fragmented as in the
United States, and radical groups created their own rival antiwar formations. One was the Centre
Information-Vietnam sponsored by the Parti Communiste Marxiste-Léniniste de France.
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Far

more effective, however, was the Comité Vietnam de base (CVB), organized by the Union des
jeunesses communistes marxistes-léninistes (UJC-ml). The UJC-ml began as a Maoist student
group within the PCF’s youth organization (UEC), based primarily at the prestigious École
123

Normale Superieur.
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After being expelled from the UEC, they formed themselves into a distinct
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political organization on December 10, 1966 and quickly developed what would become one of
their primary axes of organization, the CVBs.

124

The CVBs were militant, grassroots committees

that sought to develop the antiwar struggle not only in universities, but in neighborhoods and
factories.

125

Of course, the most important of these non-PCF radical antiwar initiatives was the CVN.
Like the CVBs, the CVN sponsored more militant actions than the PCF, adopted a far more
radical stance on the war, and encouraged grassroots committees across France – Schwartz
even called for teach-ins at Renault factories.

126

Yet, the two formations differed in crucial

respects. First, the CVBs offered unconditional allegiance to the DRV, whereas the CVN, though
still supporting North Vietnam against the United States, remained a bit more cautious. Second,
while the CVBs eschewed institutionalized hierarchy, the CVN possessed a firm federalist
structure.
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Third, the CVN often relied on the star power of intellectual celebrities, unlike the

CVBs, which tried to remain closer to the grassroots. Most importantly, whereas the CVBs were
very sectarian, criticizing every other group while hosting their own separate actions, the CVN
practiced a radical inclusivity.
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In fact, much like the VDC in the United States, the CVN successfully fused a number of
distinct radical currents. There were dissident Communists, such as Jean-Pierre Vigier, a hero of
the French Resistance, who opposed the PCF’s organizational obstinacy and lukewarm stance
on the war. There was also a small but distinct tendency of radical Christian socialists, such as
Henri Bartoli, one of the original CVN organizers, and Nicolas Boulte, the CVN’s official
secretary.
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Far more important than either of these two currents, however, was the Parti

Socialiste Unifié (PSU), a leftist organization formed out of a union of several socialist currents in
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April 1960. The bulk of the PSU were former members of the SFIO, France’s mainstream socialist
political party, who abandoned their party after it threw its weight behind the Algerian War.

130

The

PSU, which counted some 15,000 members, was therefore less a disciplined party based on
ideological unity than a conglomeration of activists from distinct political currents, from Christian
socialism to Trotskyism, social democracy to Castroism. Although the PSU never played an
ideologically or even organizationally preponderant role in the CVN, a number of PSU radicals,
such as Laurent Schwartz, Claude Bourdet, Pierre Naville, and Marcel Francis-Khan, helped form
the backbone of the Committee. The fourth, and most significant component of the CVN was the
Trotskyists, themselves adhering to a number of distinct groups. Schwartz, for instance, was a
Trotskyist from the PSU. Others issued from explicitly Trotskyist organizations such as the
Alliance Marxiste Révolutionnaire. Indeed, more than any other general political perspective,
Trotskyism dominated the CVN. This did not mean that the CVN was a Trotskyist front group, but
as historian Nicolas Pas argues, their influence was so great that “one can rightly speak of a
131

strongly Trotskisante organization.”

The CVN, more so than the CVBs, was also a profoundly intergenerational political
formation, uniting radicals who had fought the Nazis, militants who came of age during the Cold
War, antiwar activists who cut their teeth on the Algerian War, and the young people who would
compose the generation of May 68. The most important youth organization in the CVN, and one
that would go on to play a central role in the events of May 68, was the Jeunesse Communiste
Révolutionnaire (JCR). Like the UJCml, the core of the JCR originally consisted of young activists
from the Communist UEC, though predominantly issuing from the Faculty of Letters of the
Sorbonne, rather than the ENS. They, too, were expelled by the PCF, but for refusing to endorse
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François Mitterand in the 1965 Presidential elections. Joined by other young radicals, the
expelled students decided to found their own autonomous organization on April 2, 1966.
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JCR radicals, who declared in the very first issue of their paper that “the war in Vietnam
will become one of the central axes of our struggle,” served as the foot soldiers of the CVN.

133

They organized the grassroots, developed the CVN in the provinces, and extended the radical
antiwar struggle to high school students encouraging the formation of Comité Vietnam lycéens
134

(CVL).

With one of its leaders, Alain Krivine, serving on the National Bureau of the CVN, the

JCR also played something of a leadership role in the organization. Indeed, as one of the most
radical currents in the CVN, the JCR ultimately helped push the CVN towards a more
revolutionary position over the course of the decade. But their partnership with the CVN proved
transformative for JCR radicals as well. The JCR benefited from the CVN’s role as a transmitter
of radical historical memory as young radicals learned from older militants. The CVN also helped
the JCR forge a number of important national and international connections. But most
importantly, through the CVN’s antiwar efforts, JCR radicals gained invaluable organizing
experiences that would come to the fore during the tempest of May 68. Retrospectively, their time
in the CVN can be seen as a formative radical apprenticeship.
The JCR was politically heterogeneous, in large part reflecting its composition.
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The

nucleus of the group was affiliated with the French Section of the Trotskyist Fourth International.
Others came from the youth branch of the PSU. Some, such as Daniel Bensaïd, were not
originally Trotskyists.
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One early member of the group, gay activist Guy Hocquenghem, would
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later become the leader of the libertarian Maoist group Vive La Révolution!

137

The JCR’s

Trotskyism was thus tempered by a potent infusion of other political trends, most importantly
Guevarism. Indeed, like most radical youth in North America and Western Europe, JCR radicals
were profoundly inspired by anti-imperialist revolutions abroad, above all Cuba.

138

But they also looked to the United States from the start. For example, in 1965, the young
Sorbonne radicals who would go on to form the nucleus of the JCR wrote a detailed article about
struggles in Berkeley, reporting on the history of the civil rights movement, the FSM, and the
formation of the VDC. For the JCR, the antiwar movement’s formation in the United States carried
enormous consequences. “After years of political passivity in the persistent climate of anticommunism,” the JCR explained, “a new left is in the process of bursting forth in the United
States.”

139

The development of a radical left taking aim at the “system” was especially welcome.

“Criticism of the Vietnam War,” the JCR optimistically forecasted, “is rapidly transforming into a
radical movement of opposition to the Democratic Party and the anti-democratic system that
reigns in the U.S.A.”

140

This movement, the JCR hoped, could lead to a “real, mass political force”

in the very heart of the United States, which would in turn completely transform the international
balance of power.
The CVN shared this optimism about American struggles and forged durable links with
American activists. At their founding event, CVN organizers made special effort to invite U.S.
radicals, such as Dave Dellinger and SNCC’s Courtland Cox. To underscore the French
movement’s commitment to aiding their U.S. comrades, they held a symposium on the antiwar
struggle in the United States.
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After the Six Heures, the CVN worked with the Paris American

Committee to Stopwar (PACS), a group of antiwar American expatriates led by Maria Jolas, to
formalize these relationships with American radicals. “Maria was linked to the American anti-war
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movement,” Schwartz recalls, “and was our link with it.”

142

Indeed, through Jolas’ efforts, PACS

not only served as a major information center for Americans abroad, but also as a vital relay for
French radicals. As historian Bethany Keenan has shown, “French anti-war groups sought PACS
out for information on American activism,” and most information passing to and from the United
States went through the group.

143

But the CVN, though fastened to the American struggle, also looked to movements in
other countries. At the Six Heures du monde, CVN organizers invited activists from Brazil, Cuba,
Morocco, Algeria, Germany, Australia, and of course, Vietnam. The final symposium of the
evening, dedicated to the theme of “The Anti-Imperialist Struggle in the World,” included talks by
Lawrence Daly, a member of the Russell Tribunal; Marcello Cini, president of a similar Vietnam
Committee in Italy; and Marcel Niedergang and Bernard de Vries, leaders of the Provos, a Dutch
anarchist group. As we have already seen, from its very origins one of the CVN’s primary
objectives was to push the internationalizing work of the VDC even further. This obsession with
promoting internationalism had something to do with the particular domestic political situation. In
France, de Gaulle’s vocal opposition to the United States’ war in Vietnam worked to take some of
the wind out of the radicals’ sails, which left militant antiwar organizing in France lagging behind
144

movements elsewhere.

In other countries, especially Great Britain, West Germany, and Italy,

whose governments played a crucial role supporting the American war effort, the stakes were
much higher, which pushed antiwar struggles to achieve a certain amplitude, unity, and ferocity
missing from the hexagon in 1966. Some French radicals compensated by putting considerable
effort into solidarity campaigns, which translated into a deep commitment to internationalism. One
can add to this the fact that the vast majority of French antiwar radicals were dedicated Marxists
142
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and therefore had internationalism virtually inscribed in their DNA – unlike the Americans, for
whom Marxism was still marginal in 1966. For these reasons, by late 1966 the CVN became a
nodal point in a number of intersecting international antiwar networks.
Some CVN radicals, above all the JCR youth, aspired to turn this internationalism into a
fully organized, “coordinated” force.
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Hoping to move beyond simply forging personal contacts,

sharing information, or synchronizing the occasional demonstration, some radicals aimed to build
not only a feeling of internationalism, but what they now called an “international front.”
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To be

more precise, if some American activists, led by the VDC, helped foster internationalism, that is to
say, the political assumption that the struggle against the war had to be international, then some
antiwar radicals in Western Europe, especially the French, responded by trying to organize this
internationalism into an international, or a formal international organization capable of uniting
radicals from different countries for a common aim.

147

Building a Radical International
Significantly, while they certainly intended to include everyone “from Vietnam to America”
in this new international, some French radicals also began to insist on the special value of a
radical antiwar international specifically within the advanced capitalist countries of North America
and Western Europe.
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For these radicals, building an international in “Berkeley, Washington

[D.C.], New York, Paris, Brussels, and Berlin,” that is to say, in the “heart of imperialism,” was
more important than ever because traditional internationalist forces in North America and
Western Europe had turned their backs on internationalism precisely when it was needed
most.
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For while third-world radicals quickly took the lead in international solidarity by forming
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their own radical internationalism, which culminated in the Tricontinental Conference in January
1966, the leadership of the traditional left in North America and Western Europe did the opposite,
in the words of Alain Krivine, effectively throwing the “principles of proletarian internationalism
overboard.”

150

Indeed the social democratic parties that comprised the Socialist International had

almost all become accomplices of imperialism. Had the SFIO not overseen both the First
Indochinese War and the Algerian War? Now, faced with Vietnam, Krivine charged, these parties
“shed a few tears of sympathy,” but ultimately bowed to the United States.
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As for the

communists, Joseph Stalin had disbanded the Comintern in 1943. And while the various
Communist Parties in North America and Western Europe still enjoyed a certain international
network, this too had become hopelessly accommodationist. Most of these parties, such as the
PCF and the CPUSA, did not even call for the victory of their fraternal party in Vietnam. In this,
they reflected the USSR’s policy to prioritize “peaceful coexistence” with U.S. imperialism over
international solidarity with revolutionary movements. In 1954, the USSR exerted enormous
pressure on the Vietnamese to accept partition; in the early 1960s, they tried to dissuade the NLF
from launching armed struggle; and now, in 1966, the Soviets offered pitifully little aid to the war.
Like the Communist Parties, they called for negotiated settlement.
Unsurprisingly, this behavior provoked a rupture in the international communist
movement. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) blasted the USSR for raising its national
interests above those of the international revolutionary movement. Their disputes escalated into
an open split in the early 1960s, after which China struggled to become the leader of global antiimperialism, winning considerable support in Southeast Asia and beyond.
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A number of pro-

Chinese parties also emerged in North America and Western Europe, such as Progressive Labor
in the United States and the UJC-ml in France. Although there were some attempts to unite these
scattered parties into a new anti-revisionist international – Hardial Bains tried to create a network
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in the Anglophone countries while Jacques Grippa of the Parti Communiste de Belgique traveled
across Western Europe on orders from the PRC itself – these ended in failure.

153

The pro-

Chinese parties – of which there were usually several in each country – were so sectarian they
could never agree with one another, let alone work with other non-Maoist groupings. Thus, the
Maoists proved unable to fill the space left by the renegacy of Soviet international communism.
One internationalist tendency, however, seized the opportunity to build an antiwar
international. Although nearly moribund in the 1950s, the deeply divided international Trotskyist
movement held what was known as a Reunification Congress in June 1963 in order to
reassemble the various currents into a unified Fourth International (FI).
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In December 1965, the

new Fourth International held another Congress, which reconfirmed its commitment to antiimperialist struggle, specifically naming the Vietnamese revolution. In its official statement, The
International Situation and the Tasks of Revolutionary Marxists, adopted in June 1966, the FI
declared that, “The most urgent immediate task facing revolutionary Marxists on a world-wide
scale is to strengthen the struggle against the imperialist aggression in Vietnam and for the
Vietnamese Revolution.”
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The best way to do that, the statement continued, was by “tirelessly

stressing the need for an anti-imperialist united front on an international scale.”

156

To stop the

Vietnam War, radicals had to build a new antiwar international.
But the Fourth International could never play that role itself. Trotskyism still had a terrible
reputation, the organizational capacities of the FI were severely limited, and the various Trotskyist
groups were miniscule. Ernest Tate, an FI international organizer, recalls that in the early 1960s,
the French section claimed perhaps 100 members, the Belgians fifty or sixty, and the Italians
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even less.

157

In Great Britain, the Fourth International did not even have an organized presence,
158

and the Unified Secretariat had to send Tate to build a branch there.

As a result, the FI

Trotskyists resumed the older strategy of “entering” existing political organizations, such as the
Socialist or Communist Parties, to organize.

159

Their main focus was the youth. As the FI put it in

1965, the FI “attaches particular importance to the working and student youth, who stand in the
160

vanguard today in a number of countries.”

As it turned out, the FI’s efforts to connect with these

emerging youth movements proved quite fruitful. In Belgium, entryism in the Socialist Party
helped radicalize its youth section, the Jeunes Gardes Socialistes (JGS), which grew so militant
its parent organization ultimately expelled the group in 1964.
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In France, the FI’s relentless

efforts helped pull some students in the Sorbonne Letters section of the UEC towards Trotskyism,
ultimately giving birth to the nucleus of the JCR. A similar process was underway in Italy, where
Trotskyists hoped to gain influence in the Communist Party, inspiring Trotkyisante young radicals
to publish their own journal, Falcemartello.
In this way, despite its many limitations, the FI succeeded in channeling internationalist
sentiment into a new kind of functional antiwar international. They did not mastermind every step
of the process, but they did create the conditions of possibility for a future international. Trotskyist
militants from the Fourth International had not only helped radicalize a number of young activists
across Western Europe, they also provided them with a very rudimentary network, making future
multilateral conversations between them possible. Thus, when the JGS announced a militant
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antiwar demonstration for October 1966, their call did fall into a void, but could find a powerful
echo in a preexisting transnational network.
The October 1966 convergence in Liège cannot be reduced to a Fourth International
front. Some of the groups that attended, such as the JCR, included non-Trotskyist members. A
few groups, such as the German Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund (SDS), the expelled
youth section of the German Social Democratic Party, were not affiliated with the Fourth
International. The organizers of the convergence, hoping to be as inclusive as possible, even
welcomed two rival Trotskyists groups, Gerry Healy’s Young Socialists from Great Britain, and the
“Révoltes” youth group from France, who repaid the gesture by trying to sabotage the meeting.
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It was precisely this radical openness that allowed this nascent network to develop into a radical
antiwar international. Indeed, although the FI helped spark an antiwar network in the 1960s, it
would soon assume a life of its own, moving well beyond its Trotskyist imprint.
On October 15, 1966, 3,000 young radicals representing 20 different groups gathered in
Liège.
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As the hosts, the JGS commanded the largest contingent. By one account, the JCR

brought about 220 activists from across France.

164

The Frankfurt section of the German SDS sent

a delegation of about 100 students. From the United States, the YSA sent Mary-Alice Waters to
not only attend the meeting, but also visit England and France to forge stronger ties with radicals
abroad. The major points of unity among the groups, Waters reported, were “support to the
Vietnamese Revolution, the demand for immediate withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam,
and the demand for European countries to get out of NATO.”

165

Indeed, despite the Young

Socialists and the “Révoltes” group’s disruptions, a sense of international unity prevailed, and the
day ended with radicals singing the Internationale. The following day, many of the groups stayed
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to finalize a tentative program to serve as the basis for future international antiwar coordination.
The task of all the youth organizations, the final statement declared, “is to support the struggle of
the Vietnamese fighters by supporting their demand for immediate and unconditional retreat of
the imperialist forces.”

166

The JCR left the gathering determined to maintain the momentum. As their paper, Avantgarde jeunesse, explained, the Liège gathering was no “ordinary demonstration.”
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“For the first

time,” the JCR enthused, “an independent organization of the youth, attacked by the bureaucratic
leadership of the workers’ parties, took the initiative of an international gathering against
imperialism and capitalist military pacts.”

168

This “unprecedented success, unthinkable several

years ago,” the JCR continued, “demonstrates the strength of this new vanguard” developing
throughout the countries of North America and Western Europe.
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Soon after Liège, the JCR,

which quickly spearheaded the work of building the new international, collaborated closely with
the JGS to organize another conference in Brussels in March 1967 to refine the points of unity,
find ways to coordinate international actions, and solidify the international.

170

Ernest Tate recalls that in preparation, the JGS and JCR “issued a call to the
International’s few youth organizations to send people to Europe to help with its organization.”
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The Young Socialists in Canada sent an organizer, Jess MacKenzie, who spoke French, to spend
a couple months “helping get the printed materials ready, organizing registration of delegates and
arranging their billeting.”
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On March 11, 1967 delegates representing over a dozen radical

organizations arrived in Brussels.
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The JCR, JSG, YSA, and German SDS were of course all

present. A new addition came by way of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC), the major
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grouping of antiwar radicals in Great Britain.

174

The VSC, which held its founding conference on

June 4, 1966, would play a highly analogous role to the CVN. Like its fraternal organization in
France, the core of the VSC was also Trotskyist.
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But at the same time, the new international

continued to move beyond its Trotskyist origins, inviting the Étudiants Socialistes Unifiés (ESU),
176

the youth section of the French PSU, to send delegates.

In Belgium, radicals produced a unifying statement that not only discussed the purpose of
a permanent international formation, but also clearly explained why international coordination
among antiwar activists in North American and Western Europe was so necessary. Whereas
most Americans largely subordinated international coordination with radicals in Western Europe
to the far more important task of building relations with movements in the Third World, Western
European radicals now tried to make the case that a radical international within the advanced
capitalist world could be just as important for the overall antiwar struggle. Developing ideas
developed at Liège, the official statement of the Brussels convergence argued that U.S.
aggression does not operate independently, but actually depends on a kind of “international
177

capitalist alliance.”

This alliance was codified in certain formal treaties and pacts, with the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) being one of the most important. As the radicals explained,
NATO “is the military expression of the solidarity of the capitalist countries of Europe,” with the
United States serving as its “pivot.”
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In a certain sense, the capitalist countries had their own

“international" led by the United States.
Thus, what made American military intervention in Vietnam possible was not simply the
power of the U.S. military, but the fact that through this imperialist international the United States
could count on other allied countries to support its specific policies. Given the indispensability of
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this international to the U.S. war in Vietnam, a crucial aspect of the antiwar struggle was attacking
on this international. This meant, first of all, that antiwar struggle had to take an international form
– against the U.S.-led imperialist international, radicals had to form their own radical international.
More importantly, since so much of the United States’ power derived from the support of major
Western European countries, radicals in Western Europe would play a decisive role in this new
179

antiwar international.

Of course, this argument posed a potential problem for French radicals, some of the
strongest proponents of this strategy, since President Charles de Gaulle had not only criticized
the Vietnam War, but had withdrawn the French Navy from the North Atlantic fleet of NATO in
1963. Yet French radicals remained undeterred. Although France had withdrawn from the military
alliance, they explained, it was still a part of the Atlantic Alliance. Thus, despite de Gaulle’s
actions, France objectively remained an important pillar of U.S. aggression. A statement from the
CVN in Rennes developed the argument even further. Reminding readers that U.S. aggression in
Vietnam was made possibly by “an imperialist front in the heart of which they assume the
leadership role,” the statement went on to explain that even if de Gaulle occasionally dissented,
this changed little since “the Gaullist positions only differ from the American theses over the
means of containing the liberation movement of the people: that which JOHNSON attempts to
accomplish by force, DE GAULLE tries to obtain through the diplomatic route.”
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Despite

disagreements, French policy still legitimized the broader logic behind American aggression,
which meant that the struggle in France was still crucial to breaking the hegemonic power that
allowed the Vietnam War to continue. Indeed, far from dissuading radicals, de Gaulle’s actions
further galvanized them. His withdrawal, the Belgium statement explained, should be welcomed
because it “objectively weakens” NATO.
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It showed that contradictions had appeared within the

enemy internationalism, that the United States’ actions were straining the international alliance on
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which its foreign policy ultimately depended. In this context, a radical international in North
America and Western Europe could be especially effective.
The Liège and Brussels gatherings were the first coordinated international meetings of
North American and Western European radicals in the 1960s. They established the general
strategy and defining ideas of the international antiwar struggle for radicals into 1967. They would
also give birth to a functional radical international that would fill the void left by the social
democrats and the communists. After the Brussels conference, radicals established a permanent
Secretariat in Brussels, complete with an Executive Bureau, composed of six radical
organizations, including the JCR. Regularly communicating with radical groups, and holding
meetings once every two months, the organization coordinated “international campaigns,” from
multilingual propaganda to planned demonstrations.

182

By early 1967, a veritable radical, antiwar

international, based above all among the youth, had taken shape.
To be sure, this international differed from those that came before. Unlike the Second, or
Socialist International, it was not composed of formal parties; unlike the Third, it was not
sponsored by a foreign government; and unlike the Fourth, it was not united by fidelity to the
ideas of a singular political figure. This international was looser in structure, dominated by youth,
politically pluralistic, and operated just as much through imaginary identification as formal
contacts. Furthermore, while thoroughly aligned with the Third World, it was North American and
European, with the notable exception of the Japanese.
And yet, one can still classify this as a kind of international. After all, however inchoate,
this international hoped to unite radicals from different countries in a coherent, sustainable,
coordinated international organization. In this respect, the “Vietnam International” of the 1960s
bore striking similarities with the original International Working Man’s Association, or the First
International, as it came to be known. Like the IWMA, it was a small, loose group of radicals
largely from Europe.
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Like the IWMA, it was anti-imperialist. Indeed, the first international was
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founded out of support for Polish national liberation from Tsarist Russia, in the same way that this
new radical of the international 1960s was sparked by the Vietnamese struggle against American
imperialism.

Why Vietnam?
By 1967, the Vietnam War had become the undisputed center of international political
attention. Many radicals not only in the United States and France, but throughout North America
and Western Europe, made international solidarity with the Vietnamese struggle one of their
highest priorities. Through antiwar activism, radicals developed into an independent political force
of significant consequence in countries like the United States and France. More importantly, the
Vietnamese struggle emerged as a kind of binding element, unifying otherwise isolated
radicals into a new radical international. In this way, Vietnam came to shape the very identity of
what was increasingly becoming a self-consciously international radical left. Without Vietnam
there would likely have never been an international of radicals in North America and Western
Europe. But why did Vietnam, and not some other struggle, come to play this function?
To answer this question, we must take a step back for a moment. For while the
specificities of the Vietnamese struggle played the determinant role in creating a radical
international, two other elements were needed: the reemergence of domestic struggles in North
America and Western Europe in the early 1960s and the wave of national liberation revolutions
cascading across the Third World. Let’s begin with the first element. Before the Vietnamese
struggle could unify radicals in different countries into some kind of international, there had to be
radicals to unify in the first place. While the Vietnam War certainly provided an opportunity for the
radical left to grow in countries like France and the United States, it did not itself create the radical
left. On the contrary, before escalation in 1965, a number of other domestic struggles across
North America and Western Europe had already begun to politicize a new generation, draw exiled
radicals from the margins, and provide activists with experiences that would define their struggle
against the Vietnam War. In this sense, the radicals who went on to form the antiwar international
67

did not emerge out of a vacuum, but from a preexisting radical microsystem of accumulated
struggles.

184

Without these domestic microsystems in North American and Western European

countries, there would have been no antiwar radicals, and therefore, no antiwar international.
Beginning in the 1950s and early 1960s, in nearly every country in North America and
Western Europe, important struggles helped form the microsystems that made antiwar struggle
possible later in the decade. In Great Britain, for example, the antiwar struggles of the 1960s are
incomprehensible if one does not take into account the enormous impact of the peace movement
for nuclear disarmament – after all, the majority of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign’s rank and
file had been active in the earlier Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.
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In France, a number of

struggles played similar roles in shaping the various microsystems of struggle, such as the
186

nascent student movement, but the Algerian War played the most determinant role.

The war

prompted many French radicals to engage directly with a national liberation movement.
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It

pushed intellectuals to regroup as a political force, setting a vital precedent for the subsequent
anti-Vietnam war struggle.
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In addition, the war not only politicized a generation of French

students, it triggered the formation of a militant, antifascist youth movement that increasingly set
itself apart from the PCF, which adopted a “wait and see” attitude to the war.
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In short, it was

Algeria that taught a new generation of radicals how to fight fascists, battle police, organize
grassroots committees, and mobilize thousands. It is little coincidence that many of those
184
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involved in the opposition to the Algerian War – from Laurent Schwartz to Jean-Paul Sartre, Alain
Krivine to Bernard Kouchner, Madeleine Rebérioux to Pierre Vidal-Naquet – went on to lead the
French struggle against the Vietnam War.
Similarly, the United States witnessed a series of domestic struggles in the late 1950s
and early 1960s, such as the student movement, movement for nuclear disarmament, and the
counterculture. The most important was by far the civil rights movement, which can in many ways
be seen as the United States’ own decolonization struggle. As with French radicals and the
Algerian War, most American activists, both black and white, passed through the civil rights
movement in some way or another before turning to the Vietnam War.
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There, they learned

crucial organizing skills, built important networks, and developed an array of tactics that made the
antiwar movement possible – to take only one example, the famous teach-ins that came to define
early antiwar activism not only in the United States, but throughout the world, were directly
inspired by the civil rights sit-ins. In the words of SNCC Freedom Singer Bernice Johnson
Reagon, the civil rights movement was the “centering, borning” struggle of the American
1960s.
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Thus, when the Vietnam War began to make headlines, a core of activists in countries
like France and the United Sates were already radicalized, organized, networked, and battletested. The struggle against the war could therefore channel these preexisting energies,
experiences, and skills. In this respect, the timing of escalation was impeccable: the United
States intensified the war just as the radical left was beginning to reemerge as an organized force
in a number of countries, but also when these preceding, formative struggles had begun to
transition, subside, or collapse. The signing of the Test Ban Treaty in 1963, for example, sent the
British campaign for nuclear disarmament into decline. Similarly, the Evian Accords of 1962
precipitated a lull in radical activism in France. As for the United States, the combined effects of
urban rebellions, legislative victories, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights
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Act of 1965, and internal political shifts in the broader black liberation struggle, above all the
spread of black nationalism, prompted many in the civil rights struggle to reassess the
movement’s trajectory. In this way, the Vietnam War erupted at an opportune moment, precisely
when radicals, hardened by earlier experiences, were either eager to dive into the next struggle in
the cycle, as in France, or caught in a moment of reevaluation, as in the United States.
The second indispensable element was the global political ecosystem. The United States
escalated its involvement in Vietnam amidst the cresting of a seemingly unceasing wave of
national liberation struggles across the globe. Indeed, huge swathes of the world’s population
were on the cusp of struggles for liberation, presently fighting revolution, or had recently emerged
victorious. Most importantly, these struggles saw themselves as part of a global movement.
Liberation movements in Asia connected with anticolonial struggles in Africa, which allied
themselves with anti-imperialist movements in Latin America. Newly liberated countries gathered
in Bandung in April 1955, an Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Conference convened in Cairo in
1957, and in January 1966, at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana, leaders from the Third
World founded the Organization of Solidarity with the People of Asia, Africa and Latin America to
192

promote global revolutionary solidarity.

Unfolding against this background of unity, the

Vietnamese struggle benefited enormously from these preexisting international networks,
structures of support, and mentalities of solidarity.
The militant self-activity of the revolutionary movements in the Third World had a
profound effect on radicals in North America and Western Europe. Since it was here, and not in
the capitalist strongholds, that revolutionary movements were changing the world, radicals
naturally turned their attention abroad.
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Searching for revolution, some traveled to revolutionary

countries abroad, above all Cuba. They all returned transformed. General Baker, Jr., an antiwar
black nationalist, spoke for many when he recalled how experiencing the “revolutionary

192

Robert J.C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (Oxford, Blackwell, 2001),
chapters, 12-14, 16.
193
Robert Gildea, James Mark, and Niek Pas, “European Radicals and the ‘Third World’:
Imagined Solidarities and Radical Networks, 1958-1973,” Cultural and Social History 8, no. 4
(2011): 449-71; Ross, May ’68, 80-90; Elbaum, Revolution in the Air, 40-46.
70

194

laboratory” of Cuba “was a real awakening.”

Back home, radicals organized vibrant solidarity

organizations to circulate information, offer moral support, and provide material aid to numerous
third-world struggles, such as those in the Congo, China, and Cuba, to name only a few.
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In the

United States, the best example of this kind of solidarity was the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, in
which many future antiwar radicals, such as Dave Dellinger, Stephen Smale, and much of the
SWP leadership, participated.
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Thus, the Vietnam War unfolded after structures of international

solidarity were already taking shape, allowing radicals to easily pivot towards Vietnam.
Without the encounter of domestic microsystems of struggle on the one hand with a
specific global political ecosystem on the other, something like a radical international would have
never emerged in the 1960s. This is precisely why, for example, nothing of sort took shape during
the First Indochina War against the French in the 1940s and 1950s. On the one side, an
independent radical left was virtually inexistent in the early 1950s. In the United States,
McCarthyism devastated radicalism as an organized force; in France, the Cold War forced
radicals to choose sides, banishing those who searched for alternatives to the political desert. Of
course, some radical formations survived, and while a few even coordinated among themselves,
their numbers were too miniscule to form anything like a meaningful radical international.
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On

the other side, decolonization had only just begun when the First Indochina War began in
December 1946. Although in retrospect the war marked the beginning of a worldwide surge of
victorious revolutions, at the time, the trend was far from clear. The great international
convergences of the liberation movements or the stunning revolutionary victories of China or
Cuba were still in the future. Even when the Vietnamese smashed the French at Dien Bien Phu in
1954, nearly all of Africa was still firmly under colonial rule. During the First Indochina War,
therefore, neither element – the domestic microsystems nor the global ecosystem – obtained. But
if the First Indochina War came “too soon,” as it were, the Second Indochina War intensified
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precisely as domestic struggles in North America and Western Europe and international solidarity
throughout the Third World had come to synchronize.
But while domestic microsystems and a global ecosystem provided the necessary
conditions for the formation of a radical international, they do not on their own explain why
Vietnam, and not some other struggle, played the role of binding element, uniting radicals from
different North American and Western European countries into an international. After all, from
Palestine to the Congo, there was no shortage of galvanizing revolutionary movements in the
1960s. Indeed, at the very same moment that the United States intensified the war in Vietnam,
the U.S. military invaded the Dominican Republic. After a popular movement overthrew the proAmerican Donald Reid Cabral on April 26, 1965, the United States, intent on preventing another
Cuba, authorized “Operation Power Pack,” ultimately deploying 40,000 U.S. troops to crush the
198

revolt. Antiwar activists everywhere rallied behind the movement.

In fact, it is often forgotten

that Vietnam Day in Berkeley was also called to protest against U.S. aggression in the Dominican
Republic.

199

It is also forgotten that in 1965 French radicals leading the struggle against the

Vietnam War, such as Jean-Paul Sartre, were simultaneously involved in the Comité de solidarité
avec le peuple dominicain.

200

Indeed, the two struggles were often joined in the imagination of

many radicals. But then why was there no Santo Domingo International? Why did it fall to
Vietnam to organize a new radical international?
The answer lies in the specific characteristics of the Vietnamese struggle. To begin with,
the sheer immensity of the suffering in Vietnam was virtually unparalleled. The Vietnamese had
lived under colonial occupation since the 1880s, had been fighting since the 1940s, and after
having already lost hundreds of thousands against the Japanese and French, now found
themselves once more in the jaws of war. Northern towns were leveled, Southern villages
torched, hundreds of thousands were forcibly relocated, over a hundred thousand political
198
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dissidents rotted in prisons, and the Vietnamese people faced some of the most lethal weapons
ever invented. Even worse, there seemed to be no end in sight. The Dominican Civil War came to
a close in September 1965; the Vietnam War, which had in many respects begun two decades
earlier, would not conclude for another decade. Thus, unlike in Cuba or China in the 1960s,
where the revolution seemed relatively more secure, the Vietnamese struggle was still underway,
which meant the results were still uncertain and the stakes incredibly high. In this context,
international solidarity with Vietnam was a priority, for it could have a real effect on the outcome
of the struggle.
In addition, not only was the war ongoing, it seemed like the Vietnamese, who
categorically refused to surrender, might even have a chance. Somehow, a tiny country of mostly
poor rice farmers held its own against the most advanced military force in human history.
Radicals therefore began to interpret the war as a heroic struggle between David and Goliath, a
narrative the Vietnamese revolutionaries created themselves. Indeed, in addition to never
showing the slightest sign of defeatism, all their public statements reaffirmed the inevitability of
their victory. Exclamations such as “Our Unshakeable Will: All the Way to Complete Victory,”
regularly appeared on the front pages of the Courrier du Vietnam, the primary foreign language
publication of the DRV, printed in French and English versions.
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This kind of unflappable

courage had a tremendous effect on American and French radicals – no other struggle in the
1960s captivated them in this way. Demonstrating solidarity with the Vietnamese struggle
therefore not only gave radicals the chance to aid this struggle towards victory, but allowed them
to invest themselves affectively in the movement.
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Although other national liberation movements spoke of international solidarity, the
Vietnamese were arguably the most committed to orchestrating internationalism from the very
start. They not only welcomed support from friendly governments, but encouraged radical
internationalism across the globe. In the South, the NLF, which saw itself as part of an
international movement, officially called for “struggle against all aggressive war and against all
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forms of imperialist domination; support [for] the national emancipation movements of the various
peoples,” as well as solidarity with “all movements of struggle for peace, democracy, and social
progress throughout the world.”
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In the North, governed as it was by committed communist

internationalists, connecting with struggles throughout the world, including North America and
Western Europe, was a central component of state policy. As Schwartz explains, “This was one
of the things that made the Viet-Nam war very different from the Algerian War: the North
Vietnamese government was fully internationalist in the Marxist sense of the word.”
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No other

ongoing revolutionary struggle made so much of international solidarity in the 1960s.
Indeed, the NLF and the DRV genuinely believed they were fighting not only for
Vietnamese independence, but also for the liberation of all the people of the world. Vietnam, they
argued, stood at the front line of the global struggle for liberation. In May 1966, for example, the
National Assembly of North Vietnam formally declared, “To defeat the American aggressors, the
shared enemy of the peoples of the entire world, such is the noble historic mission of our people.
All while fighting for the interests of our people, we also fight for those of the peoples of the entire
world.”

205

For the Vietnamese, in other words, all the liberation struggles were in fact

fundamentally linked, which meant that victory in Vietnam “effectively contributes to the liberation
movement of the people” across the planet.
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By the same token, the victory of other struggles

could directly assist the Vietnamese. This explains why the Vietnamese placed such enormous
emphasis on internationalism, actively figuring the success of other struggles into their own
military strategy. To that end, both the NLF and the DRV prioritized connections with other
liberation movements.
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The DRV, for example, not only built strong relations with countries that

“Program of the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam,” December 20, 1960, point ten.
Schwartz, A Mathematician Grappling with His Century, 395. For a good study of the Algerian
liberation struggle and internationalism, see Jeffrey James Byrne, Mecca of Revolution: Algeria,
Decolonization, and the Third World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
205
Declaration of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Third
Legislature, Third Session, reprinted as “Nous Vaincrons, les agresseurs américains seront
certainement battus,” Le Courrier du Vietnam 56, April 28, 1966, 3.
206
“Merci aux intellectuels du monde entier,” Le Courrier du Vietnam 87, December 5, 1966, 7.
207
See, for example, “Côte à côte dans la lutte contre l’impérialisme U.S.,” Le Courrier du
Vietnam 107, April 24, 1967, 6.
74
204

had already won their liberation, but publicly hailed every ongoing revolution, including Soudan,
Palestine, Cambodia, Laos, and Puerto Rico.
In this way, Vietnam continued the work of the Tricontinental by fusing heterogeneous
struggles into an imagined international unity: struggles still in progress with those that had just
won their independence, movements fighting colonialism with those confronting imperialism,
communist revolutions with non-communist movements. The Vietnamese could assume this role
because their struggle stood at the crossroads of these differences: they fought both an anticolonial and an anti-imperialist war; half the country had recently emerged victorious from a war
of independence, while the struggle continued to rage in the southern half; in the North, the
government was explicitly communist, while in the South, the NLF coalition included anticommunists. Vietnam, in other words, condensed all the major trends of the time.
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But it also emerged as the focal point of global contradictions: peasants against
landlords, the working masses against the comprador bourgeoisie, national liberation against
colonialism, anti-imperialism against empire, socialism against capitalism, global revolution
against American hegemony. It was precisely this unique role that led so many radicals in North
America and Western Europe to elevate the Vietnamese struggle over all others. “The struggle of
the people of South Vietnam against American imperialism and the ruling class of Saigon is not
only a struggle of international importance,” the Brussels statement explained, “Vietnam is the
key to the world situation, a decisive text of strength between American imperialism and the
colonial revolution and the whole labor movement. The international capitalist alliance directed by
the American government (NATO, SEATO, Treaty of Manila) is locked in combat with the
Vietnamese revolution which is an integral part of the worldwide socialist revolution.”
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The NLF, and especially North Vietnam, contributed to the idea that Vietnam had become
a kind of nexus of international solidarity. Every issue of the Courrier du Vietnam featured a
section called, “Le Monde à nos côtes,” which reported on antiwar struggles throughout the world.
By bringing all these distinct antiwar actions – in different countries, by different groups, for
208
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different ends – onto the same plane of consistency, Vietnamese revolutionaries encouraged the
feeling that a unified international antiwar movement already existed. Politically astute, the
Vietnamese strived for maximum inclusivity, carefully promoting, supporting, and graciously
thanking all antiwar forces – liberals, communists, radicals, anyone who stood against the war.
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The Vietnamese, for example, never took sides during the Sino-Soviet split, knowing full well that
doing so would have weakened the war effort. In the same way, the DRV thanked both the PCF
and the CVN, even though North Vietnam recognized the differences between the camps, and
knew that each “claimed” Vietnam for their own side. In fact, the Vietnamese encouraged this
kind of projection, adeptly balancing these contradictory political forces, domestic rivalries, and
competing internationalisms.
Yet Vietnam also gave strong indications to North American and Western European
radicals that they fully endorsed their efforts. Because of the crucial strategic importance of
antiwar contestation in the United States, American radicals frequently received approbation and
encouragement from the Vietnamese. American radicals solidified these contacts by meeting with
NLF and DRV representatives directly, either in Vietnam, or in other countries, such as
Czechoslovakia or Cuba.
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These personal meetings, regular communications, and glowing

endorsements left radicals convinced that the Vietnamese supported their cause.
Although their struggle was certainly less important than that of their American peers,
French radicals also received unambiguous support from the Vietnamese. In 1966, the DRV
applauded the formation of the CVN in the pages of the Courrier du Vietnam. Around Christmas
1966, Ho Chi Minh wrote a personal message to Schwartz thanking the CVN, which, to them,
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“represented official recognition of the role of the CVN in the struggle against the war.”

212

From

then on the CVN enjoyed a correspondence with leaders of both the NLF and the DRV. In the
second issue of its paper, for example, the CVN reprinted a letter from the FLN expressing its
213

“militant solidarity” with the committee.

In the fall of 1967, the CVN published a letter from DRV

Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, in which he thanked the CVN for developing the struggle in
France, calling the committee “a magnificent example of the militant friendship between our two
214

peoples, which is destined to consolidate itself and develop ceaselessly.”

He ended

triumphantly, adopting the CVN’s own slogan, “as you put it in your message, our struggle is also
215

yours, dear friends, let’s move forward to victory!”

For CVN radicals, nothing could be a greater

endorsement of their politics – Vietnam was on their side.
French radicals also benefited from the presence of a North Vietnamese embassy in
Paris. To the dismay of the PCF, Vietnamese delegates not only spoke at CVN events, but often
collaborated with French radicals in organizing antiwar actions. Explaining how the Vietnamese
began to reorient towards the more radical CVN, Schwartz recalls how Mai Van Bo of the North
Vietnamese delegation called him during the bombing of Hanoi:
“I need your help. I’ve tried telephoning the Communist Party office, but in vain; I didn’t
reach anybody. So I’m calling you: can you organize a demonstration of the CVN as
quickly as possible?” The bridges linking us to the Vietnamese authorities were firmly
established. After that, every Vietnamese official visiting France wanted to meet with
216
us.
From then on, French radicals and Vietnamese authorities, from both the NLF and the DRV,
forged intimate relations, coordinating initiatives and discussing strategy.
But Vietnamese revolutionaries not only encouraged radicals in countries like France and
the United States, they also supported deeper international coordination among radicals in North
America and Western Europe. During the Brussels conference in March 1967, for example, Mai
Van Bo of the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris sent radicals a letter of appreciation for their
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international initiative.

217

In addition, as we will see, the Vietnamese came to agree with radicals’

assessment of the strategic value of antiwar struggle in North America and Western Europe.
Radicals interpreted all this as a ringing endorsement of the new radical international, which
continued to grow into 1967. Indeed, by the next convergence in January 1968, even American
groups such as SDS or SNCC would join. And while it was initially an explicitly antiwar
international, with Vietnam at its center, it would soon grow into a radical international tout court.
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CHAPTER 2: FORMS OF SOLIDARITY

In the first issue of Pour le Viet-Nam, the CVN’s official paper, Laurent Schwartz argued
that the resistance of the Vietnamese concerned the entire world. “[T]heir fight,” he announced,
“is our own.” Unfortunately, there were many in France, he went on, who opposed the war, but
felt the French could do little to affect its course. Countering the defeatists, Schwartz declared
that it was wrong to say that “only the American left and the Vietnamese can do something about
it.” “Our American friends feel very alone and often discouraged,” he explained to his readers.
“They need a broad international support.” Thankfully, the CVN was there to do just that. To
galvanize his readers, Schwartz went on to list the many forms of international antiwar solidarity
in which the CVN was presently engaged: the spectacular Six Heures teach-in; the campaign to
raise a million francs for Vietnam; international conferences organized by American, European,
and Japanese antiwar students; street protests and demonstrations; a vibrant transnational
network of draft resisters, deserters, and subversive soldiers within the army; an International
War Crimes Tribunal; and even creation of international brigades to fight in the jungles of
Southeast Asia. Contrary to what, some of the naysayers assumed, there was a great deal the
218

French could do to help end the war.

The Vietnamese, for their part, were immensely appreciative of all these efforts. They
placed particular emphasis, however, on the ideological struggle. Thus, they encouraged the idea
of international brigades, but not for their military contribution, but their overall propaganda effect.
Given this priority in winning the ideological war, both the NLF and the DRV were especially
enthusiastic about the Bertrand Russell Peace Tribunal, a war crimes tribunal, modeled after the
one held at Nuremburg, convened to try the United States for war crimes. The Vietnamese knew
that the results, whatever they may be, could never be enforced, but saw the Tribunal as an
excellent way of eroding the United States’ legitimacy in the western countries. Indeed, at this
point, many antiwar radicals felt the best way to help the Vietnamese was to change public
218
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opinion, win the ideological struggle, and isolate the U.S. government from its other allies in
Western Europe.
The Tribunal also signaled the growing popularity of the radical critique over the course of
1966 and into 1967. As radicals strove to better understand, then change, the system that made
this war possible, the Marxist problematic of anti-imperialism rose to dominance. Indeed,
whatever their differences, and there were many, anti-imperialist radicals in France, and later the
United States, all came to accept V. I. Lenin's positions on anti-imperialist struggle, the core of
which was the idea of the right of nations to self-determination. By this, however, radicals did not
mean individual rights protected by international law; they saw rights as collective in nature, firmly
within the framework of nation-states. As the Bertrand Russell Tribunal shows, despite all its talk
of international law, war crimes, and atrocities, radicals saw the subject of rights as the nation, not
the individual.
Of course radicals debated at length how anti-imperialist struggles should unfold, how
many stages this should take, or who should be involved, but almost no anti-imperialist seriously
disputed the centrality of the nation-state in the process of liberation. In the struggle against
imperialism, oppressed peoples would fight to build their own sovereign nation-state. For the
colonized and “semi-colonized,” as in Vietnam, this meant creating a unified nation-state where
none existed before. For those who had already won their formal independence, as in Latin
America, this meant securing real independence from imperialist intervention and aggression. For
those in the imperialist centers, anti-imperialist internationalism meant supporting all of these
struggles as best as possible. This centrality of the nation-state was, of course, double-edged. In
the context of the 1960s, with national liberation struggles unfolding across the globe, the alliance
with nationalism made perfect sense for anti-imperialists. But so profound was this connection
that if anything were to ever problematize the hopes that radicals invested in the revolutionary
nation-state, anti-imperialist internationalism could be thrown into disarray.

The War in Europe
80

In early April 1976, President Johnson dispatched Vice President Hubert Humphrey to
meet with European allies about the administration’s war policy, among other things. In France,
he tried to reaffirm Franco-American bonds, meeting with President Charles de Gaulle, laying a
wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and visiting the statue of George Washington on the
Place d’Iéna. With de Gaulle openly against the war, Humphrey was eager to rebuild relations,
especially now that international opposition had begun to mount. He made a toast to the
219

“friendship that has linked our country through so many years and so many trials.”

French activists had other ideas. In preparation for Humphrey’s arrival they had
organized a series of coordinated protests. Activists greeted Humphrey at the airport with chats of
“U.S. Assassins!” They positioned themselves on the route leading to the capital, screaming at
the Vice President, throwing rotten eggs, and pouring paint on cars. In Paris, they harassed him
incessantly, anticipating his every move. Indeed, the night before, some pasted posters that read
“Humphrey Go Home!” at venues he was supposed to appear. At the Arc de Triomphe, over a
thousand protesters broke past the barricades, unleashing police repression. That day, violence
engulfed the city. Demonstrators tore down the American flag at the American Cathedral in Paris
and burned it. Others threw rocks at the windows of the American Express office. Another group
attacked the offices of the New York Times. Battles raged into the night as protestors and police
clashed near the American Embassy, and later into the streets surrounding the Opéra.
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The day’s significance lay, however, not simply in its militancy, but in the fact that the
French protests served as just one act in a coordinated action across Western Europe. Indeed,
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Humphrey found little solace as demonstrators attacked him in every city he visited. In Belgium,
activists gave the Vice President a nasty welcome, showering him with rotten eggs. In Florence,
he met the same treatment, and one demonstrator pelted him in the face with a lemon. In Rome,
angry crowds forced the police to rush him to safety. Not to be outdone, demonstrators in West
Berlin threw eggs and bottles, chanting “Vice Killer.” In London, Humphrey’s last stop, only a hard
rain succeeded in thinning the ranks of demonstrators.
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Protestors everywhere targeted symbols of U.S. power. But such attacks cannot be
reduced to simple anti-Americanism, as many Americans argued at the time.

222

For the protestors

focused not only on the United States, but also their own governments. Indeed, the coordinated
protests against Humphrey’s European tour represented one of the first realizations of the plan
radicals sketched in March. If the United States’ power rested in part on the support it enjoyed
from its European allies, then the best way for Europeans to protest the war would be to attack
their own government’s implicit or explicit support for U.S. foreign policy. As the CVN explained,
they were not only protesting Humphrey, the representative of U.S. imperialism, “we denounce
the French government’s complicity in receiving him.”
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As Humphrey himself observed, the

French heckled the American anthem as well as the Marseillaise.
Assassin!” were often followed by “De Gaulle complice!”

225

224

Chants of “Humphrey

What’s more, to French activists, the

alacrity with which the French police began to beat protestors only confirmed the tight alliance
between the U.S. and French states. With the French police basically crushing opposition to the
United States’s war in Vietnam, American imperialism, the JCR argued, “is not solely to
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blame.”

226

Humphrey’s trip was a disaster. Not only did he meet protests in the streets, his
European allies raised concerns about the war. De Gaulle remained opposed. In Italy, Deputy
Prime Minister Pietro Nenni confided, “Europe does not understand American any longer.
America does not understand Europe. The root of the discord is the Vietnam War.”
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In Great

Britain, Prime Minister Harold Wilson urged a peace settlement, while his Foreign Secretary
criticized U.S. bombing. The Vietnam War was beginning to strain the alliance between the
imperialist powers. Of course, the United States was slow to listen. “No one with whom I spoke,”
Humphrey announced after his tour, “indicated basic disagreement with our presence and
objectives in Vietnam.” As for the protests, he argued, the United States simply needed to hire
European journalists to redouble publicity efforts.
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But protestors saw right through this. They felt the timing of the trip was especially
significant, for it showed the United States was not only getting bogged down in the battlefields,
but also beginning to lose the propaganda war. “The American troops continue to suffer defeat
after defeat,” a UJC-ml flier announced. “That’s why the United States Vice President Humphrey,
traveling salesman of US imperialism, has come to Europe, and today France, seeking the
support of the governments of the so-called ‘free’ world.”
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But instead of supporting him, the

UJC-ml gleefully observed, the “people of the European countries have shown through
particularly dynamic demonstrations their solidarity with the Vietnamese people and their hatred
of American aggression.”
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The Humphrey protests were not, however, the only form that antiwar solidarity assumed
at this time. Nor were the young radicals behind them the only antiwar activists. Indeed, as
Schwartz explained in the very first issue of the CVN’s paper, there were a variety of forms of
protest, and the CVN itself served as the nexus of a number of intersecting international antiwar
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networks. Some CVN activists tried to raise funds and collect supplies for Vietnam. Others tried to
organize an international boycott of American products. Still others organized an international
network to aid draft resisters, deserters, and antiwar activists still in the military.

Antiwar Soldiers
In the mid-1960s, some U.S. soldiers stationed in U.S. bases in West Germany began to
desert. Initially, most embarked for Sweden, but given the sour relations between the United
States and France, a trickle began to arrive in Paris as well, figuring they might be afforded some
protection. Their legal status remained uncertain until May 1967, when Louis Armsfield, an
American GI, was caught sleeping in a car in the Latin Quarter.
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Although obliged to return

deserters to the United States, the French government granted him permission to stay, giving
Armsfield a temporary visa and work card. By setting such a precedent, France began to attract
greater numbers of deserters.
American GIs often had assistance finding their way into Paris. In Germany, the German
SDS agitated around American bases, not only convincing GIs to desert, but helping them flee
the country.
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In some cases, GIs traveled directly into France, often meeting with French
233

radicals in cities like Strasbourg, then making their way to Paris.

Indeed, German and French

radicals collaborated closely in these sensitive missions, and German SDS often gave deserters
234

CVN addresses.

In other cases, deserters took a more roundabout path, often crossing

through the Netherlands. There, they received assistance from the Dutch Provos, who then sent
the GIs off on the next leg of the journey into France.
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Once in France, deserters found a number of organizations to help them find their way.
Two in particular worked to politicize desertion, both with ties to members in PACS and the
CVN.
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The first, called RITA, was organized Dick Perrin, a deserter, and had connections with

activists in France. Max Watts of PACS played an enormous supportive role, and the group used
Jean-Paul Sartre’s mailbox as their mailing address.
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Perrin and Watts announced the

formation of RITA in December 1967, during a televised press conference with Stokely
238

Carmichael.

As its name suggested, RITA aimed to organized soldiers inside the army. “RITA,”

the organization announced, “is a Resister inside the Armed Forces, an American Serviceman
239

who resists imperialistic aggression in S.E. Asia.”

As Perrin later explained: “We developed a

network with soldiers still inside the military, guys who wanted to take part but were reluctant to
desert. We made a point of saying that was okay. In fact, those antiwar GIs who saying in
240

became really helpful.”

Indeed, RITA hoped to organize resistance inside the heart of the U.S.

military machine itself. To reach these soldiers, RITA published ACT, the first GI paper written in
Europe by GIs, out of Paris and smuggled copies onto bases in West Germany with the help of
the Provos and German SDS.
The second organization was a bit more militant. It was closely connected to Henri
Curriel’s group Solidarité, and primarily organized by an American named Robert “Bo” Burlington,
who went by the nom de guerre “Arlo,” and PACS member Larry Cox.
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been deeply involved in the Jeanson network during the Algerian War.

242

Curriel, of course, had
As for Burlington, he

would later join the Weather Underground in the United States. It is no surprise, then, that the
group was somewhat conspiratorial and even paranoid.
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This second group also had deep international contacts. In 1967, a French representative
of the group contacted SDS during a visit to the United States, seeking further collaboration. In
July, SDS sent Greg Calvert to help build this transnational network of deserters and resisters.
Calvert had studied abroad in Paris in the early 1960s and the experience left a deep impression
on him.
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“The first anti-war demonstration I was ever in,” he later recalled, “was a demonstration
244

against the Algerian war, in Paris, France.”

He was particularly impressed with efforts to

organize draft resistance during the Algerian War, which no doubt had some role in his early
advocacy of pushing SDS to organize draft resistance, desertion, and support for antiwar
soldiers.
The group also enjoyed much deeper contacts with French radicals than Perrin’s. In April
1968, Larry Cox organized a public event where American soldiers, backed by representatives of
a number of antiwar groups, including the CVN, turned in their draft cards. To support resisters
and deserters living in France, French radicals decided to create the “French Union for American
245

Deserters and Resisters.”

Unfortunately, the repression following the events of May 1968 led to

the group’s demise. But French support for resistors continued to be such a major axis of antiwar
struggle that a new organization was built from the ashes, the American Deserters Committee
246

(ADC).

The ADC was in fact a fully transnational movement, with branches of the same name

in Montreal and Sweden. It distributed a publication, Second Front, in order to coordinate
struggles around desertion in Europe, North America, and Asia. For their part, the Vietnamese
were extremely support of the ADC’s efforts, and Tran Van Hue, representative of the NLF,
personally thanked its Swedish branch.
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Like its predecessor, it also enjoyed firm support from French radicals. On March 21,
1969, for example, figures associated with the CVN, like Sartre, Schwartz, and Vidal-Naquet,
founded a new organization, the Association for the Support and Defense of American Exiles
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(ASDAE), to support resisters and deserters in France, gather resources, organize their legal
defense if needed, and popularize their struggle. Beyond this, such an organization could
“facilitate contacts” between deserters, the American left, anti-imperialists in Europe and in the
Third World.
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This kind of “international solidarity,” the organizers concluded, constitutes “an
249

essential link in the anti-imperialist struggle that is developing every day in the world.”

Indeed,

given the post-May atmosphere, the ADC itself was extremely militant. Its manifesto firmly aligned
the group with the NLF, declaring, “We wish to express our solidarity with all the forces of the
Third World standing up to imperialist domination …”
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While these activities signaled growing international coordination between radicals in the
United States and France, and the deepening of an international front, they also illuminated some
crucial differences. Significant misunderstandings and disagreements had emerged between the
Americans and the French over media work, for instance.
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For the Americans, the primary

objective was to use public media to connect to other soldiers and address the American public.
For them, declaring their presence, holding press conferences, speaking out publicly about their
desertion were important forms of resistance. But for the French, many of whom had been
involved in the Resistance or with the Algerian FLN, where speaking out in this manner carried
severe consequences, the American approach seemed outrageous. This disagreement pointed to
a deeper mutual incomprehension over the objective of clandestine work in the first place. Given
their experiences, the French radicals involved in aiding U.S deserters brought with them very
specific ideas about clandestine operations, centralized organizing, and insurrectionary struggle,
imagining that the resisters and deserters network could trigger some kind of underground
revolutionary force inside the United States.
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The Americans, on the other hand, had no such

traditions to speak of, and imagined resistance and desertion completely differently. For example,
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instead of remaining secretive, they were eager to go public, which confounded the French.
Calvert remembers this frustration well:
I remember very clearly a conversation that I had with one of them. It sort of cleared the
air for me around these issues and this is why I talk about it. In the conversation I had
been pressed by people to come with some kind of organizational strategy and I was just
at my wit’s end to even begin to talk in the terms they were talking about, and I finally had
a conversation with a guy and we began talking about the situation he finally said, “I don’t
see why you need a clandestine organization.” He said, “It sounds to me, as you present
your political movement and the needs of that movement, that some people in your
country need to organize some clandestine services to provide services for people who
are in these situations, but,” he said, “it doesn’t make any sense to me that you organize
253
a clandestine organization,” and everything sort of clicked, too, for me.
Calvert’s experience also points to the learning process that resulted from these transnational
contacts. “So I came back to the States with a lot more knowledge about something that I really
didn’t know very much about before,” he concluded. “I also had my first really heavy exposure to
people who thought strictly in Leninist terms and were trying to devise a Leninist strategy for the
United States.”
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Indeed, as we will see, one of the most important differences between the

radical left in France and the United States was their relationship to Leninism. By the late 1960s,
most of the anti-imperialist radical left in France was firmly Leninist. This was not the case in the
United States, though that would soon change, in large part because of these emerging
transatlantic connections and future events in France.

International Brigades
Attempting to emulate the experiences of the Spanish Civil War, some French antiwar
radicals tried to organize international brigades as yet another form of international solidarity with
the Vietnamese. Although its precise origins are unclear, the idea seems to have been
encouraged very early on by the Vietnamese themselves. In March 1965, just as the United
States unleashed its massive bombing campaign of the North, the NLF announced that “if the
American imperialists continue to engage their troops and those of their satellites in Vietnam, and
to expand the war to the North and into Laos, the Front National de Libération will call on the
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peoples of different countries to send young people and soldiers to South Vietnam to join the
255

population in order to annihilate the common enemy.”

In France, a certain Trotskyist current known as the “pablists,” named after its leader,
Michel Pablo, welcomed the call with great excitement. The pablists had experiences with this
kind of solidarity. In 1949, the Fourth International organized international Work Brigades for
Yugoslavia, with the French sending over 1,500 volunteers, including future pablist leader Gilbert
Marquis. Later, during the Algerian War, a number of pablists became deeply involved in the
liberation struggle, with Pablo himself arrested for arms trafficking and printing counterfeit money.
Soon after the Vietnamese appeal, the pablists issued their own call exhorting readers to
“[o]rganize the international brigades to defend, whatever the cost, heroic Vietnam against the
256

barbarian imperialist oppressor.”

But while they were perhaps the most eager about the call,

the pablists were not alone. Other groups, like the JCR, quickly backed the idea.
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The call for

brigades was also formally endorsed by the CVN – which a few pablists such as Marquis,
Jacques Grimblat, and Michel Fiant joined – almost immediately after its formation.
By early 1967, the initiative attained a certain degree of seriousness. CVN co-founders
Jean-Paul Sartre and Laurent Schwartz supported the project, the first issue of the Comité’s
journal featured an article on the Brigades, Gilbert Marquis established an office for the
campaign, and the group began to publish its own journal, Le Volontaire. From there, the
movement grew to such a degree that in February 1967 Le Monde could write that two hundred
French volunteers, including twenty-five women, had signed up. In addition, the organizers had
made efforts to internationalize the campaign, revealing that they had received applications from
many other European countries, including Germany, Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, Sweden, and
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Switzerland.
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Ready to take the campaign to the next level, in May of that year, the French

contingent met with Le Dinh Nahn of the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris to present the first
list of 209 volunteers.

259

Publicly, the Vietnamese reaction was enthusiastic. As Le Dinh Nahn put it in his formal
letter to the organizers, later reprinted in Le Volontaire, “We thank you most sincerely and
appreciate this gesture that demonstrates your militant solidarity with the struggle we are leading
against the imperialist of the United States, for our national independence, and for peace in
Southeast Asia.”

260

Behind closed doors, however, Vietnamese representatives expressed firm

opposition to the plan. Marquis recalls how they were “received by the Vietnamese, who did not
discourage us, on the contrary, thanked us, but left us absolutely no hope that they would support
this campaign.”

261

One gets a sense of why in Tariq Ali’s autobiography. When Ali visited Vietnam in
February 1967 as part of the Russell Tribunal, Ali directly asked Prime Minister Pham Van Dong
about the possibility of organizing international brigades in emulation of the Spanish Civil War.
According to Ali, Pham Van Dong aired several concerns, but he seemed most opposed to the
idea because of its military impracticability. Brigades would be of little value in the North, given
the nature of the air war. As the Prime Minister put it, “this is not Spain in the thirties, where the
technological level of combat was primitive. You have seen the scale of the US attacks on us.
International brigades are no good against B52 bombers.”
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Furthermore, international brigades

would be ill suited to the kind of guerilla warfare waged by the NLF. “In the South,” he explained,
“any brigade from abroad would not be able to function effectively. Many areas we control by
night are overrun by the enemy during the day. We disappear very effectively because, after all,
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we are Vietnamese. Just imagine trying to hide several thousand European faces in the forests of
the South.”

263

In fact, not only would volunteers prove largely ineffective, they would likely

become a burden. The NLF would have to spend considerable time training recruits for guerrilla
warfare, constantly look after their safety, and expend precious resources keeping them alive. In
fact, Pham Van Dong continued, “even if we had them repair bridges and roads and schools and
hospitals we would be more worried about their safety and would have to expend more resources
on housing and looking after them.”

264

Civil or military, international brigades were off the table.

Why, then, had the Vietnamese themselves encouraged their formation? Indeed, Pham
Van Dong had himself promised that Vietnamese revolutionaries would call for “brigades of
foreign volunteers in the more or less near future and hope that there will be many Americans in
these brigades.”

265

What’s more, even after firmly rejecting these initiatives by North American

and Western European antiwar radicals, Vietnamese representatives continued to support the
idea of international brigades of some kind or another. For example, as late as July 18, 1968, the
North Vietnamese Ambassador to the United Arab Republic, Nguyen Xuan, announced that he
would be “very thankful” to receive applications from Americans willing “to come fight side by side
with the Vietnamese people against the common enemy, that is United States imperialism.”
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The reason for this attitude lay in what the Vietnamese felt was the immense propaganda
value of such an initiative. Though ineffective on the battlefield, the initiative to organize
international brigades could score a victory in the war of ideas. The mere fact that North
Americans and Western Europeans would even consider risking their lives to die in the distant
jungles of South Vietnam revealed the dedicated international support the NLF and North
Vietnam enjoyed in their joint struggle against the United States. If part of the American strategy
was to isolate Vietnam, then the formation of international brigades, even if only a possibility,
dispelled the illusion that Vietnam was alone. Moreover, talking about international brigades could
draw positive parallels with Spain, casting the Vietnamese revolutionaries in place of the heroic
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Spanish Republicans, and the Americans as the rebels, or worse, the Nazis and Fascists who
propped up General Franco’s rebellion against democracy. Indeed, by the 1960s, the Spanish
international brigades had achieved an almost mythical status, marking the apotheosis of
revolutionary internationalism. Evoking that legacy could lend a sense of legitimacy to the
Vietnamese fight.
Thus, although opposed to the idea in practice, the Vietnamese strongly encouraged it as
a form of propaganda, a powerful symbol of dedicated moral support. In his meeting with the
organizers of the volunteer corps in France, Le Dinh Nan confirmed that the corps could
nevertheless play an important role in developing “active propaganda” in France.
committee played along.
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The French

As Marquis put it, “[A]fter the meeting with the Vietnamese delegation

and Vietnam’s response, the volunteer corps became instead a means of propaganda.”
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The

effort to organize international brigades for Vietnam never came to fruition and would be
remembered as a rather marginal episode in the history of transnational antiwar activism.
Nonetheless, the attitude of the Vietnamese revolutionaries in this matter revealed something
very important about how they conceptualized international solidarity before 1968. For them, one
of the best things internationalism could do for the war effort was to help wage the ideological
struggle at an international level. While all forms of support were encouraged, ultimately, the
greatest strength of international coordination lay in its ability to help win with the war of ideas.

The Ideological Front
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“Entrevue avec les Vietnamiens,” Le Volontaire 4, 3.
In some respects, the arrangement held a certain benefit for the radicals as well. It could
demonstrate the depth of their opposition to the United States, the seriousness of their
commitment to the Vietnamese cause, and the selflessness of their internationalism. This is, for
example, why Huey Newton wrote to the NLF on August 29, 1970, offering “an undetermined
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The most famous example of ideological struggle was the International War Crimes
Tribunal (IWCT), sometimes called the Bertrand Russell Tribunal. Since the United Nations and
the International Criminal Court were both unwilling, and unable, to do anything about the
Vietnam War, British philosopher Bertrand Russell decided to take matters into his own hands,
organizing an international tribunal to try the United States in direct emulation of the famous
Nuremberg Trials. Russell collaborated with the Vietnamese from the very start. Already
corresponding with Ho Chi Minh since 1963, Russell sent two representatives, Ralph Schoenman
and Russell Stetler, to meet with the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam in the summer of
1965. The idea was met with great enthusiasm, and Nguyen Huu Tho, Chairman of the Central
Committee of the NLF, conveyed to Russell that the “National Liberation Front is ready to coordinate as actively as possible in all the work of the War Crimes Tribunal. Whatever assistance
is required from our Central Committee will be provided concretely and immediately.”
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In

February 1966, Schoenman and Stetler spoke directly with DRV Prime Minister Pham Van Dong
and Ho Chi Minh, who agreed to allow investigators into the North, provide them access to all
facilities, and make available witnesses and all evidence in their possession.
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The Vietnamese

felt the Tribunal could provide a venue for them to make their case before a larger audience,
272

especially one in the orbit of the United States.
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In an effort to expand the Tribunal, Russell wrote to Jean-Paul Sartre in April 1966. Sartre
readily agreed, as did others in the CVN. Indeed, French involvement proved decisive. The
French supplied key personnel: Sartre served as Executive President, Laurent Schwartz as coPresident, and dozens of French doctors, journalists, lawyers, filmmakers lent their services,
many traveling to Vietnam as part of the investigative teams. They also provided essential
273

logistical support and publicized the event at home and abroad.

The Tribunal ultimately came

to include Sartre, Schwartz, de Beauvoir, and Gisele Halmi from France; Stokely Carmichael,
former SDS President Carl Oglesby, James Baldwin, and Isaac Deutscher from the United
States; Lelio Basso from Italy; and playwright Peter Weiss from Germany; among many others.
During the fall of 1966, the Tribunal met to formalize its procedures. At the behest of the
French, Tribunal organizers decided that instead of putting individual U.S. officials on trial for war
crimes, the Tribunal would serve as an investigative commission to determine whether the United
States had committed war crimes.
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In November 1966, they posed five questions to establish

guilt: has the United States and its allies committed acts of aggression, has the U.S. military
made use of illegal weapons, has the U.S. bombed civilian targets, have prisoners and civilians
275

received inhuman treatment, and has the United States committed genocide in Vietnam?

To

answer these questions, the Tribunal not only collected as much documentary material as
possible on the nature of the war, but dispatched a series of research teams to gather firsthand
accounts in Vietnam. In addition, all those involved in the war were invited to submit their own
evidence, though the United States refused to participate. First at Stockholm in May 1967, then in
Copenhagen in December 1967, the Tribunal convened to review the evidence, hear testimonies,
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and reach a decision. In the end, the United States was found guilty of all charges, including
genocide.
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In levying these charges, the Tribunal had a very specific political objective. Most of the
organizers felt that part of the U.S. government’s war effort hinged on its ability to win over public
opinion not just at home, but in the world. As a brochure by the “French Friends of the Russell
Tribunal” put it, the IWCT “can facilitate rising consciousness in the western world.”
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Thus, even

though the Tribunal could not possibly enforce its judgment, its findings had the potential to
weaken the United States in the arena of world opinion. As Sartre explained in his inaugural
statement, the Tribunal is a jury, but the “judges are everywhere: they are peoples of the world,
and in particular the American people. It is for them that we are working.”
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Thus, although the

Tribunal was designed in part to show the Vietnamese that they were not alone in their struggle,
the primary goal was to turn audiences in the West against the war. In so doing, the Tribunal
hoped to shift the balance of forces on the ideological terrain of struggle.
This was precisely the kind of support the Vietnamese wanted from their North American
and Western European comrades. As Ho Chi Minh himself put it in his telegram to the preliminary
meeting of the IWCT, “By condemning these crimes the international tribunal will promote
worldwide indignation against the American aggressors and will intensify the movement of protest
among the peoples of all countries in order to demand the end of this criminal war and the
withdrawal of the troops of the U.S. and their satellites.” “It will contribute to the awakening of the
conscience of peoples of the world against American imperialism,” he concluded.
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Prime

Minister Pham Van Dong underlined the point: the Tribunal “will have a wide and profound impact
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on world opinion, helping to intensify and widen the international movement of solidarity with the
Vietnamese people.”

280

To accomplish this task, the Tribunal did not aim to morally condemn the U.S.
government, but to measure the United States and its allies against its their laws. As Sartre put it
in a 1967 interview, the goal was to determine “whether imperialist policies infringe laws
281

formulated by imperialism itself.”

The United States, and all the major powers, had agreed at

Nuremberg to a certain category of laws governing the conduct of war. The Tribunal sought to
show that the United States had violated these. Through its investigative missions, the Tribunal
amassed a wealth of information about napalm, cluster bombs, civilian bombings, exfoliants,
torture, and so forth. Since the United States had lied about the conduct of the war from the
beginning, much of this information was quite revelatory for most in North America in Western
Europe. Even committed antiwar activists had little knowledge of the details. It was the Russell
Tribunal, for example, that famously broke the news about cluster bombs, weapons designed not
to kill but to brutally maim.
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Drawn as they were from copious notes, photographs, and films, the

accounts were vivid: villages reduced to rubble, children blown apart, civilians burned alive,
churches bombed on Sundays, rice crops devastated, dams destroyed. The United States was
not engaged in a simple peacekeeping mission; it was to kill as much of the civilian population as
possible in order to reduce the Vietnamese will to resist.
In addition to focusing on the conduct of the war, the Tribunal also explored its causes.
Lyndon Johnson justified American intervention by arguing that the United States was simply
aiding a free country from foreign invasion. In short, the United States was in Vietnam to protect
the national sovereignty of the Vietnamese. But the Tribunal showed quite clearly that the only
threat to Vietnam's sovereignty was the United States. Marshaling massive historical evidence,
the Tribunal completely disrupted the U.S. government’s narrative about the war. As the lawyer
Lelio Basso put it, “not only is there not a war between two States of Vietnam, there is not even a
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civil war in the South. This war is being fought by the people on one side and by the American
army and mercenary troops on the other.”

283

In this way, Basso concluded the Stockholm session

by arguing that the United States had violated Articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter, the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the UN General Assembly Resolution of December 1960.
How effective was the Russell Tribunal? Although most accounts assume the Tribunal
was virtually ignored, recent scholarship shows this was far from the case. Indeed, historian
Harish C. Mehta has shown that the United States saw the Tribunal as a significant threat.
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The

Undersecretary of State drew personnel from the CIA, State Department, Department of Defense,
and U.S. Information Agency in a disinformation campaign. The group talked with French and
British governments about how to handle the Tribunal, ordered U.S. ambassadors abroad to
convince foreign governments sympathetic to the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation to withdraw
their support, collaborated with the press to convince the world that the Tribunal was a
Communist front, and even considered hosting a counter-trial, but ultimately felt doing so would
only draw more attention to the Trial. Indeed, it was certainly the weight of the alliance between
the United States and European countries that led de Gaulle and then Prime Minister Wilson to
ban the Tribunal from meeting in France and Britain respectively.
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Thus, far from ignoring the

Tribunal, the U.S. government worked hard to combat its potentially deleterious effects on the
ideological front. Indeed, the U.S. government had reason to worry. A 1967 White House study
concluded that the DRV was effectively winning the psychological war in the “free world” against
the U.S. war.
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But even with the massive repression, the Tribunal did have important effects. In France,
the Tribunal’s findings were warmly received. The CVN distributed information from the Tribunal,
held a giant meeting at the Mutualité to review the results, and devoted an entire issue of its
magazine to the IWCT. The JCR actively publicized the Tribunal in France, and published an
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287

interview with Ralph Schoenman in its paper.

CVN activists were not the only ones transmitting

the information. Indeed, Le Monde republished Sartre’s concluding remarks on its front page,
288

allowing the Tribunal to reach a more mainstream audience.

Given the lengths the U.S. government went to undermine the Tribunal, it had much less
impact in the United States. But while the mainstream media, liberal and conservative, denigrated
the proceedings, the Tribunal still managed to have an important effect. Karen Wald, an American
antiwar journalist, wrote a report immediately after the Stockholm session for her comrades in the
antiwar movement at home. Drawing out the implications of the Tribunal for American antiwar
activists, she argued that the proceedings could be of immense value, allowing activists to
become better informed and supplying “documentation and evidence which can be used to recruit
289

and mobilize new people into the anti-war movement.”

In particular, she continued, activists

could use the arguments about the violation of international law, the detailed information about
atrocities, and the evidence proving that the assault on civilians was not “accidental” but part of
the entire war plan.
In his speech at the second meeting in December 1967, Carl Oglesby, former President
of SDS, confirmed that the results the first meeting earlier in the year “has played an important
role in the developing of the consciousness which instills this militancy among America’s young
people.”
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Oglesby confided that the “the Tribunal has been the clearing-house of information on

the war.” He clarified:
You understand that it is not always easy for us, unless we probe with great care, to get
an accurate picture of what actually happens in Vietnam. The Tribunal’s capacity for
pulling together and then developing in a most public and conspicuous way the elements
291
of the war’s reality – this function has been very important to us in the United States.
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Thus, if the Tribunal did not change opinion in the United States directly, it did so indirectly, by
funneling important information to activists to then use strengthen their case against the war,
thereby shifting American opinion.
Oglesby also added that the Tribunal had provided a “clear legal base” for draft resisters
since its findings proved that the United States had itself broken international law.
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Indeed, this

was actually one of the primary motivations for forming the Tribunal in the first place. In 1965, the
Bertrand Russell Peace foundation provided support for David Mitchell, who went on trial in 1965
for resisting the draft. Aiming to go further, Russell hoped that by presenting concrete evidence
that the United States was committing war crimes, the Tribunal could give resisters legal grounds
for opposing the war.
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Lastly, Oglesby said, the Tribunal “creates in the very heart of the West a window on the
Third World.” In this, he concluded, the Tribunal has played a vital role in “the building of an
294

internationally solid New-Left movement.”

Indeed, the IWCT formalized contacts across

borders, made new ones, and expanded the reach of the network to include representatives from
countries like Pakistan, Cuba, and so forth. It was through the IWCT, for example, that the French
CVN came to build stronger ties with SNCC and black radicals in the United States, a connection,
we will see, that proved transformative.

The Anti-Imperialist Imaginary
The Tribunal did not simply accumulate evidence in a neutral manner; it presented the
Vietnam War as a just struggle for national liberation against imperialism. As Russell himself
argued in the introduction to the published proceedings, “I hope the peoples of the Third World
will take heart from the example of the Vietnamese and join further in dismantling the American
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empire.”

295

His remarks signified a dramatic shift in the discourse about the war. From the

formation of the Tribunal in 1966 to its final session in December 1967, the radical critique of the
war gained currency: the objective was not simply to end the war, but to end the system. As
radicals grasped to understand the larger system that made the Vietnam War possible, they
increasingly embraced Marxism.
Of course, many activists in France were already familiar with some version of Marxism.
But over the course of the 1960s, Marxism experienced a kind of renaissance. There are many
reasons for this surge in popularity, but two stand out in particular. First, worldwide anti-imperialist
struggles of the late 1950s and early 1960s politicized many young activists in France, creating
the conditions for the positive reception of Marxism. “The basis of our politicization,” Étienne
Balibar recalls, “was mostly that of the anti-colonial and, consequently, anti-imperialist
296

mobilization.”

Second, at the very moment that activists were searching for cutting-edge radical

theory to make sense of the radical struggles unfold around them, Marxism entered a period of
reinvention and experimentation. Figures like Sartre, Henri Lefebvre, and especially Louis
Althusser were taking Marxism in new directions.
The Vietnam War unfolded in precisely this context. The Vietnamese liberation struggle,
which was in large part led by communists, further radicalized youth, presented an example of a
living struggle guided by Marxism, and helped circulate the Marxist critique of imperialism. Thus,
even radicals in the United States, who had a very complicated relationship to Marxism in the
1960s, began to follow suit by the late 1960s.
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In this way, the Vietnam War not only

encouraged the growth of the radical left in France and the United States, or enabled a new kind
of radical internationalism; it was also one major factor in the renewed international popularity of
Marxism in 1960s North America and Western Europe. With the revival of Marxism, the system
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came to be fully identified as imperialism, and the struggle against that system as anti-imperialist.
But what, exactly, did it mean to be anti-imperialist?
Radicals in the late 1960s understood anti-imperialism within not just a Marxist
problematic, but a specifically Leninist one. To be clear, not all radicals in the 1960s were
Leninists. Indeed, there were quite a few anarchist, libertarian, and left communist currents at this
time, especially in France, that explicitly broke with Lenin on a number of points. But these groups
were often miniscule, and often did not play as great a role in anti-imperialist solidarity.
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On the

other hand, those radicals who cared about the struggle against imperialism, which in France and
the United States was by far and away the majority, for the most part derived their idea of antiimperialist revolution from V. I. Lenin. For that reason, it is worth briefly sketching a genealogy of
this anti-imperialist problematic.
The roots of the Leninist conception of anti-imperialism lay in an earlier Marxist debate
299

over the “national question” in Europe.

With numerous peoples across Europe subjected to

imperial rule, the problem of national oppression became one of the burning issues of the early
twentieth century. Marxists offered a number of competing solutions. Lenin’s answer to the
problem was the right of nations to self-determination: oppressed nations had the right to secede
and form independent nation-states if they so desired. Although it would become hegemonic by
the 1960s, this position was in fact fiercely opposed by other Marxists, both inside and outside the
Bolshevik Party. The most forceful and wide-ranging critique of the idea of national selfdetermination, however, came from the pen of Rosa Luxemburg.
Luxemburg began by dismantling the idea of rights. Why, she asked, did Marxists have to
articulate the struggle against national oppression in the language of rights? “The duty of the
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class party of the proletariat to protest and resist national oppression,” she wrote, “arises not from
any special ‘right of nations,’ just as, for example, its striving for the social and political equality of
sexes does not at all result from any special ‘rights of women’ which the movement of the
bourgeois emancipationists refer to.”

300

Not only was this recourse to the language of rights

unnecessary, it was dangerous. The language of rights, she continued, suggests a universal
solution, valid in all contexts, and thus a “metaphysical cliché” no different from “rights of man”
301

and “rights of citizen” peddled by the bourgeoisie.

With this universal “right” socialists would be

compelled to defend national aspirations to statehood anywhere, ignoring the specific historical
context, the opposite of what Marxism entails.

302

Even worse, asserting the right to self-

determination not only flattens particular political conjunctures; it is incapable of actually achieving
anything political. Asserting a nation’s right to self-determination, she added sarcastically, is
303

“worth as much as the “right” of each man to eat off gold plates.”

From the criticism of rights, she moved to the concept of the nation. The nation,
Luxemburg argued, cannot be accepted as the agent of liberation. Indeed, the nation is but a
fiction that obscures irreconcilable class divisions within a social formation. As a result, there is no
guarantee that the nation would lead to socialism. In other words, just because a nation
determines itself does not mean that it will do so in a progressive manner. In fact, chances were
very high that “nationalism” would inevitably become the nationalism of the bourgeoisie. The
nation, she continued, has become a fundamental aspect of capitalist accumulation and is
therefore incompatible with the emancipation of the proletariat. Indeed, the nation, she argued, is
an “efficient instrument of conquest” and domination, not only against the proletariat, but also
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against other nations.

In this context, talking about the rights of nations “can serve only as a

means of deception, of betraying the working masses of the people to their deadly enemy,
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imperialism."

305

Lastly, Luxemburg suggested that the nation actually possess a kind of internal

logic or compulsion towards war, giving the cautionary example of Latin America, where new
nations almost immediately went to war against each other after freeing themselves from
Spain.

306

Not only could nations not guarantee peace, she concluded, they could in no way

ensure economic independence; the right to self-determination would ineluctably result in the
economic subordination of newly liberated nations to the great powers, turning political freedom
into a fiction.
These were devastatingly sharp criticisms, and they deserve to be studied again today,
especially in light of the disasters of national liberation since the 1970s. That said, Luxemburg’s
indisputably strong criticisms of the right of nations to self-determination were not only
encumbered by many weak and dubious claims, but fastened to a deeply flawed conceptual
framework, which in turn led to highly unsatisfactory political positions. Luxemburg’s entire line of
argument rested on a philosophy of history in which capitalism was said to necessarily move
towards higher levels of concentration, thus erasing local economies, particular cultures, and
individual nation-states themselves. For her, this was a progressive development, and socialism,
“the legitimate child of capitalism,” would simply take over and complete this tendency towards
complete centralization: a completely interconnected economy, the formation of single
international culture, and the disappearance of nations.
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Given this view, the call for national

self-determination, which suggested small national units, the fiction of small economies, and the
preservation of cultural particularities, was not only impossible, the demand for it was completely
regressive. The goal was to push this natural development along towards socialism, not step
backwards.
Luxemburg believed that national differences would tend to dissolve as capitalism
progressed, and that the national question would be definitively resolved with the socialist
revolution, which was in fact the primary question. But national oppression would no doubt
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continued to exist until then, so what was to be done in the meantime? For Luxemburg,
oppressed nationalities should remain within the larger imperialist social formations until the
socialist revolution, but depending on the particular circumstances they could pursue a variety of
options. For people like the Poles, who formed the majority of a specific territory, the solution was
regional autonomy within the larger multi-national empire. But for others, like the Jews,
Lithuanians, or peoples of the Caucuses, the solution could only be some kind of local selfgovernment, legal protection, schools, and support for minority languages.
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There were a few problems with such a solution. First, such provisions did not guarantee
that the dominant nationalities would cease to oppress the minority peoples in these regions.
Second, and following from the first, since Luxemburg saw national oppression as primarily
cultural or economic, her approach denied other aspects of national oppression, namely, the
political. Third, Luxemburg’s solution completely discounted the colonies. Their struggles, she
argued, would have no impact on the course of the world revolution. They could only be liberated
by revolution in the capitalist core.
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This solution no doubt left many quite displeased. What, for

example, were the Vietnamese supposed to do? Quietly endure their oppression until the workers
made a successful socialist revolution in France?
Lenin responded ferociously, diving straight into the heart of the matter. He began by
pointing out that while Luxemburg began her disquisition by declaiming against generalities,
insisting instead on the need for concrete historical investigation, it is Luxemburg herself who has
succumbed “to the sin of abstraction and metaphysics.”
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Luxemburg’s philosophy of history, he

explained, had led her to completely misread the trajectory of capitalist development, discounting
crucial historical differences and particularities. The future, he predicted, would not see the
disappearance of nations into more homogenous units, but their rapid proliferation. Lenin argued
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that the nation-state was not regressive, but the primary political form of capitalist
311

development.

Those remaining multinational empires, he prophesized, would soon crumble

into distinct nation-states as capitalist spread across the globe.
Indeed, for Lenin, the crux of the national question was the question of uneven
development. The call for the right of nations to self-determination, he clarified, was specific to the
underdeveloped East. For him, the countries of the capitalist core had already passed through a
series of crucial structural transformations resulting in territorial unification, constitutions, national
assemblies, domestic markets, and so forth. This process, Lenin continued, was only just
beginning outside North America and Western Europe. “In Eastern Europe and Asia the period of
bourgeois-democratic revolutions did not begin until 1905. The revolutions in Russia, Persia,
Turkey and China, the Balkan wars – such is the chain of world events of our period in our
312

‘Orient.’”

Justifying the Bolshevik’s affirmation of the right of nations to self-determination, he

wrote: “It is precisely and solely because Russia and the neighbouring countries are passing
through this period that we must have a clause in our programme on the right of nations to selfdetermination.”
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For Lenin, the right to self-determination was therefore the expression of the

coming transformations of these peripheral societies, which would include the formation of
centralized states, the adoption of constitutions, and the establishment of democratic rights.
Luxemburg, writing from Germany, assumed that the revolutionary process in the West
would lead the way for all other oppressed peoples. Here, in the capitalist heartlands, a mature
proletariat could directly confront the bourgeoisie. Other classes, like the peasants, were
314

retrograde and doomed to disappear.

Other struggles, like that over national oppression, were

effectively distractions from the struggle for socialism. For Lenin, writing from the peripheries, the
revolutionary process had to take place differently. In Russia, the proletariat was miniscule, most
Russians lived as peasants, and national minorities fought against the Empire. For Lenin, the
revolution here had to be contradictory and complex. “Whoever expects a ‘pure’ social
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revolution,” he later wrote, “will never live to see it. Such a person pays lip service to revolution
without understanding what revolution is.”

315

This meant that socialists not only had to ally with

other classes and class fractions, but they also had to support other struggles which might not be
immediately socialist. Thus, given the Russian context, struggles for national liberation, even if
not socialist, could play a crucial role in the overall struggle by striking blows against the Tsarist
Empire.
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Lenin’s approach to the national question, then, was purely strategic. The right of nations
to self-determination, he thought, was the precondition, he thought, for political articulation in
certain parts of the world: the unification of heterogeneous elements into a political unity. Indeed,
for Lenin, the national question was purely political, not an economic, psychological, or cultural
one. The question of self-determination, he wrote, “belongs wholly and exclusively to the sphere
of political democracy.”

317

This is precisely where he differed from Luxemburg. “For the question

of the political self-determination of nations and their independence as states in bourgeois
society, Rosa Luxemburg has substituted the question of their economic independence,” he
318

argued.

“This is just as intelligent as if someone, in discussing the programmatic demand for

the supremacy of parliament, i.e., the assembly of people’s representatives, in a bourgeois state,
were to expound the perfectly correct conviction that big capital dominates in a bourgeois country,
319

whatever the regime in it.”

Thus, for Lenin, it made no difference if new nations could not be

economically independent. To begin with, no country was wholly independent. “Not only small
states, but even Russia, for example, is entirely dependent, economically, on the power of the
320

imperialist finance capital of the “rich” bourgeois countries.”

But more importantly, the national

question was not about economics at all.
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In this, Lenin insisted that the right of nations to self-determination was not the obligation
of nations to secede.

321

The right, he clarified, was the precondition for politics. As historian

Michael Löwy has explained, Lenin “understood, firstly, that only the freedom to secede makes
possible free and voluntary union, association, co-operation and, in the long term, fusion between
nations. Secondly, that only the recognition by the workers’ movement in the oppressor nation of
the right of the oppressed nation to self-determination can help eliminate the hostility and
suspicion of the oppressed, and unite the proletariat of both nations in the international struggle
322

against the bourgeoisie.”

Thus, for Lenin, the right to national self-determination was the basis

for a deeper international solidarity.
Luxemburg had mounted a string of brilliant criticisms only to deliver a highly
unsatisfactory political solution. Lenin, on the other hand, seemed to have found a solution that
emphasized the agency of oppressed peoples outside the capitalist core, included them in the
global revolutionary struggle, and therefore encouraged future internationalism. The solution no
doubt had its limits, which would become apparent over the course of the twentieth-century, but
Lenin’s advocacy of the right of nations to self-determination had an undeniable appeal. For
better or worse, his positions on the national question achieved hegemony in the international
communist movement after 1917.
Since Lenin himself had directly connected the national question, which had originally
been limited to Europe, to the larger “colonial question,” his ideas also came to play a
fundamental role in shaping the way Marxists approached the question of anti-colonialism and
anti-imperialism.
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As prospects of revolutionary victory in the West subsided into 1920, Marxists

began to turn their attention to the struggles outside of Europe. Thus, at the Second Congress of
the Communist International that year, Marxists from both the West and the East met to establish
the Comintern’s formal policy with regards to the colonial question. Lenin’s “Draft Thesis on the
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National and Colonial Question,” served as the basis for the discussion. In the Theses, Lenin
argued that the revolution in the colonies and what he called the “semi-colonies” would effectively
pass through two stages. In the first, colonized peoples would join in a united front for national
self-determination. Socialists, based in the tiny working classes, had to unite with both the
peasants, the immense majority of the population, and also “enter into a temporary alliance” with
the “bourgeois-democratic” movement, that is to say, the nationalist movement of the
bourgeoisie.

324

Lenin added that while socialists should always retain their autonomy, advancing

an independent socialist perspective throughout the struggle, the first phase could not be
socialist. Only after the successful realization of national liberation, and with it the fundamental
tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, would the struggle for socialism proper commence.
At the Second Congress M. N. Roy objected to Lenin’s call to ally with the national
bourgeoisie, arguing that the bourgeoisie would only pursue the most reactionary aims.
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As a

compromise, the Comintern made an important distinction between two kinds of nationalist
bourgeois movements, the “reformist” and “revolutionary.”

326

The former, to be called the

“bourgeois-democratic” movement, was not to be supported; the latter, to be called “nationalrevolutionary” movement, could serve as an ally. In addition, Roy, as well as other
representatives from the colonized countries, pressured Lenin to consider the possibility that
revolutions in these “backwards” countries might be able to bypass capitalism on the way to
socialism. As Lenin explained in his report to the Comintern, “the Communist International should
advance the proposition, with the appropriate theoretical grounding, that the backwards countries,
aided by the proletariat of the advanced countries, can go over to the soviet system and, through
certain stages of development, to communism, without having to pass through the capitalist
327

stage.”
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But as historian Demetrio Boersner has shown, Lenin and Roy assumed this path
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would only be possible if the communist revolution met imminent success in the West. Barring
that outcome, the revolution in the colonies and semi-colonized would have to pass through two
328

stages.

Thus, in his Supplementary Theses, Roy stated quite clearly that the “revolution in the

colonies will not be a communist revolution in its first stages.”

329

Immediately after the Congress,

Marxists realized the revolutionary wave in the West was about to subside, and the Comintern
formalized the two-stage policy, establishing the basic outlines of the anti-imperialist problematic
within which most radicals would operate until the crisis of the late 1970.
Subsequent thinkers introduced important clarifications over the decades. For radicals in
the 1960s, the two most important were the Maoist and the Trotskyist. Following the Comintern
model, Mao Zedong reiterated that in colonized and semi-colonized countries like China, the
revolution would have to pass through two stages, the bourgeois-democratic and then the
proletarian-socialist. In the first stage, the revolution would result in “the joint dictatorship of all the
330

revolutionary classes of China headed by the Chinese proletariat.”

Politically, this joint

dictatorship, which Mao called the “New Democracy,” would include the peasantry, the petty
bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, and even the nationalist bourgeoisie. Its two primary tasks would be
the overthrow of imperialism through national liberation and the destruction of feudalism through
agrarian reform. Under the “new-democratic republic,” the state would nationalize enterprises
such as banks, railways, and airlines, but “the republic will neither confiscate capitalist private
property in general nor forbid the development of such capitalist production as does not ‘dominate
331

the livelihood of the people.’”

Mao insisted that given the backwardness of China, the first step

would take a “long time.” “We are not utopians,” he wrote, “and cannot distance ourselves from
the actual conditions confronting us.”
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Mao’s model soon spread to other anti-imperialist

struggles, and became one of the pillars of what was called “Maoism” in the 1960s.
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Leon Trotsky proposed yet another variation. As is well known, since 1905, Trotsky had
begun to experiment with a different strategy in which the two distinct revolutions, the bourgeoisdemocratic and the socialist, could in fact be compressed into a single continuous revolution, or
what he called the “permanent revolution.”

333

However, Trotsky did not initially extend this new

model to the colonized world, considering it far too backwards. Indeed, when it came to China,
Trotsky fully supported the stagist model; he only felt that proletarian socialist forces should
preserve their autonomy.

334

After the disastrous results in China, however, Trotsky extended the

model of permanent revolution to the colonized world, making three basic arguments about the
nature of anti-imperialist revolution there.
First, in the colonized world there could be no sharing of power between different classes
in some kind of “democratic dictatorship.” There would emerge either a bourgeois dictatorship or
a proletarian dictatorship, which meant, first, that, contra Mao, the national bourgeoisie could not
be counted as an ally; and second, that other classes, like the peasantry, had to follow one or the
other, but could not ally as equal partners. “This means that the ‘democratic dictatorship of the
proletariat and the peasantry’ is only conceivable as a dictatorship that leads the peasant masses
behind it.”
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Thus, the only form of revolution in the Third World had to be proletarian

dictatorship. Second, Trotsky insisted that there could not be an “intermediate stage” on the way
336

to socialism, but only a single continuous revolutionary process.

“The democratic revolution

grows over immediately into the socialist, and thereby becomes a permanent revolution,” Trotsky
explained.
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This meant that a “country is ‘ripe’ for the dictatorship of the proletariat of the

proletariat not only before it is ripe for the independent construction of socialism, but even before
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338

it is ripe for far-reaching socialization measures.”

Lastly, although Trotsky still conceptualized

the process as a single “national democratic revolution,” which would culminate in an
independent nation-state, he insisted that the process could not be completed within a single
state, but required an international revolution. It was this position that most Trotskyists followed
into the 1960s and 1970s.
In the 1960s, most anti-imperialists in France, and later the United States, adopted some
version of these two models, which framed their solidarity with Vietnam. That said, the
Vietnamese Communists, themselves sophisticated Marxists in their own right, developed their
own unique model. Like all other models, the basis of the Vietnamese model of anti-imperialist
revolution derived directly from Lenin’s theses. Like many radicals from the colonized world, Ho
Chi Minh was first exposed to these ideas during a sojourn in Paris.

339

In July 1920, he studied
340

Lenin’s writings on imperialism, published in L’Humanité, the main paper of the PCF.

He

recalled years later:
There were political terms difficult to understand in this thesis. But by dint of reading it
again and again, finally I could grasp the main part of it. What emotion, enthusiasm,
clear-sightedness and confidence it instilled into me! I was overjoyed to tears. Though
sitting alone in my room, I shouted out aloud as if addressing large crowds: “Dear martyrs
compatriots! This is what we need, this is the path to our liberation! After then, I had
341
entire confidence in Lenin, in the Third International.
In 1929, Vietnamese radicals from three parties merged into the Vietnamese Communist
Party, soon to be converted to the Indochinese Communist Party on instructions from the
Comintern. In October of the following year, the ICP adopted a formal program that would guide
Vietnamese communism for the next forty years. Directly modeled on the Leninist problematic,
the 1930 Theses followed the classic two-stage model of revolution. The two primary tasks of the
“bourgeois democratic” phase would be to “do away with the feudal vestiges and the model of
pre-capitalist exploitation and to carry out a thorough agrarian revolution; on the other hand, to
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overthrow French imperialism and achieve complete independence for Indochina.”

342

In so doing,

the “bourgeois democratic revolution is a preparatory period leading to socialist revolution.”

343

But

the Vietnamese added a surprising twist, arguing that crucial historical events – namely, the rise
of global revolutions, the capitalist crisis, and the consolidation of the first socialist state –
necessitated a revision of the model. In this context, the 1930 Theses asserted, “Indochina will
bypass the capitalist stage and advance direct to socialism.”

344

Although the imminent collapse of capitalism prophesized by the Comintern in 1930 did
not come to pass, subsequent developments led Vietnamese revolutionaries to believe that the
unique path they had sketched for themselves remained valid. As Le Duan, General Secretary of
the Vietnamese Workers Party, explained years later, the confluence of a set of unique
conditions, such as the existence of a weak national bourgeoisie, the underdevelopment of
capitalist relations, a very militant peasantry, a tightly organized Communist Party, and the
certainty of aid from the Soviet Union meant that the “North can and must bypass stage of
capitalist development to advance to socialism.”
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Reflecting on the Vietnamese experience in 1971, Le Duan explained that in the first
stage of the revolution the Vietnamese revolutionaries formed a united front, which included the
bourgeoisie, to simultaneously fight the French and complete the tasks of the “national
democratic” revolution. After 1954, however, the country was split in half, and the national
democratic revolution was completed in the North, but left unfinished in the South, creating an
imbalance. The Vietnamese communists therefore had two tasks ahead of them. In the North, the
Democratic Republic effectively functioned as the dictatorship of the proletariat, abolishing
capitalist relations, building the productive forces, launching a cultural revolution, and constructing
socialism. In the South, the NLF, working with the North, would have to complete the prerequisite
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national democratic revolution, which meant breaking up the landed estates, redistributing land,
and uniting with the North to create an independent nation-state.
In this way, the complexities of the Vietnamese experience had radicals from a variety of
competing currents vying to claim Vietnam as their own. The Maoists approvingly cited the VWP’s
theoretical distinction between the two stages, and believed they perceived the two-stage model
in action, above all in the South. But some Trotskyists argued that in leaping through the various
stages towards socialism in the North, the Vietnamese Workers Party, the party that had
repressed Trotskyists in Vietnam, was in fact following a path described by Trotsky. Indeed, for
the Ligue Communiste, the successor of the JCR, the Vietnamese revolution represented “the
concrete verification of the theory of the permanent revolution.”

346

The specific historical

conditions in Vietnam, the international context, and the decisive leadership of the VWP, the
Ligue argued, had pushed the Vietnamese to move from democratic tasks to socialist ones.
As the Vietnamese case shows, anti-imperialists remained divided over crucial questions
about the nature of anti-imperialist revolutions abroad. Who was to lead the revolution? Who
could be included? How many stages would it require? How long would these last? What were
their tasks? Despite these differences, virtually all anti-imperialists shared the same fundamental
assumption: the conjugation of anti-imperialism with national-self-determination. Of course, antiimperialists recognized the pitfalls of nationalism, but they argued, following Lenin, that
nationalism always had a dual character, the nationalism of the oppressor nations and the
nationalism of the oppressed nations. And the only way to combat national oppression, they
continued, was through the right to self-determination. They were also all cognizant of the
dangers of states, but as Marxists they believed that some kind of “non-state” state was still
essential for the transition to socialism. Thus, all major trends of radical anti-imperialism believed
that anti-imperialism required the struggle for an independent nation-state, which would then
create the conditions for the subsequent transition to socialism. These independent nation-states
would then cooperate in some kind of international.
346

Vietnam, Laos, Cambodge: même combat! Cahier “Rouge” no. 14 (Paris: François Maspero,
1970), 3.
113

It should be noted that the struggle against imperialism does not necessarily need to
result in the formation of a nation-state. Indeed, other polities could replace the nation-state, such
as communes. Yet since Lenin, the link between anti-imperialism and the nation was
unbreakable, serving as the foundation for the imaginary of the radical anti-imperialist left not only
in the United States and France, but of anti-imperialist radicals across the globe, including the
Vietnamese themselves. For the colonized, this meant creating an independent nation-state
where none existed. For those with their own nations, it meant defending national sovereignty
from imperialist depredations. For those living in the imperialist centers, it meant assisting, in
whatever way possible, all those oppressed by imperialism to realize their own sovereign nationstate. In this way the fight for national liberation became the dominant principle of anti-imperialist
internationalism. In the 1960s, empires crumbled, dependent nation-states tried to achieve a
more robust independence, and oppressed peoples across the world joined together. The
inspiring successes of national liberation struggles and the enormous promises they seemed to
hold for the future of the world put wind into the sails of anti-imperialist internationalism. But the
alliance between anti-imperialism and nationalism could be double-edged. For if national
liberation were to ever fail, then anti-imperialism would pay dearly.

The Rights of the Nation
For better or worse, Marxist anti-imperialists ignored Luxemburg’s warnings and
embraced the language of rights. By the 1960s and 1970s, the impulse to frame the struggle
against imperialism in the framework of rights had become second nature. But what did antiimperialists mean by rights? In recent years, historians have spilled considerable ink on this
question. Turning their attention to this period, some have argued that when anti-imperialists
spoke about rights, they meant principally the right to national self-determination, which should be
contrasted with the idea of individual rights. Thus, scholars like Samuel Moyn argue that whatever
the rhetoric, the vast majority of anti-imperialists did not make use of anything like the human
rights discourse so common today. Others have pushed back, arguing that the idea of human
114

rights was in fact not only present in the 1960s, but a crucial aspect of the struggles of these
decades, often pointing, for example, to how black radicals in the United States like Malcolm X
framed political demands in the language of human rights.
As an international gathering of anti-imperialists appealing to international law it is no
surprise that the Russell Tribunal has emerged as a flashpoint in this debate. For Robin
Blackburn, for example, the Tribunal was a clear example of how activists employed ideas about
human rights to further social justice. As evidence of the Tribunal’s immersion in rights talk, he
argues, “One of its members, Jean-Paul Sartre, declared in this journal that its deliberations were
animated by ‘a certain idea of human life.’”
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As further evidence, he points out how in later

iterations the Tribunal investigated the crimes of Latin American dictatorships. Moyn, however,
insists on a sharp distinction, arguing that this version of internationalism was a “world away from
348

the human rights movement soon to form.”

While the debate over the Tribunal seems

academic, the stakes are in fact quite high; determining exactly what anti-imperialists meant by
human rights at this time is essential to understanding the broader trajectory of the radical left,
and, as we will soon see, explaining its eventual collapse decade later.
At first sight, the Russell Tribunal would seem to have fit neatly under the sign of human
rights. Activists invoked the Nuremburg trials, made regular appeals to international law,
investigated acts of atrocity against the Vietnamese, and often spoke of “war crimes,” “humanity,”
and “inhuman treatment.” But upon closer inspection, we see that despite the rhetoric, the
participants had a very different conception of rights in mind. In his inaugural statement to the
Tribunal, Sartre tried to explain the need for a Tribunal following in the footsteps of Nuremberg.
Curiously, though, while he made reference to genocide, Nazi crimes, and the Nuremburg Trials,
he justified the new Tribunal with reference to the recent phenomenon of decolonization. “You
know the truth. In the last twenty years, the great historical event has been the struggle of the
Third World for its liberation: colonial empires have collapsed and in their place sovereign nations

347

Robin Blackburn, “Reclaiming Human Rights,” New Left Review 69 (May-June 2011): 135.
Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 142.
115
348

have come into existence, or have recovered a lost traditional independence, destroyed by
colonization.”

349

This, Sartre says, is the historical context of the Tribunal: the struggle for national

sovereignty.
But all this, he continues, has “taken place in suffering, in sweat, and in blood.”

350

Because of the great suffering surrounding the struggle for national independence, he concludes,
351

“A tribunal such as that of Nuremburg has become a permanent necessity.”

In this way, Sartre

argued that the precedents set at the Nuremburg Trials should now be used to safeguard the
rights of oppressed people against imperialist aggression. He added that after Nuremburg, no
one can “prevent people from thinking back to its sessions whenever a small, poor country is the
object of aggression, prevent them from saying to themselves, ‘but it is this, precisely this, which
was condemned at Nuremberg.”

352

Sartre, it seemed was trying to rewrite history: Nuremberg’s

objective was to uphold the right of nations to self-determination, condemning imperialist
aggression against “small, poor” countries seeking liberation. Whether this was actually what
Nuremberg did is irrelevant; what is significant is that for the participants Nuremburg established
guidelines for trying violations to the rights of national self-determination. And it was precisely this
crime that had brought them together.
This was a view shared not only be other members of the Tribunal, but by the
Vietnamese themselves. For their part, the Vietnamese covered the Tribunal very closely,
publishing articles, informing the people about the proceeds, and organizing their own meetings.
In the Courrier du Vietnam, Do Xuan Sang, deputy Secretary General of the Association of
Vietnamese jurists, argued that the Tribunal was not only a great political act, but carried
tremendous importance from a “juridical point of view.”
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Arguing that “sovereignty,

independence, unity, and territorial integrity” formed the “touchstone” of contemporary
international relations, it was imperative to condemn all infractions of the right to national self349
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determination.

354

In his message to the preliminary meeting of the Tribunal, Ho Chi Minh

underlined this point: “The tribunal is an action of world-wide importance for justice and for the
right of people to self-determination.”

355

Violating this right was in fact the primary crime to be

investigated.
Everyone involved in the Tribunal understood rights in a collective manner. In his opening
statement, Russell explained: “There is one reason for this International War Crimes Tribunal:
Overwhelming evidence besieges us daily of crimes without precedent. Each moment greater
horror is perpetrated against the people of Vietnam.”

356

Indeed, participants thought in terms of a

collective subject, not individuals. The victims were not individual Vietnamese, but the
“Vietnamese people” as a whole. The War Crimes Tribunal certainly investigated crimes that may
now be considered attacks on individuals: for example, whether the United States and its allies
had taken hostages, tortured or mutilated prisoners, or forcibly relocated communities. But at the
time, these were not seen as violations of the basic liberties of individual Vietnamese. There was
no appeal to their “human rights.” Operating as they did within the framework of collective rights
to national self-determination, anti-imperialists saw these kinds of atrocities as attacks on the
entire people: a collective people with a collective right to nationhood. Hence their particular focus
on genocide, which they understood not as affronts to individuals, but as an attack on an entire,
coherent people, on the totality. As Russell put it, the opposite of genocide was national
liberation: “the war knows no middle course between national salvation and genocide.”
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In short, the Tribunal, despite its constant references to international law, was not
interested in establishing international legal protection for individuals. Instead, as with all Marxist
anti-imperialists at the time, it understood rights only within the context of the right of nations to
self-determination. If anti-imperialists occasionally spoke of human rights, they did so only
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rhetorically. Indeed, for them, human rights could only mean the right to national selfdetermination.
It is important to also point out that while the Vietnamese and their antiwar comrades
abroad justified their revolution in terms of the right to self-determination, President Lyndon
Johnson justified his war in the same terms. In his famous 1965 speech explaining to the
American public why their sons were dying in a country few could find on a map, Johnson
explained, “Tonight Americans and Asians are dying for a world where each people may choose
its own path to change. This is the principle for which our ancestors fought in the valleys of
Pennsylvania. It is the principle for which our sons fight tonight in the jungles of Viet-Nam.”

358

In

other speeches, he explicitly named that principle. Thus, on September 29, 1967, just a couple
months before the Second Session of the Russell Tribunal, Johnson flatly announced, “We
cherish freedom – yes. We cherish self-determination for all people – yes. We abhor the political
murder of any state by another …”

359

This is the same language one could expect from Ho Chi

Minh. Indeed, the NLF and DRV argued that their war was a justified struggle for national selfdetermination: an imperialist power had divided their country in half, denied them the right to
choose their fate, and now murdered them in order to prevent the formation of a unified,
independent nation-state. The United States justified its war by arguing that North Vietnam was
violating the national self-determination of South Vietnam.
In this way, the Vietnam War was also a struggle over the meaning of self-determination,
which reflects just how hegemonic the idea had become not only on the left, but in mainstream
political culture. Neither the anti-imperialists nor the U.S. government justified their actions or
articulated their objectives in the language of human rights, but as the struggle between one
nation-state against another. This, however, would begin to change over the next few years, as
the U.S. government, anti-imperialist radicals in France and the United States, and
representatives from the NLF and North Vietnam began to talk about individual rights. This shift is
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reflected in the fact that the Bertrand Russell Tribunal focused on what were increasingly called
“human rights violations” in Argentina and Brazil. But that was not until 1973, and to use this as
evidence of what radicals thought in 1967, as Blackburn does, prevents us from understanding
exactly how and why the meaning of rights began to change.
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CHAPTER 3: FROM PROTEST TO REVOLUTION

On December 6, 1967, a handsomely dressed Stokely Carmichael addressed four
thousand French antiwar activists at the Mutualité in Paris. After a five-month world tour that
included stops in Cuba, Vietnam, Algeria, Syria, Guinea, Tanzania, and Sweden, Carmichael
landed in Paris, his final stop before returning to the United States. Although French police
detained immediately after he stepped off the plane at Orly airport, on Tuesday, December 5, he
remained defiant. When the authorities let him free, he set to work, filling his schedule with
political meetings with Laurent Schwartz, army resistor Dick Perrin, black expatriates, and antiwar
organizers. The highlight of his brief, but eventful stay was a thunderous speech at the CVN’s
latest event, “Che Guevara Week,” a weeklong action intended to commemorate Che’s death
earlier that year.

360

There, beneath a giant poster of Che Guevera, and flanked by NLF flags, Carmichael
launched into a militant critique of the Vietnam War. Calling for a shift from protest to active
resistance against the war, he declared: “We don’t want peace in Vietnam. What we want is a
Vietnamese victory over the U.S. In spilling our own blood to help this victory, we feel that we’re
not paying too high a price, even if we have to destroy the structures of the United States.”
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Soon after, at a press conference, he was even more blunt:
The war in Vietnam must be brought to the United States of America. If Ho Chi Minh
cannot sleep, Lyndon Johnson shall not sleep. The babies in Vietnam are in threat of
their lives, and people in the United States must be in threat of their lives. If fire is raging
in Vietnam, then fire must rage in the United States. And as long as the United States
oppresses black people inside the United States and oppresses Vietnamese in Vietnam,
362
we have a common bond against a common enemy.
Carmichael’s militant speech captured an important shift among antiwar radicals. Despite
coordinated international protest, the U.S. military continued to escalate the war. In light of this,
some radicals now argued that the kind of ideological struggle exemplified by the Bertrand
Russell Peace Tribunal was simply insufficient; radicals had a duty to end the war by any means
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necessary. As Julius Lester, a member of SNCC, explained in his reflections on the Russell
Tribunal, “Commitment is something that Sartre has written extensively on, and I presume that his
involvement at Stockholm was an example of his commitment. If so, possibly what this age needs
is not commitment but just caring about other people and being willing to die because you care so
363

much.”

The black nationalists who led this revolutionary charge argued that African Americans

had a particularly important role to play in this respect: as an “internal colony” inside the United
States, they faced the same enemy as the Vietnamese, and could therefore open a second front
right inside the belly of the beast. Other radicals quickly began to embrace this idea, arguing that
the best way to aid the Vietnamese was to bring the war home. Soon after, Che Guevara codified
this new strategy of anti-imperialist internationalism, calling for “two, three, many Vietnams.” For
their part, representatives from the National Liberation Front and Democratic Republic of Vietnam
welcomed Che’s new internationalist strategy, and the General Secretary of the Vietnamese
Workers Party, Le Duan, even called for a worldwide anti-imperialist front.
The CVN’s decision to invite Carmichael to Paris reflected, but also contributed to, the
growing radicalization of French antiwar activists. Although many radicals were already
committed Marxist anti-imperialists, and therefore open to the theoretical possibility of revolution,
making domestic revolution to aid the Vietnamese abroad was not on the agenda. Even though
they had already made a strong case for including Europe in the international antiwar struggle,
antiwar activism was primarily oriented towards winning the ideological struggle, putting pressure
on their governments, and condemning NATO. But over the course of 1967, the escalation of the
war in Vietnam, the growing militancy of movements in the United States, and domestic struggles
in France, signaled to many French radicals that making revolution at home may not seem so
farfetched after all. Thus, when Carmichael spoke at the Mutualité in December, he struck a
chord, articulating what French radicals were starting to think. The time for revolution had come.
Although they did not confront U.S. imperialism in the same way as African Americans or
Latin Americans, French radicals began to suggest that they, too, could play an important role in
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this anti-imperialist front. Building on earlier arguments about how U.S. imperialism depended on
the support of other capitalist states, they argued that opening a “second front” in Europe would
deal a decisive blow to imperialism, relieving the pressure on the Vietnamese. Antiwar activism
grew more militant, culminating in February 1968, when thousands of radicals from over a dozen
European countries met in Berlin to coordinate their efforts to open new fronts across the
continent. As they met, the NLF launched a surprise attack against the U.S. military throughout
South Vietnam. If the Vietnamese could repel the most devastating military machine in history,
they thought, then surely they could make revolution.

The Internal Vietnam
In December 1965, a teach-in at Wayne State University took a confrontational turn.
Activists sneered at the American flag, prowar students interrupted speeches by screaming the
Star Spangled Banner, and a conservative heckler was punched in the face. Amidst the chaos,
John Watson, a black nationalist, stood up, connected the war in Vietnam to the one waged
against African Americans at home, and, in what amounted to a declaration of war, threatened
364

that “the only fighting we are going to do is right here in America.”

Even the organizers, some

of whom were professed socialists, thought he had gone too far. Three years later, declarations
such as this would become commonplace. In 1965, they appeared outrageous.
John Watson, however, was not alone. He belonged to a vibrant constellation of black
nationalist organizations that emerged in the cities of the northern United States in the early
1960s. In Detroit, Watson was joined by Luke Tripp, John Williams, Charles (Mao) Johnson,
General Baker, and Gwen Kemp in the leadership of a revolutionary nationalist student collective
named UHURU. In early 1965, some of them regrouped as the Detroit chapter of the AfroAmerican Student Movement (ASM), editing a journal for black students called Razor and a
publication for factory workers called Black Vanguard. In Oakland, radicals led by Ernest Allen,
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who by chance met an UHURU delegation on an illegal trip to Cuba in 1964, organized the Soul
365

Students Advisory Council, which produced the journal Soulbook.

The organizational node of this emerging black nationalist network was the Revolutionary
Action Movement (RAM), a small but extremely influential clandestine group founded in the spring
of 1962.

366

Beyond its core of young radicals, which included Max Stanford, Donald Freeman,

and Wanda Marshall, RAM was closely associated with nearly all the major radical figures of
black nationalism. James Boggs, for example, served as the group’s Ideological Chairman,
Robert F. Williams as International Chairman, and Malcolm X as International Spokesman.

367

RAM not only kept disparate radicals tightly connected, largely through the tireless efforts of its
field organizer, Max Stanford, but it also played a crucial role in the circulation of revolutionary
black nationalist theory through its journals Black America and RAM Speaks.
What brought these groups together was the fundamental idea that African Americans
constituted an oppressed nation within the United States. This belief, of course, was not invented
by radicals in the 1960s, but can be traced at least as far back as the nineteenth century. It had
formed the basis of the various Back-to-Africa proposals, with Marcus Garvey’s perhaps only the
most famous. While many of these exodus formulations may have seemed somewhat farfetched
even at the time, they persisted deep into the twentieth century precisely because they captured
the unfulfilled desire for full self-determination. In the 1930s, the idea of black national selfdetermination was reframed in a Marxist register by the Communist Party USA as the famous
“black belt thesis.”
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In the 1950s and early 1960s, inspired by the wave of national liberation movements
overthrowing colonialism across the globe, many American radicals came to imagine the history
of black struggle through the optic of colonialism.

368

While the comparison with colonialism was

not new, the preferred term in radical discourse had always been the nation, and whenever the
term colony was used, it was often put in quotation marks, suggesting a distance, perhaps even
discomfort with the word.

369

Indeed, the Communist International, pushed by black radicals such

as Harry Haywood, Claude McKay, and others to formally adopt a resolution in 1928 recognizing
African Americans in the Southern United States as an oppressed nation, clearly stated that while
national oppression of colonial peoples and African Americans was “of the same character,” it
was “not correct to consider the Negro zone of the South as a colony of the United States.”

370

In the early 1960s, however, the idea of the nation, while by no means abandoned, was
increasingly recoded in the language of the colony, the black nation understood as a specifically
colonized nation rather than just an oppressed or minority one. For instance, after returning from
Cuba in 1960, Harold Cruse argued

371

:

From the beginning, the American Negro has existed as a colonial being. His enslavement
coincided with the colonial expansion of European powers and was nothing more or less
than a condition of domestic colonialism. Instead of the United States establishing a
colonial empire in Africa, it brought the colonial system home and installed it in the
372
Southern states.
Since African Americans were a colonized people, even if they happened to live within the
imperialist world, their struggles could only be understood within the framework of national
liberation.
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This line of reasoning had a powerful impact on a number of young revolutionaries,

especially those in RAM, and the colonialist paradigm, now shorn of its scare quotes, became
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hegemonic among black radicals, forming the basis, for example, of Stokely Carmichael’s
influential concept of Black Power.

374

The idea of the “internal colony” helped black radicals clarify their status as oppressed
peoples inside the heartland of the oppressors, as pockets of the Third World inside the First. In
addition, it gave even greater legitimacy to their struggles. For decolonization seemed to be an
unstoppable force – new nations appeared everywhere, the old colonial powers crumbled, and
even those in the imperial centers wished to be on the right side of history. Drawing attention to
their own colonized situation allowed the internally colonized to ride the anticolonial wave. As
Cruse put it: “Those on the American left who support revolutionary nationalism in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America must also accept the validity of Negro nationalism in the United States. Is it not
just as valid for Negro nationalists to want to separate from American whites as it is for Cuban
nationalists to want to separate economically and politically from the United States?”

375

Above all, it was precisely this “colonial consciousness” that allowed transnational
solidarities to emerge, creating the possibility of an international of the colonized. This is why
black nationalist organizations like RAM were so fervently internationalist. RAM was not only
inspired by the Cuban revolution, decolonization in Africa, or the Chinese Communists; it believed
that African Americans, as a colonized people, formed an integral part of what they called the
“Bandung World.”

376

“We must all do what is necessary to gain our rightful freedom,” they

declared, “for the world can never be free until Black America is free, and Black America cannot
377

be free until the Bandung world is free.”

This self-identification as a colonized people allowed African Americans to advance a
vision of solidarity with the Vietnamese that was inaccessible to many other radicals in North
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America and Western Europe.

378

They could oppose the war not only on the grounds that African

Americans were disproportionately drafted, that they faced racial discrimination at the front, or
even that the money wasted in Vietnam could be better spent assisting poor black communities –
all arguments mobilized by more moderate African American leaders, such as Martin Luther King,
Jr. For black nationalists, the basis of their solidarity with the Vietnamese lay in the fact that they
experienced an analogous form of colonial oppression.

379

African Americans, they argued, lived the same colonial situation, facing the kinds of
racial discrimination, legal injustices, economic domination, and political violence that other
colonized peoples like the Vietnamese did. “When a child is murdered by bombs in the Congo, or
Vietnam,” young black nationalists powerful reminded each other, “it is the same as a child
murdered in a church bombing in Alabama or in Harlem.”

380

In addition, African Americans and

Vietnamese shared a special bond since they not only suffered the same colonial violence, but
confronted the exact same enemy. “The same white man who is killing our brothers in Vietnam,”
Black Women Enraged (BWE), an early black nationalist women’s group closely affiliated with
RAM, explained, “is lynching our black brothers here in Mississippi, Los Angeles, and New
York.”
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American imperialism, black nationalists argued, was waging not one, but two wars, one

at home against African Americans, another abroad against the Vietnamese. “The gas used in
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Vietnam,” they claimed, “was first ‘tested’ in Selma, Ala.”

382

Lastly, both sides fought for the same project: national liberation. On Independence Day
1964, for instance, RAM penned an open letter of solidarity, titled, “Greetings to Our Militant
Vietnamese Brothers,”
On this Fourth of July 1964 when White America celebrates its Declaration of
Independence from foreign domination one hundred and eighty-eight years ago, we of
the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) congratulate the Vietnamese Front of
National Liberation for their inspiring victories against U.S. imperialism in South Vietnam
and thereby declare Our Independence from the policies of the U.S. government abroad
383
and at home.”
Like the Vietnamese, whose own declaration of independence quoted the American Declaration
of Independence of 1776, RAM believed, as so many black nationalists had argued before, that
African Americans had to win independence, even if this meant forming a separate black state.
The strong parallelism between Black Americans and Vietnamese articulated by RAM
and other early black nationalist groups became a defining trope in radical discourse. Vietnamese
face the US army; African Americans face the American police. Vietnamese are shot; African
Americans lynched. Vietnamese are denied full civil rights in South Vietnam; African Americans
are denied the same freedoms in the Southern United States. Vietnamese are racially degraded;
African Americans confront racial discrimination throughout the United States. In the words of a
later Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) pamphlet, which reproduced this
parallelism in its very structure, with images of African Americans on the one side, and
Vietnamese on the other: “black people in Washington want: black power … The colored people
of Vietnam want: Vietnamese Power.”
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Occasionally such comparison bordered on

straightforward identification. For example, Soulbook closed a 1967 issue with the following
announcement: “To the Vietnamese people: your confidence and determination lends impetus to
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our own struggle for national liberation, North America’s “internal Vietnam,” and renews and
revitalizes each day our unshakable faith in mankind. SOCK IT TO ‘EM!!!”

385

Given this idea of solidarity, it is no surprise that radical African Americans were the first
in North America and Western Europe to seriously argue that the best way to aid their comrades
was to open another front inside the imperialist world. If African Americans lived the same
colonial experience, faced the same enemy, and held the same desires for emancipation, black
nationalists argued, then they could not limit themselves to simply holding demonstrations,
fighting the draft, or pressuring the American government to negotiate, but had to follow the
Vietnamese and wage armed struggle inside the United States. Ridiculing Martin Luther King,
Jr.’s threat to help the Vietnamese by using non-violence tactics to push the American
government into negotiations, John Watson, General Gordon Baker, and other young black
nationalists argued it was time to use Vietnamese tactics to help African Americans win their own
war against American imperialism. “Let us remember, first of all,” they wrote, “that the
Vietnamese people have already shown that they really know how to handle Charlie. We support
the Viet Cong, they are our blood brothers, having spilt their blood fighting the same white racist
beast which we have! The Viet Cong know how to take care of themselves. It is high time we
learned to do the same.”

386

“Cowboy Johnson wants to double the daft induction into the white

U.S. army of slavery,” they continued. “Well my program calls for tripling that number of recruits
into an Army of Black Freedom Fighters.”

387

The Black Army was no idle threat. In fact, RAM was busily forming a youth army, called
the Black Guards, which was to be the forerunner of a Black Liberation Front (BLF) intended to
wage revolution inside the United States.
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Inspired by Robert F. Williams, RAM and other

nationalist organizations not only experimented with the idea of armed guerilla warfare, but
practiced with firearms, studied military strategy, and made preparations for the coming
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insurrection.

389

RAM members even participated in the famous Watts Riots in Los Angeles, which

they saw as “the inauguration of the guerilla war.”
For RAM, Watts was intimately connected to the war in Vietnam, a point captured by the
agenda for the conference on Black Power they called for September 4-5, 1965 in Detroit,
Michigan. Two of the key tasks were to “evaluate the Los Angeles Campaign,” and to “discuss the
afroamerican’s international responsibility and the war in Vietnam.” In November 1965, RAM’s
Chairman-in-Exile, Robert F. Williams, made these links explicit to the Vietnamese, when he
delivered a speech at the International Conference for Solidarity with the People of Vietnam in
Hanoi, North Vietnam. “As a representative of the Revolutionary Action Movement, I am here to
give support to the Vietnamese people in their struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression,” he
said. But this was not enough:
Not only do we condemn, protest, and raise our fists in indignation at these brutal crimes
perpetrated against the noble patriots of this gallant land, but we promise our brothers,
and let the whole world bear witness, that we shall intensify our struggle for liberation in
the so-called free world of the racist USA. We shall take the torch of freedom and justice
into the streets of American and we shall set the last great stronghold of Yankee
390
imperialism ablaze with our battle cry of freedom! Freedom! Freedom now or death!
RAM’s pioneering ideas about internal colonization, armed struggle, and international
solidarity had a profound influence on other, more visible organizations. RAM introduced Huey
Newton and Bobby Seale, both of whom joined the Soul Students Advisory Council, to black
nationalism and revolutionary Marxism.
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The Black Panther Party, SNCC, and others eagerly

adopted RAM’s idea that making internal war against the American empire would be the best way
392

to support the National Liberation Front (NLF).
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Americans led by David Dellinger, Tom Hayden, and others met representatives of the NLF in
Bratislava, Czechoslovakia.

393

There, John Wilson of SNCC told his Vietnamese counterparts

that “we feel very close to your struggle and understand it to its fullest since we are a colonized
people also.”

394

He continued:

It is not our job to give our brothers in arms advice. But it’s our job to do what we can to
forward their struggle for liberation and self-determination. Therefore it is our job to
disrupt American society by any means necessary. The duty of a revolutionary who finds
himself captured in the heart of imperialism is to destroy that imperialism by any means
necessary so that it cannot carry its aggression to other people of color around the
395
world.”
“We believe this linkage is necessary,” he concluded, “because the goals of our struggles are the
same and we have the same enemy.

396

The Vietnamese, for their part, applauded African Americans for helping the Vietnamese
by making revolution inside the United States, lending legitimacy to their claims. An August 1966
article in the Courrier du Vietnam, North Vietnam’s primary foreign language newspaper – printed
in French as well as English, and therefore read by radicals in North America and Western
Europe – explained:
The first front against American imperialism is to be found in Vietnam. The second is in the
United States itself. In this country there are 20 million Blacks oppressed, exploited,
despised like slaves… they realize that they share a common enemy with the Vietnamese
people – American imperialism – and that to win freedom and equality, they must, like the
397
Vietnamese people, oppose counter-revolutionary violence with revolutionary violence.
Surprisingly, although this article, acknowledged the special bond between the Vietnamese and
African Americans, it simultaneously expanded the idea of the second front to include the white
antiwar movement as well. These two movements, the white and the black, “fusing into an
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398

imposing force,” the article read, “constitute the Second Front against American imperialism.”

African Americans and white radicals could both offer tremendous assistance to the Vietnamese
since they were strategically placed inside the United States, able to wage the struggle behind
enemy lines, so to speak. “Attacked on both fronts,” the article concluded, “American imperialism
will be defeated by the American people and the Vietnamese.”
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Most white radicals in the United States, however, did not take the offer seriously. Some
accepted that African Americans could play this role – the organizers of the famous October 1967
march on the Pentagon, for example, officially declared, “We recognize that there is only one
struggle – for self-determination – and we support it in Vietnam and in Black America.”
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Most,

however, did not feel that white Americans could play this kind of revolutionary role. Some, like
the Communist Party USA (CPUSA), were happy to link the war to struggles at home, but like
most of the official Communist Movement, did not call for revolution, either at home or abroad,
believing the war could end through negotiations.
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Others, such as the Socialist Workers’ Party

(SWP) felt the best way to end the war was not to bring it home, which sounded adventurist, but
to agitate around a single-issue campaign for immediate withdrawal.
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The Progressive Labor

Party (PL) called for revolution, but eventually condemned all national liberation struggles,
including those of African Americans at home and the Vietnamese abroad, as reactionary.
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As

for Students for a Democratic Society, by far the largest formation on the American left, while
some of its members did identify with the NLF, even to the point of trying to share their struggle,
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this was often framed within a moralistic perspective. For instance, at the very same 1967
meeting in Bratislava, Tom Hayden reportedly said, “now we are all Viet Cong.” While the media
spun this as a declaration of war, he was not suggesting that American radicals emulate the Viet
Cong ’s model of guerilla warfare in the United States, but that Americans should share the
suffering of the Vietnamese victims. As Hayden, bemoaning the misquote, clarified later, the “test”
of solidarity “is whether we as Americans can identify enough with the suffering and ordeal of the
Vietnamese people to feel what they feel, and not turn away. So when the Pentagon carries out a
search-and-destroy mission and demands to know where are the Viet Cong, we will be able to
step forward and say, ‘Here we are, take us instead …’”

404

Thus, with few exceptions, the white

American left, though bestowed a place in the second front, did not accept the offer at this time.

Multiplying the Fronts
If white Americans were not ready to join the second front, radicals elsewhere were. In
April 1967, one revolutionary fighting deep in the jungles of Bolivia issued an appeal for not only a
second front, but for multiple fronts. In his final address to “the peoples of the world,” Ernesto Che
Guevara laid out what, in the words of one radical, would become “the internationalist manifesto
405

of our generation.”

Che’s vision of solidarity was simple: he proposed that the best way to help

the Vietnamese would be to create a worldwide front against American imperialism. Of course,
although he was one of the earliest defenders of the Vietnamese revolution, the idea of a
worldwide anti-imperialist front preceded him, perhaps most powerfully expressed at the first
406

meeting of the Tricontinental in January 1966.

After all, the Tricontinental, which brought

together delegates from Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the first international body committed
to the overthrow of imperialism to be organized by the Third World itself, unanimously recognized
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the program of the FLN and the four points of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, offered its
active support to the revolution, and created a continuing solidarity committee. In his closing
speech, Fidel Castro even offered to send Cubans to fight there:
Thousands and thousands of Cubans have expressed the desire and readiness to go
anywhere in the world where they may be needed to help the revolutionary movement and
this is logical. If the Yankee imperialists feel free to bomb anywhere they please and send
their mercenary troops to put down the revolutionary movement anywhere in the world,
then the revolutionary peoples feel they have the right, even with their physical presence,
407
to help the peoples who are fighting the Yankee imperialists.
The Vietnamese welcomed this tremendous show of support, proposing a worldwide front
to combat American imperialism. Since the “struggle, destiny, and future of the Vietnamese
people are tied to those of the peoples of the three continents of Asia, Africa, and Latin America,”
the Courrier du Vietnam’s report declared, their task was to “concentrate all their efforts in order
to defeat, together with the Vietnamese people, the new military adventures of Yankee
imperialism.”

408

This meant demonstrations, boycotts, financial donations, and even sending

“volunteers to fight alongside the Vietnamese people.”
But in 1967, Che advocated a different vision.

409

410

Instead of dispatching revolutionaries to

Vietnam, as Castro offered, he suggested that the best way to assist the Vietnamese revolution
would be to intensify struggles wherever else American imperialism was engaged. Vietnam, he
said, is “isolated”; to break that isolation, revolutionaries had to “create, two, three, many
Vietnams.”

411

Instead of fortifying one front, they had to build new ones.

While in certain respects Che merely updated an already familiar idea of solidarity, his
contribution nevertheless proved decisive. Not only did he articulate a complex strategy into an
elegantly poetic slogan, he found a way to justify the move from the two to the many. While the
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Vietnamese often spoke of the “second front,” it was not until Che that radicals across the globe
could seriously contemplate a plurality of coordinated fronts. Above all, he personally
demonstrated how his sensational slogan could be operationalized; he lived his vision of
solidarity, setting an example for others to follow.
Of course, Che primarily had Latin America in mind. It is often forgotten that the phrase
“two, three, many Vietnams,” is used twice in that address, the first time in overt reference to
Latin America. “America, a forgotten continent in the last liberation struggles,” Che explained, “will
today have a task of much greater relevance: creating a Second or a Third Vietnam …”

412

Latin

American countries faced the same kind of imperialism as the Vietnamese, he said. While they
had won their independence long ago, unlike the newly decolonizing countries of Asia and Africa,
they were the first to feel the brunt of American imperialism, which had now subsumed the
colonialism of the old European empires. Latin America, more than anywhere else, offered the
most fertile terrain for building new fronts against imperialism. At the same time, however, Che’s
grandiloquence pushed the idea further, suggesting that any country facing Yankee imperialism
could become a front. Many Vietnams would “flourish throughout the world,” he prophesized, as
American imperialism would be “impelled to disperse its forces under the sudden attack and the
increasing hatred of all peoples of the world!”

413

While Latin America was perhaps best poised to

make new fronts, it was not the only place where this could happen.
Vietnamese representatives had the opportunity to officially welcome his conceptual
discovery at the first meeting of the Organization for Latin American Solidarity (OLAS) in Havana,
Cuba the following July: “when ‘2, 3, or many Vietnams,’ as comrade Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara puts
it, emerge, when in the very heart of the USA the movement of the American people in struggle,
particularly the black sector, develops with the force of a storm, it is certain that North American
imperialism can no longer stay standing.”
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Solidifying this emerging alliance between the

Vietnamese, Latin Americans, and African Americans, SNCC’s Stokely Carmichael spoke at the
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meeting as well.

415

“The struggle we are engaged in is international,” he argued, “we know very

well that what happens in Vietnam affects our struggle here and what we do affects the struggle
of the Vietnamese people.”

416

OLAS’s General Declaration echoed the sentiment, formalizing the

mutual reciprocity of their struggles: “the heroic struggle of the people of Viet Nam aids all
revolutionary peoples fighting against imperialism to an inestimable degree and constitutes an
inspiring example for the peoples of Latin America.” OLAS ended the conference by advocating
for armed struggle throughout Latin America.

417

This emerging worldwide front against U.S. imperialism prompted the NLF to update its
program almost immediately after the conference. Departing from the original 1960 statement, the
new program assumed an aggressive internationalist stance. In Part 4, Section 3, the NLF vowed
to “actively support the national liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin
America against imperialism and old and new colonialism,” support “the just struggle of Black
people in the United States for their fundamental national rights,” and “the struggle of the
American people against the U.S. imperialists’ war of aggression in Viet Nam.” In a passage read
by radicals the world over, the NLF called to consolidate their struggles into a “world peoples’
front in support of Viet Nam against the U.S. imperialist aggressors…”
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In late 1967, Le Duan, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Vietnam and Ho Chi Minh’s right hand man, went further, condensing all these
internationalist ideas into a powerful historical statement. “The struggle of the Vietnamese people
is the offensive point of the global revolutionary tide,” he declared.
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The “global counter-

revolutionary strategy of American imperialism,” however, was to “contain the revolutionary wave”
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by destroying the Vietnamese revolution.

420

Thus, the “objective situation” called for a worldwide

coordination of forces, “the constitution of a united global front against imperialism, with American
imperialism at the head.”

421

The Worldwide Anti-Imperialist Front
Radicals in France followed these developments with great interest. The Comité Vietnam
National reported on OLAS,

422

glowingly reviewed Le Duan’s book,

423

interviewed Vietnamese

officials, and ravenously consumed literature from Vietnam, including Le Courrier Vietnam.
Despite their differences, French radicals paid close attention to black struggles in the United
States, which they all saw as an integral front in the global struggle against American imperialism.
As the Union jeunesses communistes marxistes-léninistes (UJCml) argued, “The resolute
struggle of the African American people of the United States is a blow against American
imperialism, it forms an integral part of the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and
nations of the world.” “Each battle fought by black Americans,” they continued, “weakens
imperialism and constitutes support for the revolutionary struggles of people elsewhere in the
world.”
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A few, like the Jeunesse communiste révolutionnaire (JCR) even toyed with the idea of
opening new fronts inside Western Europe. The JCR argued as early as 1965 that “the best way
to support a people in struggle is to intensify the class struggle against one’s own bourgeoisie.
The best way to help the Vietnamese revolution is to weaken global imperialism by effectively
425

threatening the capitalist order in one’s own country.”

The delegates to the March 1967

Vietnam conference in Brussels shared this sentiment: “the worldwide escalation of the antiimperialist struggle involves in Western Europe the intensification of the struggle against capitalist
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governments and against their political and military instruments …”

426

But for these radicals, such

notions, however rhetorically persuasive or intellectually seductive, nevertheless remained
unrealizable as strategy. These groups were far too marginal, they had no examples to follow,
and struggles at home never approached the desired degree of mass militancy. The idea was
therefore banished to abstraction and many Western European groups focused their activism on
winning the ideological war, that is, changing public opinion, raising consciousness, pressuring
their own governments, and hoping to isolating the United States. In their day-to-day practice,
they continued to collect aid for Vietnam, circulate literature, and hold demonstrations.
Over the course of 1967 and into the beginning of 1968, however, a series of events not
only legitimated the idea of waging war at home, but convinced many French radicals to adopt it
as the most effective form of solidarity. First, struggles in the United States, especially those led
by African Americans gained in militancy, suggesting to the French that black radicals’ objective
of opening a second front could succeed. In the summer of 1967, Detroit city police raided a party
where a number of African-Americans celebrated the return of two local GI’s from Vietnam. An
427

altercation ensued, followed by one of the largest riots in American history.

When it was over,

43 lay dead, 1,189 injured, 7,200 arrested, and over than 2,000 buildings razed. Detroit was not
the only uprising in the United States; that summer 159 race riots exploded across the country.
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For Pierre Rousset, the JCR’s Vietnam specialist, these events confirmed that African Americans,
“concentrated in the vital centers of the U.S.A., the most exploited part of the working class,
oppressed racial minority, experiencing the intolerability of the present situation, possessing the
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will to act,” were emerging as the vanguard of the coming American Revolution.

429

The JCR

certainly projected its desires onto these riots, contorting all African Americans into urban
guerrillas. Yet the thought of a revolutionary force struggling inside the heart of American
imperialism, even if based on a misreading, gave substance to the idea of multiple fronts.
Second, a new round of struggles at home suggested the return of revolution to the
imperialist countries. In France, workers struck at a nylon and polyester factory in Besançon on
February 25, 1967, with demonstrations rapidly spreading to neighboring plants.
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The workers

even convinced Chris Marker to document their struggle, and the film would have an enormous
radicalizing effect on the new generation of activists.

431

Indeed, young radicals from all

tendencies hailed the strike, perhaps the most militant in over a decade, as signaling the
definitive return of “class struggle.”

432

The “length, scale, and violence of the movement,” the

JCR wrote, not only revealed the bankruptcy of syndicalist capitulation, but also put to rest all
those “neo-capitalist ‘theories’ about the deep complacency of a sated and bourgeoisified working
433

class.”

The strike prefigured the militant mass actions of May 1968, opening the cycle of what

historian Xavier Vigna has called “worker insubordination.”
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The heightened political situation in North America and Western Europe in turn
radicalized growing frustration with the antiwar movement. Despite persistent worldwide
condemnation, the war continued to escalate. In March 1967, the United States increased its aid
to South Vietnam to a total of $700 million for the year. In December, the number of US military
personnel on the ground reached 486,600. By the end of the year, the United States had dropped
864,000 tons of American bombs on North Vietnam – compared with 653,000 tons during the
entire Korean War and 503,000 tons in the Pacific theater during the Second World War.
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In the

face of such carnage, traditional forms of protest appeared ineffective. At a strategic impasse,
antiwar activists in Western Europe searched for more militant forms of solidarity.
Even if the idea of opening another front seemed more legitimate, revolution appeared
more likely in Europe, and the influence of radical groups seemingly greater than ever before, an
intractable theoretical problem remained: how could these radicals possibly justify opening
436

multiple fronts in Western Europe, which was not directly involved in the war?

Before radicals

in Western Europe could make the slogan “two, three, many Vietnams” the “categorical
imperative of solidarity,” as Daniel Bensaïd, one of the leaders of the JCR, later put it, they still
had to resolve a final conceptual obstacle: they did not confront American imperialism in the
same way that African Americans, Latin Americans, or the Vietnamese did.
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These radicals solved the problem by arguing, along the lines of the Brussels Statement,
that imperialism was a larger system that was not reducible to the foreign policy of the United
States alone. While the United States formed imperialism’s “head,” it needed the support of other
capitalist countries in Europe, which meant that European radicals had an equally revolutionary
part to play in the struggle. But they went even further, effectively decoupling imperialism from the
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United States, and turning it into its own autonomous force. In this way, the enemy ceased to be
“U.S. imperialism,” but “imperialism” pure and simple. For radicals, imperialism was basically
synonymous with worldwide counter-revolution in the service of capitalism. As radicals explained
in the antiwar youth international’s official announcement for their next conference, scheduled to
take place in Berlin in February 1968: “Imperialism seeks, through its offensive operations in
Vietnam, in Latin America, its maneuvers in Greece with its general, to change the international
relations of force. Its goal is to terminate the development of the global revolution and to attempt
an attack on the conquests of the workers movement.”

438

In other words, wherever capitalism

was in danger, imperialism would rush to the rescue, repressing struggles, overthrowing
governments, or going to war. This conceptual reduction, it should be noted, had ambiguous
results. On the one hand, it risked evacuating the concept of imperialism of its historical
specificity, turning it into a subject with its own will. On the other hand, reducing imperialism to an
abstract synonym of capitalist counter-revolution was immensely effective at the agitational level.
It gave radicals a broad, expansive enemy that could be fought wherever they were.
All these ideas were codified into an official strategy in the Executive Bureau of the
Brussels Conference’s statement, released in December 1967. The statement argued that
Vietnam served as a focal point, a “a decisive confrontation between the international revolution
and counter-revolution.” But that struggle between imperialism and world revolution extended
globally, assuming different forms in different national contexts. In Europe, the struggle took the
form of an attempted onslaught against the working classes, who were said to be objective allies
of the national liberation struggles abroad. Thus, “Europe constitutes a decisive battlefield in the
anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist struggle.”
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The duty of the revolutionaries in Europe, the

authors of the statement argued, was to open another front against “the international counter440

revolution,” which meant the “intensification of class struggle.”

“This strategy,” the statement

concluded, “finds its expression in Guevara’s call to “create two, three, many Vietnams, a
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conception that revives proletarian internationalism.”

441

With this, French radicals not only found a

way to justify making domestic revolution, the antiwar international transformed itself into a
revolutionary, anti-imperialist international.

Meeting of the Tribes
In the days before February 17, 1968 radicals from North America and Western Europe
filed into trains, boarded planes, and packed into cars. Their destination: Berlin. Their objective: to
build the worldwide anti-imperialist front inside the advanced capitalist world. The Berlin
Conference held at the Technical University on February 17-18 1968, and the international march
that followed, marked an important turning point for radicals.
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“It was the first real gathering of

the clans,” recalled Tariq Ali, who represented the British VSC, “and it reinforced our
internationalism as well as the desire for a world without frontiers.”
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The choice of Berlin was deliberate. Germany was not only the home of the most militant
student organization in Europe. As the CVN put it, “‘Showcase’ of capitalism and emblem of the
‘German Miracle,’ Berlin is also the outpost of the Federal Republic of Germany, where, over
twenty years after the war, 250,000 American soldiers are still stationed, and which is presented
as a model of social stability where the great mass movements are practically inexistent.”
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Gathering in Berlin, the JCR argued, “assumed a particular resonance,” since they would be in
the very “bastion of European capitalism.”
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Berlin was also a city under siege. Police murdered a demonstrator in 1967, the press
demonized the student movement as terrorists, and the Bundestag discussed banning SDS.
Meeting in Berlin, then calling for a massive demonstration the following day, was not only a show
of strength, but a direct provocation. Upon hearing that thousands of radicals from all over Europe
would storm Berlin, the municipal government prepared for battle, further encouraging radicals.
The JCR reported to its readers that the Senate had banned the international demonstration,
“3,000 cops were directed to reinforce the city,” and “the chief of police had reserved 4,000
vacant cells in the central prison, in the English sector.”

446

It was against this background that approximately five thousand radicals from over fifteen
European and North American countries – including a delegation from Turkey – met to discuss
the future of the international radical left. Although a number were in some way affiliated with the
Trotskyist Fourth International, participants represented a broad spectrum of political ideologies,
from anarchism to Third Worldism, Trotskyism to Situationism, and insurrectionism to antirevisionism. The conference brought together personalities as distinct as Manuel Castells, the
theorist of urban space, Paola Parangua, the future Argentinian revolutionary, Gianciacomo
Feltrinelli, the publishing magnate turned guerilla, and Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a Nanterre sociology
student who would be catapulted into fame during May 68.
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Those unable to attend such as

Stokely Carmichael and Jean-Paul Sartre delivered messages of support.
delegation from Vietnam present.
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There was even a

449

Indeed, what brought them together, despite their differences, was precisely Vietnam. It
not only united the radical tribes, it did so under the sign of international revolution, something
captured by the enormous NLF flag blanketing the main auditorium, which blazoned Che’s
unforgettable command that “The Duty of Every Revolutionary is to Make Revolution.” For two
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days, radicals not only traded stories, shared tactics, and briefed one another on the political
situations of their own countries, they discussed how to contribute to the Vietnamese revolution.
There was a general consensus that it was time to intensify the struggle in the imperialist
countries themselves. The most vocal proponents of this idea, as we have seen, were radical
African Americans, primarily represented at the conference by Ray Robinson and Dale Smith of
SNCC. “As long as parents in Vietnam are crying about their children,” Smith threatened in Berlin
“parents in the USA should cry about their children, too.”
The Germans were also exceptionally militant.
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451

They had, more than other European

groups, forged deep transnational ties with the American movement, through which they learned
direct action tactics.

452

They were also acutely aware of their country’s Nazi past, vowing to

prevent such horrors from repeating, unlike their parents, whom they pinned as cowards.

453

This

seemed particularly exigent given the country’s incomplete de-Nazification – Nazi laws were still
active, the civil service had not been purged, and many leading businessmen and politicians had
loyally served in the SS.
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In addition, the radical left was an isolated minority in a very hostile

country. The Federal Republic of Germany aligned strongly with the United States, the state was
fiercely anti-communist, and there was little chance the working class would join in any kind of
revolution, as in France or Italy. This extreme marginalization led many German radicals to
militant action. If they could never hope to sway the majority of public opinion in their favor, why
fear radical actions that might further alienate a fundamentally hostile populace?
Lastly, since Germany was, of all the European countries, closest to the United States,
with its accommodating government, American military bases, and GIs, the German left could
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more easily justify bringing the war home as a way to materially aiding the Vietnamese. Peter
Weiss, the revolutionary artist, gave expression to this sentiment when he unequivocally
declared: “The NLF – the sole and victorious representative of the revolutionary people – has
given us the task of organizing the resistance in the metropoles.” Only by meeting this challenge,
he continued, would radicals in the imperialist world pass from mere “spectators” to “participants
in the liberation struggle.” It was time to begin the struggle in the “cities, universities and schools,
and vulnerable industries of the capitalist world,” resorting to sabotage “wherever possible.”
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Rudi Dutschke, one of main leaders of SDS, further emphasized the need to internationalize the
revolution, “if to the Viet-Cong there will not be added an American, a European, and an Asiatic
Cong, the Vietnamese revolution will fail as others before.”
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Significantly, however, most radicals, even those not from Germany, were ready to
accept this logic. Of course, making revolution at home necessarily meant very different things in
different contexts, but the Berlin Conference effected a kind of synchronization whereby the
various national radical lefts – all of which, though certainly networked to one another, had
nevertheless developed according to their own temporal rhythm – for a brief moment converged
on the same plane of consistency. It is only in this context that we can understand why, at what
Tariq Ali called a “high point” of the Conference, everyone joined the chant led by African
American radicals:
I ain’t gonna go to Vietnam
Because Vietnam is where I am
Hell no! I ain’t gonna go!
457
Hell no! I ain’t gonna go!
While these words were accurate only for African Americans and other oppressed minorities in
the United States, and certainly not for West European radicals, the Conference nevertheless
allowed radicals to adopt a common form of international revolutionary solidarity.
As radicals plotted to bring revolution to the imperialist world, the city authorized the
scheduled march, and the next day around 20,000 revolutionaries draped in red banners
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marched through the streets of Berlin.

458

Hoping to discredit German radicals, the papers

regularly referred to the SDS as “a small radical minority.” In response, when reporters,
administrators, and the police came to surveil the march, the impressive crowd boomed in unison,
“we are a small active minority,” as if to show that, globally speaking, the German radical left was
not at all isolated, but could count on the active solidarity of radicals throughout Europe and
beyond. Some German bystanders were emboldened to join, even though the state exhorted
citizens to avoid the march. The JCR reported that one German remarked, “It’s the first time since
1933 that one sees so many red flags on the streets of Berlin!”
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Even more significantly, radicals not only reactivated, and even exchanged, their own
national revolutionary traditions – Germans carrying portraits of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa
Luxembourg; the Italians of Falce Martello and the PSIUP chanting “Bandiera Rossa” – they saw
the march as the first step in formalizing the united European Front. As the CVN put it “this
European Front must not be a word just thrown onto paper,” but should “really lead to the war
against imperialism in the metropoles.” “The Berlin demonstration of February 17 and 18,” the
article went on, was at the same time its “beginning and guarantee.”
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The Berlin demonstration was important in one final, unanticipated respect. At the very
moment that all these radicals linked arms and dreamt of revolution, the Vietnamese unleashed a
devastating surprise attack. Beginning on January 30, 1968, the Vietnamese lunar New Year Têt,
nearly eighty thousand NLF and NVA soldiers launched what was at that point the largest
offensive of the war, overrunning 100 cities, towns, and provincial capitals throughout Vietnam in
a coordinated strike that shocked the entire world. Communists held Hué for twenty-five days,
dislodged only after the United States Air Force destroyed eighty percent of the city; 35 NLF
461

battalions invaded Saigon; and, most daringly, nineteen guerillas stormed the US Embassy.

458

For eyewitness accounts, see Anne-Marie Lespinasse, “Berlin: 30,000 derrière les drapeaux
rouges,” 5; Renaud Legrouillot, “C’en était trop pour les Berlinois,” Avant-Garde Jeunesse 10/11
(February-March, 1968): 6.
459
Lespinasse, “Berlin: 30,000 derrière les drapeaux rouges,” 5.
460
“Berlin: La Jeunesse européenne pour le Vietnam,” Vietnam 4 (March 1968): 7.
461
On the destruction of Hué, see Gabriel, Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States,
and the Modern Historical Experience (Pantheon Books, 1986), 308-309. On the Têt Offensive,
145

The campaign hit like a thunderbolt. Millions of Americans, told for years that the war was
almost over, now gaped at images of slain GIs sprawled on the Embassy floor. Têt set the
media’s tapestry of lies ablaze, violently exposed American imperialism’s fragility, and proved to
the world that the Vietnamese would win. Its effect on young radicals was immeasurable. To
radicals, the worldwide anti-imperialist front was no longer just rhetoric; revolution had become a
reality.
News of the ongoing offensive poured in as thousands of these radicals gathered in
Berlin. Tariq Ali recalls how
The Tet offensive had begun even while we were preparing to open the Congress. Every
fresh victory was reported to the Congress amidst louder and louder applause. The
Vietnamese were demonstrating in the most concrete fashion imaginable that it was
possible to fight and win. This was critical in shaping the consciousness of our
462
generation. We believed that change was not only necessary, but possible.
Following the offensive as it unfolded, radicals felt they were fighting alongside the NLF. “This
was a time,” Ali continued, “when it really seemed as if our actions in the West were co-ordinated
with what was happening on the actual battlefields in Vietnam.”
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The Vietnamese were beating

imperialism in South East Asia; it was time for radicals to do their part in North America and
Western Europe. Têt accelerated political time. Defeat was around the corner; worldwide
revolution felt immanent. When radicals left Berlin that February, they took with them not only
new tactics, contacts, and slogans, or even a committed revolutionary perspective, but a feeling
of incredible urgency.
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CHAPTER 4: TRANSLATING VIETNAM

In the 1967 omnibus film Far from Vietnam, Jean-Luc Godard muses aloud about what it
means to support a struggle when one is so far, in every sense of the word, from the scene.
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He

admits, with brutal honesty, how he wanted to travel to Vietnam, but the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam declined his offer. This refusal, he confesses, was for the best. Driven by altruism, yet
knowing nothing of that struggle, he was more likely to have “made things worse, rather than
better.” Vietnam was not his struggle; how could he possibly film it? You cannot “talk about
466

bombs when they are not falling on your head,” he sagaciously pointed out.

Godard posed the most important political question of the period – how could one most
effectively demonstrate solidarity with a struggle that is not one’s own? Antiwar radicals in France
experimented with many forms of international solidarity in the 1960s: they formed grassroots
committees, hosted teach-ins, held mass marches, agitated in neighborhoods, schools, and
factories, assisted deserting GIs, put the United States on trial for genocide, and some even
attempted to organize international brigades to combat U.S. imperialism directly in Southeast
Asia. But by the end of the decade, an escalating war, an increasingly militant global political
landscape, and a new conception of anti-imperialist struggle pushed thousands of radicals to
embrace one form of solidarity above all others.
“Instead of invading Vietnam with generosity,” Godard explained, we must “let Vietnam
invade us.”
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In other words, the best way to support Vietnam would be to “create a Vietnam” in

France. For Godard in 1967, this meant looking to the struggles already unfolding in France, such
as the Rhodiaceta factory strike in Besançon, which prefigured the explosive events of May 1968.
While Far From Vietnam became enormously important for the young radicals later involved in
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the May events, the directors debuted the film not in a Parisian theatre, but inside the Rhodiaceta
plant itself. The connection was not lost on the audience. Georges Maurivard, a Rhodiaceta
worker, introduced the film by affirming: “It will be about us.”
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Neither Godard nor any of the thousands of radicals who pursued this strategy invented
the idea in the 1960s; but they did, through a dense transnational network, reanimate it for their
own historical conjuncture. Some French radicals, especially youths, formed a new antiwar
international to coordinate their efforts. Through these exchanges, many came to believe that the
best way to assist their Vietnamese comrades would be to open a second front within the
imperialist countries of North America and Western Europe. The best form of solidarity, therefore,
was one that could reproduce the distant struggle they sought to support. To do so, they
translated that struggle into their own particular contexts. In France, young radicals’ efforts to
bring home the anti-imperialist revolution of the Vietnamese triggered a series of events that
would culminate in May ’68. Internationally, just as the Vietnamese inspired the French, the
events of May ’68 inspired radicals in the United States, who in turn tried to translate May ’68 into
their own domestic vernaculars. Thus, the radical left’s turn to revolution was in large part an
attempt to bring the anti-imperialist struggles of the Vietnamese home to the imperialist world.
Seen in this way, the entire arc of radical upheaval in the United States and France from late
1967 to the early 1970s must be understood as the opening of other fronts in the worldwide antiimperialist struggle led by the Vietnamese, with the wars at home serving as auxiliaries to the war
in Vietnam.

The Second Front Opens in Europe
French radicals from the JCR, CVN, ESU, and other formations returned from Berlin high
on revolution. Losing no time, they prepared to “inaugurate a new type of political demonstration”
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Although

470

From

on February 21, 1968 to “break decidedly with the routine of nonchalant processions.”

some plans had been laid in advance, the events of Berlin changed the action’s tenor.

Berlin, they not only brought a German SDS banner, which they would wave during the
demonstration, but the fast-march chant “Ho Ho Ho Chi Minh,” which now spread throughout
Western Europe, and a variety of confrontational street tactics they had learned from the German
471

SDS.

Their service d’ordre, or what amounted to the group’s flying squad, had been

“particularly ‘hardened’ since Berlin, they threatened.

472

The most important export, however, was

a more fully developed conviction to wage the revolution at home. That day, CVN, JCR, and
UNEF radicals would not simply protest the war, but “make the Latin Quarter into the Heroic
Vietnam Quarter.”
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On February 21, six CVN activists planted the NLF and North Vietnamese flags on the
Sorbonne, as hundreds of others changed street signs, renamed buildings, and covered the walls
of the Latin Quarter with posters celebrating the recent victories of the NLF. Boulevard SaintMichel became Boulevard du Vietnam Heroique; the lycée Saint-Louis became the lycée Nguyen
Van Troi, after the guerilla famously executed in 1964 for attempting to assassinate US Secretary
of Defense Robert McNamara and future ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge; an effigy of Lyndon
Johnson was hung in the Fontaine St. Michel, just over the subdued devil, and set ablaze; and
the words “FNL Vaincra” appeared in burning letters above the gates of the Jardin du
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Luxembourg.

In arguably their most militant antiwar action yet, a coalition of radicals took

Che’s idea of “creating two, three, many Vietnams” literally, bringing Vietnam to Paris by mutating
its very physiognomy.
The campaign continued into the following months. On March 18, 1968, antiwar radicals
bombed the offices of three American businesses. Two days later, several hundred
demonstrators smashed the windows of the American Express offices in the Rue Scribe. The
police arrested six activists, including Nicolas Boulte, one of the student leaders of the CVN, and Xavier Langlade of the JCR. Radicals immediately viewed the arrests as part of a state campaign
to repress antiwar demonstrations, with the CVN publishing an article in Le Monde alerting the
475

public to the repression.

Significantly, the arrest created unity between rival factions.
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On

March 22, 1968, 150 students from different political tendencies occupied a conference room at
the Nanterre campus, forming a coalition called the Mouvement du 22 Mars, in direct emulation of
Fidel Castro’s Movimiento 26 de Julio.
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It was this coalition, in which the JCR played a very

important role, that would go on to spark the events of May 1968. That month, the efforts of the
March 22 Movement to defend their arrested antiwar comrades snowballed, prompting the
closure of not only the Nanterre Campus, but also the Sorbonne, ultimately triggering the police
478

repression that kicked off the events of May 68.

In that month, mass student unrest articulated

with a general strike of over nine million workers, forcing President de Gaulle to surreptitiously
479

flee the country.
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Reflecting on the events, Jean-Paul Sartre once suggested that, “the origins of May lie in
480

the Vietnamese Revolution.”

As radicals themselves recognized, Vietnam “played a

determinant role in radicalizing youth.”
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The war, historian Nicolas Pas has demonstrated,

allowed the fledgling radical left to escape from the French Communist Party (PCF). For instance,
while the Party chanted “Peace in Vietnam,” radicals distinguished themselves with “NLF will
Win!,” proposing their own stance on the burning international issue of the day.
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In addition,

historian Bethany Keenan has shown how antiwar activity allowed young radicals to gain
invaluable experiences – learning how to organize events, hold demonstrations, and battle the
483

police.

Above all, antiwar work allowed radicals to experiment with a variety of organizational

forms that would take center stage during the May events. In some cases, especially at the high
484

school level, the Vietnam Committees simply transformed into the Action Committees of May.
Antiwar activism, in other words, prefigured May of 1968, providing radicals with a “veritable
political formation.”
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More profoundly, however, Vietnam lay at the origins of May, Sartre continued, because
it “expanded the field of the possible.”
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If Vietnamese peasants could defeat the most powerful

military machine in human history, then anything was possible. Vietnam played what became
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known as an “exemplary” role, inspiring the March 22 Movement in France.

487

Thus, Vietnam set

in motion the defining characteristic of this entire period, what might be called a chain of
exemplarity. One struggle inspired another, which would inspire another, and so forth. “As the
Vietnamese success inspired the students,” Tariq Ali reflected on May 68, “so now the triumph of
the students inspired the workers.”
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To this sequence of resonating examples – which was by

no means unidirectional, as the heroism of the workers worked back on the students – one could
easily add how the workers’ rebellion in France in turn inspired radicals all over Europe and North
America.
Lastly, Vietnam lay at the origins of May because the revolution abroad provided French
radicals with the very ideas that made May possible. “All militants,” the Maoist Gauche
prolétarienne explained the following year, “know that the ideas they had in their heads during the
May struggles came for the most part from the practice of the Vietnamese people.”
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They

meant, of course, the idea of revolution. The Vietnamese not only revived it, their struggles
redefined revolution itself as the worldwide struggle against imperialism, as the coordinated
opening of fronts all over the world. At an international meeting in Paris on May 9, 1968 –
involving SNCC, the German SDS, JCR, and Italian students – the radicals who made May
possible revealed they were not just fighting against a repressive university system in France,
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they were opening a new front in the war against imperialism.

May 68 was not a singular,

French event; it was merely one front in the worldwide revolution, with the Vietnamese at the
491

head.
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should point out that while my emphasis on predominantly white students would seem to return to
this older historiography, it actually contributes to this revisionist turn. By situating May 68 within
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May 68, “could have been one of Che’s ‘many other’ Vietnams.” “Reciprocally,” they went on, “the
492

victory of the Vietnamese revolution reinforces our own fight.”

The JCR, March 22 Movement, and others were able to help open this second front
precisely because they struggled to translate the ideas of the Vietnamese into the French context,
making Vietnam their own. In contrast, the Maoist UJC-ml argued that this vision of solidarity only
instrumentalized the struggles of the Vietnamese, doing violence to the particularity of the
Vietnamese revolution. Instead, they adopted a very literal form of solidarity. Their primary
activity, after all, consisted of convincing everyone to read the Courrier du Vietnam, for them the
first and last word on anything that had to do with Vietnam. The group, echoing every position the
NLF or the RDV took, served as a kind of mouthpiece. While it made for effective propaganda,
this stance rendered the group’s antiwar work extremely rigid, and they never took the creative
leaps that others like the JCR, March 22 Movement, or the CVN did.
This literal attitude is one of the main reasons why the UJCml was caught completely off
guard when rebellions finally broke out in France.
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Content to simply present what they

assumed to be the authentic voice of the revolution abroad, unwilling to interpret it in light of their
own conditions, and therefore unable to see how deeply Vietnam resonated with other seemingly
distinct issues at home, the UJCml missed the events of May ’68.
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Instead of joining thousands

of students on the barricades, the UJCml – which had been eagerly awaiting the Peace Talks
between North Vietnam and the United States, which were held in Paris during May 1968 –
instructed its members to gather around the Vietnamese embassy as the best way to show their

the broader global context of anti-imperialist struggle, we see that even these students saw
themselves as little more than junior partners of the Vietnamese, and regarded May as nothing
more than an extension of the Vietnamese Revolution.
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“support and complete solidarity” for North Vietnam as the talks were about to unfold.

495

After

realizing their too literal vision of solidarity prevented them from playing a part in a potential
revolutionary opening, which would have been an even more profound act of solidarity with the
Vietnamese struggle than surrounding an embassy, the group saw no choice but to dissolve
itself. After the May events, the JCR admonished the UJCml, explaining that remaining loyal to
the Vietnamese did not mean following their every wish, but rather activating the essence of their
example. “It was stupid,” they wrote, scolding the UJCml, “to put one’s self at the service of the
Vietnamese because the Vietnamese cannot judge for us the possibilities of our actions.”
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Some in the UJCml learned their mistake. In June they conceded that “the Vietnamese
example is universal.”

497

After the UJCml’s auto-dissolution in November, some radicals – many

of whom would go on to form La Gauche prolétarienne, the most dynamic of the Maoist groups in
France after 1968 – continued the new direction with their paper La Cause du peuple. “The mass
movement of May-June in France,” a lengthy article announcing their adhesion to the worldwide
anti-imperialist front explained, “is a link in a long chain that encircles imperialism before
strangling it. The revolutionary flames spread from one end of the world to the other.”
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May allowed radicals to explore the challenges of “creating many Vietnams” On the one
hand, as the UJCml pointed out, this vision of solidarity risked speaking for the oppressed, with
an orientalizing, even imperialist perspective – silencing the voices of those who fight in favor of
Western radicals’ own idealist projections. If they ignored difference, radicals not only
decontextualized struggles, but risked substituting themselves for the Vietnamese, turning
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solidarity into its opposite. Yet at the same time, other radicals, such as the JCR, recognized that
bending the stick too far the other way, insisting on absolute difference, risked foreclosing all
creative resonance with the Vietnamese struggle, reducing solidarity to either hero worship or the
neurotic policing of others. Radicals struggled to find the best way to approach this field of
differences in order to make repetition possible. For without difference, there could be no
repetition, only imitation; but too much difference would occlude all reproduction, and with it
solidarity itself.

Resonating Revolutions
The exhilarating events of May 1968 convinced radicals across Western Europe, and
even North America, that the strategy of building multiple fronts against imperialism could
succeed, although this would be interpreted differently in distinct national contexts. In retrospect,
it may seems unsurprising that the breakthrough would come in France, a country known for its
vibrant revolutionary past. At the time, however, nothing seemed more unlikely. Compared to its
neighbors, especially the Germans and Italians, the French radical movement seemed tame.
Norberto Bobbio, who would go on to form Lotta Continua, one of the largest of the extraparliamentary groups in Italy, spoke for many when he later revealed radicals initially saw the
American and German movements, and not the French, as vanguards.
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After May, however,

France took center stage, to the surprise of everyone, including the French themselves. Mary
Alice Waters of the Youth Socialist League asked Alain Krivine about the sudden change in an
interview later published in several languages:
We worked here month and month to organize demonstration after demonstration in
support of the student’s struggle in Germany and Italy. We never thought that our turn
would come so soon. The movements of solidarity in Germany, in Italy, in Belgium, as well
as in Rome, where thousands of students marched under the slogan of “two, three, many
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Parises,” had a great impact on us; we feel part of a vast movement.
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Only Tet rivaled the international impact of the May events. Indeed, the two fused together in the
imaginary of the North American and West European radical left. “The world had to be changed
and France and Vietnam proved that it is possible to move forward,” recalled Tariq Ali of the
Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, the premier antiwar organization in Great Britain.
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Most

importantly, however, the May events functioned as a relay from the Third World to the imperialist
centers, showing that North America and Western Europe could again serve as privileged sites of
radical action.
Inspired by what was quickly perceived as the return of revolution to the advanced
capitalist countries, radicals everywhere learned as much as they could. Some, especially those
in neighboring countries, went to see for themselves. In September 1968 Krivine explained that:
since the beginning of the struggles there have been numerous delegations from the
revolutionary student organizations in Italy, Germany, Belgium and England. They want
to discuss with us, they want to learn from our experience, they want to aid us financially.
Since the Berlin demonstration in February, all these student organizations have
participated in struggles in their own countries and are putting up a fight. We will all come
502
out of this with a much richer experience.
Students were not the only pilgrims. To take just one example, Rossana Rossanda, Lucio Magri,
and Filippo Maone, all established intellectuals within the Italian Communist Party (PCI), also
made the journey. “When we set out on our journey in France,” Rossanda recalled, “the transport
system was still on strike, trains were idle, planes were grounded, there was no petrol and the
filling stations were all closed. Our friend the editor Diego De Donato took the risk of lending us
his Giulia, and we packed it with cans of petrol and hoped we wouldn’t have an accident, because
we would have gone up in flames.”
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Of all the visitors, the Italians had perhaps the most to learn, since their situation
resembled the French more than any other. As in France, Italy boasted a militant working class, a
long history of revolutionary struggle, a vibrant Marxist culture, and an enormous though largely
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504

obstructionist Communist Party.

If there was anywhere else in Europe where the political

sequence of May 68 might have been reproduced, it was Italy, something not lost on Italian
militants. As Sergio Bologna recalls, “The French May changed everything,” it was “a watershed
in the collective imagination,” inspiring many Italian radicals to do the same.

505

Indeed, only a few

months later Italy would see its own wave of revolutionary struggles, sometimes called “the
creeping May” because it spanned an entire decade.
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The May events and the idea of making revolution inside the imperialist world even had
an effect in those countries, such as Great Britain, where revolution seemed extremely unlikely.
This did not stop the British government, however, from fearing they would be next. “France
shook the ruling classes throughout Europe,” Tariq Ali, one of the main organizers of the Vietnam
Solidarity Campaign (VSC), later put it, “and the British decided to take no chances that the
507

disease would spread.”

In an almost farcical rerun of 1789, the British state prepared for the

worst, and the authorities openly feared that the VSC’s planned demonstration for October 1968
would devolve into “a French-style insurrection.”

508

The Press referred to the coming

demonstration as the “October Revolution,” the government banned The Rolling Stones’ “Street
Fighting Man,” and secret police infiltrated the VSC’s meetings. Police raided the offices of The
Black Dwarf, a prominent radical paper with close ties to the VSC. Two days later, The Times
published an inflammatory article warning that a “small army of militant extremists plans to seize
control of certain highly sensitive installations and buildings in central London next month.” This
“starting plot,” the article continued, was “uncovered by a special squad of detectives to track
down the extremists who are understood to be manufacturing ‘Molotov cocktail’ bombs and
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amassing a small arsenal of weapons. They plan to use these against police and property in an
509

attempt to dislocate communications and law and order …”

Although fictional, it succeeded in

inciting fear – and fascination – that spread beyond the British Isles. Journalists flooded in from all
510

over, “hoping that the next act after Paris might be London.”

As for British radicals, a growing number seriously believed in the possibility of
511

revolution.

Some even expected the October demonstration to trigger a nationwide insurrection

similar to what was imagined to have happened in France. “None of us knew for sure what might
happen,” recalled John Rose, an LSE student and member of the International Socialists, the
other major Trotskyist group in Great Britain.
But we thought the revolution was going to start then …We would have welcomed a
major confrontation which would have raised the stakes and drawn the workers into the
struggle … had there been fighting, with serious injuries, possibly even a killing, I’m quite
sure a major student rising across the country would have taken place, and the thing
512
would have exploded.”
Other LSE radicals turned their occupied university into a headquarters, complete with a medical
513

center for the coming fight.

During the famous October demonstration, some 6,000 radicals

from the Maoist Britain-Vietnam Solidarity Front, the Action Committee for Anti-Imperialist
Solidarity, and several anarchist groups broke from the march in an ultimately unsuccessful
attempt to storm the US Embassy in Grosvenor Square.

514

Inspired by the events in France,

these radicals hoped to provoke the police into overreacting. Taking the embassy, they thought,
would lead to precisely the violent confrontation that might trigger the British Revolution.

515

But most radicals, even those affiliated with The Black Dwarf, proved more sober in their
assessment of the situation. The events in France were no doubt tremendously inspiring,
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something symbolically captured by the many May 68 posters visible in the October march, but
Great Britain was not the next domino. “As we listened to the news from Paris,” remembered Pete
Gowan, a student leader at Birmingham University and a member of the British section of the
Fourth International:
we were aware that what was going on there was worlds away from the everyday
realities of the British student movement. The British state, the whole political system in
this country, had immensely more ideological authority amongst students than was the
case on the Continent. British universities were fairly flexible, tough institutions that didn’t
516
have great difficulty in absorbing and containing radical impulses.
“The very thought was absurd,” Ali argued. “Britain was not France. Labour was in office and the
working class was restive, but quiescent … none of us ever believed that anything remotely
resembling France could happen in Britain that year.”
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This attitude was also shared by the International Socialists, who, while certainly inspired
by May, and still believing in revolution, nevertheless felt that the kind of insurrection some were
hoping for was simply utopian:
But in Britain, the new English Jacobins who solidarized with the Vietnamese
revolutionaries, who flew over to Paris and who pasted over their bathroom mirror Che’s
imperative injunction “the duty of a revolutionary is to make revolution,” were troubled.
While events in foreign parts sprouted wild plumage, the struggles in Britain were a
determined mufti …
What must be emphasized and re-emphasized is the immense gulf that separates the
working class’s revolutionary potential and our revolutionary ideas. There are no shortcuts to overcoming this. No amount of verbal euphoria or frenetic activism will do this –
especially if it is confined to the university ghetto. What is required is not the heroic
gesture or the symbolic confrontation (any more than the perfect revolution); nor is it
vicarious participation in the self-activity of others (whether they be in Hanoi or Paris);
rather we have to be where the various sections of the working class are as they begin to
518
work out new ways of dealing with the new problems, in the factories in the unions…
Revolution was not to be abandoned, but the British could not simply mimic the sequence that
played out in France. However much inspired by Hanoi or Paris, if it were to happen in Britain,
revolution must necessarily assume a different form, one that would involve a much longer, less
glamorous struggle.
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Sensing the pressure from their left, and hoping to prevent political suicide, The Black
Dwarf released a special issue with a print run of over 50,000 for the October demonstration,
which featured an excerpt from Friedrich Engels’ famous essay on the ineffectiveness of street
fighting.

519

The march, numbering some 200,000 people, culminated not in revolutionary violence,

but in old-fashioned Chartist respectability, when Tariq Ali handed a 75,000-signature petition to
the government.
While it seems, in retrospect, that The Black Dwarf and the VSC leadership may have
bent the stick too far the other way – focusing on the students, avoiding confrontation, insisting on
a single-issue campaign

520

– a real change had nevertheless taken place. For if insurrection

might not have been on the agenda for most radicals, fundamental social transformation of some
kind was. Whatever the official public stance of the VSC, most radicals now placed greater
emphasis on the struggle against capitalism at home. After May, the VSC pushed for an autumn
offensive, and the discussion, having been “flavoured perceptively by the events of Paris,” called
for a more direct confrontation with the British government, even if this never materialized in the
streets.
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“Harold Wilson,” The Black Dwarf reported, “could ponder the problems facing de
522

Gaulle at this very moment…”

May 68 gave substance to the idea of “creating two, three, many Vietnams” in Europe.
But as Great Britain shows, this was not a single, unchangeable, universal doctrine, but a flexible
guide to action, to be translated according to national conditions. Even radicals in those countries
where revolution seemed completely unlikely, therefore, could uphold the watchword. May was
the first opening of the worldwide anti-imperialist front’s struggle in Europe. But it would not be the
last. As the front page of The Black Dwarf’s inaugural issue put it, echoing a chant shouted at a
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May 25, 1968 solidarity demonstration at the French embassy in London: “We Shall Fight, We
Shall Win: London, Paris, Rome, Berlin.”

523

Reversing the Polarities
Claimed by nearly every group, whatever its line, May 68 commanded attention in the
United States as no other recent militant event in Europe had. The newspapers of the SWP, the
YSL, and Progressive Labor all featured stories. New Left Notes, the official SDS bulletin, ran a
series of articles, including a translation of a detailed eyewitness account by French radicals. The
SDS magazine CAW! devoted its entire third issue to the “Battle of France,” presenting translated
materials brought directly from France by a March 22 Movement activist.

524

May 68 accelerated three transformations in the United States. Above all, the sight of
nine million striking workers compelled many radicals to reassess the American working class.
This alone marked a revolution in ideas. Many of the young white radicals who formed the core
institutions of the pre-1968 American New Left, especially SDS, disavowed not only the organized
labor movement, but the broader working class as such. Present at the drafting of the Port Huron
Statement, the founding document of SDS, activist Kim Moody, for instance, remembers the
statement as “very, very negative, a dismissal of the labor movement.”

525

“Simply stated,”

historian Peter Levy summarizes, “the New Left inherited an anticlass perspective; it assumed
that class struggle and class structure were essentially irrelevant to the modern American
experience. Contemporary social theorists described the workers as satisfied, labor as
bureaucratized and complacent, and class conflict as anachronistic.”
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There were important

exceptions, especially among Marxist parties such as Progressive Labor or the Socialist Workers
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Party. In general, however, during much of the 1960s few in the white American left consistently
distinguished between the rank-and-file and the supposedly corrupt, torpid, or collaborationist
unions that claimed to represent them. Convinced that white workers were racist, conservative, or
bought off by capitalism, many students turned to other social subjects, ignoring the militant
workers’ struggles slowly re-emerging across the country.

527

Unlike France or Italy, much of the

American student movement remained relatively disconnected from the workers’ movement.
May 1968 helped change that view, something observed by Jean Dube of the JCR during
his speaking tour of the United States and Canada in August of 1968:
I was extremely impressed by the response of the American students. They were eager
to know what has happened in France. But the most encouraging thing was that they are
optimistic about the situation in North America and the struggle here. They felt that they
might soon be confronted with a situation similar to France. On almost every campus the
students asked how we in the student struggle in France had managed to achieve a link
with the working class, how we had been able to involve the working class and work
together. I think the fact that this question was asked is extremely important, because it
shows that a lot of people here have understood the main lessons and drawn the most
important conclusion from the May and June struggle in France: the main task of the
student struggle in any country, if you want to carry it to a higher state, is to involve the
528
young workers in the struggle.
Proposals appeared in publications such as New Left Notes, the Guardian, or Liberation, arguing
that the strategic question of an alliance with the working class was now the order of the day.
This new concern with labor gave Old Left groups such as Progressive Labor a shot in
the arm. As a result, PL argued the May events fully validated their workerist line:
France is the sharpest people’s struggle in recent history in an advanced Capitalist
country. It clearly shows that the industrial working class is the key force on the people’s
side in the advanced Capitalist countries … French students were very clear that while
529
they could start the fight, the working class must finish it!
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PL tried to capitalize on this renewed interest in workers’ struggles by calling for a “workerstudent alliance,” encouraging SDSers to organize campus workers, and even plan a series of
“summer work-ins,” and pushing students to take industrial jobs.

530

This meant that those radicals trying to combat PL’s attempt to take over SDS had to
confront their adversary on the question of the working class. The very reasoning behind the
tendency known as the Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) – named after a position paper
drafted by Jim Mellen, Mike Klonsky, and others – was precisely to “undercut” PL’s “influence in
SDS and take away their exclusive identification with working-class politics.”
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The working class

was no longer PL’s pet project, but the burning issue of the entire movement. “At this point in
history,” the paper explained, “SDS is faced with its most crucial ideological decision, that of
determining its direction with regards to the working class.”

532

Thus, many of the young

revolutionaries in SDS who once rejected the working class out of hand now upheld the
proletariat as not only a litmus test, but as the ultimate factor in the revolution to come.
May 68 also internationalized the white American left. As we saw in the previous chapter,
despite a few early initiatives, the vast majority of white radicals in the United States did not seek
out ties with other groups. If they did look abroad, it was almost exclusively to the Third World, not
to Western Europe. Wherever such transatlantic connections existed, they were often ad hoc,
isolated, or on a strictly personal level. While there were certainly some very important exceptions
to the rule, such as the Socialist Workers’ Party, these groups were numerically miniscule. For
instance, by 1968 the premier organization of the white New Left, SDS, which had discounted
international ties for most of its history, may have had 100,000 members completely
overwhelming the ranks of the SWP. This is not to say that the United States was not part of
some international. For even if most American radicals did not actively build ties with their
activists in Europe, their struggles did figure quite prominently in the imaginary of Western
530
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European radicals, who looked to Americans for inspiration, models, and strategies. Nonetheless,
for much of the 1960s, the United States was far more important for Europeans than Europe was
for Americans. By 1968, the polarities were reversed, as it was the Americans’ turn to look
abroad.
As Kirkpatrick Sale notes, a sequence of events that year led to a “growing international
consciousness for the American Movement.”

533

First came the Berlin conference, which was not

only attended by the SWP, but also representatives from SDS. Then, in April, a rightwing student
shot Rudi Dutschke in the head, provoking a strong show of solidarity from radicals all over the
world.
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Since Dutschke was regarded as not simply a German radical, but a highly visible

international figure, perhaps one of the best known European radicals in the United States, his
attempted murder was interpreted by American groups as an assault on the “international antiwar movement.”
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The most important chain in this sequence, however, were the events of May

1968 in France.
May convinced many American radicals that struggles abroad were profoundly connected
to those in the United States.

536

Carl Davidson, SDS Inter-Organizational Secretary, explained

how “there are more critical reasons for developing fraternal relations with Europeans and
Japanese New Left groups than political education or moral solidarity; namely, we have a
537

solidarity based in struggle around a community of interests.”

He surveyed struggles in France,

Germany, Japan, and Quebec, and proposed joint actions: “A variety of programs joining
American, Japanese, and European New Left students could be developed, co-ordinating
international actions around Draft-resistance, desertion, or attacks on the CIA, NATO, and other
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military alliances.”

538

“Hopefully,” he continued, “the recent dramatic struggles of the European

New Left students will change some of our isolationist attitudes.”

539

SDSers discussed the matter at the National Interim Committee meeting in June. “On the
whole,” the meeting minutes made clear, “the consensus was that European travel is to be
stressed at this time. Everybody shouldn’t go to Hanoi as we have been doing; the struggle in the
540

advanced capitalist countries has been ignored by SDS.”

A debate soon erupted about the

best way to forge these connections. Carl Oglesby suggested inviting European leaders, such as
Daniel Cohn-Bendit or Tariq Ali, to speak in the United States. Barbara and John Ehrenreich
vigorously opposed his proposal, arguing that passively inviting foreigners to visit the United
States would only reinforce “the inexcusable provincialism of American SDS,” while inviting
celebrities would simply defeat the purpose of understanding the real movements developing on
the ground: “The bourgeois press has an understandable interest in transforming movements into
‘personalities’ and their followings. We don’t, so let’s not fall into the trap.”
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Acknowledging that “Columbia and France” had convinced them “that something was
happening,” the Ehrenreichs had already embarked on an SDS-sponsored tour of Europe. They
would write a series of research articles about the various student movements in order “to import
whatever European movement ideas looked useful to us.” But one could not randomly “transfer”
ideas from one context to another, they explained; they had to discover the “setting in which they
542

were developed and the context in which they were applied.”

The Ehrenreichs were correct about forging deeper international ties. “There is no
question,” Kirkpatrick Sale confirms, “that the growing international consciousness of the young
American left helped to turn it in a deliberately revolutionary direction.”
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The French events

played an instrumental role in this transformation because they demonstrated “the possibility of
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the radical overthrow of established regimes even in advanced industrial nations despite their
armed might and domestic entrenchment.”

544

Of course, just as the May events did not

singlehandedly convince Americans to rediscover the struggles of their own domestic working
class, May did not suddenly reveal the idea of revolution. May was just one event in a long chain
that ultimately pushed many American radicals in the white left into adopting revolution as a
political possibility. One can mention the October 1967 demonstration, the Têt offensive in
January 1968, and the riots following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in April.
Frustration with an unresponsive government, impatience with reforms, and outrage at the
murder of progressive leaders culminated in the “Ten Days of Resistance,” a series of
coordinated nationwide actions in late April. At Columbia, demonstrations intersected with an
ongoing struggle against war research at the university and a campaign against a segregatory
gymnasium to be built in Morningside Park, which ultimately led to a prolonged campus
occupation, with African American students holding Hamilton Hall while white SDS students
captured Low Library, turning it into a “liberated zone” in emulation of the NLF in South
545

Vietnam.

“Two, Three, Many Columbias …,” read the front page of New Left Notes.

After Columbia, the ground was well prepared for the reception of May 68.

547

546

May

seemed to show that radicals could not only occupy buildings, shut down universities, and battle
the police, but trigger revolution itself. That month, John Jacobs and other radical Columbia
SDSers, inspired by events at Columbia and in France, coined the phrase “Bring the War Home.”
Tom Hayden, present at the occupation, raised the war cry: “American educators are fond of
telling their students that barricades are a part of the romantic past, that social change today can
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only come about through the processes of negotiation. But the students at Columbia discovered
548

that barricades are only the beginning of what they call ‘bringing the war home.’”

Revolution filled the air at SDS’s National Convention in East Lansing, Michigan from
June 9 to 16, 1968. In stark contrast to previous years, hammer and sickle emblems made an
appearance, portraits of Lenin festooned the walls of the Student Union, and SDSers donned red
armbands. One could hear such statements like “our movement is an element of the revolutionary
vanguard painfully forming from the innards of America.”

549

Tom Bell, Bernardine Dohrn, and

Steve Halliwell submitted a proposal to turn SDS into a “professional revolutionary
550

organization.”

On June 10, Bernardine Dohrn, who, in response to a question in the plenary,

professed, “I consider myself a revolutionary communist,” was elected the new Inter551

Organizational Secretary without opposition.

Not only had SDS made the leap to revolution, it

now imagined itself as a front in the worldwide revolutionary movement, perhaps best captured in
the concluding lines of the Convention’s message to the Iranian Students Association: “Your fight
against the Shah, the fight of German SDS against Kiesinger, of the French against de Gualle
[sic], of the Japanese against SATO – these are a few of the current fronts of a single war. We
552

are your allies and brothers.

Bringing the War Home
In October 1969, American radicals brought the war home. Although united under the
sign of revolution, those who traveled to Chicago that month remained bitterly divided over just
what this slogan meant. Some, known as the Weathermen, took it literally. On the night of
October 8, around 350 radicals, many outfitted with helmets, goggles and wielding lead pipes,
poured out of Lincoln Park into the affluent Gold Coast neighborhood, waving NLF flags,
smashing car windows, and destroying property en route to the Drake Hotel, home of the judge in
548
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the Chicago Eight trial. Over a thousand police officers intercepted their charge, driving squad
cars straight into crowds, beating protesters, and firing revolvers.

553

When the columns of tear
554

gas cleared, six Weathermen had been shot, 68 protesters arrested, and 28 policemen injured.
The next day, as the Weathermen’s “Women’s Militia” set out to destroy the Chicago
Armed Forces Induction Center, another, rival group of radicals held a rally at the Federal

Courthouse with the Black Panther Party and the Puerto Rican Young Lords, then marched to the
International Harvester Plant and Cook County Hospital in solidarity with the workers there.
Although equally convinced that the time had come to bring the war home, this second, antiWeathermen group understood this to mean not waging urban guerilla warfare, but linking up with
the industrial working class, communities of color, and immigrants. The next day, in the largest
action of the weekend, this loose coalition of anti-Weathermen white radicals, the Panthers, and
Young Lords led an interracial march through a poor Latino neighborhood.
As the curious events in Chicago revealed, the strategy of creating “two, three, many
Vietnams,” now pursued by tens of thousands of radicals throughout North America and Western
Europe, was as ambiguous as it was inspiring. As a general watchword, its meaning was quite
clear; but as a specific strategy, it left considerable room for interpretation. Two dominant views
emerged in the United States by 1969.
555

In June, SDS held its last convention.

Not only SDSers, but radicals of all shades,

including Mary Alice Waters of the YSL, Abbie Hoffman’s Yippies, and Fred Hampton’s Black
Panthers attended. Progressive Labor, which officially rejected black nationalism, condemned the
Vietnamese revolution as revisionist, and repudiated militant confrontation, claimed about one
third of all delegates. Consequently, those SDSers who saw their mission as forcing open a front
in the heart of imperialism believed that saving the revolutionary project in the United States
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meant first defeating PL.

556

Since PL based its politics in a detailed knowledge of Marxist theory,

the response had to take a theoretical form.

557

A collective of radicals led by John Jacobs therefore submitted a position paper called
“You Don’t Need A Weatherman To Know Which Way The Wind Blows.”

558

Since imperialism

was now overextended, the Weathermen argued, revolutionaries everywhere had to adopt Che’s
strategy of “creating, two, three, many Vietnams,” in order “to mobilize the struggle so sharply in
so many places that the imperialists cannot possibly deal with it all.” These many fronts “reinforce
one another,” since the “existence of any one Vietnam, especially a winning one, spurs on
559

others.”

African Americans already formed a “Vietnam” inside the United States; white

Americans had to do the same. The problem, the Weathermen continued, rehashing tired New
Left doxa, was the torpidity of much of the white working class, which benefited from its “white
skin privilege” as well as the super-profits from American imperialism. The burden of revolutionary
struggle therefore fell to the shoulders of radicalized white youth, who had to form a
Revolutionary Youth Movement to force open another front against imperialism. This Movement,
which would become the basis of a revolutionary red army in the United States, “will in turn
become one division of the International Liberation Army, while its battlefields are added to the
many Vietnams which will dismember and dispose of US imperialism.”

560

Armed with this vision, a few careful alliances, and some highly undemocratic
maneuvering, the Weathermen ousted PL, elected themselves to the National Office, and
declared the white radical left in favor of revolution. The following month, thirty of them took a
“Weather trip” to Cuba where representatives of North Vietnam and the newly formed Provisional
561

Revolutionary Government in the South guaranteed total victory.

“The greatest invention of the

th

20 Century has not been nuclear weapons, but people’s war,” a representative of the Viet Cong
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explained to his enthralled audience. “The U.S. can never escape from the labyrinth and sea of
fire of people’s war.”
563

them.

562

The Weather delegation hoped to bring the people’s war home with

The October 1969 Days of Rage in Chicago became the first battle:

When we move with the people of the world, against the interests of the rulers, we can
expect their pigs to come down on us. So we’re building a fighting force to struggle on the
side of the Vietnamese, the blacks, and oppressed people everywhere. There’s a war we
cannot “resist.” It is a war in which we must fight. We must open up another front against
US imperialism by waging a thousand struggles in the schools, the streets, the army, and
564
on the job, and in CHICAGO: OCTOBER 8-11.
“We showed them that Wednesday night,” one participant boasted. “It was like unfurling a
565

gigantic Viet Cong flag in the heart of Chicago.”

In fact, the Weathermen, took the slogan “bring

the war” home literally – “if [the US] demarcated free-fire zones in Viet Nam, we would map our
free-fire zones in the U.S.; when they bombed Hanoi, we might just figure out how to bomb
Washington; search and destroy might be played out both ways.”

566

Soon after, the Weathermen went underground to pursue a campaign of terror bombing.
“All over the world,” they explained, “people fighting Amerikan imperialism look to Amerika’s youth
to use our strategic position behind enemy lines to join forces in the destruction of the empire.”

567

They were convinced not only that they had to play an indispensable role in the worldwide antiimperialist front, but that they were alone in the United States, surrounded by a hostile public and
an unreliable working class. They were partisans battling a society of collaborators, of “good
Germans.”

568

Everyone was guilty. For their first act, they planned to bomb a Non-Commissioned

Officers’ dance at the Fort Dix U.S. Army base as well as the Butler Library at Columbia
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University; it backfired, killing three of their own.

569

Although the Weathermen avoided future

deaths, they continued their guerilla campaign relatively unabated, at one point even bombing the
Pentagon. Other revolutionary groups, such as the Symbionese Liberation Army, continued the
struggle, going so far as murder.
While many on the white radical left despised PL, a number were equally repelled by
what they saw as the Weathermen’s careless adventurism, even if they agreed about bringing the
war home. One of the leaders of this tendency, SDS National Secretary Michael Klonsky, penned
a proposal at the 1969 Convention titled “Take the war to the people – and bring it home,” in
which he argued that radicals had to “understand the dialectical relationship that exists between
the struggle in Vietnam and the class struggle in the US.”

570

“Each blow we strike against US

monopoly capitalism,” he continued, “is of multiple benefit not only to the Vietnamese but to all
571

other oppressed people as well.”

Like the Weathermen, he saw African Americans leading the

way in the United States, arguing that the “rebellions in Detroit, Watts, etc. have been the
vanguard actions against US imperialism in Vietnam by bringing the war home. Two divisions of
troops were sent to Detroit instead of to Vietnam to put down urban insurrections.” And like
Weathermen, he felt white Americans had to do their part by helping to build “a militant classconscious movement against the war, here in the mother country,” which could “be the straw that
breaks the camel’s back.”
Unlike the Weathermen, Klonsky felt that guerilla warfare was impractical. He was joined
by other SDSers, such as Les Coleman, Carl Davidson, and Sue Eanet, the latter of whom
represented SDS at Berlin in 1968; Noel Ignatin’s Chicago Revolutionary League; and Bob
Avakian, Stephen Hamilton, and H. Bruce Franklin’s Revolutionary Union – all of whom
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regrouped as a loose coalition called the Revolutionary Youth Movement II (RYM II).

572

Against

the Weathermen, they argued that white skin privilege did not actually benefit white workers, but
only the white bourgeoisie, since even with their privilege white workers faced massive speedups,
falling real wages, plant relocations, and widespread layoffs. “To suggest that the acceptance of
white-skin privilege is in the interests of white workers,” Noel Ignativ argued, “is equivalent to
suggesting that swallowing the worm with the hook in it is in the interests of the fish.”

573

The

immense majority of white workers in the United States did not enjoy affluence, imperialist superprofits, or complacent integration, but, Ignativ argued, were still a real fighting force.
Thus, for RYM II, while it was imperative to follow the Vietnamese example, one could
not imitate their struggles since terror bombing, camouflaged guerillas, and liberated zones made
little sense in the United States. Radicals had to translate the inspirational “lesson” of Vietnam for
American conditions.

574

For RYM II, this meant uniting “the struggles of oppressed and exploited
575

people in this country with the struggles of the Vietnamese.”

As their position paper put it, they

had to connect with the “black and Puerto Rican liberation struggles,” struggles in proletarian
neighborhoods, and in factories.

576

They had to go into workplaces, community centers, and poor

neighborhoods to do the hard work of organizing, forming coalitions with people of color, building
trust. In their view, that is precisely what bringing the war home meant in Chicago 1969, not
storming through streets breaking windows. So vital was this unglamorous, but still revolutionary
work to the worldwide anti-imperialist front, they argued, that abandoning it as the Weatherman
had would “have made us scabs on the Vietnamese.”
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For the Revolutionary Union (RU), which would eventually become the largest, most
dynamic revolutionary communist formation in the United States, bringing the war home meant
578

articulating it with the struggles of the American working class.

The “U.S. ruling class not only

exploits our own working people; it extends its exploitation throughout the world by a system of
imperialism,” they explained in the first pages of their widely read theoretical statement, the Red
Papers. “Today, Vietnam is the focal point of these struggles.”

579

As the “peoples of the world,”

led by the Vietnamese, “seize the initiative,” they weaken imperialism inside the United States,
creating political openings for the American working class. Proletarian revolution was directly
connected to the war in Vietnam; just as the Vietnamese revolution weakened imperialism in the
United States, so an American revolution could weaken it abroad.
For groups like the Revolutionary Union, bringing the war home involved going to
workplaces across the country to help organize the coming proletarian revolution. The RYM II
position paper had already argued that an anti-imperialist front meant radicals had to “go into
shops, plants, hospitals, to work, etc. not only for summer “work in” programs but more and more
of us should be making longer commitments to live and work among the proletariat.”
following Mao Zedong, made this a fundamental principle of its political identity.

581

580

The RU,

RU even sent

its members to work in critical industries, such as auto, coal, and steel, across the country.
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Dozens of other radical groups, including the Trotskyist International Socialists, and later, the
SWP did the same.

583

By the 1970s, thousands of young radicals went to work to made

revolution.
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Vietnam is Everywhere
In Nanni Balestrini’s 1971 novel, Vogliamo Tutto, a recently hired autoworker at FIAT’s
monster Mirafiori plant joins a spontaneous demonstration inside the factory:
I get there and I join in the shouting, too. We were shouting the strangest things, things that
had fuck-all to do with anything … Mao Tsetung, Ho Chi Minh, Potere Operaio. Things that
584
had no connection to anything there but that we liked the sound of.
“We wanted to shout things that had nothing to do with FIAT, with all that we had to do in there,”
he explained. Those who had “no idea” who Ho Chi Minh was began shouting “Ho Chi Minh.”
Soon after, when these demonstrations turned into a revolt at Corso Traiano, Milan, the
protagonist vividly describes the street battles: “I saw that lots of policemen were scared and
were running away. All around our guys started to chant: Ho Chi Minh. Forward, forward.”

585

As Ballestrini shows, after 1968 many radicals began to repurpose the Vietnamese
struggle for their own needs, abstracting words such as “Ho Chi Minh,” the “NLF,” and “Vietnam”
from their specific context. Ballestrini may have exaggerated when he had his character confess
that no one knew who Ho Chi Minh really was, but he was correct to depict how “Ho Chi Minh” no
longer simply referred to a specific person, but an idea. As Ballestrini’s autoworker explains, Ho
Chi Minh had nothing to do with FIAT, but everyone chanted his name to “create a moment of
rupture.” Those three syllables became a symbol of revolution. They came to signify the
overturning of roles, the eruption of the new, the power of the oppressed.
In the minds of tens of thousands of radicals in North America and Western Europe,
“Vietnam” had become much larger than itself. It no longer referred to that Southeast Asian
country at war with the United States. Or at least, if it did, it had acquired meaning in surplus of its
referent. By the late 1960s, one could say “Vietnam” had become the master symbol of an entire
generation, as practically every struggle of the time articulated itself in the language of “Vietnam”
in some way or another. In creating “many Vietnams” throughout North America and Western
Europe, radicals succeeded in translating the Vietnamese struggle for their own imperialist
contexts. But what did “Vietnam” really mean?
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At its simplest, Vietnam, or related phrases such as “Ho Chi Minh,” often personified
certain admirable human qualities such as intrepidity, indefatigability, confidence, or fortitude.
Above all, Vietnam embodied heroism, the adjective most commonly used by radicals to describe
their Vietnamese comrades. Their tenacity in the face of impossible odds astonished radicals
everywhere. General Baker, Jr., John Watson’s onetime roommate and a central figure in the
black nationalist network of the 1960s, recalls traveling illegally to Cuba in 1964, where he met a
Vietnamese delegation:
When we talked to the Vietnamese it was just before the Tonkin Gulf and the question of
escalation was on everybody’s mind. I remember asking the Vietnamese, “Do you think
that if the United States bombs Vietnam, the Chinese are going to help you?” They tell me,
“We don’t need Chinese help to defeat the Americans.” That shit just fucked me up. I just
couldn’t understand how these little-ass Vietnamese were going to handle an American
586
invasion. But that was the adamant statement they made.
Over the course of the 1960s astonishment gave way to veneration. When Balestrini’s protagonist
battles the police, what possible meaning could chanting “Ho Chi Minh” have if not to show one’s
courage, dedication, commitment? Shouting such phrases, common throughout North America
and Western Europe, were ways of channeling the bravery of the Vietnamese. This meaning of
Vietnam was so abstract, it could be used for literally any struggle, however tenuous its relation to
what was unfolding in Southeast Asia. For instance, queer radicals in a number of countries,
including France and the United States, further translated the famous “Ho Chi Minh” chant to suit
their own needs, shouting “Ho Ho Homosexual.”
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Since Vietnam was above all a war, radicals also used the term to evoke how they, too,
were in a state of war. During the May 68, for instance, striking workers in Besançon put forth the
slogan “Combat in the maquis of the factories of France.”
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The maquis – literally the thick

shrubland of certain Mediterranean regions – referred here not simply to the experience of World
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War II resistance fighters in the thicket, but to guerillas in the jungles of Vietnam.

589

Italian

workers in turn translated the expression into the simple, “Vietnam is in our factories,” later
590

reimported to France.

Expressions such as “The university is our Vietnam,” or “The struggle at

Fiat must become the Vietnam of the bosses of Italy,” or even portmanteaus such as “Fiat-Nam,”
591

became common in Italy.

To describe the factory, university, or any site in this way was

effectively to call it was a war zone, a site of pitched battles, shifting fronts, new campaigns.
Perhaps most importantly, radicals not only translated Vietnam for their own contexts,
they projected their struggles back onto Vietnam in a way that amplified them. To their eyes,
Vietnam was not simply a specific struggle, but appeared as the concentration of all struggles, in
the same way, perhaps, that white light is composed of all the colors on the spectrum. Vietnam’s
polysemy allowed it to signify political projects as diverse as national liberation, socialist
construction, cultural revolution, and women’s liberation. For this reason, it was not uncommon
for struggles at home to play out symbolically over Vietnam. Take, for instance, the women’s
liberation movement in France.
For instance, to bolster its antiwar message of charity and goodwill, the PCF invited
women to express their antiwar politics through their “natural” maternal instincts. The Communist
Party coaxed women into protesting the war by appealing to their “natural” maternal instincts.
“Today we address ourselves especially,” one flier went “to all the women, you mothers, also to
592

you whose profession it is to care for, heal, and educate children. ”

The PCF thus tended to

reduce the Vietnamese to mere victims in need of sympathy, justifying its particular approach of
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solidarity: charity, goodwill, and pressure politics; and that reduction simultaneously forced
women back into the traditional gender roles of caretaker, mother, and nurturer.

593

In response to this victim-centered approach to solidarity that forced women back into
traditional roles, revolutionary feminists insisted that the women of Vietnam were obliterating
these very roles in the act of revolutionary struggle. Indeed, for many radical feminists Vietnam
meant Women’s Liberation itself. Le Torchon Brule, the first journal of the French Mouvement de
libération des femmes (MLF), often treated Vietnamese women as the vanguard of the liberation
struggle. As an MLF flyer explained,
In Vietnam, women don’t stay confined to their maternal and domestic role, they
undertake, in their own right, the constant reconstruction, the defense of villages, or they
enlist in the liberation army. They therefore wholeheartedly join in the fight, whether they
pick up the rifle, or take on responsibilities … In actively struggling, in the same way as
the men, for the liberation of the Vietnamese people, they move towards their own
liberation, breaking with the image and the role that until now they’ve been assigned:
passivity, domestic tasks, the sole functions of mother and spouse.
“There is ruin, death, suffering in Vietnam,” the flier concludes, but also the seeds of something
594

new: “the laying of the foundations of a new world, liberating women and men.”

To be sure, women’s liberation was indeed a cornerstone of the Vietnamese revolution.
After 1954, traditional gender relations in the North were rapidly overturned as women found work
outside the home; participated in political life; and won legal equality with men, equal pay, paid
maternity leave, access to free childcare, the right to divorce, and equal rights of use, ownership,
and disposal of property acquired before and during marriage. During the war, women in both the
North and the South continued to challenge gender boundaries. Playing an indispensable role in
the war effort, they carried supplies, built infrastructure, managed the village economy, organized
political opposition, staffed anti-aircraft guns, took up arms against the Americans, planted booby
595

traps, and at times even assumed leadership roles in the revolution.
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barriers to full gender equity continued to exist, but North American and Western European
feminists upheld these experiences as a model for women’s liberation in their own countries.

596

“Our Vietnamese sisters hold out their hand,” the first issue of Le Torchon brûle explained. “They
show us the example.”

597

Indeed, the NLF and the DRV themselves invited this kind of semiotic play, allowing
western radicals to read the Vietnamese revolution in ways that enlivened their own struggles at
home. The Courrier du Vietnam, for instance, ran numerous articles on the role of women in the
Vietnamese Revolution. Although much of it was veracious, some was propaganda, designed to
inspire radicals abroad – the Vietnamese woman could set a revolutionary example to be
translated into diverse national contexts.
As the experience of the MLF shows, this period was rife with projections, many of which
involved Vietnam, yet these were all intended to be emancipatory. These projections even
traveled in both directions. For example, in its open letter to women in the American anti-war
movement, the South Vietnamese Women’s Union for Liberation revealed a similar kind of
productive misreading: “We have often told one another moving stories of American mothers, like
Mrs. Evelyn Carasquillo and Anne Pine, throwing back to the US rulers the ‘Bronze Star’ medals
of their sons who had died meaninglessly in Vietnam. These acts are the continuation of the
598

conscious anti-war activities which have multiplied daily and formed an irresistible current.”

Or recall how in 1966 the Courrier du Vietnam not only named African Americans the
second front, but convinced its readers that the latter were fighting the same violent struggle as
the Vietnamese. “The United States faces two violent wars, one inside the country, the other in
Vietnam,” the article proclaimed. “Almost everyday,” it continued, “struggles against racial
segregation explode somewhere in the USA,” which supposedly proved that the United States
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careened towards civil war, in the same way, for example, that black nationalists treated the
NLF’s resistance as definitive proof that American imperialism approached terminal crisis.

599

Lastly, “Vietnam” simply became a universal. In the words of the workers who
successfully self-managed the Lip watch factory in Besançon, France for several months in 1973:
“VIETNAM: is not the endowment of the Vietnamese. In Franc-Comtoise, you say ‘Lip.’”

600

“Vietnam” did not even belong to the Vietnamese; it was a global tendency simply assuming
different forms. Just as radicals redefined the relationship between “imperialism” and the United
States as one of synecdoche, they did the same with “Vietnam” and Vietnam, positioning them as
opposite poles in a Manichean struggle. Imperialism represented reaction, repression, counterrevolution; Vietnam connoted revolution, self-determination, and heroism. Vietnam became
everything as everything became Vietnam.
In direct proportion as Vietnam began to appear everywhere, however, it began to vanish
as a particularity. Although radicals liberated Vietnam from the news cycle, translating it into an
everyday reality, adding its own particular color to almost every major social movement of the
time, in most countries radicals withdrew from specifically antiwar activity after 1968. In fact, in
France, radicals effectively abandoned Vietnam as such, devoting their attention to factory
struggles, university organizing, or new social movements such as gay liberation or the women’s
movement.
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This was not lost on some radicals, for example, who occasionally lamented how

the left had “forgotten” Vietnam as a specific issue.
Even as the PCF, moderates, and some Christian groups continued to protest the war,
Vietnam, as a specific issue, grew less visible after May 68.

602

Historians have variously

suggested this was because the Vietnamese achieved their goals, or because radicals saw their
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antiwar demands fulfilled, or even because Vietnam merely played an instrumental role – and
now that radicals won their autonomy, and revolution appeared on the agenda, they had no
further need for Vietnam.

603

In reality, radicals withdrew from specifically anti-Vietnam war activity

precisely because they felt the best way to aid Vietnam was no longer to rally around Vietnam as
such, but to translate Vietnam into a domestic idiom.

604

Radicals never abandoned Vietnam; they
605

assimilated Vietnam so thoroughly it seemed to disappear.

As Fredy Perlman, an American

present during the May events, reported on French radicals in 1968, “the war in Vietnam ceased
to be an ‘issue’ and became a part of their own daily lives.”
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The major exception, however, was the United States, since radicals found themselves
inside the very country at war with Vietnam. But even here, despite a brief revival in 1970 when
President Nixon announced the bombing of Cambodia, Vietnam as a specific issue generally
declined in importance after 1969, precisely when many in the American radical left turned to
607

revolution.

And with departure of radicals, who now pursued other struggles, what remained of

the movement grew more moderate.
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Of course, some radicals in North America and Western Europe did not accede to
revolution. Others, such as the Italian workerists, arrived at revolution, but not by way of
609

Vietnam.

In general, however, many radicals in North America and Western Europe came to

see revolution as not only possible, but necessary, and they arrived at this conclusion through
anti-imperialist solidarity with Vietnam. And even while some radicals affirmed revolution
theoretically, it was only Vietnam that gave substance to this dream. Other struggles no doubt
pulled some radicals to revolution, such as the Cuban Revolution, the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution in China, and for a time, the Palestinian liberation movement, but Vietnam stood apart.
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In Vietnam, there was a definite adversary, insurmountable odds, high stakes, terrible costs, and
ongoing struggle reported daily. There was also a sense of measurable progress, usually very
hard to gauge in most revolutionary struggles. Above all, however, Vietnam possessed this power
to inspire precisely because it was the most inherently translatable struggle of the period. Its
revolutionary lessons could be easily learned, its example readily followed. Vietnam became a
semantic tapestry, an immense storehouse of revolutionary symbols, ideas, experiences, and
feelings for radicals throughout the world to draw upon. “There were layers upon layers in Viet
Nam,” one American radical later recalled, “meanings within meanings, wheels within wheels.”
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610

CHAPTER 5: THE DEMOCRATIC TURN

On June 20, 1970, sixty-seven-year-old Jean-Paul Sartre defied the government’s new
censorship laws by promenading down the avenue du Général-Leclerc in Paris hawking a stack
of political newspapers. Although the police detained him for disseminating the recently banned
radical paper, La Cause du peuple, Sartre was quickly released, evading the two-year prison
sentence that other less famous activists could face for the same crime. Sartre expected as
much, and his action aimed not only to protest the government’s flagrant violation of civil liberties,
but to lay bare for the French public the hypocrisy of the state’s selective repression of the radical
left, which had by then landed hundreds of young activists in prison.

611

As he put it, “the

government could not try to turn the repressive laws of the bourgeoisie against [the radicals]
612

without itself stepping outside the law, outside its own law.”

State repression of openly revolutionary organizations not only in France, but throughout
North America and Western Europe, did not come as a surprise. As Sartre reflected in 1972,
“since they wanted to overthrow the bourgeoisie by force, they were sooner or later going to fall
613

before the arsenal of bourgeois law.”

Governments revoked civil liberties, outlawed radical

organizations, threw activists in prison, and terrorized social movements. In this context, radicals
in the United States and France, from the Black Panther Party to the Gauche prolétarienne, had
to reevaluate their strategies: how could they continue the revolutionary project in the face of
such harsh repression? In response, most radicals, who had only recently shunned talk of reform
in favor of violent revolution, paid closer attention to civil rights, built alliances with progressive
organizations, and demanded liberties from the very states they sought to abolish.
Experiences of incarceration in the United States and France also pushed many radicals
to reconsider the rights, status, and struggles of prisoners. Whereas many activists had initially
overlooked prisons as sites of politics, internalizing the assumptions of bourgeois criminal
611
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categories, they later began to turn their attention to organizing prisoners, learning from one
another in a transnational network that included the United States, France, and Italy. This
organizing in turn prompted a substantial rethinking of the repressive role of the law, the struggle
for reform, and the rights of the individual. In this context of repression and reassessment,
radicals now saw the struggle for what they called “democratic rights” as not only a legitimate
form of activism, but a strategically necessary phase of the revolutionary movement.
This chapter examines the origins and consequences of this “democratic turn.” It first
synthesizes the history of fierce repression that the U.S. and French governments wielded
against revolutionary organizations, and shows how this repression led French and American
activists to forge new links across the Atlantic, but also among themselves. It argues that in both
the United States and France, some radicals responded to the wave of repression by moderating
their internal rivalries, reaching out to intellectuals, cooperating with progressive but not radical
organizations, and allying with other social classes. In placing themselves at the head of a new
democratic front fighting for the restoration of basic civil liberties, radicals were able to turn the
tables on the state, using repression to win popular sympathy. But in the process, what began as
a purely instrumental advocacy of civil rights slowly transformed the way radicals thought about
class struggle, rights, and revolution, fundamentally reshaping the radical imaginary in both the
United States and France in the early 1970s.

Repressing Revolution
Today, it is sometimes assumed that only a handful of North American and Western
European radicals truly believed in revolution in the 1960s and early 1970s. Even then, some
argue, this revolution amounted to nothing more than empty phraseology, innocuous cultural
experimentation, tragi-comic role-playing, or Oedipal psychodrama.
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Nothing could be further

from the truth. As the previous chapter showed, after the transformative global events of 1968,
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hundreds of thousands of radicals in North America and Western Europe rapidly moved from
antiwar activism to committing their lives to revolution. And as the colossal wave of state
repression that rose to crush them attests, their revolution was not a game.
In France, perhaps over a hundred revolutionary groups mushroomed after May 1968,
representing every imaginable shade of the radical spectrum. Membership, difficult to gauge
since many groups chose to forego party cards, varied tremendously. Some, like Vive la
révolution, counted no more than four hundred comrades at best.

615

Others, such as the Ligue

Communiste or the Parti communiste marxiste-léniniste de France (PCMLF), may have had
several thousand members at their height.

616

Most of them exercised significant influence beyond

their core, enjoying not only the support of a sea of domestic sympathizers, but the active
contributions of respected figures or foreign governments. For instance, the PCMLF, which the
Communist Party of China officially recognized as its fraternal Maoist party in France, was heavily
subsidized and internationally promoted by China. Meanwhile, groups like the Maoist Gauche
prolétarianne could count on support from the philosophers Simone de Beauvoir and Michel
Foucault, filmmakers Jean-Luc Godard and Claude Lanzmann, writers like Jean Genet, and
musicians such as folk celebrity Dominique Grange and Rolling Stones front man Mick Jagger.
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In Italy, groups grew considerably larger than anywhere else on the continent. For
instance, Lotta Continua, a leading extra-parliamentary group, claimed some 30,000 members by
1971, and even then represented only one pole in a vast ecosystem of radical organizations that
included Avanguardia Operaia, Il Manifesto, Potere Operaia, and many others.
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All of them

included militant workers, counted memberships in the thousands, and, since many were deeply
embedded in factories, neighborhoods, and universities, wielded the power to organize crippling
mass actions. Countless other revolutionaries did not belong to these formal parties, but militated
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in other ways, rallying to looser coalitions, new social movements, or, towards the end of the
decade, as an archipelago of autonomous collectives known as “autonomia.”

619

While France and Italy were admittedly exceptional – both boasted vibrant workers’
movements, a revolutionary past, and a pervasive Marxist culture – other countries witnessed this
turn to revolution as well. In Germany, after the implosion of SDS, some students regrouped into
highly disciplined parties known as K-gruppen. According to one estimate, by the mid-1970s
perhaps 15,000 radicals belonged to these groups.
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Chary of such doctrinaire organizations,
621

tens of thousands of German radicals joined other initiatives.
flexible Basisgruppen.

622

Some remained in the more

Others, such as those involved in the Proletarische Front, followed

models imported from Italy.
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A few pursued terrorism.

624

Even in the United States, where in retrospect revolution seemed unlikely, tens of
thousands of radicals devoted themselves to the cause.

625

Some groups were miniscule, and

often confined to a single state or region – the Sojourner Truth Organization, for example,
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claimed perhaps no more than forty members.

626

Others, such as the Revolutionary Union (RU),

or the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), enjoyed a national presence and boasted over a thousand
members each in the mid-1970s.
628

1969.

627

The Black Panther Party peaked at around 5,000 members in

These figures may not seem impressive, but for every committed party member there

were likely many more radicals who sympathized. Some unaffiliated radicals donated to radical
groups, attended their events, or read their newspapers. By 1971, for example, the Party’s
newspaper reached a top circulation of 250,000 copies a week.

629

Others simply organized their

own informal initiatives, which were often no less radical than those of the formal organizations.
Therefore, while formal organizations may have been small in numbers, taken in their
totality, they nevertheless made for an imposing force, exercising influence far beyond their
official membership. Party radicals committed their entire lives to revolution: many sought out
industrial jobs, attended regular party meetings, and threw themselves into whatever campaigns
were on the agenda. Dan La Botz, of the International Socialists, recalled life with his branch
leader, Kevin Katz:
Forceful and persuasive, and absolutely dedicated to building a socialist movement in the
United States, Kevin pushed to make us all professional revolutionaries. His view was
that as full-time socialists we should give every waking hour to the cause, as he himself
630
did. He established a pace of work that was demanding, even exhausting …
This frenetic activity and herculean effort allowed radicals to shape struggles in workplaces,
unions, local politics, and neighborhoods despite their modest numbers.
Most significantly, governments in the United States and Western Europe were
themselves so convinced that these groups posed a significant threat that they responded in kind.
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Indeed, the U.S. government advanced a frightening expansion of its repressive state
apparatuses. The police, the FBI, the CIA, and the Pentagon all collaborated to stem the
revolutionary tide. Soldiers hardened from combat experience abroad, especially in Vietnam,
trained local police officers. The state worked closely with corporations, such as RAND, to
implement domestic counterinsurgency strategies. Congress passed new legislation, such as the
Anti-Riot Act, which meted out harsher sentences to those suspected of inciting violence, and the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which expanded the FBI, augmented local
631

police departments, and funded weapons research.

Repression took many forms. The U.S. government began by raising an army of
informants to spy on American citizens. In May 1969, the New York Times alleged that the FBI
had “undercover agents and informers inside almost every [SDS] chapter.”

632

By 1970, Army

Intelligence had a network of some 1,500 agents across the country, some operating in the
ghettos, others scrupulously observing various organizations.

633

But surveillance often joined with

other, more egregious forms of repression. Local police, and above all the FBI’s COINTELPRO,
spread misinformation, tapped phone lines, aggravated rivalries between groups, raided offices,
destroyed property, targeted specific individuals for selective enforcement of tax laws, arrested
634

radicals on trumped up charges, and even turned to intimidation, torture, and murder.

Unsurprisingly, a close relationship developed between the U.S. government’s repression
at home and its war in Vietnam. Vietnam had become a laboratory for the military, and many of
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the strategies, and even weapons, tested in Vietnam were soon redeployed in the United
States.

635

Some police officers, veterans of Korea or Vietnam, adapted their combat skills to the
636

domestic context.

Others like Commander Daryl Gates studied guerilla warfare in Vietnam to

learn how to contain domestic struggles such as the Watts Rebellion.

637

Police departments

acquired communications technology, ammunition, weapons, riot material, and sensors designed
638

to track the NLF, all developed in Vietnam.

In 1968, for example, the Army began distributing
639

CS gas to local police forces to use against radicals.

Helicopters, which featured prominently in

Vietnam, also became a regular part of U.S. police operations.
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This wave of repression smothered all radical organizations, but the state persecuted
antiwar activists in particular. The Vietnam Day Committee in Berkeley, California, for example,
was an early target. After acquiring declassified COINTELPRO documents, antiwar activists later
confirmed that the FBI “monitored all phases of VDC activity, regularly compiling comprehensive
reports on VDC finances, membership and meetings.”
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The Bureau tracked VDC co-founder

Stephen Smale’s every move, even reporting on his speech at the “Six Heures pour Vietnam”
event in Paris.

642

The FBI also attempted to directly “handicap” VDC operations through

sabotage. Activists later proved that the FBI burglarized the VDC office, stole materials,
collaborated with local police to harass targeted activists, jammed radios during marches,
tampered with mail to cancel or change dates of proposed actions, sent false letters to other
groups like SDS to turn them against one another, coordinated with rightwing groups such as the
Young Republicans or the Young Americans for Freedom to plan counter demonstrations.
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Tellingly, although the VDC had already begun to decline on its own by the spring of 1966, it took
a terrorist attack to put an end to the organization. Just minutes past midnight on April 9, 1966 a
bomb demolished the VDC headquarters, shattering windows within a one-mile radius. While
there is no proof that the FBI had any hand in this attack, records indicate that the FBI did try to
blame the bombing on Progressive Labor in order to destroy both groups at once.
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The VDC was not unique. The 1976 Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, also known as the Church Committee, later
confirmed that the FBI had targeted “almost every anti-war group.”
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And as the antiwar

movement grew more militant, state repression grew more violent, famously culminating in May
1970 when National Guardsmen murdered four students on the Kent state campus in Ohio and
killed two and injured eleven at Jackson State College in Mississippi.
The extreme hostility towards antiwar radicals can partly be explained by the fact that
many American politicians – including National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Special
Assistant to National Security Affairs Walter Rostow, top military leaders, and above all President
Lyndon Johnson – were convinced that the movement was part of an international Soviet
conspiracy to overthrow the United States.
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According to Johnson’s advisor Richard Goodwin,

the President was certain that “the communist way of thinking had infected everyone around him,”
and he ordered the CIA to prepare an investigation into the antiwar movement’s international
connections in October 1967.
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Whatever its disagreements with Lyndon Johnson, the Nixon

Administration shared the same suspicions, no doubt encouraged by J. Edgar Hoover’s
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continuous stream of memos alleging communist control of the antiwar movement – most of it
was revealed to be based on faulty or fabricated evidence.

648

The only activists who suffered worse than those involved in the antiwar movement were
black radicals.

649

African Americans regularly confronted police brutality, watched local police

patrol their communities like an occupying army, and saw their political organizations harassed by
the state, with members often imprisoned on trumped up charges.

650

Indeed, the number of

651

incarcerated African Americans rose significantly in the late 1960s.

The FBI hounded groups

like the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), at one point even entrapping three radicals in a
bizarre conspiracy to destroy the Liberty Bell, Washington Monument, and Statue of Liberty.
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In

the face of mass arrests, RAM soon went underground, and in late 1968, voted to dissolve the
653

The black nationalist Republic

654

SNCC also came under heavy

organization in order to embed themselves in other movements.
of New Afrika had 140 of its supporters arrested in a single day.

fire as police arrested chairman H. Rap Brown for allegedly inciting a riot.

655

Of all black radicals organizations, the Black Panther Party soon emerged as the state’s
primary target. On July 15, 1969, J. Edgar Hoover labeled the Panthers the “greatest threat to the
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internal security of the country.”

Party offices were raided, news stories planted, rivalries

intensified, and Panthers arrested. Huey Newton was imprisoned in October 1967. Eldridge
Cleaver fled the country in the fall of 1968. On December 4, 1969 the FBI murdered Fred
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Hampton, chairman of the Illinois chapter of the Black Panther Party. In November 1969, Chicago
judge Julius Hoffman sentenced Bobby Seale, to four years imprisonment, and in 1970 he was on
trial once again, this time for a murder he did not commit.
Yet in many cases, widespread state repression had the unexpected effect of bringing
black radicals and white antiwar activists closer together. For example, antiwar students arrested
during the 1967 Stop the Draft Week in Oakland were joined in Alameda County Prison just a
week later by Huey Newton.
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They shared not only the same prison, but also the same lawyer,

Charles Garry. As growing numbers of antiwar demonstrators and draft resisters confronted
arrest, brutality, and imprisonment, they became particularly attuned to the repression of the
black movement.

658

Some black radical organizations, such as the Black Panther Party, were

therefore eager to reach out to white antiwar activists facing repression.
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Sensing a potential

alliance, the Panthers specifically asked antiwar activists involved in those demonstrations to help
organize the Free Huey Campaign, and the Panthers made an effort to defend the antiwar
activists. Many white radicals, such as Bob Avakian, future leader of the Revolutionary Union,
answered the call, and worked to “link these things and to build support, particularly among
people who’d been active in the ‘Stop the Draft Week,’ for Huey Newton and the Black Panther
Party.”
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On January 28, 1968, at a UC Berkeley rally defending students arrested during Stop the
Draft Week, Bobby Seale remarked:
Black people have protested police brutality. And many of you thought we were jiving,
thought we didn’t know what we were talking about... But now you are experiencing this
same thing. When you go down in front of the draft, when you go over and you
demonstrate in front of Dean Rusk, those pig cops will come down and brutalize your
heads just like they brutalized the black heads of black people in the black community.
We are saying now that you can draw a direct relationship that is for real and that is not
abstract anymore: you don’t have to abstract what police brutality is like when a club is
there to crush your skull; you don’t have to abstract what police brutality is like when
there is a vicious service revolver there to tear out your flesh; you can see in fact that
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the real power of the power structure maintaining its racist regime is manifested in its
661
occupying troops, and is manifested in its police department – with guns and force.”
Through shared experiences of state repression, different elements of the American radical left
began to coalesce against repression.

Building the United Front
On February 25, 1970, Connie Matthews, the Black Panther Party’s International
Coordinator, approached famed writer Jean Genet in Paris about putting his talents to the service
of black liberation.

662

With the Party under heavy attack, and many of its leaders in exile, prison,

or awaiting trial, the Panthers searched for allies. At this “critical stage,” in which the Party
struggled to spread the movement against racism, repression, and incarceration, Angela Davis
663

recalls how they “thought Genet, thanks to his fame, could help us reach White progressives.”
One of the most vocal supporters of the Black Panthers in France, Genet was not content to
simply raise awareness in his own country.
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To the surprise of the Panthers, he left for North

America only a few days later, clandestinely entering the United States through Canada. For two
months Genet traveled the United States to rally support for not only the besieged Black Panther
Party, but for black political prisoners in general.
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For the Panthers, however, working with

people like Genet was not just a way to fend off repression. They saw these careful alliances as
part of a concerted strategy to turn state repression to the Party’s benefit.
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While it is true that in some cases repression destroyed movements, in others, it allowed
radical organizations to transform and grow. The Panthers, for example, successfully survived
massive repression by using it to win sympathy. The repeated trials of black radicals, often over
fabricated charges, before white juries, and in the courts of racist judges won many over to the
Panther cause.

666

For example, when Judge Hoffman ordered Bobby Seale bound and gagged

for contempt of court, he only attracted further support for the Panthers. By highlighting the
inherent racism of the entire justice system, the Party could convince even those who disagreed
with its revolutionary politics that African Americans could not receive fair trials in the United
States.
The Panthers also succeeded in spinning armed confrontations with the police to their
favor. For example, on November 12, 1969, the Los Angeles police launched a coordinated
assault on the Panthers, arresting dozens, firing thousands of rounds of ammunition, and
ordering a helicopter to bomb the Panther headquarters with dynamite. Even though the Panthers
fired back, organizations overtly critical of the Panther call for revolution, such as the American
Civil Liberties Union and the NAACP, nevertheless rallied to the Party’s defense.
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The Party’s

actions, they felt, were a justified response to the inadmissible violence of the state. The key to
the Panther strategy, therefore, was transforming this sympathy into formal alliances, and then to
use those alliances to organize support, win protection, and accumulate moral capital against the
state. The Panthers forged links with lawyers, academics, writers, progressive organizations,
such as the Peace and Freedom Party, as well as with celebrities such as Jane Fonda, Jean
Genet, and Jean-Luc Godard. In this way, the Panthers used repression to fuel the growth of the
668

party.

Jean Genet’s tour culminated on May 1, 1970 at Yale University where he addressed a
crowd of over 25,000 about Bobby Seale’s pending murder trial. “For Bobby Seale, I repeat, there
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must not be another Dreyfus affair,” he said, referencing his country’s own racist past.

669

Calling

on the audience to “speak out across America” on behalf of the Panthers, he declared, “Bobby
Seale’s life depends on you. Your real life depends on the Black Panther Party.”
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Immediately

after his impassioned speech, he fled the country, returning to France through Montréal, where
he attended the opening of a Black Panther information center to solidify an alliance between the
Party and Quebec separatists.
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Genet drew parallels between the two sides, and his escort,

Panther spokesman, Zayd-Malik Shakur declared: “We understand that Quebec is colonized by
the same system that confronts us. Our party is not racist, but internationalist, and we think it is
essential to link up with other liberation struggles to form a world-wide anti-imperialist front.”
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But as Genet’s sojourn proved, the major task for radicals was now to find creative ways to
counter state repression, both in North America and in Western Europe.
Genet returned home as the embattled French left began, like the Panthers, to
experiment with its own united front. During the events of May and June 1968, the new Minister of
the Interior, Raymond Marcellin, utterly convinced of an international plot to subvert the French
state, banned eleven radical organizations, including the JCR and the UJCml.
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In addition, he

tightened censorship laws, harassing radical publishers such as François Maspero, who
distributed revolutionary literature like the Tricontinental’s quarterly.
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In March 1970, he arrested

Jean-Pierre Le Dantec, the editor of the Gauche prolétarienne’s paper, La Cause du peuple.
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On April 30, the state passed the “Anti-Casseurs” law, which held that anyone associated with
any demonstration in which persons were harmed, property damaged, or violence committed
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against police officers could be arrested for those crimes, no matter how tenuous the link.

Then

on May 27, 1970, Marcellin officially banned the Gauche prolétarienne (GP), arresting Alain
Geismar, one of its leaders, the following month.

677

Outlawed, the “ex-GP,” as it was now called, rethought its strategy in June 1970. A
theoretical statement published in January 1971 reflected on the ex-GP’s trajectory and
articulated a new way forward. The statement argued that in the first phase, from the group’s
founding to May 1970, the GP had successfully sharpened the revolutionary perspective through
“aggressive” struggle. But now that the balance of forces had shifted, it was time to “destroy” their
old style of brazen confrontation. “We adopted the habit of dividing morale by introducing class
struggle,” but now “it is necessary to acquire the habit of uniting.” The new objective was to
“conquer the center,” with a new style of work that emphasized “unity and the democracy of the
678

majority.”

The ex-GP now called for a united “democratic front” to expand and strengthen the

opposition to the state’s repressive turn.
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The concept of the “democratic front” derives directly from Chinese communism, and
especially Mao Tse-Tung’s argument that while the revolution would still be led by the working
class, particular historical conditions in China meant that it required an interclass alliance of
different social forces, such the peasantry, small business owners, and even certain national
capitalists.
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The ex-GP translated this idea for their own context, arguing that the new

conditions of repression meant that revolution in France necessitated a similar alliance. This
meant deescalating rivalries with other radical organizations, collaborating with prominent
intellectuals, forming coalitions with progressive forces, and uniting with other social classes,
including the petty bourgeoisie. To hold this potential bloc together, the front would fight for
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“democratic rights” – such as the freedom of assembly, speech, the press, and protection from
arbitrary arrest or search and seizure – that would appeal to most social classes in France.
This democratic front would serve several concrete functions. Above all, it would offer
protection. For instance, the ex-GP could only continue publishing La Cause du peuple by asking
Jean-Paul Sartre, who was virtually immune to arrest, to serve as editor.

681

Second, with the

official ban forcing the ex-GP underground, members risked losing contact with struggles; by
linking with other legal organizations, however, they could remain connected to the movement.
Lastly, allying themselves with more moderate groups and respected intellectuals in a struggle
against threats to democratic freedoms could elevate their cause in the eyes of a public that had
long been told that ex-GP radicals were terrorists. Far from becoming the enemy of democracy,
the ex-GP could become its greatest champion. By uniting radicals, working people, intellectuals,
and shop-keepers, this front, the ex-GP declared “is perfectly capable of taking back from the
bourgeoisie that which it has stolen: liberty is an important task.”

682

The ex-GP took this new role seriously, putting itself in the service of many popular
struggles. For instance, after a mining disaster at Lens left sixteen miners dead, Sartre and the
ex-GP organized a popular tribunal that eventually found Houlières, the state-owned mining
company, guilty of murder for neglecting the safety of the workers.
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In the factories, the Maoists

defended workers charged for kidnapping their bosses by arguing that these “sequestrations”
were actually forms of popular justice.

684

At the same time, the group advocated for the rights of

immigrants, organizing anti-racist campaigns.

685

And, to the consternation of many other radicals,

the ex-GP even extended an olive branch to small shopkeepers, some of whom were still
686

sympathetic to the xenophobic populism of Pierre Poujade.
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Indeed, not all French radicals shared the ex-GP’s perspective. While the ex-GP, along
with the Parti communiste marxiste-léniniste de France, tried to justify the new turn towards
democratic struggles by arguing that France was undergoing a turn to “fascization,” most other
groups, such as the Ligue Communiste and the VLR, firmly disagreed.

687

They also felt that

widening the “democratic front” to include potentially reactionary forces such as small
shopkeepers would reproduce the pitfalls of the classic popular front of the 1930s. The ex-GP’s
concept of popular justice came under fire as well. The Ligue Communiste blasted the Maoists for
688

having confused “popular justice” with “revolutionary justice.”

Even Michel Foucault, who

nonetheless collaborated closely with the ex-GP, raised concerns about the glorification of the
popular tribunal promoted by the ex-GP leadership, famously arguing that the court is not “the
natural expression of popular justice, but rather its historical function is to ensnare it, to control it,
to strangle it, by re-inscribing it within institutions which are typical of a state apparatus.”
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Nevertheless, since the massive state repression affected everyone, sympathetic
intellectuals, progressive organizations, and other radical groups initially put aside their
differences and heeded the call. As early as May 25, 1970, a panoply of otherwise fratricidal
organizations – including the GP, Ligne Rouge, Ligue Communiste, Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU),
690

Lutte ouvrière, and Vive la Révolution (VLR) – gathered to discuss their common future.

While

relations certainly remained tense, most radical groups at the time did embark on their own
“democratic turns.” This consensus appeared powerfully in the new Secours Rouge (SR).
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example, the Amis de la cause du peuple, headed by Simone de Beauvoir, not only ensured the
publication of the paper, but exposed the state’s hypocritical stance on free speech. Another
organization of this kind was the Agence de presses Libération (APL). Directly inspired by the
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SR first emerged in the 1920s as a communist counterpart to the Red Cross, providing aid to all
those struggling against oppression internationally. In October 1970, soon after the wave of
repression, former French Resisters, Christian socialists, academics, and lawyers collectively
reactivated the defunct SR.

692

The new SR temporarily drew together radicals from groups such

as the ex-GP, the PSU and the Ligue Communiste. Indeed, open to everyone, the SR proclaimed
itself a nonsectarian “democratic association” aiming to “assure the political and juridical defense
of victims of repression and to give them and their families material and moral support with no
exceptions.”

693

The SR, which soon included radicals of all stripes, advocated for immigrants,

activists, workers, prisoners, and everyone else faced with state repression.
The new SR’s self-described struggle to “defend all fundamental rights” marked an
694

important shift for the radicals in France.

In 1968, French radicals had equated the struggle for

rights as mere reformism, but by the early 1970s, state repression had compelled them to adopt
democratic struggles as a fundamental axis of their political work. This did not mean that these
groups abandoned violent revolution, the overthrow of capitalism, or the dictatorship of the
proletariat as final goals, or that they confined their efforts to the narrow field of parliamentary
politics. Rather, they felt that, given the new balance of forces, radicals could no longer afford to
behave as they did in 1968 or 1969, when many believed, in the words of Alain Geismar, that the
revolution was only a few years away in France.
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communist revolution, and many, especially the ex-GP, still engaged in violent struggle,
encouraging bossnappings, beating hated foremen, organizing acts of sabotage, battling police,
and planning militant strikes. But they agreed that in this new democratic phase, they had little
choice but to also struggle for democratic rights and unite with the broader public.

696

This strategy began to appear outside of France as well. Faced with similar forms of
repression, radicals elsewhere in Europe followed suit. Branches of Secours Rouge emerged in
other countries, notably in Belgium, Italy, and Germany, helping to lay the scaffolding for a new
international movement for democratic rights.
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Rethinking the Prison
One of the most transformative consequences of this democratic turn was a new concern
with the status, rights, and struggles of prisoners, an issue most radicals had initially overlooked.
In the aftermath of the May events, and even into 1970, most French radicals had tended to
ignore the prisons. As an ex-GP circular complained in 1970, “concern for the prisoners does not
698

exist,” and many act as if “an imprisoned militant is a dead militant.”

But with escalated

repression throwing radicals behind bars, many groups finally began to regard the prison as a
political space, committing themselves to sustained prison organizing for the first time. In June
1970, for example, the ex-GP created the Organisation des prisonniers politiques (OPP) to
advocate for imprisoned militants.
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For their first campaign in September, OPP worked with Secours Rouge to organize a
coordinated twenty-five-day hunger strike at six prisons, including a women’s prison.

699

The strike

enjoyed mixed success. On the one hand, the Supreme Court of Appeals granted Geismar the
“political regime” status, according him certain privileges, such as the right to order books, receive
visitors, and write. On the other hand, as a political action, the strike had little overall effect on the
political situation. Reflecting on the action, OPP activists argued that the limited results of the
strike could be traced back to the general isolation of the strikers from those on the outside, not
just radicals, but lawyers, doctors, and families. For the next action, set for January 1971, the
700

OPP had to rethink its entire strategy.

In December 1970, ex-GP militants Jacques Rancière, Daniel Defert, Christine Martineau
and others outlined a new direction for the group. To widen the struggle, and truly link prisoners
to the growing democratic front, Defert proposed to “form an investigative commission of experts
on the general situation of the prisons, and that we entrust the leadership to Michel Foucault.”

701

Foucault – along with other figures like Gilles Deleuze; Jean Genet; Jean-Pierre Domenach, the
editor of the progressive Christian journal Ésprit, who had taken a stance against the Algerian
War; and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, the historian of Ancient Greece also active in the earlier struggles
against the Algerian War – agreed, and a new democratic coalition was born.
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On February 8,
703

1971, Foucault formally unveiled the new Groupe d’information sur les prisons (GIP):

There is little information published about the prisoners; it is one of the hidden regions of
our social system, one of the dark zones of our life. We have the right to know. We want to
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know. This is why, with magistrates, lawyers, journalists, doctors, and psychologists, we
704
have formed the Groupe d’information sur les prisons.
To learn about the prisons, the GIP drafted a questionnaire to circulate among prisoners, drawing
heavily on the “workers’ inquiry” model first proposed by Karl Marx in 1881, and later adopted by
French Maoists in the late 1960s and early 1970s in factories and farms.
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Organizationally, the

group relied on the experiences of établissement – or the practice of sending activists to find jobs
at specific workplaces to organize workers – to form investigative work teams for each prison.
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With the help of doctors, lawyers, and family members, the GIP, working with the Secours Rouge,
smuggled inquiries into the prisons. These investigations not only gathered valuable information;
they gave voice to the silenced demands of the prisoners.
The GIP not only inspired other radical groups in France, such as VLR or the Mouvement
de libération des femmes, but also began to connect with prison activist movements in other
countries.
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For French radicals, prisoner struggles in Italy emerged as a central reference point.

After reading Lotta Continua’s coverage of the rebellion at Le Nuove prison in Turin, Italy on
Easter of 1971, a rebellion that sparked a wave of prison unrest across the peninsula, Daniel
Defert and Jacques Donzelot of the GIP traveled to Italy. There, they initiated a fruitful
collaboration with Lotta Continua, which left a profound influence not only on how French radicals
understood prison organizing, but on the revolutionary struggle itself.
Italian radicals’ turn to prison organizing began after a wave of workers’ struggles
reached an impasse after 1969. Known as the “Hot Autumn,” this movement won pay raises,
better benefits, and greater say in the operations of the factory, but was outmaneuvered when
capitalists subsequently raised the cost of living and encouraged trade unions to institute a new
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council system.

708

Some Italian workers therefore began to devise an alternative organizing

strategy. “In view of this,” Italo Sbrogio, a factory worker at the Porto Marghera petrochemical
plant, put it, “we put our back into it and said that the intervention inside the factories would have
to be carried to the outside, to the ‘social,’ as well, broaching the issue of the rise of living
costs.”
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The new strategy was to surround the factory by waging struggles on what was called

the terrain of social reproduction, that is to say, schools, houses, civic centers, neighborhoods,
and streets.

710

Housewives launched a vast movement of “autoreduction” to unilaterally reduce

bus fares, electricity bills, or rents.

711

In some cases, Sbrogio recalls, “people lowered rents,

occupied empty houses, paid less for their food. We organized all this by establishing local
committees in the various parts of town. We even managed to organize a shopping strike which
forced some supermarkets to cut prices for basic food.”
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Lotta Continua was one of the strongest advocates of this new strategy, and went further
by rethinking the role of prisons from this perspective.

713

Prisons, they argued, were sites of

social reproduction, and prisoners’ struggles were therefore intimately linked to the fight for lower
714

rents, affordable food, and accessible transportation.

The French GIP was immediately

inspired by this new conceptualization. In a report on their 1971 meeting with Lotta Continua, the
GIP wrote that “the struggle of the inmates is taken up in a strategy of struggle in the
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neighborhoods.”

715

For the French, who steadfastly prioritized organizing at the point of

production, these Italian ideas about reorienting away from the giant factories to the surrounding
communities came as a revelation. Soon after, the GIP’s close collaborator in France, Secours
Rouge, threw itself into a long campaign over housing.

716

Other radical groups in France were

similarly inspired by Lotta Continua, forging new links and translating their articles on the politics
of tenant struggles and social reproduction.

717

But an even more important transnational influence on the French was the struggle of
African American prisoners. The ex-GP, the GIP, and other French radicals avidly read,
translated, and circulated material about the black prison movements, and the GIP devoted an
entire booklet to George Jackson after his murder on August 21, 1971. In fact, these struggles,
particularly the writings of the Panthers and Jackson, substantially challenged how many French
radicals understood the prison, class composition, and revolutionary politics.
When French Maoist groups first entered the prisons, they drew a line between the
“political” prisoners and the “common law” inmates, arguing that as specifically political prisoners,
they deserved what was known as “political regime” status. They aimed “to force the enemy to
recognize us as a political force and not as a band of criminals – as communists and not as
thieves. The people mobilize behind communists, not behind thieves … The car thief, the
common law criminal, reflects society; the communist transforms it.”

718

As Michel Foucault later

put it:
When Maoists were put in prison, they began, it must be said, by reacting a little like the
traditional political groups, that is to say: “We do not want to be assimilated with the
criminals of common law, we do not want our image to be mixed with theirs in the opinion

715

GIP, “Depuis la reunion des camarades du GIP ont rencontré …” April 1971, reprinted in in Le
Groupe d’information sur les prisons, 104.
716
See, for example, their special issue devoted to housing struggles, Secours Rouge 2
(February 1972), F Delta Res 576/5/8 Gauche prolétarienne: Secours Rouge, BDIC.
717
On the transnational links between Vive la Révolution and Lotta Continua, see Manus
McGrogan, “Vive la Révolution and the Example of Lotta Continua: the circulation of ideas and
practices between the left militant worlds of France and Italy following May ‘68,” Modern and
Contemporary France 18, no. 3 (August 2010): 309-28.
718
“Pour l’union des prisons et des bases d’appui” [June 1970?], F Delta Res 576/5/5/1, BDIC.
203

of people, and we ask to be treated like political prisoners with the rights of political
719
prisoners.”
This was, after all, the primary objective of the first strike in September 1970. However, as
historians like Julian Bourg have noted, the combination of that strike’s limited gains, along with
subsequent prison inquiries, collaboration with “common law” prisoners, and engagement with
Foucault’s ideas helped push the ex-GP beyond this rather narrow conception of the prison.

720

It

is often forgotten, however, that black prison organizing, especially the figure of George Jackson,
played the most decisive role in this rethinking.
In his writings, Jackson, an African American Marxist and one of the three Soledad
Brothers, demonstrated that the prison, just as much as the high schools, universities, factories,
or the union offices, could be a site of politicization. He argued that prisons did not in fact
suppress politics, but rather, were places where many people learned politics for the first time.
The GIP came to see Jackson, imprisoned since the age of eighteen, as “one of the first
721

revolutionary leaders to acquire his political education entirely in prison.”

This in turn had a

profound impact on the ex-GP, which began to argue, paraphrasing Jackson, that “the prisons
722

are not only ‘Marxist universities,’ but training camps.”

They saw the 1971 Attica riot, where

incarcerated rioters had inscribed the words “prison is the school of revolution” on the prison
walls, as definitive proof.

723

Jackson, and the Panthers more broadly, also helped French radicals overcome their
scorn for what was known as the lumpen proletariat, that is to say, the underclass of criminals,
vagabonds, ragpickers, and others at the margins who were allegedly hostile to proletarian
revolution. This bias revealed an inability to recognize the class dimensions of the prison, and
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was directly responsible for the Maoists’ initial decision to separate themselves from the common
law prisoners. Jackson, now seen as “the first to carry out a class-based analysis of the
724

prisoners,” changed their view.

In an interview translated by the GIP, Jackson wrote, “All these

cats in here are lumpen, that’s all I’ve ever been.” However, he continued, “you would be very
surprised to see how these particular lumpen in here accept class war and revolutionary
socialism.” Jackson argued that prisoners were not selfishly individualistic, as traditional Marxist
theory seemed to suggest, but rather that their isolation from community, family, clan, or national
ties, engendered an intense longing for “community, commune-ity.” “That’s what helps define us
as a class,” Jackson explained.
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Indeed, Jackson continued, the prison, bourgeois law, and the judicial apparatus were
themselves responsible for creating the very category of the lumpenproletariat. In 1971, the
Cause du Peuple translated some of Jackson’s writings in which he argued that even when
released, prisoners were marked with a record, had enormous difficulty to find jobs, and were
quickly arrested again, often charged with the crime of “the inability to keep paid work.”

726

Another

article in the Cause du Peuple argued that the prison, as the “privileged instrument” of the justice
system, marginalized certain sectors of the proletariat, drained resources from workers facing
trial, and, echoing Jackson, ensured that once convicts were released, they would face
unemployment or highly exploitative and precarious jobs.
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Through the perspective of the black prison experience, French radicals such as Jean
Genet began to see how the justice system branded certain people as always-already guilty. As
Genet wrote in his preface to Jackson’s Soledad Brother, “the black man is, from the start,
728

natively, the guilty man.”

In other words, the law itself had created an entire category of people

designated as criminal, expendable, surplus. The insights gathered from the struggle of African

724

GIP, “La place de Jackson dans le mouvement des prisons,” 212.
Ibid., 212; the original interview is from Pat Gallyot, “George Jackson, a Beautiful Black
Warrior,” Sun Reporter, August 28, 1971, 2.
726
“George Jackson,” La Cause du peuple-J’accuse 9, 10-11.
727
GIP, “La prison: enjeu d’un combat,” La Cause du peuple-J’accuse 1 (May 24, 1971): 7.
728
Jean Genet, “Introduction,” July 1970, in Soledad Brother: The Prison Letters of George
Jackson (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1970).
205
725

Americans, the GIP later realized, “overturn many commonly accepted ideas in the history of the
working-class movement about the population in the prisons.”

729

Paired with the GIP’s own

empirical discoveries in French prisons, these arguments forced many radicals to not only
fundamentally rethink the idea of class, but also change their very political strategies. Instead of
separating themselves from the petty criminals, whose existence they initially felt was
nonpolitical, radicals now demanded the special “political regime for everyone.”

730

Reflecting on these shifting ideas in an article published in La Cause du peuple, the GIP
argued that “the struggle of prisoners is not different, at bottom, from those that are carried out in
the society from which they are ‘excluded.’”

731

The new political project, therefore, was to

overcome these artificially imposed divisions. Analyzing the GIP’s discovery, theorist Alberto
Toscano notes that unity now meant breaking a division that “was both imposed upon and
eventually affirmed by the workers’ movement, with its debilitating introjection of a bourgeois
morality itself reproduced by legal and penal institutions: the division between the proletariat and
732

the ‘non-proletarianized plebs.’”

Instead of trying to advance the struggles of a visible,

spectacular, mythic vanguard, that of the wageworker in the factory, radicals now considered
rearticulating a fractured class by reintegrating the forgotten, invisible, so-called “backwards”
figure, reorienting the focus away from independent class figures to the relationships between
those figures – a task all the more pressing given the plurality of new social movements emerging
at this time.
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This rethinking demanded a more nuanced engagement with the law. Through their
experiences organizing around prisons, some radicals began to see the law as a more subtle,
creative form of power, rather than a blunt instrument wielded by the bourgeoisie in reaction to
movements. Foucault summarized the new thinking:
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If one makes the distinction, if one accepts the difference between political law and
common law, that means that fundamentally one recognizes bourgeois morality and law
as far as respect for the property of others, respect for traditional moral values, etc., are
concerned. The cultural revolution in its widest sense implies that, at least in a society
like ours, you no longer make the division between criminals of common law and political
criminals. Common law is politics, it is, after all, the bourgeois class that, for political
734
reasons and on a basis of its political power, defined what is called common law.
As they began to understand the law as a creative political force, activists demanded further
inquiry. The ex-GP called for the creation of “study groups” to not only investigate different legal
matters, such as arrests or violation of press laws, but to publish accessible brochures to help all
militants familiarize themselves with the political function of the law.
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Indeed, the ex-GP, along

with other radicals, began to see the law as itself a site of struggle, and called for an “army of
lawyers” allied with the left to “open a breach in the legal apparatus of the bourgeoisie.”
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Thus,

through this transnational experience of prison organizing, some radicals began to see the subtle
ways in which politics was at work even in those places they once ignored or wrote off as
nonpolitical, such as the prison of the “common law.”
French radicals initially made the “democratic turn” out of immediate strategic concerns,
as a kind of political expedient in a changed situation. But as they followed this turn, they began
to rethink many of their long held assumptions. The democratic turn did not just buy radicals time,
space, and allies, leaving the core of their project unchanged; it transformed the very way radicals
thought about class struggle, politics, and the revolution itself. This was clearly felt in the new
confrontation with rights. Through prison organizing, radicals begin to rethink how rights might fit
into their more general conception of revolution. The GIP, by no means a reformist organization,
later reflected that their investigations into the prisons ended up speaking “less about the
experience of prisoners, or their misery, than their rights – right to defend oneself against
tribunals; the right to news, visits, mail; the right to hygiene and food; the right to a decent wage
for work done, and the right to keep working when one been released …” The questionnaires,

734

Foucault, “Michel Foucault on Attica: An Interview,” 32.
“Pour l’union politique des prisons et des bases d’appui,” no date, 4, F Delta Res 576/5/5/1,
BDIC.
736
Ibid.
207
735

which asked very specifically what rights prisoners had, and what rights they wanted, was, upon
further reflection, seen as a way of “declaring these rights.” Most profoundly, the GIP argued that
while some of these rights had already been won, they were always being taken away, meaning
that the struggle for rights would never be finished once and for all, a mere one way step on the
way to revolution, but an ongoing, integral part of the revolutionary process.
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This process was not without its contradictions. While radicals increasingly adopted the
new rights discourse, most did not embrace the notion of individual sovereignty, but continued to
place their advocacy of “democratic rights” firmly within the framework of collective revolution. But
attempting to reconcile a commitment to democratic rights with the overall struggle for the
dictatorship of the proletariat was bound to raise some serious questions about the meaning of
both rights and revolution. This tension risked rendering the politics of some of these groups,
especially the ex-GP, incoherent. For at the same time that the ex-GP assured the French public
of its commitment to basic liberties, its militants assaulted security guards and foremen and
plotted the overthrow of the French state.
This fraught relationship between rights and revolution grew even more serious when
radicals looked abroad. As the next chapter will show, the concern with rights began to affect their
organizing beyond French prisons, shaping the way radicals conceptualized international
solidarity. For radicals soon learned that revolutionaries in South Vietnam faced far higher levels
of state repression. The dictatorial government of General Nguyen Van Thieu revoked civil
liberties, imprisoned hundreds of thousands of political dissenters, and tortured those suspected
of revolutionary sympathies. Activists, as we will see, responded by grafting their new concerns
with rights onto the antiwar movement, demanding the immediate release of the political
prisoners. Yet in arguing that South Vietnam violated fundamental democratic rights, the defense
of national liberation against imperialism increasingly took the form of criticizing the internal affairs
of a sovereign state. In so doing, they not only began to lend legitimacy to a competing form of
international solidarity that shared the progressive aspirations of anti-imperialism but rejected
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national sovereignty and collective rights in favor of human rights; this new iteration of
international solidarity accentuated some of the implicit contradictions between rights and
revolution in the strategy of the radical left in the 1970s.

209

CHAPTER 6: FREEING THE POLITICAL PRISONERS

On April 16, 1971, President Richard Nixon responded to questions about Vietnam at a
panel interview at the annual convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. During
the interview, Otis Chandler, publisher of the Los Angeles Times, broached the question of the
U.S. prisoners of war in North Vietnam. Nixon responded bluntly: the North Vietnamese have,
“without question,” been the “most barbaric in their handling of prisoners of any nation in modern
history.”

738

Insisting that he would never abandon the POWs, he threatened, “As long as there is

one American being held prisoner in North Vietnam,” he would “retain that force.”

739

The POW

issue, in other words, had become a central justification for the prolongation of the war.
Indeed, at the very same moment that radicals in France and the United States began to
make the rights of prisoners a central dimension of their revolutionary struggles, the U.S.
government launched an ambitious strategy to transform the entire discourse on the war into one
about the repression of American prisoners of war. While the plight of the POWs had always
been part of the debate about the war, especially within the anti-war movement, under the Nixon
Administration, the safe release of the American POWs would become a primary justification for
the prolongation of the war in Vietnam. By 1969, most Americans had come to believe the war
was a mistake, the international community had turned against the United States, and the Nixon
Administration had lost moral legitimacy. Hoping to revive support, Nixon, backed by a loose
coalition of conservatives, gambled that he could use the cause of the political prisoners to
rebrand the American war as a just fight for humanitarian principles.
Antiwar radicals in the United Sates, then France, responded by pointing to the tens of
thousands of political dissidents imprisoned, tortured, or disappeared by the U.S.-backed
government of South Vietnam. Drawing on their considerable transnational experiences with
prison organizing, they grafted their newfound concern with rights directly onto antiwar solidarity,
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calling for the liberation of all political prisoners in South Vietnam. Indeed, after the United States
withdrew from Vietnam in 1973, thereby depriving anti-imperialist international solidarity
movements of their primary target, antiwar radicals made the liberation of the political prisoners
one of their primary concerns, demanding that South Vietnam free all its political dissidents,
restore civil liberties, and adhere to the Paris Accords. Hoping to revive the international antiwar
movement, French radicals used this common demand to unite the radical left at home and
abroad. These efforts culminated in a massive antiwar demonstration in May 1973, when over ten
thousand Western European and American radicals met in Milan, Italy.
Despite the focus on rights, anti-imperialists still framed internationalism around national
liberation, believing that socialist states, at least in the short run, remained the primary vehicles of
emancipation. Yet in arguing that South Vietnam violated fundamental democratic rights, antiimperialist solidarity increasingly took the form of criticizing the internal affairs of a sovereign
state. Thus, while most radicals did not convert to human rights in the early 1970s, their new
attention to rights, along with alliances with rival groups such as Amnesty International, created
the political terrain that allowed a competing form of solidarity to attract new audiences. In so
doing, anti-imperialists lent legitimacy to a competing – and at the time relatively marginal – form
of internationalism that shared the progressive aspirations of anti-imperialism but rejected
nationalism in favor of human rights.

Prisoners of War
In the early stages of the war the U.S. government said very little publicly about POWs
and MIAs. Believing that drawing attention to the prisoners could hamper the government’s efforts
to secure their freedom, the Johnson Administration practiced what was known as “quiet
diplomacy.”
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But dissenting voices soon emerged from within the government. As early as 1967

several proposals from the military recommended the United States mobilize the POW issue for
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“counter-propaganda.”

741

The Marine Corps, for instance, argued that it was imperative to counter

North Vietnam’s claims to treating American POWs humanely, believing they could easily win
742

“world public opinion” in this matter.

According to the Army, the United States needed “a

strategy which aggressively grasps the initiative for us and keeps the other side reacting in the
desired direction.”

743

The Air Force went furthest, advocating the United States seize this

opportunity to influence both domestic and foreign audiences by targeting major institutions,
national media, social clubs, and Congress. A Working Group for the Proposed Publicity
Programs Working Group, created to evaluate these proposals, concluded that the POW issue
would help the United States take the offensive in its losing ideological war.
Although the Johnson Administration resisted these proposals, by 1969 the U.S.
government changed direction. The incoming Nixon Administration proved far more receptive to
the military’s proposals. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird took a personal interest in the issue,
and, encouraged by conversations with “experienced DoD officials about the pent up urge to go
on the offensive,” he openly advocated change of strategy.

744

In fact, within only a few months of

taking office, Laird publicly raised the issue, releasing a memorandum to the press condemning
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) for denying the POWs “basic rights.”
This new direction away from “quiet diplomacy” was paralleled by considerable pressure
from below. POW/MIA families, tired of staying silent, turned against “quiet diplomacy.” Certain
the U.S. government was not doing enough for the prisoners, the National League of Families of
American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia initiated a very aggressive campaign to
“publicize the plight of our men,” publishing stories in newspapers across the country,
bombarding Richard Nixon with telegrams on his inauguration, and later appearing on television
shows.
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In 1969, the League went national, Sybil Stockdale, wife of the highest ranking naval

officer imprisoned in North Vietnam, became its coordinator, and the group forged powerful ties
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with major Republican politicians, including Defense Secretary Laird, California Governor Ronald
Reagan, Senator Bob Dole, and President Nixon himself. For their part, these politicians
recognized they could not afford to alienate the families.
Above all, the U.S. government realized it could not afford to lose the ideological war.
After Têt, morale plummeted and opposition rose. In January 1969, for example, 52% of Gallup
respondents said the war was a mistake.
to a “public relations crisis.”

747
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In July, Nixon’s own ratings began to decline, leading

In October and November, he would face the first two nationwide

demonstrations against his administration. With the majority of Americans against the war, the
U.S. government, which did not intend to withdraw from Southeast Asia, needed to not only justify
its actions, but revive prowar sentiment. With pressure from the grassroots, a new strategy from
the White House, and support from within the military, the U.S. government settled on the POWs
as the perfect issue to outflank the Vietnamese on the ideological front.
To be sure, it was the Vietnamese, then the American anti-war movement, who first
politicized the POWs. North Vietnam periodically released American POWs as early as 1965 to
foster goodwill, pressure the United States to negotiate, and cast the Vietnamese as the real
748

humanitarians.

But the Nixon Administration, following suggestions from the military, gambled

that it could use the POW issue to, in the words of Laird, “marshal public opinion” against the
antiwar movement at home and the DRV abroad.
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Thus, the Nixon Administration hoped that, if
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approached correctly, the POW issue could be used to rally prowar support, transforming the
“silent majority,” as Nixon later called it, into an active coalition.

750

Thus, on May 19, 1969, the last birthday Ho Chi Minh would live to celebrate, the U.S.
government launched the Go Public campaign. At a press conference, Secretary of Defense
Laird called for the “prompt release of all American prisoners,” denounced the North Vietnamese
for their treatment of the POWs, and put forward five concrete demands.
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Although led by the

Nixon Administration, the campaign was a coming together of relatively independent efforts
involving the military, social clubs, veterans associations, the League of Families, conservative
politicians, wealthy philanthropists, the mainstream news media, and prowar ideologues. While
they all had different immediate interests, their common goal was an American victory in Vietnam,
and they all saw the POW/MIA issue as playing a crucial role in revitalizing the pro-war
752

campaign.
shape.

In fact, through the Go Public campaign, a new right-wing coalition began to take
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Few could have anticipated the scope of the Go Public campaign. In late July 1969,
prowar groups printed 5,000 bumper stickers with the words, “Don’t let them be forgotten: POWs,
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MIAs.” Within four years there would be fifty million in circulation.
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the prisoners. Some were zealously prowar. For instance, Sybil Stockdale was a right-wing
fanatic who once proposed annexing Vietnam as American territory. Working closely with the
military, Stockdale even took advantage of her husband’s capture to communicate military
information with him through coded letters. But as the war continued, the prisoners continued to
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POW/MIA families flew to Paris to accost the “enemy face-to face.”
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In November, Congress

unanimously declared November 9 a National Day of Prayer for POWs in Vietnam, and the
House Subcommittee on National Security Policy formally condemned North Vietnam for violating
the Geneva Convention’s statutes on POWs.
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Reader’s Digest sponsored a “write in,”

instructing its readers to send letters to Xuan Thuy, North Vietnam’s chief negotiator in Paris.
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That same month, billionaire Ross Perot not only paid major newspapers to run full-page
advertisements about the prisoners, he purchased time on 53 stations to run a half-hour
propaganda film. By the end of November 1969 Perot had spent over one million dollars.
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The campaign continued unabated into 1970 and 1971. On May 1, 1970 Bob Dole
teamed up with the League to organize an extravaganza, meretriciously titled, “An Appeal for
International Justice,” in Constitution Hall that featured one thousand POW/MIA families. On May
9, 1970, at the Salute to the Armed Forces Ball, the Victory in Vietnam Association (VIVA),
unveiled its fundraising campaign to sell nickel and copper bracelets engraved with the names of
POWs and MIAs. By January 1973, when the Paris Peace Agreements were finally signed, four
to ten million Americans wore these bracelets.
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The Go Public campaign signaled an entire reorientation of U.S. policy in Vietnam. In a
national broadcast on October 7, 1970, President Nixon presented a new proposal to end the
war, announcing that one of the highest priorities would be the immediate release of “all prisoners
of war, without exception, without condition.”
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To prove his commitment to freeing the prisoners,

he even ordered a daring military raid to liberate the Son Tay prison camp outside Hanoi.
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Through these stunts, televised speeches, and the Go Public campaign, the Nixon Administration
and its allies hoped to make the entire war about freeing the prisoners. As Reagan once put it,
“The issue of the prisoners is the single most important issue involved in this long and savage
war and we want them back now.”
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Nixon went further, menacing that “as long as there are American POWs” he would have
to “maintain a residual force in South Vietnam.”
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He even implied that the United States was still

in Vietnam precisely to free the prisoners of war. Critics highlighted the absurdity of this new
position, arguing that the war itself was creating the very thing it was now allegedly being waged
to end. When they suggested that if the United States really wanted to bring the POWs home, the
military should simply withdraw, Nixon maintained that announcing withdrawal would only play
into the enemy’s hands, and that “we will have given enemy commanders the exact information
they need to marshal their attacks against our remaining forces at their most vulnerable time.”

764

Nixon took every opportunity to lambaste “the enemy’s callous indifference,” repeatedly
suggesting that the North Vietnamese used the POWs as “hostages for political or military
purposes” or as mere “negotiating pawns” in some “barbaric” game.

765

It was a cunning move.

For at the very same time that U.S. government violated civil liberties at home, and supported a
dictatorship in South Vietnam, it arraigned the North Vietnamese for infringing “basic rights.” At
the same time that the pro-war conservatives disregarded the Geneva Accords of 1954 on
Vietnamese self-determination, they fulminated against the Vietnamese for breaking the Geneva
Convention of 1929 regarding prisoners of war. And at the same time that American imperialism
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murdered hundreds of thousands in Indochina, its proponents sought to divert attention to the no
more than several hundred captured soldiers.
Most insidiously, however, the Nixon administration aimed to redefine the POW/MIA
matter as a purely humanitarian issue, to be treated independently of not only military, but also
political concerns. As early as October 1970, Nixon argued that the “release of all prisoners of
war would be a simple act of humanity.”

766

Not only, he explained again in March 1971, had the

Vietnamese contravened the statues of the Geneva Convention, but, on a “moral plane above
and apart from these formal rules, all civilized peoples are subject to the basic humanitarian
standards long established in international law and custom.”

767

Appealing to universal

“humanitarian standards,” the United States hoped, could move the question of imprisonment
beyond its specific historical context, turning it into a purely ethical issue.
The United States’ growing concern with the plight of the prisoners of war in Vietnam
moved in the exact opposite direction as radicals’ equally new concern with the status of political
prisoners in North America and Western Europe. For while radicals tried to repoliticize seemingly
nonpolitical experiences, such as “common law” imprisonment, the United States tried to
depoliticize the emphatically political experiences of the POWs. While radicals aimed to reactivate
a language of rights in the service of global revolutionary transformation, the U.S. government
aimed to confine all rights discourse to a notion of intrinsic humanitarian ethics that could
ultimately preserve the status quo. Thus, the United States implicitly tried to outflank radicals on
both the issue of the war and that of imprisonment by shifting the discussion to a different terrain,
focusing on morality instead of politics, universal standards instead of historical contingency, and
individual rights instead of the collective right to self-determination.

What About the Other POWs?
In 1969, the Black Panther Party disclosed that North Vietnam would release captured
American POWs in exchange for the freedom of Chairman Bobby Seale and Minister of Defense
766
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Huey P. Newton, then incarcerated as “political prisoners here in fascist Babylon.” “If you have
sons, husbands or friends who are prisoners of war in Vietnam,” their paper enjoined, “send us
their name, rank, and serial numbers.”

768

The U.S. government declined the offer, but the Party

persisted. “This proposed freedom of Political Prisoners in exchange for Prisoners of War,” the
Panthers continued, “could only be ignored by a government that has no concern for its poor, its
peace-loving, its non-White, and its soldiers, and even less concern for PEACE.”

769

The Panther’s call for a prisoner exchange was just one of many swift responses to the
U.S. government’s POW strategy. Some radicals exposed the POW campaign as a U.S. plot to,
in the words of DRV Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, “cover up its odious crimes against the
Vietnamese people, its war acts against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, and its schemes to
prolong and extend the war of aggression.”

770

Others, such as the Panthers, pointed to the

thousands of political prisoners languishing in penitentiaries at home. Still others tried to
outmaneuver the Nixon Administration by convincing the public that antiwar radicals and the
Vietnamese were not only concerned about the POWs, but could allay their plight more effectively
than the U.S. government. This was precisely why in August 1969, just months after the United
States fired the opening salvos of the Go Public campaign, the DRV released three POWs
directly to a representative of the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam,
rather than government officials. Hoping to transform this gesture of goodwill into an ongoing
campaign to meet Nixon’s challenge, in January 1970, representatives from the DRV and a
contingent of anti-war activists led by Cora Weiss and David Dellinger formed the Committee of
Liaison with Families of Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam (COLIAFAM).
COLIAFAM tackled the POW issue from a resolutely anti-war perspective, arguing in its
very first press release that the “safe return of American pilots held in North Vietnam can only
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come with a decision on the part of the U.S. government to withdraw from Vietnam.”

771

Until then,

COLIAFAM would cooperate with the North Vietnam to improve the situation as best as possible.
The committee produced a complete list of American POWs, convinced the DRV to allow POWs
to receive heavier packages, and provided the only functional channel for relaying mail to the
prisoners. COLIFAM was so successful that even Nixon’s ally, the prowar League of Families,
772

ultimately voted down a proposal to boycott the Committee.

This did not stop the government,

however, which felt sufficiently threatened that it strove to smear and harass the Committee,
going so far as to seize 379 letters from POWs sent to COLIAFAM in September 1970.

773

While pursuing all these other paths, radicals, beginning with American antiwar activists,
ultimately focused on one strategy to expose the hypocrisy of the U.S. government’s concern with
POWs: drawing attention to the political prisoners rotting in South Vietnamese jails.

774

By the late

1960s, South Vietnam was rapidly becoming an authoritarian state under the firm control of
President Nguyen Van Thieu. In the August 1971 presidential election, he ran unopposed,
winning 94 percent of the vote in what many considered a rigged contest. Although already
repressive, his regime took a sharper autocratic turn in response to the DRV’s 1972 spring
offensive. Thieu imposed martial law, ruling by decree, limited the rights of political parties, and
strangled basic democratic rights throughout the country, especially the freedom of speech.
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This destroyed what little popularity Thieu’s dictatorial government could count on, leading him to
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turn to violent repression to maintain order. Until the end of the war in April 1975, he would
imprison hundreds of thousands of suspected dissenters – communists and anti-communists,
Buddhists and Christians, poor farmers and outspoken intellectuals – without trial. In many cases,
the guards tortured the prisoners, keeping them awake for weeks on end, mutilating their bodies,
feeding them only grass to eat, or in some cases even blinding dissidents with caustic lime.

776

Gaolers locked thousands of prisoners in dreaded “tiger cages” no more than five or six feet long
and four feet high. In the face of such repression a coalition of progressive South Vietnamese
organizations, including the Union of Women, the Mouvement des Catholiques pour la paix, and
the National Liberation Front, as well as the government of North Vietnam quickly organized on
behalf of the prisoners.

777

In Saigon, Vietnamese activists even braved further reprisals to found a

specific solidarity group, the Comité pour la réforme du régime de détention au Sud Vietnam.
A central component of this coalition’s strategy was to publicize the issue internationally.
For example, in 1970, the South Vietnamese Committee of Women’s Action for the Right to Live,
which unsuccessfully tried to meet with Vice President Spiro Agnew during his visit to the
Republic of Vietnam, circulated an open letter to the Nixon Administration about the suffering of
the political prisoners in the South, which the Women’s International League for Peace and
778

Freedom later distributed internationally.

“We are the mothers of the political prisoners

detained in the various prisons of South Vietnam,” they announced. “None of our children is
convicted of a crime,” the women continued, but all of “them are being imprisoned because they
have dared spoken of Peace and Independence, a most profound desire of all the Vietnamese
779

People after years and years of war.”

The women concluded their open letter by demanding

the liberation of their children from the “present inhuman system of imprisonment in South
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Vietnam.”

780

More damning, however, the Committee directly implicated the United States in

these crimes. “Our children witness the presence of American Advisors at the prisons,” they
781

warned.

The United Sates, the Committee accused, not only funds, equips, and trains Thieu’s

police force, but the American military carries out its own arrests, sometimes handing over
suspects to the South Vietnamese government without trial.
Although Thieu denied these accusations, irrefutable evidence appeared in the summer
of 1970. Congressional aid Tom Harkin, accompanying a group of House representatives to
Vietnam, visited antiwar journalist Don Luce in Saigon, where he happened to meet a group of
former political prisoners claiming Thieu had locked them in hidden tiger cages on the island of
Con Son.

782

One of them, Cao Nguyen Loi, drew Harkin a map, and Harkin convinced two

representatives to investigate the Con Son penitentiary.

783

Once there, the delegation broke from

the official tour, following their map to a secret entrance leading to tortured political prisoners.
Luce, who served as translator, recalls how the “faces of the prisoners in the cages below are still
etched indelibly in my mind: the man with three fingers cut off; the man (soon to die) from Quang
Tri province whose skull was split open; and the Buddhist monk from Hue who spoke intensely
about the repression of the Buddhists. I remember clearly the terrible stench from diarrhea and
784

the open sores where shackles cut into the prisoners’ ankles.”

From that point on, the suffering of the political prisoners became a recognizable issue.
Harkin published his photographs in a July 1970 edition of Life Magazine and penned a lengthy
story about the political prisoners in an issue of The Progressive. Don Luce provided further
revelations about the violations of basic civil liberties in South Vietnam, the suffering of the
political prisoners, and the dreaded tiger cages. The stories soon reached an international
audience. The Front Solidarité Indochine (FSI), the successor to the Comité Vietnam National,
780
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led by the indefatigable Laurent Schwartz, helped publicize the issue in France. Drawing directly
on Luce’s research, as well as statements from Vietnam, the FSI published an article in 1971 on
Thieu’s regime, calling French radicals to “help the 200,000 political prisoners in South
Vietnam.”

785

The struggle to free the political prisoners gained further momentum in 1972. Don Luce’s
Indochina Mobile Education Project and Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden’s newly formed Indochina
Peace Campaign (IPC) led the way in the United States.
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They were joined by dozens of other

newly formed antiwar organizations specifically devoted to the issue. These groups, such as the
Bay Area Committee of Inquiry into Political Prisoners in South Vietnam and American
Responsibility, circulated detailed pamphlets that often presented, among other things, statistics,
letters from prisoners, or revelations about U.S. aid to Thieu’s regime.

787

Some of these groups,

such as the International Committee to Free South Vietnamese Political Prisoners from
Detention, Torture, and Death drew on their strong international connections to coordinate efforts.
These varied initiatives proved so successful that by the end of 1972 even most mainstream
American newspapers, such as the New York Times, The Washington Post, and the San
Francisco Chronicle, felt obliged to run lengthy stories on the issue.
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In January 1973 the campaign crossed a threshold when two Frenchmen formerly
detained in South Vietnam published an eyewitness account of the brutality in the prisons. In
1968 André Menras and Jean-Pierre Debris traveled to Vietnam as teachers on a governmental
exchange program. Although “nonpolitical” when they first arrived in Saigon, by the summer of
1970, they found Thieu’s regime so oppressive that they staged a risky protest – they scaled the
monument adjacent to the National Assembly, unfurling an NLF flag, and scattering leaflets
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demanding peace.

789

The government had them arrested immediately and thrown into Chi Hao

prison, where they remained until December 29, 1972. Upon returning to France, they furnished
the most authentic non-Vietnamese statements about the treatment of political prisoners in South
Vietnam. Their testimonies were immediately translated into many languages, and the two men
embarked on an international speaking tour to publicize the political repression in the South.
Menras and Debris worked especially closely with American activist groups, above all
Tom Hayden’s IPC.

790

In March 1973, Studs Terkel interviewed the pair on the radio, where the

two described, in heavily accented English, the oppressiveness of Thieu’s regime and the
gruesome tortures in the prisons.

791

Their accounts, along with the careful research of Don Luce,

who had just published a book called Hostages of War: Saigon’s Political Prisoners, formed the
792

factual basis of much of the antiwar literature on the issue in the United States and elsewhere.
After these revelations, practically every American antiwar organization made the political

prisoners a central feature of their activity. By 1973, even rival revolutionary organizations, such
as the Socialist Workers Party and the Revolutionary Union, joined the same cause.
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The campaign to liberate the political prisoners gave radicals the perfect response to the
Nixon Administration. How could the U.S. government, antiwar radicals asked, criticize the DRV
for its treatment of a few hundred POWs when it supported a brutal dictatorship that tortured
literally hundreds of thousands of prisoners in the South? Many American radicals explicitly
counterposed their political prisoner campaign to Nixon’s Go Public campaign. “For years
Americans have worn name bracelets symbolizing their deep concern for the release of American
POWs,” one group argued, but “a tragedy of a far larger scale continues for 200,000 Vietnamese.
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These are the civilian POWs in the prisons of South Vietnam.”

794

Moreover, since the political

prisoners would remain imprisoned even after the United States agreed to withdraw in January
1973, the radicals held a lasting campaign in their hands. Thus, when Nixon triumphantly
welcomed the POWs home in early 1973, hoping to definitely close the issue, antiwar activists
pointed to the political dissidents still imprisoned in South Vietnam, chanting, “not all the prisoners
795

are home.”

As the Black Panther Party’s Intercommunal News, drawing on Menras and Debris’

testimony, put it “What about the Other POWs?”

796

Antiwar activists had effectively routed the U.S. government on the issue of the prisoners
by channeling the widespread concern over American POWs into one for Vietnamese political
prisoners.

797

In the process, they hoped to reorient the discussion about prisoners in Vietnam to

its proper political context, rather than the nonpolitical moralism the United States championed.
But in their struggle to outmaneuver the Go Public campaign, some antiwar activists came
dangerously close to simply mimicking the strategies, tactics, and arguments of their rivals.
In a bizarre mirroring of the earlier prowar POW campaign, the new antiwar political
prisoner campaign sold bumper stickers, buttons, and even plastic bracelets with the names of
specific Vietnamese prisoners.
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Where some prowar activists, including Joe McCain, captured

Navy pilot John McCain’s brother, once sat in bamboo cages eating “POW food” to dramatize the
plight of the Prisoners of War, antiwar activists now circulated instructions for creating their own
model tiger cages to use in demonstrations.
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And in place of the POW days of prayer, activists

organized the “International Days of Concern with Saigon’s Political Prisoners” in September
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800

1973.

In some cases, for example, activists appealed to moral conscience, spoke about

humanitarian standards, or circulated lachrymose tales and grotesque images of the broken
Vietnamese prisoners, which stood in stark contrast to the earlier days when radicals generally
represented the Vietnamese as heroic guerillas, not miserable victims whose “lives are in our
hands.”

801

Thus, in their campaign to win broad public support and beat the U.S. government at

its own game, activists sometimes ran the risk of copying the kind of moralism deployed by their
enemies, thereby muddling the specificity of their political message.

Reorienting the Antiwar Movement
By the end of 1972 it seemed increasingly that the United States, the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government
(PRG), the successor to the NLF in the South, were approaching an agreement. But instead of
welcoming the coming negotiations as an opportunity to finally demobilize, antiwar activists in
North America and Western Europe redoubled their efforts to ensure that the United States would
sign the Peace Accords. On Nixon’s second inauguration on January 20, 1973, just one week
before the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, antiwar radicals coordinated international
demonstrations across the globe. In Washington, D.C., 80,000 Americans held a “counterinauguration,” involving a number of radical groups, such as the Vietnam Veterans Against the
War and the Attica Brigade, the youth affiliate of the Maoist Revolutionary Union.
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The following day approximately 15,000 activists, organized by the Comitato Italia
Vietnam demonstrated in Turin, Italy.

803

In France, an incredibly broad coalition of otherwise rival

groups – including the ex-GP, Ligue Communiste, the PSU, Ligne Rouge, Revolution!, as well as
Christian groups such as the Fraternité chrétienne avec le Vietnam – gathered in Paris, led in
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804

large part by the new Front Solidarité Indochine (FSI).

They even drafted a collective

statement, ominously warning demonstrators that every time an American President made some
promise to end the war the “anti-war movement believed” him, and “demobilized itself.”

805

The

movement, they promised together, would not fall for that trap again. As another FSI pamphlet
phrased it, “nothing is decided; nothing is finished.”

806

For the Americans, the Inauguration Day Protest would be the last major antiwar
demonstration of the Vietnam War. Wracked by internal tensions, and faced with a public that
simply wanted to put the war behind it, the movement as a whole declined significantly compared
to the late 1960s. But even if the movement declined as an organized presence, it should be
remembered that tens of thousands of radicals – through specifically antiwar groups such as the
Indochina Peace Campaign, through revolutionary groups like Socialist Workers Party, or simply
through local initiatives – continued to protest the war.
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In surprising contrast, however, while

the formal American movement had been steadily weakening since 1972, the organized
movements in European, and above all in France, witnessed a remarkable resurgence. Indeed,
the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973, far from spelling the end of the
movement, turned the war into an even more important issue for French radicals.
The Peace Accords represented a major turning point in the war. They signaled the
departure of the United States from Vietnam, which, for the Nixon Administration, meant the end
of the war, and hopefully the complete demobilization of the radical movements at home and
abroad. On May 25, 1973, just a few months after the signing of the Accords, President Richard
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January 1973, he remarked, “saw the return of all Americans from Vietnam, all of our combat
forces, the return of all of our prisoners of war, the end of the American involvement in Vietnam, a
808

peace agreement which, if adhered to, will mean peace for Vietnam and Southeast Asia.”

With

the war over, Nixon argued, it was time to put the past to rest.
Of course, the war was not over.

809

The United States continued to bomb Cambodia,

dropping over 250,000 tons of ordinances in 1973 alone, far more than the tonnage dropped on
Japan during the entirety of the Second World War. Laos, which had been bombed since 1964,
suffered even worse, becoming the most heavily bombed country per capita in history.

810

As for

Vietnam, the country remained divided, with the United States continuing to support the
extraordinarily unpopular, authoritarian regime it had spawned in the South. While the Peace
Accords brought the North much needed respite, the threat of war still loomed large. In June
1973, for example, US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger even threatened to resume
bombing of North Vietnam if the Democratic Republic of Vietnam launched another offensive.
In retrospect, it may seem that with the United States formally out of the fighting, a North
Vietnamese and PRG victory was a foregone conclusion. Nothing could be further from the truth.
The North was devastated, Thieu’s regime hardened into a police state, and American aid
continued to bolster South Vietnam’s military. At the start of 1975, for instance, South Vietnam
had nearly three times the artillery, twice the number of armored vehicles, and double the combat
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troops as the North.

811

While North Vietnam and the PRG no doubt scored a tremendous victory

in January 1973, the struggle for a unified, independent, socialist Vietnam was far from over.
For the renascent antiwar movement in Europe, following the lead of Vietnamese
revolutionaries, it was clear that the struggle had to continue. “Total support until the final victory,”
French radicals chanted after the signing of the Accords.

812

But while it was clear to radicals that,

contrary to the United States’ assertions, the Paris Peace Accords had not ended the war, the
Accords nevertheless posed an enormous strategic dilemma. For now that the United States had
formally withdrawn from the war, with the last combat troops set to leave the battlefield in March
1973, the international antiwar movements were deprived of their primary target. For years
antiwar radicals had mobilized against the United States as the personification of imperialist
aggression in Vietnam. Of course, everyone argued that, through the puppet regime in South
Vietnam, the United States was still involved, but its role had changed. How could they continue
to support the Vietnamese revolutionaries now that the U.S. military no longer bombed the North
or terrorized the PRG in the South? Who was the new target?
For Vietnamese revolutionaries, who counted on the continued support of antiwar
movements abroad, the answer was clear: radicals should call for the institution of full democratic
freedoms in South Vietnam, criticizing in particular Thieu’s treatment of political dissenters. In
fact, as early as October 1972, Madame Zung, representative of the PRG in Paris, explained to
French radicals that while the upcoming Accords would be a tremendous victory, there was still
much to be done about Thieu’s regime in the South. Indeed, at this point it had become clear not
only that the United States would not replace Thieu’s authoritarian rule in the South with a
democratic governing coalition as part of the Accords, but that because of American withdrawal
from the war, which left the South vulnerable, Thieu would escalate repression in the South.
Vietnamese activists genuinely feared “imminent, generalized massacres in the prisons in the
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South,” Madame Zung confided to Madeleine Rébérioux of the Front Solidartié Indochine on
October 24, 1972.

813

Thieu’s regime, she continued, was becoming ever more repressive in the

hopes of finally “decapitating” the resistance, depriving the movement of its most “experienced
cadres.” Thus, with South Vietnamese radicals in significant danger, North Vietnam unable to
liberate them through quick military victory, and the war likely lasting much longer than expected,
the struggle now had to reorient itself towards the goal of “obtaining and respecting democratic
freedoms.”
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Focusing the campaign on basic democratic rights could save the lives of the

prisoners, protect the rights of dissidents, and isolate Thieu internationally.
The FSI, the premier radical antiwar organization in France, led the way. The immediate
task, they wrote in the February 1973 issue of their paper, was to save “the some 300,000
political prisoners crammed in Thieu’s prisons, these indomitable men and women who must be
815

the cadres of the free Vietnam of tomorrow.”

“Nothing is more important right now,” the editorial

continued, “than demanding their freedom. The Vietnamese revolution needs them. It’s up to us
to make sure that they are returned to the revolution.” Although continuing to champion other
demands – such as cutting U.S. aid to Thieu, withdrawing the remaining American military
advisors from the South, or ending the bombardment of Cambodia – the FSI went on to make the
campaign to liberate the political prisoners in South Vietnam the dominant form of Vietnam
solidarity work for French radicals. The group wrote about the prisoners in its journal, circulated a
comprehensive brochure across all the radical milieus, and organized numerous meetings
816

throughout the country, often in close collaboration with Vietnamese radicals living in France.

At one of these meetings on February 5, 1973, in a message of gratitude, the PRG delegation in
France formally thanked the FSI for focusing on the struggle to realize “democratic freedoms in
817

the liberated zones” and win the “liberation of all the patriots by the Saigon regime.”
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Remarkably, despite their disagreements, other antiwar radicals followed suit, focusing
their efforts on the same issue. The Trotskyist Ligue Communiste, FSI’s ally from the very
beginning, collaborated most closely on the campaign. On February 26, 1973, for example, the
FSI and the Ligue Communiste organized a day of solidarity with the prisoners in South
818

Vietnam.

The Ligue, much larger than the FSI, went even further, sharing resources, publishing

FSI articles in its newspaper, and even printing the FSI journal on its own presses.
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Yet rival

formations also made the plight of the prisoners the primary axis of their solidarity with Vietnam.
Some ex-GP radicals not only demonstrated with the FSI, but also penned collective statements
on occasion. Even those groups ferociously opposed to the FSI – such as the Maoist Prolétaire
ligne rouge, which sponsored its own anti-imperialist formation known as the Mouvement national
de soutien aux peuples d’Indochine (MNSPI), and the official, hardline pro-Chinese Party in
France, the Parti communiste marxiste-léniniste de France, through its competing anti-imperialist
front group, the Centre d'information sur les luttes anti-impérialistes (CILA) – shared this concern
over the liberation of the prisoners. Although at odds with each other, the MNSPI and CILA put
aside their differences to collaborate on the campaign, producing, among other things, a
coauthored booklet on the prisoners. The “problem of the political prisoners,” they explained,
“poses the question of the democratic freedoms trampled every day by the Saigon administration
…” Radicals everywhere had to develop “concrete forms of support” for the prisoners and the
struggles for democratic rights in South Vietnam.
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In the same way that after 1967 many radicals in France united around the belief that
solidarity with Vietnam meant bringing the war home, in the changed conjuncture of 1973 they
rallied around the idea that the best form of solidarity with Vietnam would be to struggle for the
restoration of democratic rights in South Vietnam. As with the turn to revolution in 1968, the
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leadership of Vietnamese revolutionaries proved decisive. Through their heroic example, most
powerfully demonstrated in the Tet offensive of 1968, Vietnamese revolutionaries convinced
radicals everywhere of the possibility of revolution in the imperialist centers; and through their
advocacy of democratic struggle in the South as the best way to destroy Thieu’s regime from
within, they guided radicals into making the rights of political dissidents their primary concern in
1973. Given the new balance of forces in Vietnam, with the United States certainly out of the war,
but Thieu escalating repression and the DRV in no position to win a quick victory, it was likely the
war would last much longer than they had expected. It made perfect sense to struggle to reorient
their anti-imperialist solidarity.
Of course, while Vietnam always played a special role in the imagination of French
radicals, it never exhausted radical internationalism. Therefore, just as the turn to revolution was
inspired not simply by Vietnam, but also by events unfolding around the entire globe, so too did
other international developments inspire the new turn to democratic struggles. In fact, many
antiwar radicals in France – but also across North America and Western Europe – had already
gained significant experience advocating for prisoner rights in other countries. For example, in
1969, many radicals drew international attention to the Burgos Trial in Spain where sixteen
Basque radicals faced the death penalty for killing superintendent Melitón Manzanas. Groups like
the French Secours Rouge, supported by figures such as Jean-Paul Sartre, demonstrated in
defense of their comrades, denouncing Francisco Franco’s authoritarian regime.

821

And when the

French Right, led by Georges Pompidou, tried to deflate the international movement, arguing that
“France was not Spain,” the SR pointed to France’s own violations of democratic liberties,
chanting “the cops are the same in Paris and Madrid.”
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The massive international pressure not

only forced Franco to commute the death penalties, but further mobilized the domestic movement
against repression. The struggle to defend prisoners abroad could work back on the movements
at home.
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The most prominent international campaigns, however, defended the rights of political
dissidents in South and Central America, and especially Argentina during its military dictatorship.
In the early 1970s, French radicals – including figures such as Marguerite Duras, Jean Paul
Sartre, André Gorz, Régis Debray, Laurent Schwartz of the Front de Solidarité Indochine, and
Daniel Bensaïd and Alain Krivine of the Ligue Communiste – founded the Comité de Défense des
Prisonniers Politiques Argentins to secure the liberation of the prisoners, denounce torture, win
international legal assistance, and offer “material and moral support to the prisoners and their
families.”
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The committee, although initiated by the French, had strong international

connections. Beyond a notable Italian contingent that included Pier Paolo Passolini and Rossana
Rossanda, the committee also reached British radicals by way of its ties to the Bertrand Russell
Peace Foundation, and even had links to American radicals through the U.S. Committee for
Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners, which was then in the midst of a major campaign to
824

defend the prisoners in Argentina.

Indeed, many antiwar radicals in the early 1970s, such as FSI founder Laurent Schwartz,
were deeply involved in solidarity campaigns to restore democratic liberties in both Latin America
and Vietnam. As with the turn to revolution in the late 1960s, developments in Latin America and
Vietnam frequently intersected with each other, with radicals often transferring the languages,
strategies, and concerns from one context to the other. In fact, although international solidarity
work with Vietnam temporarily overshadowed other campaigns in 1973, especially in France,
many radicals later transferred their experiences from the campaign to liberate the political
prisoners back to the other international campaigns, particularly those focused on Latin America.
For example, when the FSI declined in late 1973, many of its personnel, led by Laurent Schwartz,
redirected its organizational apparatus to defending the political dissidents in Chile after the coup.
But the reason why radicals, despite their many differences, came to focus their antiwar
international solidarity on the struggle of the South Vietnamese prisoners had just as much to do
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with developments at home. The “democratic turn,” just as the earlier turn to revolution, emerged
from the encounter of events abroad with those at home in Western Europe and North America.
By 1967, important political shifts in the imperialist centers made it possible for the Vietnamese
example to resonate in the first place, enabling radicals to successfully translate the struggle into
their own contexts. In the same way, their transnational experiences struggling against
repression, fighting for popular justice, experimenting with united fronts, organizing with prisoners,
and rethinking the political importance of democratic rights allowed radicals to easily shift the
focus of their international solidarity to demanding the immediate liberation of the prisoners.
Given these previous experiences, radicals in North America and Western Europe could lucidly
connect the struggles of prisoners at home to the struggles of prisoners in Vietnam.
In fact, radicals not only grafted their concern with democratic rights directly onto the antiVietnam war movement in 1973, they brought with them the insights gleaned from prison
organizing. For instance, at a press conference on the South Vietnamese prisoners in March
1973, Madeleine Rébérioux of the FSI argued that antiwar activists had to demand “the liberation
of all those incarcerated and not only the ‘political’ prisoners” since “the label ‘common law’ is
stuck to all those who oppose the regime, whoever they may be.”
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In this, Rébérioux drew

directly on the lessons GIP organizers and other radicals learned about how the law itself creates
divisions within those it oppresses, deciding what counts as political and what does not. Since
these discoveries were made through transnational circuits, radicals in other countries made the
same arguments about the common fate of the so-called “common law” and “political” prisoners.
As the Italian Comitato Vietnam dramatically put it, “‘political’ prisoners and ‘common law’
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prisoners: for Thieu as for Hitler, a single ‘final solution.’”

From Berlin 68 to Milan 73
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In November 1971, several hundred radical students organized a contingent for a large
antiwar demonstration in New York City called the “Attica Brigade.” Later, when asked to explain
their name, they wrote, “the struggles at the Attica Prison and in Vietnam are part of the same
fight …”
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This belief that the struggles of prisoners in the imperialist centers were linked to

events in Vietnam was shared by radicals throughout North America and Western Europe. Since
radicals everywhere had faced repression, which led them to reconsider the struggle for
democratic rights and the plight of political prisoners, the call to organize around the liberation of
the political prisoners in South Vietnam carried a deep resonance. And the transnational
convergence on this issue even served as the basis for a brief revival of internationalism around
the Vietnam War in 1973
The FSI, perhaps the most dynamic anti-Vietnam war group in Western Europe, took the
lead in transforming these common concerns into an organized international movement. On
March 3 and 4, 1973, the FSI brought together the Italian Comitato Vietnam, the English ISC,
Swiss SKI, the Belgian FUNI, two German antiwar organizations, and a Danish group to discuss
the possibilities for a coordinated antiwar campaign in Europe.
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Emboldened by this initial

interest in international unity, the FSI organized an even larger gathering of a dozen European
antiwar organizations in Paris, including their rivals, the MSNPI. On March 24, 1973, the start of
an entire week of organizing for the “liberation of all the prisoners in Saigon,” and “the immediate
implementation of democratic freedoms in South Vietnam,” delegates met to revive the
international antiwar movement.
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Emulating previous meetings, the delegates drafted a collective statement. They
denounced the United States’ continued “neo-colonial presence” in Southeast Asia and called for
the combined victory of the three peoples of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. As for Vietnam
specifically, they argued that Thieu’s regime continued to violate articles 8 and 11 of the Paris
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Peace Accords, which guaranteed the release of the prisoners and the restoration of democratic
liberties, respectively. Months after the Accords, Saigon continued to violate the freedom of
information, seize newspapers critical of Thieu, and quash progressive groups.

830

Indeed, while

North Vietnam had already freed the American POWs, Thieu imprisoned even more political
dissidents. In this context, the statement declared, Vietnamese revolutionaries still had a long
struggle ahead, and it was up to Europeans to maintain their “militant international solidarity” by
organizing “a vigorous mobilization to win democratic freedoms and the liberation of the prisoners
as stipulated by the Accords.”
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Needing to coordinate their efforts, the groups agreed to

organize “a European campaign to liberate the political prisoners” to culminate in a massive
international march in Milan, Italy on May 12, 1973.
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Energized by the meeting, radicals redoubled antiwar activity in their respective
countries. They organized protests in Paris on April 12, in Milan the day after, and in Belgium on
May 5, 1973.
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Elsewhere, antiwar groups, such as the Swiss Comité Indochine Vaincra,

circulated the joint statement, advertising the forthcoming international demonstration in Milan,
Italy.
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In France, the Ligue Communiste billed the May 1973 meeting as the successor to the

famous international gatherings of the 1960s. “For the first time since the Berlin demonstration in
February 1968,” they wrote, “anti-imperialist Europe will meet again in one same city, en masse in
the streets.”
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Even though, as with the earlier meetings, Milan 73 was to be a primarily

European convergence, Western European radicals not only invited American representatives,
but some hoped that event could help the “antiwar movement in the U.S.A. redeploy its action.”
Just as the U.S. movements inspired European antiwar organizing in the 1960s, perhaps the
European antiwar movements could rekindle the U.S. movements in 1973.
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836

On May 12, 1973 some 50,000 radicals converged on Milan to demonstrate their
solidarity with the unfinished Vietnamese revolution. While groups from across the globe, from the
African National Congress of South Africa to the Palestinian Liberation Organization, supported
the meeting, most of the delegates unsurprisingly hailed from Western Europe.
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Representing

the French, who played an enormous role organizing the event, a number of rival groups –
including the FSI, MNSPI, Alliance Marxiste Révolutionnaire, ex-GP, PSU, Fraternité Chrétienne
pour le Vietnam, Ligue Communiste, Ligne Rouge, PSU, and Revolution! – put aside their
differences to sign the joint appeal, and most sent delegations to Milan.
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The Italians naturally

mobilized the largest national contingent, attracting revolutionary organizations from across the
entire spectrum, with the exception of the Italian Communist Party. Even the American
movement, caught between organizational decline and internecine strife, managed to participate.
Sydney Peck of the People’s Coalition for Peace and Justice addressed the entire gathering on
the situation in the United States, as did Vernon Bellecourt, a delegate from the American Indian
Movement who had participated briefly in the recent occupation of Wounded Knee.
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Many other

American radicals who could not attend, such as Jane Fonda and Angela Davis, delivered letters
of support, which those present read aloud.
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The event began with a massive march through the streets of Milan, with radicals
channeling the energies of the previous international antiwar meetings with chants such as “Berlin
841

68, Milan 73, the struggle continues!”

Afterwards, radicals met to discuss the major issues that

had brought them together, calling for the United States halt the bombardment of Cambodia, cut
842

aid to Thieu, and end its involvement in Laos.

837

But their focus remained the struggle to win
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democratic liberties in South Vietnam – a concern that only grew in importance after other
demands became less relevant, as when the United States stopped bombing Cambodia a few
months later. They were strongly encouraged in this by the PRG, which delivered the
demonstrators a letter thanking them for their “support in the past and in this new stage of our
struggle.” In the words of PRG Minister of Information Phan Van Ba, the three major demands in
this new phase of the struggle remained respecting the cease-fire, liberating all political prisoners,
and guaranteeing “democratic liberties” in the South, a necessary precondition for “a truly free
843

and democratic general election” that might remove Thieu and unite Vietnam.
Of course, many radicals did not attend the demonstration.
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And even the radicals who

chose to participate remained bitterly divided. At the march itself Italian radicals from the MarxistLeninist PC(ml)I violently attacked the Fourth International contingent, denouncing them as
“Trotskyist fascists.”
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Yet surveying the literature, it is clear that by 1973, the vast majority of

antiwar radicals in Western Europe as well as the United States, from Trotskyists to Maoists,
libertarians to Stalinists, had come to agree that the best way to support the incomplete
Vietnamese revolution was to fight for the liberation of the prisoners, the restoration of democratic
rights, and the observance of the Paris Accords. But what did they mean by this?
Even if Thieu somehow relaxed his rule, reestablished liberties, and freed many of the
political dissidents, most radicals would not have been satisfied. In fact, most antiwar radicals
involved in the campaign fought not for the creation of a more democratic regime in the South,
but rather the overthrow of the Republic of Vietnam, which they saw as nothing other than a
political fiction created by American imperialism to obstruct full Vietnamese self-determination.
Their goal was a united, independent, socialist Vietnam.
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Far from a single “issue,” freeing the

political prisoners served as an intermediary demand in a much longer revolutionary process. As
the Comitato Vietnam put it, speaking on behalf of those at the Milan convergence, the “struggle
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for the liberation of the political prisoners is not and cannot be considered a purely ‘humanitarian’
battle” that activists could simply “delegate to some ‘charitable’ organization” whose motivations
had nothing to do with politics or “the class struggle.” It is instead a “struggle of the first order,” of
“great importance in the context of all the work to support the Indochinese peoples,” and an
847

important step in the “future development” of the revolution.

Of course, this did not mean that radicals had no genuine concern for the prisoners, or
cared less about democracy than liberals. Rather, it meant that, given the specific balance of
forces, the best route towards the goal of a revolutionary Vietnam was the liberation of the
prisoners. For under the current regime, with thousands in prison and democratic freedoms
routinely violated, political organizing in the South had become arduous. If radicals in Western
Europe and North America could free the prisoners, they might come one step closer to
overthrowing Republic of Vietnam. After all, the very same logic pushed radicals to pursue united
fronts at home. Thus, the call to free the prisoners did not represent a retreat from the
revolutionary goals of international solidarity voiced in 1968, but rather a strategic readjustment in
response to changed historical circumstances. In both cases, radicals firmly rooted their
internationalist imaginary in a militant anti-imperialism based in collective self-determination.

Competing Visions
While antiwar radicals may have been some of the most ardent supporters of the struggle
to restore democratic freedoms in South Vietnam, they did not monopolize the issue in North
America and Western Europe. As with the antiwar movement as a whole, activists of innumerable
political persuasions, from revolutionary anti-imperialists to progressive liberals, contributed to
this massive international campaign. Often, many of these initiatives intersected. For example, on
April 12, 13, and 15 nearly one hundred different organizations from half a dozen countries –
including the nonpolitical Amnesty International, the revolutionary Front Solidarité Indochine, the
revisionist Parti Communiste Français, the Christian socialist Jeunesse Étudiante Chrétienne, the
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humanitarian Red Cross, and the legalist Comité des Juristes pour le Vietnam-France – gathered
in Paris for an International Conference for the Liberation of the Political Prisoners of South
Vietnam organized by American, French, and Vietnamese activists.

848

Despite their

disagreements, all signed a joint resolution denouncing the authoritarian regime in the South and
demanding the liberation of the prisoners.
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But in many cases, despite rallying to the same issue, various groups advanced not
simply different but actually competing visions. Many activists involved in the campaign to free the
political prisoners rejected the radical call to overthrow the South; they had instead very different
ideas about what it meant to free the political prisoners, how this should happen, and why this
mattered. Liberals, Christians, the official communist movement, and many others all proposed
850

their own alternative visions of international solidarity.

Of all the visions that entered the arena,

one in particular warrants considerable attention because, although completely marginal in the
early 1970s, it would in fact supplant all other forms of internationalism, especially that of the
radicals, by the end of the decade. While certainly heterogeneous, like the radical internationalist
imaginary itself, this alternative conception of internationalism is perhaps best associated with the
851

name Amnesty International.

In May 1961, British lawyer Peter Benenson penned what would become Amnesty
International’s founding statement. “Open your newspaper any day of the week and you will find a
story from somewhere of someone being imprisoned, tortured or executed because his opinions
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or religion are unacceptable to his government,” Benenson wrote.
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“The newspaper reader feels

a sickening sense of impotence,” he continued, “yet if these feelings of disgust all over the world
could be united into common action, something effective could be done.”
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Soon after, he

founded Amnesty International to support victims of persecution worldwide, often through
campaigns involving candlelight vigils, letter writing, and publicizing human rights violations.
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But Benenson did not simply call for an international body to advocate for the rights of
those unjustly imprisoned; he and his collaborators adumbrated a distinct vision of international
solidarity, one that would rival the internationalism of the radicals. As he clarified in his book,
Persecution 1961, he hoped for an explicitly “non-political, non-sectarial, international movement
…”
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Amnesty’s idea of internationalism, unlike that of the radicals, would refuse to align itself

with national governments of any kind, and would even try to bypass bodies of international
governance such as the United Nations, since these were composed of nations. In addition,
Amnesty’s internationalism would be entirely based on the fight for rights. But unlike the radicals,
for whom rights were based in collective self-determination, Amnesty narrowly saw rights as
residing in the individual alone.
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Furthermore, while the radicals situated rights in the context of

social struggles, Amnesty championed a notion of rights that placed them well outside the
vicissitudes of history. Rights, for Amnesty, were universal human rights, valid in all cases. Lastly,
and again unlike the radicals who grounded their vision of internationalism in politics, Amnesty
anchored its internationalism in morality. Explicitly hoping to transcend politics, Amnesty
cultivated a kind of moral authority that was objective, disinterested, universal, and global in
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scope, and therefore able to speak for all of humanity, rather than only particular classes, nations,
857

or oppressed peoples.

Thus, while both Amnesty and many radicals in North America and Western Europe
threw themselves into the campaign to free the prisoners in South Vietnam, they did so with
radically different objectives. Amnesty’s preferred strategy was to send comforting letters to
“adopted” individual prisoners, inform Thieu that the detention of said prisoner “seems in direct
violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” and then to beg the South Vietnamese
government for that specific prisoner’s release.
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The differences with the radicals were

enormous. First, Amnesty’s involvement bordered on the paternalistic. For instance, Amnesty
instructed letter writers to reassure adopted prisoners that “there are people all over the world
working for ‘human rights’ who think of you, and hope for your early release.”
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In this way,

Amnesty reduced the political prisoners to victims in need of hope, adoption, and protection.
Salvation would not come through autonomous militant struggle, but from the fact that other
people in the West believed in human rights. Second, Amnesty tried to completely abstract the
plight of the prisoners from the broader political context, turning the campaign into a purely moral
affair. “Please take care NOT to advance political or religious positions,” Amnesty advised in its
instructions to letter writers. “Your mission is purely humanitarian. It is not to criticise or reform the
government but to Protect and Help the individual person.”
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The only justification for

international solidarity, and the only means of measuring that solidarity, was human rights. Lastly,
in focusing on specific individuals, rather than the rights of the Vietnamese as a whole, Amnesty
tried to make the campaign about the inviolable rights of the sovereign “individual person.” This
was a world apart from the radicals, for whom the basis of solidarity was the struggle for collective
self-determination. While both sides spoke of rights in this campaign, they meant different things.
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Despite this enormous gulf between Amnesty’s conception of international solidarity and
those championed by radicals in North America and Western Europe, in some cases radicals
collaborated with Amnesty on the issue of the political prisoners to build as inclusive a campaign
as possible. In March 1973, for example, the Front Solidarité Indochine, after mentioning
Amnesty’s contributions, argued that any initiative that could contribute to “the solution of this vital
861

problem, must receive all of our support.”

The FSI even promoted Amnesty International’s

Amsterdam conference on the political prisoners in October 1973.

862

Beyond this, some radicals

felt that Amnesty’s specific approach to the issue, although completely opposed to their own,
might actually serve a useful tactical function. Since AI was explicitly nonpolitical, and based
much of its authority on an illusion of objectivity, some radicals felt that Amnesty data and
statements would have more authority in the eyes of the public than information from radical
groups, which might be denounced as biased.

863

Thus, radicals from many different groups

internationally, from the Bay Area Committee of Inquiry to the Italian Comitato Vietnam, drew on
Amnesty International’s research to give their own claims an air of legitimacy.

864

As the FSI put it,

“internationally, Amnesty International was one of the first movements to denounce, with
supporting evidence, the lot of the prisoners”
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While their tactical alliance with such an irreconcilable form of international solidarity
helped radicals turn the tide against Thieu, the collaboration unintentionally benefited their
competitors. For while Amnesty International, and the specific vision of internationalism it
represents, may seem hegemonic today, the organization, along with others that shared its
approach, was marginal throughout all of the 1960s and even the early 1970s. In 1969, Amnesty
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counted no more than 15,000 members internationally.

866

In the early 1970s in the United States,

Amnesty mustered no more than a few thousand members. The French section, founded in 1971,
was even more miniscule. In 1973, it numbered only a few thousand members.
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This was a

mere fraction of the vast number of radicals across North America and the United States who still
advocated revolution, self-determination, and anti-imperialist internationalism. In addition, the
radicals’ conception of international solidarity as based in the struggle for the self-determination of
all peoples enjoyed a kind of hegemony among other progressives as well. But by promoting
Amnesty through campaigns such as the one to free the South Vietnamese prisoners, radicals
lent the more marginal organization credibility, drawing it closer to progressive, and even radical,
audiences.
Radicals inadvertently promoted Amnesty beyond just sharing their audiences. While
radicals continued to believe in self-determination in the early 1970s, they had modified their
concerns, language, and even practices in a way that began to mutate their vision. Specifically,
we saw that while radicals largely ignored the question of rights during the heady days of
revolutionary fervor, after the wave of state repression, they adopted a kind of rights discourse.
To be sure, when they spoke of rights, they meant something very different from groups like
Amnesty International, evidenced by the fact that radicals rarely mentioned “human rights.”
Nevertheless, in the early 1970s the two sides began to converge. In 1968, when radicals threw
themselves into revolution, while Amnesty shunned politics altogether, almost no one could
confuse the two. But in the early 1970s, when both sides organized around the same issues with
vaguely similar appeals to rights, points of contact emerged.
Similarly, not only were radicals far more concerned with rights, but when they grafted
this newfound concern onto their anti-imperialist solidarity work, they began to parallel other
visions of internationalism. Over the course of the early 1970s, and especially after the United
States withdrew from the war in 1973, radicals targeted the government of South Vietnam.
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Instead of defending the national liberation of a people against imperialism, in their antiwar
activity radicals now focused much of their energy on criticizing the internal affairs of a sovereign
nation-state. When it came to Vietnam, fighting to overthrow global imperialism increasingly took
the form of denouncing South Vietnam for ignoring basic democratic liberties, violating the
fundamental right of its citizens, or failing to adhere to the Paris Accords. At least at level of
appearances, the international solidarity of North American and Western European radicals now
came dangerously close to that of Amnesty, for whom solidarity basically consisted of intervening
in the domestic affairs of states to pressure them to observe universal rights.
To be clear, despite these shifts in emphasis, the adoption of a seemingly different
language, and the apparent convergence with the human rights internationalism of Amnesty,
radicals still adhered to the distinct framework of self-determination. The point, then, is not so
much that radicals somehow personally transformed themselves into advocates of human rights,
though in some important cases this certainly happened, but that radicals shifted their struggles,
language, and concerns to a terrain that was more welcoming to the discourse of human rights. In
other words, while they did not adopt the specific language of human rights, their own attention to
rights discourse unwittingly helped to develop the intellectual terrain on which a properly human
rights discourse could grow. And in building tactical alliances with this competing form of
internationalism, radicals in the early 1970s rendered Amnesty’s vision more palatable and
comprehensible to their followers. Indeed, in this way, human rights could be perceived as a
distinct, yet related form of internationalism, able to share some of the progressive aspirations of
anti-imperialist internationalism even while rejecting the core principles of national liberation.
Of course, radicals had little to fear in the way of competition since their vision of
international solidarity dominated the peripheral views of groups such as Amnesty
International.
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But when the radical imaginary entered into crisis later in the decade, the human

rights forms of international solidarity represented by groups such as Amnesty International,
which survived these crises unscathed, could appear as a viable alternative. In fact, despite
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appearances, the radical forces had already begun its slow decline, and the years from 1972 to
1974 are often regarded as the final crest of the radical wave in most North American and
Western European countries. In France, for example, the GIP disbanded in December 1972, the
Minister of the Interior banned the Ligue Communiste in June 1973, and the ex-GP finally
dissolved itself on November 1, 1973, just a month after the Black September terrorist
organization murdered eight Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics and Salvador Allende was
overthrown in Chile. As for solidarity with Vietnam, the movement declined precipitously
everywhere after 1973 as anti-imperialist radicals threw themselves into other campaigns. The
Milan 1973 meeting, thought by some to mark a new cycle of anti-imperialist international
solidarity, proved to be the final great international meeting of radicals during the Vietnam War.
Even in France, where radicals played the greatest role in reactivating international solidarity with
Vietnam, the FSI died a quiet death in late 1973.
Of course, tens of thousands of radicals in North America and Western Europe continued
to dedicate their lives to the idea of revolution throughout the decade. In Italy, for instance, a
869

completely new cycle of revolutionary struggle emerged in the mid-1970s.

Moreover, even in

spite of these setbacks, in 1973 or 1974 the radical imaginary still remained more popular than
that represented by Amnesty International. But this would change in the final years of the 1970s
when the bottom fell out of the radical imaginary, leading to an astonishing reversal few could
have predicted in the early 1970s. When that happened, youth in search of new visions of
internationalism could find a home in the nonpolitical internationalism of Amnesty and other
organizations of its kind. But for that to happen, Amnesty’s internationalism did not simply have to
survive while other competing imaginaries collapsed. It had to remain comprehensible, attractive,
and capable of effecting change for those who would have otherwise rallied to the radical
imaginary, in some ways sharing its project or at least aspirations. In other words, if Amnesty’s
internationalism were completely different, a newer generation with progressive ideas might have
ignored it. Amnesty would not have spoken to their needs.
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Thus, through the points of contact formed in the 1970s – exemplified by the common
campaign to liberate the prisoners in Vietnam – Amnesty could emerge as distinct, yet not utterly
alien. It could represent a new path, yet at the same time emerge as a credible successor to other
visions, winning over all those who still cared about transforming the world. And this, of course,
was always Amnesty’s plan. As Benenson once put it, speaking of Amnesty’s overall ambitions,
“the underlying purpose of this campaign – which I hope those who are closely connected with it
will remember, but never publish – is to find a common base upon which the idealists of the world
can co-operate. It is designated in particular to absorb the latent enthusiasm of great numbers of
such idealists who have, since the eclipse of Socialism, become increasingly frustrated; similarly
it is geared to appeal to the young searching for an ideal …”
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He continues: “If this underlying aim is borne in mind, it will be seen that, a la longue, it
matters more to harness the enthusiasm of the helpers than to bring people out of prison.” Cited
in Buchanan, “‘The Truth Will Set You Free’: The Making of Amnesty International,” 591.
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CHAPTER 7: ANTI-IMPERIALIST INTERNATIONALISM IN CRISIS

On December 21, 1978, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam shocked the world by invading
Cambodia, its socialist neighbor. Writing in Lotta Continua, Marco Boato captured the immensity
of the crisis for radicals everywhere. Our generation, he explained, “was defined as the
‘generation of Vietnam,’ and we “accepted that definition with pride and satisfaction, because with
Vietnam we had experienced a new form of revolutionary internationalism.”

871

Solidarity with the

Vietnamese struggle, he continued, marked every step of the radical left’s early development. In
“1967 we took to the streets with Vietnam; in ’68, we said ‘Vietnam is here.’”

872

Given such deep

investment in Vietnam, the internecine war in Southeast Asia could only have devastating
consequences for radicals.
Of course, the Third Indochina War did not destroy the radical left on its own. Radicalism
had already substantially declined as an organized force throughout most of North America and
Western Europe before the winter of 1978, especially outside of Italy, where Boato wrote. Faced
with an unsettling array of political challenges, both at home and abroad, many anti-imperialist
radicals abandoned their activism, rejoined mainstream politics, or pole-vaulted to the other end
of the political spectrum. In France, to a degree unparalleled elsewhere, prominent former
radicals not only disavowed anti-imperialist internationalism in the 1970s; they embraced a new
kind of human rights internationalism that prioritized the rights of the individual over those of the
nation-state, morality over politics. There, Médecins Sans Frontièrs (MSF), a non-governmental
humanitarian aid organization with roots in anti-imperialism, played the decisive role of a relay
station, not only facilitating the transfer from anti-imperialism to human rights, but helping to
transform human rights themselves into a robust form of international activism with some radical
credibility. In this way, anti-imperialism not only found itself in rapid decline, but also faced an
insurgent challenger for the title of international solidarity.
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Although radicals in France, but also the United States, may still have been able to reinvent anti-imperialist internationalism for their changed postcolonial conjuncture, a series of
devastating crises in the late 1970s triggered its collapse. Vietnam invaded Cambodia, China
retaliated with its own incursion into Vietnamese territory, and a humanitarian crisis of
catastrophic proportions engulfed the entire region. The Third Indochina War split radicals, but it
also put into question the core assumptions of anti-imperialist internationalism. Since the early
twentieth century, radicals had linked anti-imperialism with the concept of national selfdetermination. Though cognizant of nationalism's dangers, radicals fully embraced the nationstate as the necessary form of political emancipation from imperialism. The decolonization
movements of the 1960s, and the enormous promises they seemed to carry, only encouraged
this assumption. Yet a series of defeats in the 1970s, which reached a high point in the Third
Indochina War, problematized this faith in the progressive role of the nation-state. Radicals
watched as newly liberated countries not only turned against their own citizenry, but rapidly
elevated their own interests above those of the international struggle, in some cases going so far
as to wage expansionist wars with one another. Far from appearing as the strongest defense
against imperialism, the nation-state seemed to be inherently imperialist. Despite their
revolutionary credentials, Vietnam, China, and Cambodia descended into wars that looked eerily
similar to the very imperialist aggressions radicals had been denouncing for decades.
This turn of events threw anti-imperialist solidarity into disarray, but it also further
destabilized Marxism, the fundamental language of anti-imperialist internationalism since the late
1960s, and the primary resource for radicals trying to find a way out of their sanguinary quandary.
Already undergoing a major crisis in the 1970s, Marxism's inability to adequately explain the
bloodshed in Southeast Asia further highlighted its sharp limits in the new conjuncture, revealing
in particular its failure to fully understand nationalism, the state, and the international system,
among other conceptual blind spots. “The crisis of Marxism,” Boato somberly explained, “is not
measured by disputes over Proudhon, but by what is happening in Cambodia and Vietnam.”
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Some radicals tried to continue as if nothing was happening. Others, above all the proChinese, doubled down on the idea national sovereignty, producing a caricatured version of
internationalism that amounted to nothing more than parroting the policies of a foreign nationstate. Thus, when Vietnam attacked the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, China's strongest ally, these
radicals organized an international campaign to denounce the Vietnamese, casting them as
genocidal murders. Given the immensity of the humanitarian crisis in Cambodia, they worked with
humanitarian groups like MSF, who also came to turn against Vietnam. Even more astonishingly,
in their quest to destroy the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, these pro-Chinese radicals found
themselves objectively allied with the United States against the "imperialism" of the Vietnamese.
Of course, most radicals did not follow this path, but they had little else to offer in place of the
obviously deficient notion of anti-imperialist internationalism. The crisis was deeper than even the
most prescient knew at the time, and it opened the space for a rival form of human rights to
definitively seize center stage.
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The Radical Left in Disarray
Over the course of the 1970s, the radical left declined as an organized force in almost
every North American and Western European country. In some cases, as in France, the reversal
was drastic. Once regarded as the country closest to insurrection, by the end of the decade,
revolutionary prospects in France seemed dim. The proximate causes were manifold, but in
retrospect, it seems that radicalism fell into disarray because radicals proved unable to creatively
reinvent their political project in the face of a vastly changed political conjuncture.
To begin with, the mass worker insurgencies that buoyed so many radical hopes met
defeated. In the early 1970s, distinct sectors of the working class, led above all by the
autoworkers, wages a relentless struggle across the hexagon. They experimented with a dizzying
array of tactics, including everything from organized slowdowns to occupations to self-
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management to “bossnappings.” Taken as a whole, the offensive proved crippling. Between 1971
and 1975, for example, the annual number of strike days in France averaged four million.

875

As

historian Xavier Vigna has shown, this mass worker “insubordination” left the world of the factory
virtually ungovernable.

876

But capitalists, along with the French state, soon deployed a set of

strategies to firmly close this cycle of struggle. The crudest response was of course repression:
radical workers were fired, organizers turned over to the police, worker committees destroyed,
strikes crushed, and in some cases agitators murdered. But while certainly effective, repression
could not secure victory on its own.
Beginning in the early 1970s, French firms allied with the state explored ways to
accommodate worker demands in an effort to defuse them. Initially, this meant passing a
cornucopia of social legislation, such as four weeks paid holiday in 1969, a guaranteed minimum
wage in 1970, and a law fixing maximum working hours in 1970.
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But, as Luc Boltanski and Eve

Chiapello have shown, when these “quantitative” reforms failed to quell worker contestation, firms
878

took the more dramatic step of “qualitatively” altering the work process.

Recognizing that the

basis of the worker revolt was in fact a refusal of work itself, many firms experimented with a
series of reforms designed to provide workers with greater creative control, gambling that a less
alienating work environment would push workers to identify with work again. Many firms began to
grant workers greater decision making powers, further autonomy at work, flexible hours, shorter
contracts, and human resources departments.
Encouraged by these successes, firms began a wholesale restructuring of the Fordist
regime of accumulation itself. The militant struggles of the 1970s revealed that the giant factories,
which concentrated thousands of workers in the same place, putting them in control of the levers
of economic power, could become a weakness for capitalists. Thus, by the late 1970s, French
industry, following in the footsteps of the United States, reordered capitalist production relations in
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order to decompose the bases of class power. Firms were decentralized, factories simply
relocated either to other parts of the country or abroad, working class neighborhoods dissolved
through urban renewal projects, and longterm union contracts replaced by precarious working
conditions. The factory universe, which had been the condition of possibility for the historical
workers’ movement, the basis of its culture, politics, and strategy since the twentieth century, and
the horizon of revolutionary politics, was being dismantled. While repression, recuperation, and
restructuring did not spell the inevitable end of the radical left, it did disorient radicals, all of whom
were attached to a certain idea of worker revolt, forcing the radical left to reinvent itself on the
spot.
In addition to the crisis of the historical workers’ movement, new movements posed a
second major challenge to the radical left in France. The 1970s witnessed a proliferation of what
were sometimes called “new social movements,” or movements – such as those centered on
women, homosexuality, ecology, or against nuclear weapons – that focused on particular issues
beyond the traditional cultures, organizations, and languages of the workers movement. Tired of
seeing their specific concerns subordinated to narrowly defined “class” needs in the official
workers movement, activists in these movements struggled to carve out an independent space
for themselves, something strongly encouraged by radical left organizations that hoped to liberate
social movements from the clutches of reformist politics. Yet at the same time, these movements
879

risked renting the coherency of the left itself.

Their insistence on identity, personal experience,

and autonomy risked foreclosing a united movement, reducing the left to congeries of
innumerable fragments.

880

To remain relevant, radicals had to find a way to rearticulate these

diverse, and sometimes opposed, movements, needs, and cultures into a new political
movement.
Lastly, the mainstream political horizon in France had changed. Ever since General de
Gaulle wrote the constitution of the Fifth Republic, the mainstream political process remained
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effectively blocked.

881

But after May 1968, de Gaulle’s resignation in 1969, and especially after

the sudden death of his lieutenant, George Pompidou, in 1974, openings began to emerge.

882

Hoping to fill the void, mainstream political parties, above all the newly founded Parti Socialiste
(PS) led by François Mitterand, reformed themselves in order to channel the political desires of
these social movements into parliamentary victory. The PS, which tellingly entitled its 1972
program “changer la vie,” attempted to rally young radicals by absorbing their major demands,
such as the call for autogestion, or self-management, not only in the workplace, but in all aspects
883

of life.

The Communist Party (PCF) also reinvented itself by, among other things, drawing

closer to new social issues such immigrant rights, condemning the repression of democratic
freedoms in the Soviet Union, and forging a common program with the PS. While this
“Eurocommunist” flirtation proved short lived, the reforms proved successful as party membership
spiked from 410,000 in 1974 to 600,000 in 1977.
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These uncertain historical events provoked the philosopher Louis Althusser to diagnose
the entire conjuncture as having precipitated a “crisis of Marxism.”
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Indeed, in the 1970s,

radicals increasingly became aware of a series of contradictions, difficulties, and absences within
Marxism, the theory of so many anti-imperialist radicals. To begin with, the rapidly changing
composition of the working class raised significant questions about one of Marxism’s most
fundamental concepts: What was the working class? What did it want? What did its changing
physiognomy mean for revolutionary strategy?
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struggles, led some to the realization that Marxism lacks, in the words of Louis Althusser, a “real
theory of the organisations of class struggle.”

887

The party, once taken as axiomatic by most

Marxists in the 1960s and 1970s, was quickly becoming an open question.
But perhaps the most important limit was the state. As Althusser put it, there does not
really exist a “Marxist theory of the State.”

888

To be sure, the changing structure of the state

apparatuses in the 1960s and 1970s did prompt a major rethinking of inherited assumptions, of
which the oeuvre of Nicos Poulantzas was the most important in France.

889

Even the otherwise

sclerotic PCF abandoned the concept of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” in 1976 as part of an
effort to reimagine the state. Yet the PCF’s failure to invent a replacement spoke volumes. While
many Marxists were finding conventional theories of the state inadequate, they proved unable to
develop an alternative state strategy. With all these glaring limits, Marxism had without a doubt
890

reached a “crossroads,” which led many to either abandon it, or try to move beyond it.

But as

Althusser himself concluded, Marxism had passed through many such crises before, and while
the task of renewing Marxism was no doubt very difficulty, it was not necessarily impossible.
Nevertheless, taken together, transformations in workers struggles, mass social
movements, the mainstream political horizon, and a crisis in Marxism left radicals in a quandary.
Some, after years of frenetic activity fueled only by messianic faith in the coming revolution,
dropped out of politics altogether. Others remained radical at heart, but abandoned the organized
political world, rooting themselves in local issues, returning to the land in a kind of rural exodus,
891

or diving into the various autonomist scenes.

Still other radicals, such as those in the Ligue

Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR), the successor to the banned Ligue Communiste, attempted
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to revise their communist politics in light of the changed conditions – they drew closer to the new
social movements, embedding themselves in the women’s and gay movements or supporting the
struggles inside the army, and formed electoral alliances with other radicals to take advantage of
the opened parliamentary terrain.

892

Many radicals, however, returned to mainstream politics. Weary of subsisting on the
political margins, a growing number of radicals were seduced by the growing possibility of a leftist
parliamentary or even Presidential victory and threw their weight behind the PS. During the 1974
Presidential elections, for example, large swathes of the radical left voted for François Mitterand
instead of either abstaining or putting forward their own radical candidates, as many had done in
the past. When some diehards refused to vote, a number of prominent intellectuals, including
Simone de Beauvoir, Michel Foucault, Henri Lefebvre, and the anarchist Daniel Guérin, issued a
collective manifesto in May 1974 exhorting radicals to participate in the election.

893

In an act that

spoke volumes about how deeply the left had changed, Danny Cohn Bendit, famed student
leader of the May events, rewrote the famous 68 slogan, “Elections are trap for idiots,” as
“Abstention is a trap for idiots.”

894

Strategic electoral alliances with mainstream political parties

rapidly evolved into cooptation as many radicals simply joined the ranks of the PS itself. In
October 1974, the PS, hoping to absorb young radicals, invited representatives from practically
the entire spectrum of the radical left to the Assises nationales du socialisme. Soon after, many
radicals abandoned their erstwhile revolutionary parties to adhere to the PS. In December 1974,
for example, Michel Rocard, a leader of the radical Parti Socialiste Unifié, formally joined the PS,
895

bringing a sizeable section of his party with him.

Others from groups like the Ligue

Communiste Révolutionnaire followed.
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Some radicals responded to the challenges of the decade by turning against the left itself.
In June 1976, for example, Maurice Clavel, a leading journalist and philosopher who had rubbed
shoulders with radicals after May 68 and helped found the Agence de presse liberation with the
ex-GP, gathered many former Gauche prolétarienne militants, including Jean-Pierre Le Dantec,
Alain Geismar, and André Glucksmann, to discuss, in the words of historian Michael Scott
Christofferson, “their disillusionment with political activism.”
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This gathering, which led to regular

meetings as the “Cercle socratique,” eventually prepared the way for the bizarre rise of the
Nouveaux Philosophes.

897

A mass media phenomenon, the New Philosophers were a highly

farraginous group of intellectuals whose only real point of commonality was that they traded on
their radical past to justify a denunciation of the far left in the present. In a series of extremely
popular books – including Christian Jambet et Guy Lardreau’s L’Ange (1976), André Glucksman’s
La Cuisinière et le mangeur d’hommes (1975) and Les Maitres penseurs (1977), and BernardHenri Lévy’s La Barbarie à visage humain (1977) – the New Philosophers abandoned revolution
for ethics, denounced the organized left, and equated Marxism with the gulag. Regularly
appearing on television, selling their books into the tens of thousands, and enjoying the support of
famous intellectuals, from Michel Foucault to Roland Barthes, the New Philosophers became the
most visible representation of the extent of radicalism’s disarray.

Against the Third World
Since the radical left was not shaped exclusively by events at home, but through complex
encounters between developments in North America and Western Europe and those in the Third
World, it should come as no surprise that simultaneous transformations in the Third World played
a crucial role in the radical left’s political decomposition in the 1970s. For at the very same
moment that radicals confronted a strange new political conjuncture at home, forcing them to
896

Michael Christofferson, French Intellectuals Against the Left: The Antitotalitarian Moment of
the 1970s (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 195.
897
For the New Philosophers, Christofferson, French Intellectuals Against the Left, especially
chapter 5; Julian Bourg, From Revolution to Ethics: May 1968 and Contemporary French Thought
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), part 4; Kristin Ross, May ’68 and
its Afterlives (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2002), 169-81.
255

rethink their political assumptions, developments abroad began to shake their faith in Third World
revolutions. Despite initiatives like the New International Economic Order, the continued
economic dependence of newly liberated countries on the imperialist core pointed to the limits of
898

national sovereignty.

Countries like China, for example, abandoned internationalism,
899

collaborating with the United States to destroy liberation movements in places like Angola.

In

some cases, as in East Timor, newly independent countries refused to recognize the self900

determination of minority peoples.

Throughout Africa postcolonial states spawned autocratic

regimes or military dictatorships. In socialist countries, ruling Communist Parties regularly violated
basic civil rights. Reports of human rights abuses arrived from Vietnam. In Cambodia, Pol Pot’s
Khmer Rouge unleashed genocide. In short, radicals watched as the struggles that once inspired
them to make revolution at home fell short of their goals, betrayed their promises, or turned into
their opposites.
These astonishing events entered France through a series of highly publicized
“revelations.”
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In his 1975 book, Prisonnier de Mao, Jean Pasqualini chronicled his life in

Chinese labor camps. In 1976, Gérard Chaliand, who participated in the investigative
commissions of the Russell Tribunal, published a richly documented survey of the Third World
that began to unravel many of the myths held so dearly by the radical left. The following year saw
the appearance of Deuxième retour de Chine, in which onetime Maoists Claudie Broyelle,
Jacques Broyelle, and Evelyne Tschirart captured their generation’s disillusionment with China.
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Perhaps most devastating of all, in 1977 François Ponchaud, a Catholic missionary in Cambodia,
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published Cambodge année zero, revealing the full extent of the Khmer Rouge’s terror. In some
cases, such as the Cambodian genocide, these reports came as a complete shock. In others,
however, these “revelations” were far from new. In 1971, for example, Simon Leys had already
revealed the unsavory side of China, just as all radicals were well aware of Soviet crimes before
the publication of Aleksandr Solzhenitzyn’s Gulag Archipelago in 1974.

903

Yet these “revelations”

had such an enormous impact in the mid-1970s precisely because they found fertile ground at
home. Disorientation, exhaustion, and growing bitterness in France allowed these reports to
resonate. This confluence of the domestic and the international worked to destabilized antiimperialist internationalism.
Uncoincidentally, these events triggered a full-scale ideological offensive against antiimperialism that lasted well into the 1980s.
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Jacques Juillard fired the opening shot on June 5,

1978 in the pages of Le Nouvel Observateur. The main target of his scurrilous attack was the
nation-state, the keystone of anti-imperialist internationalism. Juillard blamed the misguided
notion that the nation-state could act as the “expression of the freedom of the people” for the
seemingly endless accumulation of tragedies in the Third World.

905

Instead of the old “forty-

eighter idea” that national self-determination would lead to harmony between equal nations906

states, it produced only interstate conflict.

Instead of socialism, national liberation struggles

resulted in tyranny. Instead of guaranteeing the freedoms of its citizens, the idea of collective
sovereignty now justified boundless violence against unprotected individuals. For all his rhetorical
excess, Juillard had rightly identified the limit point of anti-imperialist internationalism: the
coupling of anti-imperialism with national self-determination. But Juillard’s aim was not to help
renew anti-imperialism for a new postcolonial conjuncture; he, and those who quickly followed his
lead, wished to use anti-imperialism’s Achilles’ heal to demolish the entire far left, the very idea of
revolution, and even the Third World itself.
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This is precisely why the assault took as its object not anti-imperialism itself, but the
expansive and nebulous idea of “Third Worldism.” In many respects, the attack itself created the
very notion of “Third Worldism.” For although the term “Third World” was ubiquitous, “Third
Worldism” was almost nowhere to be found in the literature of the radical left in the 1960s. It only
really appears in certain places in the early 1970s, but even then carried no meaning for
Americans and was not widely used by French radicals until the mid-1970s. Indeed, antiimperialist radicals never described their politics as “Third Worldist,” but rather as “antiimperialist.” Of course, as Maxime Szczepanski-Huillery points out, even if the specific word
cannot be found, this does not necessarily mean that traces of the concept were absent.
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Since

the late 1970s, the term has come to mean something to the effect of a belief in, or perhaps
fascination with, the ideas, struggles, models, and aspirations of the Third World. According to
this very loose definition, “Third Worldism” certainly existed in the 1960s and 1970s, but only as a
general sentiment, not as a politics. Indeed, a definition such as this does not really enable a
specific political project in the same way that anti-imperialism does. It is little wonder that few
used the word. One can therefore speak of “Third Worldism” in the 1960s, but aside from some
vague banalities, this term reveals little about the politics of the era.
There is, however, another, more specific definition of Third Worldism, one that does
denote a specific politics rather than a sentiment. According to this definition, “Third Worldism”
was the idea that since the primary contradiction in the world is between the First World and the
Third, the revolution will only unfold in the Third World, spreading across the globe as the Third
World encircles the First, in the same way, for example, that the countryside was said to have
encircled the cities in the struggle for national liberation.
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It must be insisted that this position

was not only relatively marginal among radicals, but that it was in many respects opposed to anti907
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imperialism. As Samir Amin, a major participant in the debates over “Third Worldism,” explained
in 1977:
For Third Worldism is a strictly European phenomenon, Its proponents seize on literary
expressions, such as “the East wind will prevail over the West wind” or “the storm
centers,” to illustrate the impossibility of struggle for socialism in the West, rather than
grasping the fact that the necessary struggle for socialism passes, in the West, also by
909
way of anti-imperialist struggle in Western society itself.
This is why this political perspective found more traction in countries like West Germany where
the possibility of revolution backed by mass worker struggle seemed unlikely. But even where the
idea existed in the 1960s in 1970s, few referred to it as “Third Worldism” until the late 1970s.
Nevertheless, the broad definition of “Third Worldism” deployed by certain figures in the
late 1970s – and still used by historians today – allowed critics of anti-imperialism like Juillard to
accomplish several goals at once. They were able to flatten and homogenize a very diverse set of
struggles, reduce a specific political strategy to a rather banal sentiment, and caricature radicals
as a cohort of misguided dreamers. More insidiously, the term ahistorically anchored the
existence of the radical left to the fate of a few tragedies in the Third World, discrediting the entire
project of radical change. At the same time, by reducing the Third World to an immiserated land
in need of Western aid, it helped erase the indelible impact of Third World struggles on the
910

imperialist centers.

For example, in his contribution to the debate that ensued, Jean-Pierre le

Dantec, the former editor of La Cause du peuple, argued that in projecting their desires for
revolution onto the Third World, radicals had in fact “invented the ‘Third World.’”

911

In denying the

self-activity of Third World peoples, apostates like Dantec reasserted the centrality of the
imperialist world, and by association, their own activism.
In fact, Le Dantec’s intervention reveals that one of the most important functions of the
“debate” on “Third Worldism” in France was to sanctify the conversion of a number of antiimperialist radicals to a rival form of international solidarity. There is, in other words, a profound
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connection between the fact that anti-“Third Worldism” reached such apoplectic heights in France
and the fact it was here, more than anywhere else, that former anti-imperialist revolutionaries
became some of the most vocal proponents of “human rights internationalism.” Renouncing their
anti-imperialist pasts in this spectacular, caricatural, but also self-aggrandizing manner allowed a
number of French radicals to leap into a new faith.

The Human Rights International
A particularity of the French scene was that disenchantment with revolution, the idea of
the nation-state, and the emancipatory potential of Third World struggles led a significant number
of these erstwhile radicals to not only criticize anti-imperialist internationalism, but to help fashion
a distinct conception of international solidarity based not in anti-imperialism, but in human rights.
Rony Brauman, once a member of the Gauche Prolétarienne, recalled that reading Cambodge
année zero was “the shock that made me break definitively with political radicalism.”

912

Searching

for a new form of internationalism, he joined an iconoclastic nongovernment humanitarian aid
organization, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), rising through the ranks to
913

become its president in 1982.

More than any other group, MSF came to play the role of a relay

station in the transition from anti-imperialism to human rights in France. For while campaigns
such as the one to free the South Vietnamese political prisoners reshaped the intellectual terrain
in a way that drew anti-imperialism and human rights closer together, MSF helped some French
radicals make the leap from one to the other.
MSF was born on December 20, 1971, just over a year before the signing of the Paris
Peace Accords, when two smaller organizations merged: on the one side, the Secours Médical
Français, created by the French medical journal TONUS; on the other, the Groupe d’Intervention
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Médicale et Chirurgicale en Urgence, a team of radicalized French doctors who had cut their
teeth in the Nigerian Civil War, which erupted after the country’s Eastern Region declared
independence as the Republic of Biafra in May 1967.

914

To force the secessionists to capitulate,

Nigeria’s Federal Military Government (FMG) blockaded supply routes, triggering a humanitarian
crisis. Relief organizations, above all the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
organized volunteers. One of these was a young radical named Bernard Kouchner, the future
face of MSF. Like many of his generation, Kouchner began as a committed Marxist antiimperialist: he joined the Communist student union, protested the Algerian War, organized with
the Comité Vietnam National, and traveled to Cuba in 1964 where he met Che Guevara, to whom
he would dedicate his medical thesis.

915

Like Che, Kouchner became a professional doctor as well as an anti-imperialist, and saw
in the Argentinian revolutionary a model of “humanist” socialism defined by international
solidarity, voluntaristic action, dedication to radical change, and compassion for those in need. In
the following decade, Kouchner and other “French doctors,” combined these radical ideals, based
in anti-imperialist internationalism, with elements of traditional humanitarianism to invent a kind of
radical humanitarianism, known as sans-frontiérisme, that would transform international
solidarity.

916

Although MSF, reflecting its origins, remained a highly heterogeneous organization,

Kouchner’s wing helped turn it into a vehicle for this new kind of humanitarianism.
But while solidarity with anti-imperialist struggles shaped the broader context in which
MSF eventually emerged, it was not so much anti-imperialism itself that spawned Kouchner’s
brand of radical humanitarianism, but rather a particular contradiction within anti-imperialism most
powerfully personified by the Biafran struggle. The newly independent state of Nigeria, which had
couched its struggle against the British Empire in the language of national self-determination, now
denied that same right to a minority population within its own borders. Biafran leaders argued in
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their “Proclamation of Biafra” that secession was fully justified because all peoples had a right to
national self-determination, the colonial boundaries of Nigeria did not reflect existing tribal and
communal sovereignties, and because the FMG violated the democratic rights of minority peoples
such as the Igbo, thereby forfeiting the right to govern in their name. But the FMG, arguing that
secession jeopardized the viability of new nation-states, moved against this national liberation
struggle, revealing the limits of national self-determination, and accordingly, anti-imperialism
917

itself, which, after all, saw the nation-state as the primary vehicle for collective liberation.

Should anti-imperialists defend the FMG’s right to administer its own internal affairs and protect
the integrity of a united Nigeria against its balkanization? Or should anti-imperialists defend the
rights of Biafrans to achieve their own sovereign nation state against Nigeria’s own imperialism?
The international context exacerbated the dilemma: was not the French government backing the
Biafrans in part because it hoped secession could weaken Nigeria, the largest, most populous,
and wealthiest African state; and was not Great Britain supporting the FMG in large part because
of its desire to control Nigeria’s rich oil industry, much of it now lost to independent Biafra?

918

While many anti-imperialists tried to ignore the thorny issue, Kouchner and the other
“French doctors” resolutely defended the Biafrans, whom they argued were “a people” with an
irrevocable right to national self-determination. In this way, Kouchner and his comrades helped
establish a defining aspect of MSF’s agenda: in addition to aiding victims of natural disasters,
crises, and war, a certain fraction of MSF came to advocate for the rights of minorities within
newly independent states – such as the Bengalis of East Pakistan or the Kurds in Iraq. This
emphasis soon transformed into support for those people ignored by anti-imperialist radicals in
North America and Western Europe because their political struggles did not conform to
preconceived molds. “[I]f the struggle is said to be progressive (Cambodia), the progressives will
take notice,” Kouchner said in 1976, pointing to the limits of radical solidarity, “if not, peoples can
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very well die (Kurdistan).”

By the end of the decade, he had elevated this argument into a

principle: politics should not be allowed to make the suffering of one people more deserving of
solidarity than another; there are no “good or bad deaths.”

920

But Kouchner’s response to the aporias of anti-imperialist solidarity came at the cost of
effectively bracketing the politics of those who suffered, which risked decontextualizing
oppression altogether. Indeed, as the 1970s wore on, the object of solidarity increasingly became
the deracinated “victim,” rather than the “people” in political struggle. Of course, in many cases
figures in the Third World themselves encouraged this displacement. For example, Biafran
leaders, who had hired a Swiss public relations firm to handle external communications, tried to
cast the Biafrans as helpless victims in a bid to translate international sympathy into political
recognition – the war was, after all, deliberately portrayed as genocide.

921

Thus, some peoples,

such as the Biafrans, Kurds, or the people of East Pakistan, came to be seen as an aggregation
of miserable, individual objects, not a singular, heroic, political subject like the Vietnamese. In this
way, some currents within MSF helped reorient solidarity to offering aid to individual victims
regardless of the political context.
Under Kouchner’s leadership, MSF also heralded a revolution in the mediatization of
solidarity. During the Biafran War, the ICRC not only exercised strict impartiality, but required all
volunteers to sign agreements promising confidentiality. But as Kouchner later put it, some of the
“French doctors” felt that by “keeping silent, we doctors were accomplices in the systematic
massacre of a population.”
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Upon their return to France, Kouchner and Max Récamier violated

their agreement by publishing an article in Le Monde describing what they had seen, giving rise to
the key concept of “témoignage,” or bearing witness. In addition, Kouchner and others channeled
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the anti-imperialist activism of the time to form a Comité de lutte contre le génocide au Biafra and
tapped all their media contacts to popularize the plight of the Biafrans.

923

In the following years, Kouchner went further, experimenting with the mass media.
Humanitarians had long used vivid images, emotional appeals, and riveting news stories, and
radical activists had always resorted to spectacular actions. But Kouchner, like the New
Philosophers with whom he increasingly allied himself, began to wed solidarity to the mass media
to a degree far beyond anything either humanitarians or radicals had contemplated. In his mind,
orchestrating a media uproar, or a “tapage médiatique,” as he later called it, to carve out airtime,
coax celebrity endorsements, win the attention of pop stars, secure private funding, and sir up the
emotions of viewers was now just as vital to the success of a humanitarian campaign as the
actual relief work, if not more so. Historian Michael Barnett has gone so far as to write that for
Kouchner the “primary purpose of relief was to generate publicity and international action; that is,
MSF’s relief operations might save some lives directly, but the real value in the operations was
their ability to attract concerted action.”

924

Of course, this non-neutral, mediatized radical

humanitarianism was certainly not born of a single rupture, and many in MSF opposed it. Indeed,
MSF did not formally abandon the principle of neutrality until 1977, and Kouchner’s media antics
split the organization in 1979. Nevertheless, even many of his opponents eventually adopted
Kouchner’s brand of mediatized international solidarity.
Lastly, Kouchner and others helped further transform international solidarity through what
they later termed le droit d’ingérence.
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After Biafra, Kouchner and other “French doctors,”

argued that humanitarians, as well as states, had a right to intervene in the internal affairs of a
nation-state. They made certain to inscribe this concept in the very name of the new organization:
the suffering of victims supersedes all national borders. To be sure, this kind of forcible
923

“Création à Paris d’un comité de lutte contre le genocide au Biafra,” Le Monde, December 14,
1968, 4.
924
Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2011), 151.
925
André Glucksmann and Bernard Kouchner, “La preuve par le Cambodge,” Le Nouvel
Observateur 785 (November 26 - December 2, 1976): 132. Kouchner later promoted the closely
related, though distinct notion of le devoir d’ingérence. Mario Bettati and Bernard Kouchner, Le
devoir d’ingérence (Paris: Denoël, 1987).
264

intervention in the name of humanity was not new.

926

But Kouchner’s wing of MSF did enrich the

concept: they coupled intervention with idea of “engagement” popular among French radicals,
recasting humanitarianism as a form of “militant” action.

927

They used the idea of urgence to

reframe humanitarian intervention as a kind of state of emergency in which the need for swift
medical action could justify the suspension of official rules and regulations.

928

And they clamored

not only for the intervention of states, but also for the right of private individuals with no real
jurisdiction to cross sovereign borders to protect victims.
It is not surprising that such a strong interventionist line developed in France. While
Biafra triggered tense discussions in other countries over the right to interfere, the concept of
intervention found easy acceptance in France largely because it was legal.

929

In addition, MSF’s

radicalized humanitarianism could be seen as an attempt to rearticulate historically French
notions of universality and solidarity in a postcolonial context – of course, as others have pointed
out, this meant that Kouchner’s insistence on the right to intervene in the Third World tracked
eerily close to France’s sordid history of civilizing missions.
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Yet despite such firm roots in the

French context, the notion of the droit d’ingérence, some have argued, did make its way beyond
France, in large part through the efforts of Kouchner after his appointment as both Minister of
Health and action humanitarie in 1988 and his subsequent involvement with the United
Nations.

926

931

Fabian Klose, ed. The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas and Practice from the
Nineteenth Century to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
927
Vallaeys, Médecins Sans Frontières, 46, 64; Bertrand Taithe, “Reinventing (French)
Universalism: Religion, Humanitarianism, and the ‘French Doctors,’” Modern and Contemporary
France 12, no. 2 (2014): 149.
928
Taithe, “Reinventing (French) Universalism,” 149.
929
Philippe Guillot, “France, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Intervention,” International
Peacekeeping 1, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 31.
930
Taithe, “Reinventing (French) Universalism,” 149; Lasse Heerten, “The Dystopia of
Postcolonial Catastrophe: Self-Determination, the Biafran War of Secession, and the 1970s
Human Rights Moment,” in The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s, eds. Jan Eckel and
Samuel Moyn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 31. Ross, May ’68 and Its
Afterlives, 155-69.
931
Tim Allen and David Styan, “A Right to Intervene? Bernard Kouchner and the New
Humanitarianism,” Journal of International Development 12 (2000): 825-42.
265

Over the course of the 1970s, this radical humanitarianism encountered an ascendant
human rights discourse. The convergence was made possible by the particular international
conjuncture, which included the unique legacy of Biafra in France.

932

As Brauman later explained,

“The revelations of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Helsinki conference, the proliferations of
dictatorships in Latin America, the crisis in revolutionary ideologies after failure of the socialist
experiments in the Third World, and the 1977 award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Amnesty
933

International,” all contributed to the popularity of human rights discourse in France.

By the end

of the decade, the MSF’s radicalized humanitarianism and the kind of human rights most visibly
represented by Amnesty International achieved a kind of temporary fusion. In 1979, for example,
MSF cofounder Xavier Emmanuelli openly spoke about “the questions of human rights.” “[W]e are
speaking today,” he continued, pointing to the model of Amnesty, “of orienting Médecins Sans
Frontières’ action towards this field of morality and justice.”
The encounter transformed both elements.

935

934

Human rights allowed MSF to ground

humanitarian intervention in the conceptual framework of universal rights, justifying their belief in
the primacy of the individual victim over national sovereignty. At the same time, the fusion
boosted human rights in the late 1970s. Since MSF emerged out of the far left, with a number of
its members having belonged to anti-imperialist formations in their youth, the organization’s
pedigree helped further infuse human rights with the radicalism of the 1960s and 1970s. As
Kouchner repeatedly stated, MSF was an heir to 1968, which cunningly suggested that human
rights might be as well. And despite its political ambiguities, Kouchner’s wing of MSF managed to
preserve some of its radical credentials by siding with the same radical struggles, such as those
936

of the Palestinians or the Sandinistas, that anti-imperialists supported in the 1970s.
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But more than attributing human rights with a progressive aura, MSF offered human
rights an attractive model of radical activism. Of course, human rights groups like Amnesty
International already had their own forms of activism, such as letter writing, but these seemed
uninspiring compared to the dynamic activism associated with the anti-imperialist radicals of the
1960s and early 1970s. MSF, by contrast, appeared as a human rights organization that could
channel much of the daring, confrontational, and personally transformative activism of the antiimperialists. With this basis in radical activism, MSF helped elevate human rights into a
substantial form of international solidarity that could not only compete with anti-imperialism, but
perhaps even beat it at its own game.
Indeed, this is precisely what happened in 1978. MSF’s growth, the rise of a new rights
discourse, the growing marginalization of the radicals, and above all disasters in the Third World
prompted a few thinkers to call for a new “international of human rights” to replace the failed antiimperialist internationalism of the earlier decade. Juillard’s attack on “Third Worldism,” for
example, ended with just such call. Channeling the anti-totalitarian discourse exemplified by the
New Philosophers, he set collective self-determination against individual liberty: “The rights of
937

peoples have become the principal instrument in strangling human rights.”

As such, the

interstate rivalries, ideological divisions, and political struggles that defined the Cold War were
over. “There are certainly two camps in the Third World,” he explained, but “these two camps are
938

not the American and the Soviet.”

They are those of “torturer states” and “martyred people.”

939

In other words, the struggle was now between suffering individuals and nation-states.
In this context, Julliard argued, international solidarity had to be overhauled. He therefore
proposed a new internationalism: integrating the victims of the world into “an Internationale of
human rights, which is the sole response to the Internationale of States.”

940

This, he added, was

the “only possible” path, since “any other attitude would make us accomplices of the
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executioners.”

941

When Juillard came under attack for his provocative comments, none other than

Bernard Kouchner, the man who had helped turn MSF into a model for the kind of human rights
international Juillard called for, rushed to his defense, just as he had defended the New
Philosophers. Slamming the far left, Kouchner asserted that the only acceptable form of
international activism was the “relentless defense of all minorities,” the fight against “all
oppressions.”

942

The defense of the human demanded the overturning of all inherited political

coordinates, especially those of the radicals.
As criticism of Juillard’s article showed, not all radicals abandoned anti-imperialism for
the emergent human rights international. Despite their diminished numbers and exacerbating
internal rivalries, revolutionary groups, such as the Trotksyist LCR or the pro-Chinese Parti
Communiste Marxiste-Léniniste (PCML), successor to the PCMLF, resisted the new wave of
reaction. Radical intellectuals such as Nicos Poulantzas, Jacques Rancière, and Gilles Deleuze
criticized the anti-revolutionary trend personified by the New Philosophers. Others, like Régis
Debray, denounced human rights as the new face of imperialism:
The dominant ideology of “human rights,” which contains a bizarre blend of the political
decomposition of May and the most classic imperialist practice, both represents and
travesties (like all judicial ideology) a relation of social forces. It indicates simultaneously
the growing awareness in the industrial West of the extreme fragility of its world
domination and its will to defend it by any means, economic, technical or military. For
precise economic reasons, respect for the white man’s rights passes by way of the
violation (systematic in principle but variable in its methods) of the right of brown, black,
943
yellow and red men.
To be sure, anti-imperialist radicals, not only in France, but throughout North America and
Western Europe, were in an extremely precarious position in the 1970s. Nevertheless, radicals
might have been able to reinvent revolutionary politics, and with it, a new kind of anti-imperialist
internationalism, in spite of these defeats. But in the final years of the 1970s and especially in the
early 1980s radicals faced a series of domestic and global crises that would completely shatter
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the very idea of anti-imperialist internationalism. As history would have it, Southeast Asia once
more became an epicenter of change for radicals, though this time, in the opposite direction.

The Crisis of Revolutionary Internationalism
On December 21, 1978, two divisions of Vietnamese soldiers crossed the border into
Cambodia, claiming to support an autonomous uprising of Cambodians against the Khmer
Rouge. Four days later, another 150,000 soldiers followed. Despite Chinese aid, the
Kampuchean military suffered a crushing defeat, and Cambodian leader Pol Pot ordered a
general evacuation to the west of the country. After a series of lightening victories, Vietnamese
troops marched through the streets of Phnom Penh on January 7, 1979. The following day, with
victory over its socialist neighbor secure, the military announced the formation of a new coalition
government under the aegis of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Though nominally
independent, it was clear who controlled the government.
This astonishing turn of events did not come from nowhere. Even if Vietnamese and
Cambodians fought together against France and then the United States, relations were far from
amicable. The Vietnamese, who had always played the most visible role in the struggle against
imperialism in Southeast Asia, felt they should exercise a kind of revolutionary hegemony in the
region. For their part, the Khmer Rouge, the xenophobic ruling party of Cambodia, resented the
Vietnamese. Recalling Vietnam’s historical dominance over the Khmer people, the loss of a
significant part of Cambodia’s territory to its neighbor during the colonial period, as well as the
Vietnamese communists’ often paternalistic, controlling attitude towards militants in neighboring
countries, the Khmer Rouge espoused a fanatically anti-Vietnamese line. In fact, on May 1, 1975
less than twenty-four hours after the fall of Saigon, the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army – which
in April defeated the Khmer Republic, a dictatorship supported by the United States – promptly
invaded Phú Quốc, the largest island in Vietnam, claiming it as Cambodian territory. Just ten days
later, the Cambodian Army invaded another island. In retaliation, the Vietnamese Army swiftly
recaptured them both and then invaded Koh Wai, one of Cambodia’s own islands. Despite
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declarations of unity, these disputes only continued over the next four years, and the rivalry
between Cambodia and Vietnam deteriorated further.

944

To make matters worse, this rivalry grafted directly onto the Sino-Soviet split. During the
war, Vietnamese revolutionaries studiously avoided taking sides in the conflict. Yet after Chinese
aid dwindled in 1968, and the People’s Republic of China (PR) reached a rapprochement with the
United States in 1972, Vietnam increasingly tilted towards the Soviet Union. The fall of Saigon in
1975, and the prospect of a strong, united Vietnam, made China anxious, leading Beijing to
increase its support to Cambodia to provide a counterweight to Vietnam’s potential dominance in
the region. The Khmer Rouge, heavily influenced by Maoism, firmly aligned itself with its Chinese
patron. Feeling encircled, and battered from years of war, the Vietnamese drew closer to China’s
rival, signing a treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviets in November 1978, which
guaranteed Soviet support in case of Chinese invasion. Only a few years after finally winning
peace, Southeast Asia had once more become a geopolitical powder keg, though this time,
between governments that all called themselves socialist.
These geopolitical maneuvers, along with diplomatic breakdown, border skirmishes, and
even a brief Vietnamese retaliatory invasion of Cambodia in December 1977 were not lost on
radicals abroad. Few, however, expected the massive Vietnamese invasion that overthrew the
Khmer Rouge. Even fewer suspected that the Vietnamese incursion, ostensibly to aid rebelling
Cambodians, would end in occupation. Fewer still could believe that the PRC would retaliate the
following month. Indeed, the People’s Liberation Army, with encouragement from the United
States, decided to “teach Vietnam a lesson” by invading its southern neighbor with over 200,000
soldiers on February 17, 1979.
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In response, the Soviets deployed troops on the Sino-Soviet
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and Mongolian borders. World war appeared imminent. Sensing the risks, the PRC withdrew after
three weeks, declaring its limited, punitive incursion a success. Nevertheless, the conflict
continued: the Khmer Rouge waged guerilla war against the Vietnamese military, the SRV
effectively occupied Cambodia for the next decade, and much of the international community, led
by the United States, imposed a crushing embargo on the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

946

This astonishing turn of events stunned radicals in North America and Western Europe,
especially in countries like the United States and France where anti-imperialism had been so
essential to their identity. In the 1960s and early 1970s, unity on the wars in Indochina was
practically a given. Of course, radicals had always found something to disagree about. Should
they defend the DRV or publicly denounce it? Should they support the NLF or was another
organizational force possible? Could the revolution produce genuine socialism, or was it doomed
to devolve into a kind of “state capitalism?” Many of these disagreements grafted onto preexisting
political divisions between Maoists, various shades of Trotskyists, and other radical tendencies.
Yet, despite these differences in analysis, slogans, and tactics, when anti-imperialist radicals had
to choose between American imperialism or the Vietnamese liberation struggle, Thieu or the
Provisional Revolutionary Government, Lon Nol or the Cambodian insurgents, the Kingdom of
Lao or the revolutionary Pathet Lao, the answer was obvious.
But now, in 1979, radicals found themselves faced with a very different situation. The
lines, relatively clear in the past, now blurred, the old certainties faded, and the heroes became
indistinguishable from the villains. The official communist movement, following the USSR’s lead,
unequivocally defended Vietnam. Yet some radicals shared this assessment as well. For
example, one French activist argued in a letter to Rouge, the LCR’s paper, that “there is nothing
questionable” about the Vietnamese “lending a helping hand to the struggle of the real Khmer
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communists” in the civil war with Pol Pot’s regime.

947

Citing France’s disastrous non-intervention

policy during the Spanish Civil War, he argued the duty of real internationalists was precisely to
involve themselves in wars of this kind.
Most radicals, however, adopted a more ambivalent approach. The PSU, for example,
welcomed the fall of Pol Pot’s “tyrannical, atrociously bloody” and “fascist” regime, but objected to
Vietnam “deliberately violating the sovereignty of an independent state.”
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The LCR, which saw

the invasion as the logical product of the “socialism in one country” doctrine allegedly pursued by
Vietnam’s “Stalinist bureaucracy,” denounced Vietnam for violating the socialist principle of
internationalism and, in an echo of the antiwar struggle, demanded “immediate withdrawal.”

949

At

the same time, however, the LCR argued that most of the blame fell on China. The PRC, along
with Cambodia, had conspired to contain the Vietnamese revolution; encircled, the Vietnamese
had no choice but to turn to the Soviet Union to break free. After the Chinese invasion, the
Ligue’s critical support for Vietnam grew.
But some radicals, especially the pro-Chinese, not only excoriated Vietnam, they even
rallied to Pol Pot’s defense. When the PRC invaded Vietnam, pro-Chinese groups like the French
Parti Communiste Révolutionnaire (PCR) rushed to justify China’s actions: confronted with
Vietnam’s expansionist provocations, on full display in Laos and Cambodia, the PCR argued,
China had no choice but to launch a “defensive action” to push back the “aggressors.”

950

In fact,

China was not only defending its right to national sovereignty and territorial integrity, the PCR
continued, its swift action helped “push back the danger of world war,” and in this sense, was in
full accord with “the interests of the people of the world.”
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Invasion was internationalism.
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These same fault lines emerged within the much smaller American radical left. There,
groups such as the Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP) argued that while the Vietnamese Communist
Party’s Stalinism deserved international condemnation, “the responsibility for the bloodbath in
952

Indochina falls squarely on Washington.”

For the SWP, the Chinese invasion of Vietnam was

actually part of an ongoing international counterrevolutionary campaign led the United States to
overthrow the Vietnamese revolution. Thus, although critical of Vietnam, like the LCR, its fraternal
party in France, the SWP demanded an end to “the imperialist campaign against the Vietnamese
revolution!”
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Other groups, like the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP), openly defended the

Khmer Rouge, arguing that the “struggle of the Kampuchean people and government for
liberation and independence” is “a just and heroic struggle.”

954

Other American radicals,

especially those not in formal groups, were simply bewildered by the war.
To be sure, this was not the first time that radicals in both the United States and France
had split so sharply over an international issue, but the disagreement over the wars in Southeast
Asia assumed a different magnitude. This had to do in part with radicals’ deep identification with
Indochinese struggles, and particularly those of the Vietnamese, in the 1960s and early 1970s.
After all, the Vietnamese struggle played a decisive role in the formation of the radical left in
France and the United States, served as the basis for international unity, and helped turn radicals
towards revolution. Radicals were so wedded to Southeast Asia that confronting the crisis there
necessarily meant confronting their own identity and founding assumptions.
But the Third Indochina War, as it is sometimes called, proved so cataclysmic not only
because it provoked sharp disagreements, or even because it triggered a kind of identity crisis,
but because it completely undermined the theoretical basis of anti-imperialist internationalism.
After all, what could internationalism possibly mean when socialist movements that once united
against U.S. imperialism now went to war against each other? As historian Benedict Anderson
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observed, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the subsequent Chinese response, was
completely unprecedented: the war “represented the first large-scale conventional war” between
955

socialist governments.

The war showed that anti-imperialist internationalism had in fact not

culminated in a network of sovereign nation-states working together to build socialism, but in
imperialism and anti-internationalism.
Radicals were devastated. Whatever its intentions, Vietnam, once the leader of a revived
internationalism, had become its gravedigger. As Daniel Bensaïd of the LCR explained, the first
fall of Phnom Penh, just a week before that of Saigon in 1975, was the “highest symbol of the
struggle against imperialism and the rallying point of militant internationalism across the world.”
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But the second fall, at the hands of the Vietnamese just five years later, marked the collapse of
internationalism. In unilaterally invading Cambodia, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam “beat back
all internationalist solutions to the Indochinese question,” foreclosing genuine international
solidarity.

957

Watching the peoples of Southeast Asia, once allied in a struggle for total victory,

only added to the enormous crisis in which radicals had already found themselves in the 1970s.
But more than that, it raised major questions about the constituent ideas of anti-imperialist
internationalism.

The Anti-Vietnam International
While many radicals recognized the gravity of the situation, and what it meant for radical
politics as a whole, some radicals, above all those who looked to Mao’s China, simply doubled
down on anti-imperialist internationalism. Although Maoist, anti-revisionist, and pro-Chinese
formations mushroomed throughout North America and Western Europe in the 1960s, a
coordinated international did not initially take shape there.
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One of the largest stumbling blocks
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was that in the 1960s these radicals formed many, rival formations in the same country that
refused to fuse. In France, for example, by the early 1970s there were perhaps over two-dozen
parties that took their inspiration from China.

959

Most of them jealously guarded their autonomy,

disagreeing on almost everything except their common support of the People’s Republic of China.
In fact, Maoist groups would frequently denounce each other for revisionist errors, having
misunderstood Mao’s teachings, or acting disloyally to China.
In this context, it made little sense for China to explicitly favor one party over the others.
Thus, while the Chinese Communist Party did bestow the “franchise” on one national pro-Chinese
party in each country, effectively making that formation its “official” representative, this
designation ultimately carried little weight, at least in the 1960s, since China continued to support,
publicize, and even fund a variety of pro-Chinese parties in the same country. Although aware of
the risks, China nevertheless did encourage unity of some kind, often inviting Maoists and anti960

revisionists to attend China for special events, where they were regaled as foreign dignitaries.

In addition, some parties even developed special lateral relations with one another, such as the
French Gauche prolétarienne and the Belgian Université-Usine-Union, a concord usually based
on the fact that they happened to share a particular interpretation of what the “Chinese example,”
in itself a highly ambiguous reality, actually signified.
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Moreover, in some cases, rogue radicals

such as Hardial Baines even tried, though always unsuccessfully, to link up these allied groups in
their own trans-Atlantic Maoist international. Thus, despite all these initiatives, a formal antirevisionist international did not emerge in the 1960s.

962

France specifically, see A. Belden Fields, Trotskyism and Maoism: Theory and Practice in France
and the United States (New York: Praeger), chapters 3 and 5.
959
Christophe Bourseiller, Les Maoïstes: La folle histoire des gardes rouges français (Paris: Plon
1996), 147.
960
Ibid. 145-47,
961
Manuel Abramowicz, “Au Coeur de la galaxie marxiste-léniniste de Belgique,” in Dissidences
7: 107.
962
There were much more earnest attempts to build an international in Southeast Asia, however,
especially before the decimation of the Indonesian Communist Party, one of China’s strongest
supporters, in 1965. Jian Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2001), 208.
275

The preconditions for a functional pro-Chinese international emerged only after the PRC
began to pursue a radically different foreign policy in the mid-1970s, officially expressed in the
Theory of the Three Worlds.

963

According to the Theory, the globe was now divided into three

distinct worlds: the First composed of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet
Union; the Second including all the lesser powers, especially those of “Britain, France, West
Germany, and Japan;” and the Third comprising the rest of the developing world.

964

According to

China, in this new situation, the competition between the two superpowers for global hegemony
was leading to instability, imperialism, and even world war. It was therefore up to the Third World
to build the largest possible international front to repel the “imperialism, colonialism, and
hegemonism” of these two superpowers, especially the Soviet Union, which China soon identified
as the main threat to world peace.

965

While the Third World, naturally led by China, constituted

the core of this front, it could count on the help of countries in the Second World: faced with the
growing threat of war, and needing to defend their “national independence” from the
superpowers, it was in the best interest of those Second World countries to join the international
front.

966

Despite its seemingly revolutionary rhetoric, the Theory effectively justified China’s
abandonment of global revolution in favor of pursuing domestic development, building tactical
alliances with other countries, and above all, containing its greatest rival, the Soviet Union. In
arguing that the contradictions between nations had definitely replaced contradictions between
classes, the Theory of the Three Worlds allowed China to reinscribe anti-imperialist
internationalism within the framework of geopolitics, state rivalries, and international diplomacy.
For pro-Chinese parties around the world, this meant downplaying class struggles at home in
favor of national unity in the face of “hegemonism.” In Western Europe, many radicals promoted a
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kind of ultra nationalism in the hopes of pushing their respective Second World countries into an
alliance with the Third World against the First. In Scandinavia, six pro-Chinese parties held a joint
meeting where they announced that, since the two superpowers were using Nordic waters as
staging ground, encroaching on the “national sovereignty” of several countries, their task was to
“mobilize the peoples of the Nordic countries to defend their countries’ right of self-determination
…”
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In France, the PCML even allied with Gaullists, monarchists, and extreme right

organizations such as Action Française to defend French national sovereignty against the United
States and the Soviet Union.
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Internationalism had become national chauvinism, and anti-

imperialism now meant joining with the bourgeoisie to defend the right to independence.
Many pro-Chinese radicals were unsurprisingly dismayed. Some argued that China, after
having denounced the Soviet Union for raising its national interests before those of revolutionary
internationalism in the 1950s and 1960s, was now doing precisely the same, which led to a major
split in the international pro-Chinese movement and ruptures within individual parties.
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Many

radicals, however, remained ardently loyal to China. The PRC, trying to use the split in its favor,
began to encourage a kind of pro-Chinese international, hoping that a tight network of parties
across the world could help bolster its stature internationally. After 1976, a remarkably
coordinated pro-Chinese international began to take shape, stretching from Argentina to East
Germany to Cambodia. But, in contrast to the 1960s, China took special interest in cultivating an
international network not so much in the Third World, but in North America and above all Western
Europe, the core of the Second World, and hopefully a key ally in the fight against the United
States and especially the Soviet Union. For their part, loyal parties in North America and Western
Europe were only too eager to build the new international.
Forging the international often proceeded along prosaic routes. One way pro-Chinese
parties connected was to showcase one another in their publications. For example, in 1976, the
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October League, China’s official arm in the United States, ran a series of articles introducing
American readers to the fraternal parties in Western Europe, since, following the Three Worlds
Theory, that region was to become a major battleground in the fight against “hegemonism.”

970

Moreover, the League explained, “U.S. Marxist Leninists have a lot to learn from the communist
movement in the countries of the second world. In many cases, they have longer and broader
experience in both the class struggle and the struggle against modern revisionism. The workers
in all countries have always learned and supported each other, and it is in this proletarian
internationalist spirit that this series is written.”

971

In December, they published a lengthy, two-part

interview with Jacques Jurquet, leader of the Parti Communiste Marxiste-Léniniste (PCML), who
discussed the struggle against “modern revisionism” in France.
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From there, parties regularly congratulated one another on formal achievements, creating
the appearance of a coherent pro-Chinese world. Whenever a party reached a milestone, such as
adopting a new program, holding a national conference, or celebrating the anniversary of the
party’s founding, parties from across the globe would publicize the achievement and issue
dozens of letters of support. Thus, in June 1977, when the October League formally reorganized
itself as the Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) – led by Mark Klonsky, onetime national
secretary of the Students for a Democratic Society, and including a number of respected
communists, such as Carl Davidson and Harry Haywood – the PCML saluted them on the front
page of its paper, pontificating, “the creation of your party, in the very heart of one of the two most
973

aggressive imperialisms of the present epoch is a harsh blow to the international bourgeoisie.”

In gratitude, the Communist Party (ML) reprinted the PCML’s statement, along with over a dozen
letters of support from other countries, in the pages of its newspaper. All pro-Chinese parties did
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the same for every marginally formal event. In this way they helped create the sense that they
were more numerous, organized, and coordinated than they actually were.
Lastly, parties penned joint statements. Although often little more than restatements of
the official Chinese stance on a given issue, empty rhetoric, or quotations from Lenin, Stalin, or
Mao, these performances helped forge unity. Thus, the October League and the Canadian
Communist League released a joint communiqué in May 1977 supporting one another’s
struggles.
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Or in 1978, the Austrian Communist League and the Workers’ and Peasants’ Party

of Turkey published a common statement reconfirming the need to build an international front to
fight the “Soviet social imperialists and the U.S. imperialists …”
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These kinds of actions even

worked to unite rival pro-Chinese parties in the same country. For example, by the end of 1978,
the PCML and the Parti Communiste Révolutionnaire (PCR), were not only releasing common
declarations, or even sharing resources, but even entered negotiations to fuse into a single party.
While all these gestures may appear foolish, they were in fact necessary. For what
pulled this international together was unanimity on the correct ideological line. Its organizing
principle was the centrality of the People’s Republic of China, its theoretical core the Theory of
the Three Worlds, and its primary function to project China’s official position on any given issue.
Whatever the event, the PRC could expect a united chorus to echo its line throughout the world.
In this way, the International’s tight coordination compensated for its numerical weaknesses.
Indeed, with the exception of Norway, which boasted a Maoist party with 5,000 members, a
widely read newspaper, and strong ties to intellectuals, most national pro-Chinese parties were
rather small, never more than 1,000 members at their height. But they amplified their power by
operating as a kind of echo chamber, trumpeting the same line at the same time in every major
country in North America and Western Europe. It is precisely this machine that went into action
during the Third Indochina War.

974

“Join Communiqué Issued by the October League and the Canadian Communist League,” The
Call, May 23, 1977, 6-7.
975
Reprinted as “Communiqué commun des partis marxistes-léninistes (TKIP et KBO),
L’Humanité rouge 931, September 16-17, 1978, 2.
279

When Vietnam invaded Cambodia, the pro-Chinese parties sprung into action. Since the
Khmer Rouge was China’s closest ally, these parties immediately turned their guns against the
SRV. They denounced Vietnam for violating Cambodia’s national sovereignty. They compared
Vietnam’s offensive to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the U.S. war in
Vietnam. They even tried to blame Vietnam for the mass suffering caused by the Khmer Rouge,
charging that it was the SRV, not the Khmer Rouge, that was perpetrating genocide. The
Canadian Communist League, which had sent a representative to Cambodia just days before the
invasion, charged that Vietnam had deliberately planned to “let people starve.”

976

In the United

States, Carl Davidson, writing for the CPML’s paper, called the invasion a “war of
extermination.”
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In France, the PCML – whose leader, Jacques Jurquet, visited Pol Pot in

September 1978 – claimed that Vietnam had knowingly unleashed a “holocaust” in Cambodia.
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Going even further, some parties alleged that Vietnam planned to colonize the occupied
territories once they had eradicated the native Cambodians, as the Nazis hoped to do in Eastern
Europe. Intent on pursuing a kind of “settler colonialism,” the PCML argued, “Vietnamese
colonists are progressively replacing the Cambodian peasants.”
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The PCR added that Vietnam

would not stop with Cambodia, but planned to colonize all of Southeast Asia.
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While one could dismiss these accusations as the propagandistic ravings of marginal
extremists, in some countries pro-Chinese radicals overcame their fringe reputation to play a role
in the discourse surrounding the Southeast Asian crisis. In France, the PCML seized the lead,
encouraging its members to organize among all sectors of society – in the unions and
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universities, within the religious and intellectual milieus – to shape public opinion over the war.

981

Cognizant of the need to downplay their extremist reputation, the PCML pursued the widest
possible popular fronts while deliberately effacing its own involvement in the campaign.

982

On

January 10, 1979, for example, the PCML organized a solidarity demonstration in Paris with the
PCR and the Comité des Patriotes du Kampuchea démocratique en France, a group of
Cambodians residing in France.

983

Later that month, the PCML gathered signatures for a call to

solidarity with the Cambodian people, which they published in Le Monde. We who “supported the
struggles of the Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian people against American aggression,” the
statement read, “condemn the occupation of this country by the Vietnamese army, denouncing it
984

as an infringement of the independence of a State and of a people.”

In addition to confirming

their radical credentials, recalling the Vietnam War in this manner allowed these anti-Vietnam
activists to legitimate their campaign by grounding it in the very same principles of national selfdetermination that guided the anti-imperialist struggle against the United States.
These activists also looked to the antiwar movement for organizational models. The
PCML, for example, later established a Comité Kampuchea, explicitly based on the Comité
Vietnam National and Comité Vietnam de Bases, in which some of these anti-Vietnam activists
had once participated.
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Following the anti-Vietnam War struggle, the new anti-Vietnam

campaign made international solidarity a priority. Drawing on the networks of the pro-Chinese
International, activists, again led by the PCML, organized a conference for “international solidarity

981

Claude Liria, “Cambodge aujourd’hui: lutte pour la survie d’un peuple,” L’Humanité rouge,
November 29, 1979, 6.
982
“La tactique de notre parti pour impulser er developper la soutien politique de notre peuple a la
juste cause nationale du peuple du Kampuchea,” no date, 2, F Delta Res 613/66: Relations
internationales: Cambodge, Laos, Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine,
Nanterre, France.
983
“Rassemblement,” L’Humanité rouge 1006, January 11, 1979, 1.
984
Reprinted as “Appel pour le soutien au Cambodge contre l’agression Vietnamienne,”
Kampuchea Vaincra!: Journal du Comité Kampuchea, no. 1 (February 1979): 4.
985
“Appel,” Kampuchea Vaincra!, 2. It should be noted, however, that the pro-Chinese and
Maoists were not united in their efforts, even if they all supported the Khmer resistance against
Vietnam. Alain Badiou’s group, the Union de Communists de France Marxistes-Léninistes
(UCFML), for example, created its own rival base committee, the Comité Kampuchéa Vaincra
(CVK). “Pour un Comité Kampuchéa Vaincra!,” supplement to ML no. 33-34, no date, F Delta Res
613/66, La Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine, Nanterre, France.
281

with Cambodia” in Stockholm in November 1979, gathering over 250 delegates from 31 countries.
To make sure the conference would reach as wide an audience as possible, pro-Chinese activists
also encouraged sympathetic journalists, artists, scientists, academics, priests, and politicians to
endorse the event. They secured the support of luminaries such as Albert Memmi, the famous
anticolonial theorist, Alain Badiou, the philosopher, and Joris Ivens, the filmmaker.
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Folk singer

Joan Baez sent a message to the conference, as did the French Resister Charles Tillon, while the
Swedish writer Jan Myrdal delivered a rousing speech.
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“Our solidarity work,” he said, could

“signify the life or death of an entire generation in Kampuchea, maybe even for the Khmers as a
988

nation and people as well …”

In Stockholm, then at another organization meeting in Paris soon after, activists formed
an international movement, the Mouvement Solidarité Cambodge, and organized a series of other
events, including two more international conferences in Tokyo, which involved Samir Amin, and
Paris.
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In true anti-imperialist fashion, the movement’s official platform condemned Vietnam for

violating Cambodian national sovereignty, demanded immediate withdrawal, and insisted on the
Cambodian people’s “right to self-determination.”
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It also called on activists to support all

Cambodian efforts without exclusion – which really meant supporting the Khmer Rouge – for the
“liberation and independence of Cambodia.”

991

Significantly, the Mouvement Solidarité

Cambodge tried to legitimate its demands by appealing to the United Nations Charter’s principle
of non-intervention.

992

The conference, international movement, celebrity sponsors, and

conscious attempt to code the campaign in the mainstream language of rights helped the proChinese become a part of the discussion.
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The pro-Chinese parties also reached out to those non-governmental humanitarian
organizations such as the ICRC, UNICEF, and MSF now turning their attention to the disaster
unfolding in Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese invasion, which aggravated years of social
dislocation under the Khmer Rouge, triggered a demographic catastrophe. Cambodians freed
from the work camps rushed to escape, while those beyond the reach of the Vietnamese fled in
panic, spurred on by Khmer Rouge propaganda promising that Vietnamese troops would
slaughter everyone in their path. The retreating Khmer Rouge abducted thousands more at
gunpoint, driving them into crowded camps on the Thai border to serve as slave laborers, human
shields, or soldiers for the resistance.

993

The Thai government, although happy to provide

sanctuary for Khmer Rouge forces, forcibly repatriated thousands of refugees, in one case
literally driving them off a cliff into mines; and when some returned to the border, Thai soldiers
opened fire.

994

Although humanitarian organizations, such as MSF, had operated in the region

before the invasion, they now made Southeast Asia a priority.

995

But the situation inside Cambodia was even worse than on the border. When the
Vietnamese liberated the collectives, hundreds of thousands of Cambodians abandoned the
recently planted crop to return to their home villages, and with the ongoing war, harvests
elsewhere were destroyed in the fighting and the main 1979 crop went unplanted, virtually
ensuring a famine.
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Humanitarian organizations begged the new People’s Republic of

Kampuchea to allow them into the country.

997

While the Vietnamese and Cambodian authorities

initially welcomed foreign aid, they soon changed their mind, arguing that international aid would
998

act as “a cover for intervention and aggression.”
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the crisis, but imposed strict requirements: fearing both foreign intervention and the chance that
aid would fall into the hands of Khmer Rouge forces amassing in the border camps, they forbade
humanitarian organizations from entering Cambodia unless they surrendered control of
distribution to the new government and promised to abandon the refugee camps on the border.
They had reason to worry: the Khmer Rouge had appropriated large quantities of medical
supplies, some relief organizations like the Red Cross were directly working with camps
controlled by the Khmer Rouge, and the U.S. government had already hatched plans to use relief
999

operations to find ways to help the Khmer Rouge fight Vietnam.

Nevertheless, Vietnam’s actions aggravated the crisis, infuriating the humanitarians,
which in turn led the pro-Chinese to regard them as potential allies in the fight against
1000

Vietnam.

The humanitarian campaign, the PCML put it, “is the terrain of an important political
1001

battle that we must not abandon.”

At the international level, the Mouvement Solidarité

Cambodge recognized not only the importance of the humanitarian front, but also the immense
popularity of the issue, soon making the call for immediate medical relief the central pillar of its
program.
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In France, the PCML used both its newspaper and public events to explain how

Vietnam blocked humanitarian groups such as the Red Cross, UNICEF, and MSF from entering
Cambodia, encouraging activists to put pressure on Phnom Penh to allow international relief,
pushing readers to link up with humanitarian groups like MSF, and regularly exhorted their
1003

followers to donate to groups like the International Red Cross and UNICEF.

Indeed, since

these latter two organizations were working in camps with the Khmer Rouge, the PCML warmly
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identified them as part of the overall “solidarity campaign,” and called their work “positive” for the
struggle.

1004

The PCML also had nice words for MSF. In November 1979, L’humanité rouge, the
PCML’s paper, interviewed an MSF worker who had just returned from Cambodia. Given the
organization’s principle of neutrality, the MSF activist chose to remain anonymous, but offered
some damning remarks about the new government in Phnom Penh. “There is a paradox that one
must emphasize: there are volunteers, there are people, there is money, there are donations,” in
short, everything to help Cambodia, and yet, “all of that is blocked.”
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The situation grew so

intolerable that just one month later, MSF decided to break with neutralism to directly intervene in
Cambodian affairs. “Today, in Cambodia, children starve to death before tons of rice,” began their
rousing call to action, published in all the major newspapers.
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“But the hundreds of doctors,

surgeons, and nurses whom we are holding ready,” MSF continued, have for months found
1007

themselves “forbidden from entering the country.”

Tired of waiting on the Vietnamese

authorities, MSF took matters into its own hands, organizing a campaign, the Marche pour la
survie, to forcibly enter Cambodia to save the dying. The PCML quickly reproduced excerpts of
the call, obviously quite pleased by this clear attack on Vietnam.
Although MSF criticized Vietnam most vocally, it was not alone. While humanitarians
realized that the Khmer Rouge had caused the impending cataclysm, the situation had degraded
so badly that by late 1979 they began to shift the blame to the Vietnamese. This redirection,
along with the dramatic rhetoric surrounding Cambodia, increasingly made it seem as if the
Vietnamese were deliberately murdering the Cambodians. Aid agencies blasted the airwaves with
advertisements warning of “two million more before Christmas.”
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Cross compared Cambodia to Buchenwald. In France, Claude Malhuret, who had been active on
the Thai border since 1976 before becoming MSF’s president, spoke to the rightwing Le Figaro
about an impending “massacre” in Cambodia, comparing the Vietnamese invasion to the
Armenian genocide.

1009

Kouchner spoke of the “extinction of Cambodian children,” proclaiming

that [g]enocide is happening every evening, over supper.” Unsurprisingly, the New Philosophers
1010

joined the chorus, with Bernard-Henri Lévy speaking of a new “final solution.”

In this context, pro-Chinese attacks were no longer disregarded as fanatical ravings.
Indeed, groups like the PCML, which quoted testimonies, statistics, and statements from
humanitarian groups to allege that the Vietnamese were committing genocide, capitalized on a
major slippage in the public discourse.

1011

For if there was indeed an ongoing genocide or

holocaust, as everyone seemed to suggest, then who was perpetrating it? With the Khmer Rouge
firmly out of power, and the Vietnamese at the helm, there could really only be one answer. Thus,
in blaming the Vietnamese, the pro-Chinese were only spelling out that which was already implicit
in the language of the humanitarians, human rights activists, and increasingly the public at large.
The campaign against Vietnam, which began on the fringes of the political spectrum, had become
completely mainstream by 1980.
In their campaign against Vietnam, pro-Chinese groups found objective allies in the very
imperialist governments they once denounced. In France, government officials began to blame
Vietnam, and the Foreign Minister warned that the Cambodians were “on the edge of
1012

extinction.”

But it was the U.S. government that led the charge. Still smarting from its

humiliating defeat, the United States relished in Vietnam’s discomfiture, accusing the Vietnamese
of looting peasants, destroying food stocks, hoarding outside aid, and deliberately trying to kill
Cambodians. Moving past denunciations, the U.S. government actively isolated Vietnam in the
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international arena, effectively authorized China’s punitive invasion in February 1979, and
orchestrated a massive international embargo to suffocate Vietnam for the next decade – of all
the countries in Western Europe and North America, only Sweden and France continued to help
Vietnam rebuild after four decades of almost continuous war.

1013

Still not satisfied, the United States backed the Khmer Rouge in its guerilla war against
the Vietnamese. While it still remains unclear whether the United States directly armed the Khmer
Rouge, U.S. representatives did nix an ASEAN proposal to disarm the party while National
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski himself admitted that he “concocted the idea of persuading
Thailand to cooperate fully with China in its efforts to rebuild the Khmer Rouge.”
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On the

international terrain, the United States lobbied the United Nations to recognize Pol Pot’s recently
deposed government as the official representative of Cambodia, deliberately avoiding the word
“genocide” in its statements in order to present the overthrown party as the victim of an
inexcusable Vietnamese incursion. Overriding the expostulations of the Soviet Bloc, on
September 21, 1979 the United Nations General Assembly formally recognized Pol Pot’s
Democratic Kampuchea – a regime that relocated millions of people for torture, forced labor, and
ultimately mass extermination, resulting in the annihilation of perhaps twenty-five percent of
Cambodia’s population – as the rightful voice of the Cambodian people.
Perhaps unthinkable a decade earlier, pro-Chinese radicals found themselves siding with
the United States against what they now called Vietnamese imperialism. While they welcomed
the U.S. government’s role in weakening Vietnam, the association looked bad, forcing them into
political contortions. For example, in its article hailing the U.N. decision to recognize Democratic
Kampuchea as a victory for the principles of “independence, sovereignty, non-interference, and
the safeguarding of peace,” the PCML carefully listed how each country voted, yet studiously
avoided mentioning the United States, the very country that had actually led the charge to defend
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Pol Pot.

1015

The American CPML found itself in an especially unpleasant bind. Following China’s

lead, the party had to congratulate the decision, which owed much to American imperialism; yet
showing any support for the U.S. government contradicted most of the party’s domestic
campaigns, such as the fight for Puerto Rican independence. There could not be a more
illustrative, yet also tragic, image of how deep the crisis of the anti-imperialist internationalism ran.

Ant-Imperialist Internationalism in Crisis
The Third Indochina War presented radicals with an intractable question: why did
revolutionary struggles in Cambodia, Vietnam, and China, once united around the ideas of antiimperialism, internationalism, and socialism, go to war against one another almost as soon as
they achieved victory, turning these foundational ideas into their very opposites? Despite the
gravity of the question, some denied that there was a problem to begin with. Others largely
blamed the entire fiasco on American imperialism, which, while true in some respects, seemed
more like an evasion than an answer. A few offered more honest answers, which often meant
locating the problem within the anti-imperialist struggles themselves, rather than trying to deflect
blame. The RCP, for example, identified the “bourgeois outlook” of nationalism as the cause.

1016

The LCR blamed the state itself, arguing that “logic of the state’s interests” had led the
Vietnamese to reduce internationalism to geopolitics, international rivalries, and territorial
disputes.

1017

Indeed, while there were many possible causes, the most perspicacious radicals

were beginning to point to the nation-state as a major reason for the implosion of anti-imperialist
internationalism.
As we have seen, in the 1960s, many radicals from a number of distinct currents,
especially those most active in the antiwar movement, coupled anti-imperialist internationalism
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1018

with the right to national self-determination.

Internationalism meant supporting the struggles of

oppressed nationalities, national liberation struggles were to produce nation-states that would
ensure collective sovereignty, and these states were in turn supposed to transition into
dictatorships of the proletariat that would open the path for socialism. Of course, these antiimperialist radicals were aware of the dangers of nationalism, understood that the dictatorship of
the proletariat had to radically supersede the conventional nation-state, and firmly believed that
socialist states would eventually have to “wither away” into more emancipatory forms.
Nevertheless, despite these dangers, in the context of the Third World, nation-states were said to
serve a progressive historical role in the struggle for global socialism.
The changing conjuncture in Southeast Asia in the 1970s raised serious questions about
this strategy, unraveling the presumed connections between the nation-state and liberation,
socialism, anti-imperialism, and internationalism. The Vietnamese invasion unearthed the full
extent of the Khmer Rouge’s crimes, demonstrating that the notion of collective sovereignty
promoted by these revolutionary nation-states could not guarantee individual emancipation.
China’s conservative turn in the 1970s, in which the PRC dismantled communes, embraced the
free market, and solidified a Party bureaucracy, raised serious questions about the connection
between the nation-state form and socialism. Cambodia’s constant border attacks, Vietnam’s
invasion, and then China’s incursion indicated that instead of serving as the bulwark against
imperialism, the nation-state might itself possess inherently imperialist tendencies, regardless of
the politics of those in power. And the internecine conflagration showed that individual nationstates always seemed to end by elevating their own national interests above those of
internationalism. While struggles of the 1960s led radicals to connect the nation-state with antiimperialism, the culmination of those very struggles in the 1970s seemed to suggest that the two
terms might actually be antithetical. Indeed, while not fully apparent at the time, looking back, this
crisis showed the specific function of states in social formations propels them towards imperialism
of some kind. In the words of theorists John Milios and Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos, all states, even
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socialist ones, have an “outward-looking impulse of national expansion.”

1019

Thus, the Third

Indochina War, the later Iran-Iraq War, and other such conflicts cannot be seen as the result of
interference by “Western imperialism”; their cause must be located in the specific nature of the
states themselves.
Thus, the wars in Southeast Asia pointed not only to the bankruptcy of the concept of
national self-determination, but to the limits of Marxism’s understanding of the nation-state. It is
revealing, for example, that all sides in the war justified their actions through the idea of national
sovereignty. The Khmer Rouge justified mass population transfers by arguing that they formed a
necessary part of the project to forge a new nation. Both the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese
claimed they were merely defending themselves from infringements on their rightful national
territories. Vietnam asserted that the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge was not the product of a
foreign intervention, but of an autonomous revolutionary uprising of the Khmer people fighting for
their “right to self-determination.”

1020

The SRV justified its occupation of Cambodia by saying the

new government requested Vietnamese support to help protect the country’s national sovereignty
from interference by the deposed Khmer Rouge and the Chinese.

1021

The Chinese claimed that

their invasion of Vietnam was simply a counterattack designed to protect Chinese sovereignty
1022

from Vietnamese border attacks.

In diagnosing the crisis, Benedict Anderson argued that “none of the belligerents has
made more than the most perfunctory attempts to justify bloodshed in terms of a recognizable
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1023

Marxist theoretical perspective.”

While the belligerents did advance certain concepts, these

were wholly inadequate to the theoretical problem. None of the states involved were capitalist,
and yet they behaved in ways very similar to capitalist nation-states – they made geopolitical
alliances with neighboring states, jealously guarded their borders, exerted influence over other
nation-states, crafted a national populace, and placed the self-interest of the state above all else.
In short, they seemed imperialist, but since radicals had always conceptually anchored
imperialism to capitalism, the term, they thought, could not truly explain the behavior of these
socialist states. Chinese Marxists, who had earlier confronted a similar problem in the form of
Soviet revisionism, proposed the concept of “hegemonism” as a solution. Unrelated to Antonio
Gramsci’s idea of “hegemony,” this concept simply referred to a nation-state’s desire to expand
its power, either by applying pressure on other states, or through direct expansion, irrespective of
that country’s modes of productions, level of class struggle, and so forth. Thus, the Chinese saw
the Third Indochina war as the product of the Soviet Union’s “big hegemonism” and Vietnam’s
“little hegemonism.”

1024

The Vietnamese, lacking their own explanation, adopted the concept as

well, blaming the war on “Peking hegemonism” allied with American imperialism.

1025

While the

concept may have described some of the geopolitical dimensions of the war, it did not explain
why states, whether socialist or capitalist, felt compelled to expand in this way. The only thing
“hegemonism” truly revealed was Marxism’s great difficulty in explaining the nation-state.
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But it was not just Southeast Asian Marxists, but also French and American radicals who
had a difficult time making sense of the problem, even if they began to see the nation-state, or
more narrowly, nationalism, as major problems. When the RCP explained the situation in
Southeast Asia by arguing that too many individuals with the bourgeois world outlook of
nationalism had joined the Vietnamese Party, it said very little about the structure of the state
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itself, reducing the problem to the ideas of individuals. When the LCR rightly noted that the
problem was the state, but then proposed the alternative of a “socialist federation of Indochinese
States,” it, too, revealed a limited understanding of the nation-state – after all, how was a
federation of states any different if it were ultimately composed of other smaller states?

1027

Were

not all states comprised of other states? And where did nationalism fit into this?
This theoretical limit is precisely why radicals encountered such difficulty in reinventing
internationalism. Changing circumstances at home and abroad had always forced radicals in the
United States and France, indeed, throughout North America and Western Europe, to periodically
reinvent international solidarity. But in the late 1970s, radicals proved unable to fashion a
historically apposite response, as they had in the early 1960s, in 1968, or in the early 1970s. The
domestic situation went from bad to worse, especially as the 1980s arrived. Internationally,
revolutions seemed to be in retreat almost everywhere. And the Third Indochina War, which was
in fact only one in a long series of crises, shook anti-imperialist internationalism to its very core,
completely destabilizing its basic assumptions and constituent categories, such as the idea of the
right to national self-determination. While earlier moments required a recalibration of
internationalism, the crises of the late 1970s were so thorough that they demanded a
refoundation of anti-imperialist internationalism itself. Still, the blow was not necessarily lethal,
and radicals could have tried, through very hard intellectual, political, and organizational work, to
create a new kind of international solidarity. But on the whole, most radicals, because they were
demoralized, completely weakened at home, stupefied by the turn of events abroad, or simply
intransigent, did not succeed. Once the dominant form of international solidarity, by the late
1970s anti-imperialist internationalism was in crisis, opening the field for a new kind of solidarity
to take the lead.
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CHAPTER 8: SAVING THE BOAT PEOPLE

In July 1981, just a few years before his death, Michel Foucault spoke on behalf of yet
another cause. Surrounded by enormous photographs of suffering refugees, this time he spoke
for the “boat people” fleeing Southeast Asia.

1028

In the late 1970s, hundreds of thousands of

Indochinese fled communist governments in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam; over the next quarter
century, their numbers would swell to nearly three million. While some fled by land, many took to
the seas in teeming, decrepit boats. Countless drowned, starved to death, or were murdered by
pirates. Those fortunate enough to survive the perilous journey to neighboring Southeast Asian
countries were thrown into overcrowded camps upon arrival. Under considerable strain, and
unable to take any more refugees, some of these countries began to push incoming boats back to
sea. By early 1979, all of Southeast Asia found itself gripped by a humanitarian crisis of
unprecedented proportions.
At Geneva, Foucault announced the creation of an International Committee of Piracy,
headed by Bernard Kouchner. While Foucault’s support for a people in need was unsurprising,
the way he now chose to theorize international solidarity certainly was. Instead of drawing on the
ideas that marked his earlier activism with the Maoists – ideas such as popular justice, class
struggle, and plebian revolt – Foucault now grounded his internationalism in the notion of the
“private individual.” He gestured to a new “international citizenship,” whose duty it was to “always
bring the testimony of people’s suffering to the eyes and ears of governments,” to “speak out
against every abuse of power, whoever its author, whoever its victims.” He called for a new right,
“that of private individuals to effectively intervene in the sphere of international policy and
strategy.”
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And he finished his speech, subsequently published under the title, “Confronting

Governments: Human Rights,” by pointing to concrete initiatives that he believed embodied this
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new kind of individualist, interventionist internationalism – the French and German campaigns to
send ships to rescue the boat people, as well as the work of international human rights and
humanitarian organizations such Amnesty International, Terre des Hommes, and Medecins du
monde.

1030

If the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia helped shatter an already declining antiimperialist internationalism, then the concomitant refugee crisis offered the rival human rights
internationalism a remarkable opportunity to fill the void of international solidarity. While what
remained of the anti-imperialist left contributed little to resolving the refugee issue, the human
rights internationalists sprang into action. Former French revolutionaries now turned
humanitarians, like Bernard Kouchner, Claudie and Jacques Broyelle, or André Glucksmann,
worked with Vietnamese refugees, Eastern European dissidents, and human rights groups such
as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) to launch a campaign against human rights violations in
Vietnam. Channeling the social movement strategies of the 1960s, they formed a committee to
save the boat people, won over prominent intellectuals, including Michel Foucault, and chartered
a hospital ship to rescue the boat people at sea. Their campaign, which amounted to interfering
with the internal affairs of a sovereign nation-state, inaugurated a new kind of ostensibly “nonpolitical,” moral humanitarian interventionism that promised to surpass Cold War ideological
divisions.
Their campaign spread internationally, entering the United States through the efforts of
Joan Baez and Ginetta Sagan, leaders of the West Coast branch of Amnesty International, but
now directors of their own human rights organization. The pair not only popularized the struggle
against human rights violations in Vietnam for American audiences, but also worked with the
Carter Administration, revealing how this new human rights internationalism remained deeply
implicated in politics, despite its claim to stand above governments. The Carter Administration, for
its part, jumped at the issue, sensing a perfect opportunity to simultaneously divert attention away
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from the Vietnam War, make Americans feel good again, and restore the United States’
leadership role in the international community. Of course, human rights played an ambiguous role
in the Carter Administration: some used the new rights discourse as a way to criticize pro-U.S.
dictatorships, while others wielded human rights as an anti-communist bludgeon against
countries like Vietnam. In Southeast Asia, the latter approach tended to dominate. Indeed, in that
part of the world, the United States found that with human rights it could accomplish what a
decade of war had failed to do.
Indeed, only five years after the fall of Saigon, the United States had used human rights
to successfully rebrand itself as the moral conscience of the new age, while the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam, still devastated by over three decades of war, languished in isolation, crippled by
sanctions, abandoned by much of the international community, and condemned by a new
generation of activists for violating human rights. Despite its attempt to expose human rights as a
new form of imperialism, the SRV could do little to explain itself in the face of undeniable
evidence of massive internal repression, definitively losing the ideological war it had worked so
hard to win in the 1960s. While the idea of anti-imperialism assured its international victory in the
1960s, that of human rights sealed its defeat a decade later. Vietnam had won the war, but lost
the peace.
The remaining radicals in France and especially in the United States, where human rights
internationalism had become state policy, attempted to fight back, but little could be done.
Genocide in Cambodia, a refugee crisis in Vietnam, an internecine war between China,
Cambodia, and Vietnam had completely discredited the foundational ideas of the radical left –
anti-imperialism, national sovereignty, and collective self-determination. While its criticisms of
human rights may have been convincing, the anti-imperialist left had nothing to offer in its place.
Its own form of international solidarity was moribund. In this context, a new generation of potential
1031

activists turned to human rights.
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Humanitarian Intervention
On the night of November 9, 1978, a rusty freighter crawled into Port Klang, Malaysia. Its
cargo: 2,164 Vietnamese refugees. The Malaysian authorities, unwilling to take more refugees,
ordered the vessel to turn back. For several weeks, the cramped ship remained anchored beyond
the port limits, under heavy guard. Imprisoned at sea, the refugees struggled to survive as food,
water, and medicine dwindled, while disease and misery engulfed the ship.
The Vietnamese aboard the Hai Hong, whose suffering was promptly televised to
anguished audiences across the world, were only the latest arrivals in a torrent of refugees
fleeing Vietnam. After unifying the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in 1976, the new
communist state initiated a sweeping program of socialist reconstruction to recover from the
accumulated devastation of three decades of war. The South in particular posed a challenge.
Years of occupation deformed the region’s economy, making South Vietnam heavily dependent
on a now absent U.S. military. Drugs, prostitution, gambling, and other illicit activities ran wild.
Capitalist social relations refused to whither away. The Communist Party therefore launched an
aggressive campaign to transform the region, which involved expropriations, reeducation camps,
forced collectivization projects, and harsh punishments for offenders. In light of this, many
Vietnamese considered emigration, and by mid-1977, a rising wave of refugees began to take
their chances.
Disproportionately involved in commerce, and in general wealthier than other Vietnamese
nationals, the Hoa, or ethnic Chinese, were the hardest hit by this campaign. The Communist
Party viewed Cholon, the bustling Chinatown of Ho Chi Minh city, as a “strong capitalist heart
beating inside the Socialist body of Vietnam,” and acted accordingly.
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some in the Party to view the ethnic Chinese in the country as a dangerous fifth column.
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For

this reason, the Hoa, who numbered 1.5 million, were the most inclined to leave Vietnam, and in
fact comprised the vast majority of the “boat people.”
Escape was no easy matter. In some cases, refugees were forced to pay exorbitant
prices – to smugglers, corrupt Vietnamese officials, and criminal organizations – to board some of
these boats and later ships. Those who took to the sea risked drowning, starvation, or pirate
attacks. The ones who survived were herded into deplorable camps, waiting for neighboring
Southeast Asian countries, in concert with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
to determine what to do with them. By the end of 1978, over 61,700 boat people lived in such
camps, and the Southeast Asian governments began to resist taking on more.
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Mounting evidence of political repression, forced collectivization, and mass flight reached
North America and Western Europe in early 1978, though the issue was taken up most forcefully
in France. France was home to a vibrant Vietnamese community, which had long played a crucial
role in circulating information about Vietnam. A number of journals, such as Que Me, founded in
1976, loudly condemned repression abroad. Some Vietnamese expatriates, such as Doan Van
Toai, were themselves refugees. When he arrived in Paris in 1978, Doan Van Toai, imprisoned
by both Thieu and then the Vietnamese Communist Party, shared documents from prisoners
attesting to conditions abroad. Alleging there were over 800,000 political prisoners under
Communist rule, he immediately launched a campaign. In this, he, along with many other
Vietnamese refugees in France, were strongly inspired by the human rights campaign waged by
Soviet dissidents. “Our goal,” he explained, “is to launch a campaign like those organized in the
West in support of Soviet prisoners.”
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strongest and earliest supporters of the campaign against what were now being called human
1036

rights violations in Vietnam were the many Eastern European dissidents taking refuge in Paris.

Doan Van Toai formed a Comité de défense de détenus politiques au Vietnam, published
a book documenting his experiences in Communist prisons, and gave numerous interviews for
publications across Western Europe and North America. French journalists followed up on these
revelations by producing a trickle, then a stream, of reports condemning developments abroad.
Of course, rightwing papers, such as Le Figaro, opportunistically republished these stories to
scold erstwhile activists and shame the left. But even more left-leaning publications, such as Le
Matin or even Jean-Paul Sartre’s Les Temps modernes, ran articles. On October 5, 1978, Le
Monde published its own editorial, “Peace Crimes,” condemning the repression in Vietnam.
“Between the Cambodian genocide and the Vietnamese repression there is, of course, an
enormous difference of degree. But the inspiration, alas, is the same kind. In both cases it is to
level, to eliminate, all differences that exist.”
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The editorial launched a public discussion over

repression, human rights, and the refugee crisis, which involved many activists who had played
an essential role in the antiwar movement.
Many of the journalists reporting on repression abroad were former critics of the war who
had spent time in Vietnam. For example, writing for Le Monde, Roland-Pierre Paringaux, who
once denounced Thieu’s regime in the South, now turned his pen against the new regime. In a
front-page article in Le Monde titled, “Human Rights Violations in Vietnam,” Paringaux asked:
“Does the situation justify the present Communist regime of Hanoi behaving today exactly as the
anti-Communist government of Saigon used to do and routinely resorting to repression and
preventative detention on mere suspicion or on the strength of a denunciation, which it has
elevated to a civic duty?”
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prisoners, he lamented, “The well-known militants who, under the old regime, courageously
1039

devoted themselves to defending political prisoners, have all gone silent.”

As it turned out, some of these former antiwar radicals were about to begin a vast
campaign to target Vietnam for human rights abuses. When news of the Hai Hong broke, these
radicals saw a perfect “opportunity” to take the campaign to the next level. Drawing on their
organizing experiences, they felt that, “to act,” they needed “a symbol like the Hai Hong and its
dramatic effect.”

1040

That very night, the Broyelles called Bernard Kouchner, and two meetings

were quickly organized, the first in the office of Continent, a publication by Soviet dissidents in
Paris. The group – which consisted, among others, of the Broyelles, Kouchner, Alain Geismar,
André Glucksmann, Bernard Henri-Lévy, Vo Van Ai, and Ilios Yannakakis, an ex-communist
militant exiled first in Prague, then Paris – discussed the best way to respond. Henri-Lévy,
channeling the antiwar tactics of the 1960s, suggested they attack the Vietnamese embassy.
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Although they rejected his idea, the group ultimately decided to borrow another page from the
1960s radical playbook – sending a boat to Vietnam.
In 1967, over thirty French antiwar organizations, including various Christian groups, the
PSU, Communist Party, and the Comité Vietnam National, organized a campaign to send a boat
to Vietnam filled with medical equipment, bicycles, motors, and other supplies.
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Contributing to

the campaign, the Association médicale franco-vietnamienne, of which Kouchner had been a
member, penned a text, circulated by the Comité Vietnam National, explaining how the “Victory of
Vietnam” also meant “quinine and a surgical kit in every village” as long as the war against the
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Vietnamese people continued.

1043

Just over a decade later, these erstwhile radicals decided to do

the same. But this time, instead of sending supplies to Vietnamese revolutionaries fighting
American imperialism, they would use the ship to literally rescue the boat people fleeing from the
communists.
With that, a committee was formed, called “Un bateau pour le Viêt-Nam.” Claudie
Broyelle served as president; Françoise Gautier, a former Amnesty International activist, became
treasurer; Olivier Todd, the antiwar journalist, helped with public relations; and Bernard Kouchner
was tasked with gaining the support of Médecins sans frontières.
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On November 11, 1978, they

released their first statement: “[we have] to do more: [we must] go find these escapees. A boat in
the South China Sea must, at all times, find, locate the Vietnamese who have taken the risk of
1045

leaving their country.”

And despite the logistical, organizational, and legal challenges, the

committee did in fact succeed in acquiring a ship, whose name, the Île de Lumière, or the Ile of
Light, perfectly captured the temerity of the campaign.
Leaning on their experiences in the antiwar movement, the committee circulated
petitions, held public meetings, published articles in major newspapers, appeared on television,
raised funds, and connected with famous intellectuals. Their efforts proved remarkably
successful. To take only one measure, the committee was able to convince 166 persons, from
most shades of the political spectrum, to sign their names to their call to action, including such
preeminent figures as Michel Foucault, Raymond Aaron, Roland Barthes, Michel Rocard, and
Lionel Jospin. For maximum mainstream publicity, they won over Brigitte Bardot as well.
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The committee also enjoyed international support. Irving Brown, who headed the
European Office of the AFL-CIO, not only threw his weight behind the campaign, but convinced
other American labor leaders such as George Meaney, President of the AFL-CIO, and Paul Hall,
President of the Seafarers International Union, to sign the call as well. According to Vo Van Ai,
1043

Comité Vietnam National, “La victoire du Vietnam, c’est aussi de la quinine et une trousse
chirurgicale dans chaque village,” no date, F Delta Res 2089: Comités Viêtnam de base, BDIC.
1044
“Entretien avec Jacques Broyelle,” 83.
1045
Reprinted in Weber, French Doctors, 207.
1046
For a full list of signatories, see Christiaens, “La Défense des droits de l’homme en France,”
123-24.
300

through Brown’s efforts, the AFL-CIO promised to provide a crew for the hospital ship free of
charge.

1047

Brown also took the initiative to widen the campaign by hosting an international

conference, convincing Leo Cherne, head of the International Rescue Committee, and Bayard
Rustin, the noted civil rights leader, to speak. But disagreements within the committee disrupted
these plans, as some of the organizers feared that including the AFL-CIO – whose President,
George Meany, only admitted the war was a mistake in December 1974, long after American
1048

withdrawal – would give the campaign too much of an anti-communist flavor.

Indeed, the core group was far from homogenous in its aims. Kouchner, for instance, was
hoping to use the campaign as the springboard for a new kind of human rights organization.
Others, such as André Glucksmann, wished to give the project a more explicitly political – and
anti-communist – direction. There were differences among the politicos as well. Jacques Broyelle,
for example, had become fiercely anti-Vietnamese, going so far as to argue that, “we would have
been better to have been on the side of the Americans in the Vietnam War than on the side of the
1049

North.”

While everyone in the campaign was uncompromisingly critical of the Socialist

Republic of Vietnam, few initially accepted such a harsh view.
Despite these important differences, the organizers shared a central idea – concerned
individuals had the right, in fact the duty, to intervene to stop human rights abuses, and that this
principle would be the basis of a new internationalism. This was, after all, what their campaign
had proposed to do. Chartering a ship to rescue Vietnamese nationals in the South China Sea, in
some cases perhaps even in Vietnamese waters, was tantamount to intervening in the affairs of a
sovereign state.

1050

As it turned out, instead of cruising the seas fishing for refugees, the Île de

Lumière, manned by Kouchner and a team of doctors, ended up anchoring off the coast of the
Malaysian island of Poulo Bidong to serve as a kind of hospital ship. This was less egregious
than invading foreign waters, but the intention was there, and a new idea had taken shape.
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The action unsurprisingly raised a whole series of thorny questions. What jurisdiction did
these activists have in Southeast Asia? Who could they claim to represent? Could international
law be used to justify an action of this kind? What would be the legal status of those refugees
rescued in this manner? These unresolved questions were precisely why the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, as well as many in MSF itself, opposed the action.
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Indeed, the

campaign triggered a major split in MSF as many objected to the interventionism of the project, its
excessive reliance on the media, the strategy of allying with national governments, and
Kouchner’s megalomania, and Kouchner went on to form his own rival organization, Médecins du
Monde (MDM).
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Despite the obstacles, the committee accomplished a tremendous breakthrough. The
effort to save the boat people marked a decisive moment in the development of a new kind of
humanitarian interventionism, one of the first major campaigns of the new human rights
international. Even the committee’s detractors eventually followed suit. MSF’s next campaign, for
instance, was to ignore the conventions of interstate law and march straight into Cambodia to
provide direct relief to refugees. A new idea of international solidarity – one that prioritized the
individual, based itself in the right to intervene, relied heavily on celebrities and the media, and
increasingly moved towards alliances with Western governments – had taken root.
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Central to this new human rights internationalism was the sense that it could supersede,
and in fact completely reconfigure, the political divisions that had marked the Cold War.
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As

Jacques Broyelle later admitted, the boat people campaign “was conceived on a grand scale and
on a new ideological base,” one that aimed to “go beyond ideological cleavages.”
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Yannakakis put it, the initiative aimed to “break the distinction between left and Right.”
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Thus,

the organizing core, though ultimately composed of those who had been on the left, “deliberately”
asked figures on the right to join the campaign.
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“People of the Right, people of the left, former

revolutionaries,” Broyelle remembered, “everyone was there.”
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The campaign promised a

much-needed ideological reconciliation after years of political polarization.
Nothing captured the feeling of beginning a new chapter more powerfully than when the
campaign organizers, led by Glucksmann, succeed in reuniting Jean-Paul Sartre and Raymond
Aaron at the Élysée Palace on June 20, 1979. After refusing to speak to each other for decades,
Sartre and Aaron, schoolmates who had subsequently come to represent two competing strands
of French political thought, the anti-communist liberal and the Marxist radical, finally came
together for the boat people. Sartre, once one of the most visible defenders of Vietnamese
national liberation, now spoke of the “moral duty” to “save lives.”
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Ideology had to be put aside

in the face of human suffering. Glucksmann described the event as “the end of the Cold War in
our heads.” Left and right were now transcended by human rights.
Despite the fanfare, the encounter brought not reconciliation, but rather defeat,
something poignantly captured in Aron’s rather patronizing greeting, “bonjour mon petit
camarade,” to an infirm Sartre, so shriveled and blind he had to be ferried around by
1060

Glucksmann.

Indeed, after years of relative obscurity, Aron, and the liberal politics he

represented, had returned, while the radical anti-imperialism of Sartre had withered and would
finally die the following year. The meeting, Jacques Broyelle admitted years later, was “not about
a convergence, a consensus, a symbol of rapprochement.”
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thought. Period.”

1062

And this was precisely the power of the new rights discourse – it could pass

a clear victory as mere reconciliation, advance its own politics as simple morality, a partisan idea
as supersession of ideology itself. In short, it had achieved hegemony.

Internationalizing the Campaign
The French movement against human rights violations in Vietnam, which had become
condensed in the campaign to save the boat people, inspired similar, though smaller initiatives
across Western Europe and North America. In February 1979, German activist Rupert Neudeck
traveled to Paris where he learned of the Comité un Bateau pour le Vietnam, met Bernard
Kouchner, Geismar, and the Broyelles, and promised to launch a fraternal campaign in the
Federal Republic of Germany.
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Borrowing from the French strategy, he and his wife, Christel,

courted famous intellectuals, like Heinrich Böll, founded committee, and chartered a freighter
called Cap Anamur, the French name for the cape on the Turkish coast, to save refugees on the
high seas.
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It’s estimated that the German ship rescued over 8,000 Vietnamese refugees over

the course of the 1970s.
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Neudeck collaborated very closely with Kouchner, and helped

introduce some of his ideas of humanitarian interventionism into Germany at this time.
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But the movement against human rights violations in Vietnam achieved perhaps its
greatest international success in the United States, winning the support of the federal government
itself. The campaign entered North America through two veteran antiwar activists, Joan Baez and
Ginetta Sagan. Baez, the famous American folk singer, had spoken against the war from the very
beginning. Though never a revolutionary, she did not shy away from direct action. In October
1967, she was arrested during the Stop the Draft Week protests. And in late 1972, she traveled to
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North Vietnam to deliver mail to POWs on behalf of Coliafam, barely surviving Nixon’s “Christmas
bombing” campaign in Hanoi.
That same year, Baez recalls, she met Ginetta Sagan, who appeared at her doorstep
with a “big messy bundle of documents” under arms, “telling me about something called Amnesty
International and its work on behalf of all political prisoners, regardless of ideology, race, or
religion.”
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Sagan, tortured as a political prisoner by Mussolini, immigrated to the United States

where she joined Amnesty International USA in 1967. Soon after, she founded its West Coast
branch, which first met at her home. As one of West Coast branch’s primary organizers, Sagan
threw herself into a number of political initiatives, including the international campaign to liberate
the South Vietnamese political prisoners. The West Coast branch, for example, organized a
three-week speaking tour for Jean-Pierre Debris and André Menras.
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And Sagan was also
1069

invited to the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, from March 29-31, 1974.

Baez and Sagan, who in 1973 joined the AI USA Board of Directors, worked together to
build Amnesty International throughout the West Coast. Through their tireless efforts, the West
Coast branch could come to boast more than half of AI USA’s total membership in 1974.
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In

the following years, the two participated in dozens of campaigns to free political prisoners from
Greece to Argentina to the Eastern Bloc. And through their activism, they filled their Rolodex with
an impressive array of international contacts, which included figures like Andrei Sakharov.
After the fall of Saigon, Baez and Sagan began to cast a more critical eye on Vietnam. In
1976, for example, Baez signed a letter encouraging the Vietnamese government to improve its
human rights record. While it led to a split with activists like Cora Weiss, little came of it. Only a
year after the war, there was limited hard evidence of human rights violations, many of the most
committed activists were unwilling to criticize a struggle they had spent the last decade
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supporting, and, most importantly, the general language of human rights had not yet become
common currency. All that would change in 1979, by which time Carter had made human rights a
centerpiece of his foreign policy, Amnesty International had won the Nobel Peace Prize, the
suffering of the boat people flashed across millions of television screens, and evidence of rights
violations in Vietnam mounted. In the new climate, Baez and Sagan would lead the charge again.
Baez admits that her idea to organize the American human rights campaign against the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam actually came from two refugees, Nguyen Huu Hieu, a Buddhist
monk, and the indefatigable Doan Van Toai, who toured Canada and the United States for two
months in late fall 1978.
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A representative from Amnesty International attended one of Doan’s

talks at Berkeley that fall, and put him in contact with Joan Baez, who agreed to help.
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immediately set to work, forming “a research group of five people, including Ginetta.”

She
Sagan

recalls how the team relied, in particular, on “the invaluable help of “European journalists,
scientists, refugees, and intellectuals,” some of whom they had befriended through the earlier
international campaign to liberate the political prisoners under Thieu’s government.
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Of all their European contacts, the French proved the most indispensable. Indeed, the
research group effectively headquartered itself in Paris. Baez recalls actively “seeking out wellknown French journalists of the left who as early as 1976 had begun to realize and denounce
Hanoi’s policies.”
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Sagan, who had studied at the Sorbonne from 1949-1951, devoured all the

French literature she could find on the subject. Baez paid equally close attention to the French
scene, following “the French debate over Communism, Marxism, New Philosophy, Indochina, and
all the rest.”
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In fact, Baez would develop deep ties with the French intellectual community,

remaining in touch with Doan Van Toai; building connections with MSF; meeting some of the
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French humanitarian activists, such as Claudie Broyelle; and returning to Paris to throw benefit
concerts for Indochinese refugees.
Their research abroad left them so convinced of the human rights violations in Vietnam
that Baez and Sagan decided to expand to the United States the campaign unfolding in France.
Although they had by this point formed their own humanitarian organization,
Humanitas/International Human Rights Committee, they channeled much from Amnesty
International. Following AI’s conventions, they ultimately decided to launch the campaign with an
open letter. Drawing on Doan’s testimony, reports by journalists like Paringaux, and the human
rights debates of French activists, Baez and Sagan penned a letter condemning Vietnam, which
they circulated, along with a packet of supporting materials, among noted American antiwar
activists for signatures. They received nearly a hundred signatures from people such as
Staughton and Alice Lynd, Cesar Chavez, Daniel Berrigan, Allen Ginsburg, and I. F. Stone.
Before releasing their open letter, Sagan and Baez approached the Vietnamese
ambassador. “Either Hanoi make a written promise that Amnesty International representatives
would be allowed into Vietnam within six months, with free access to go where they chose,” or,
1077

Baez continued, “we would print our full-page letter.”

The Vietnamese government, suspicious

of foreign intervention after decades of war, rejected the proposal. On May 30, 1979, Baez, after
having raised over $53,000, published the open letter in four major newspapers, The Washington
Post, The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, and the San Francisco Chronicle.
The published appeal showcased all the ideas of the new human rights internationalism.
There is the expected appeal to an idea of universal rights, and the belief that all governments
must submit to “the tenets of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights.” One also spots theoretical concepts, such as
“totalitarianism,” recently re-popularized by thinkers like the New Philosophers. Most interestingly,
the letter also tried to suggest that all these concerns had in fact always been there, that the new
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campaign for human rights against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam faithfully upheld the
commitments, aspirations, and guiding ideas of the earlier antiwar movements:
It was an abiding commitment to fundamental principles of human dignity, freedom and
self-determination that motivated many Americans to oppose the government of South
Vietnam and our country’s participation in the war. It is that same commitment that
1078
compels us to speak out against your brutal disregard for human rights.
Of course, this was anachronistic thinking. In reality, the new emphasis on individual freedoms,
universal human rights, or international covenants marked a significant rupture with much of
antiwar organizing in the 1960s, especially among radical activists. Indeed, earlier movements
thought almost exclusively in terms of national liberation, collective self-determination, and antiimperialism. Baez’s rhetorical move was to not only render human rights self-evident, but to
attach to the new campaign the legitimacy of the earlier one.
But her attempt to establish such a firm continuity between the two movements actually
belied another major difference between them. In her letter, Baez alleges that the burden of
struggle had always been placed firmly on the shoulders of Western activists. “As in the 60s,” she
1079

wrote, “we raise our voices now so that your people may live.”

Nothing could be further from

the truth. In the 1960s, radical activists believed that Vietnam not only led the struggle, but fought
for activists in the West. This idea was perhaps best captured by Jean-Paul Sartre in November
1966: “Their fight is ours… The defeat of the Vietnamese people would politically be our defeat,
the defeat of all free people. Because Vietnam is fighting for us.”

1080

Indeed, the slogan, “their

struggle is ours,” became the watchword of the Comité Vietnam National. According to this view,
North American and Western European activists were not the ones who had to save the
Vietnamese, as Baez now suggested in 1979, but rather it was the Vietnamese who, in their
heroic struggle against imperialism, would save the peoples of North America and Western
Europe. Although arguing for continuity, human rights internationalism actually inverted many of
the fundamental assumptions of anti-imperialist internationalism.
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Perhaps most importantly, the letter, and the human rights campaign it set in motion in
the United States, claimed to be beyond politics. As Baez explained in an article for The
Washington Post soon after publishing her open letter, “It is a time to put conscience before
ideology.”

1081

When promoting their efforts, Baez and Sagan insisted that “Humanitas is a non-

partisan, non-political, non-governmental human rights group.”

1082

In reality, the new kind of

human rights activism they championed was deeply political – especially in the narrowest sense
of that term. Contrary to their public statements, Baez and Sagan worked very closely with the
American politicians and U.S. government. In October 1979, for example, Baez and Sagan
worked with an aid of Eunice Kennedy Shriver to organize a fundraiser for the boat people in
Washington, D.C. Ted Kennedy attended the event, as did Chip Carter, son of the President.
Sagan, it seems, was one of the first to speak with President Jimmy Carter about human
rights. While on the campaign trail in 1975, the future President stayed at the California home of
Sagan’s Amnesty International colleague, Rodney Kennedy, whom Carter would later appoint as
Ambassador to Sweden. There, he met with Sagan. “Carter then told me,” Sagan explained in a
1978 article, “that he admired Amnesty’s work and promised that if he were elected he would
make human rights and decency in foreign policy a priority.”

1083

Soon after his stay, Carter wrote

to Sagan, affirming their partnership, I “really admire the work you are doing. During the
campaign ahead your advice & active support will be very valuable to me.”

1084

Despite its claim to

operate independently of national governments, Amnesty, along with other such human rights
organizations, substantially benefited from ties to the American President. As Sagan put it,
“Carter’s initiatives mean a great deal” in terms of “AI access to governments” abroad.
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Their campaign against human rights violations in Vietnam further developed these close
links between human rights internationalism and the United States government. In fact,
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Humanitas directly appealed to the President to increase pressure on Vietnam. Nowhere was this
clearer than the rally Baez organized on July 19, 1979 in Washington, D.C. That day, she hosted
a concert at the Lincoln Memorial, at which 12,000 supporters appeared, and then led a march to
the White House carrying lit candles. Baez had written a letter to the President before the event,
explaining that “the march was not in any way a protest, but rather a show of support from the
American people who would back him in any humanitarian effort he made on behalf of the boat
people.”

1086

In particular, she “suggested sending the Sixth Fleet our on a rescue mission.”

1087

While Carter declined the invitation to attend the concert, later in the evening, as marchers
chanted “save the boat people” outside the White House, he surprised everyone by walking
across the Presidential lawn, climbing the iron fence, and announcing that he had decided to
send the Sixth Fleet to rescue boat people in the South China Sea.
In this way, the French campaign to save the boat people at sea now enjoyed the
unexpected support of the United Sates military. By summer of 1979, what began as a small
activist campaign organized by Vietnamese exiles, French journalists, and former revolutionaries,
now transformed into a massive international movement involving not only other humanitarian
organizations, but also major national governments, beginning with the United States.
Governments across the globe echoed the call to save the boat people, politicians organized
international meetings, major newspapers carried front-page stories. Other ships joined the Île de
Lumière at sea, including vessels from the Italian Navy and the U.S. Sixth fleet.

1088

The United

Sates military now led the charge in the campaign against violations of human rights in Vietnam.
In this way, the very force those young radicals had protested so vehemently only a decade
earlier had now become their most important ally in the fight for human rights.

Winning the Peace
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After President Jimmy Carter left Joan Baez’s rally for the Boat People outside the White
House on July 19, 1979, press secretary Jody Powell stayed behind for another hour to speak
with activists. Reflecting the convivial atmosphere of the rally, someone handed him a popsicle
during the extemporaneous question and answer session that soon followed. Repeating a central
theme of the Carter Administration, Powell lamented the general malaise gripping the American
public. Americans, he said as he bit his popsicle, had grown pessimistic, no longer even trusting
their own government. “If you look at people’s attitudes,” he continued, “it’s frightening.” “The
number of people that think all politicians are crooks has tripled since the Watergate era.”

1089

Powell spoke to a fundamental crisis in American politics. By the mid-1970s, many of the
guiding beliefs, certainties, and values of Americans had come undone. On January 11, 1973, the
stock market tumbled, foreshadowing a major recession that would bring the exceptional postwar
economic boom to a definitive end. On August 9, 1974, in the face of now incontrovertible
evidence of crimes, cover-ups, and conspiracies, President Richard Nixon became the only
President in U.S. history to resign the office. On April 30, 1975, after billions of dollars, tens of
thousands of American lives, and millions of Indochinese casualties, the Vietnam War ended in
stunning defeat. Reeling from these events, many Americans were now left increasingly
economically insecure, distrustful of their government, uncertain of the United States
government’s role in the world, and convinced the America had lost its moral compass.
Jimmy Carter hoped to change that. Running on a politics of morality, he aimed to not
only restore faith in government, but heal the shame, guilt, and despair many American’s felt after
the trauma of Vietnam. He began his moral crusade on his very first day in office, choosing to
walk, rather than drive, from the Capitol to the White House for his inauguration, as if to show
ordinary Americans that he was no different from them. In the opening line of his inauguration
speech, he called for unity in the great task of moving beyond the traumas that had scarred the
country. “For myself and for our Nation,” he began, “I want to thank my predecessor for all he has
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done to heal our land.”

1090

Wishing to move past the rampant corruption, immorality, and

deception of the past, he outlined the fundamental tenants of his Administration: “Our government
must at the same time be both competent and compassionate.”

1091

In his speech, he spoke of

fostering greater transparency, moderating the Cold War, and leading by example.
Most importantly, President Carter signaled a major departure in international relations
from the Vietnam War era. He spoke of maintaining a “quiet strength based not merely on the
size of an arsenal but on the nobility of ideas.” The centerpiece of his new arsenal would be the
notion of human rights, which he implied signified not only a new foreign policy program, but a
new age for humanity. “The world itself is now dominated by a new spirit. Peoples more
numerous and more politically aware are craving, and now demanding, their place in the sun,” he
continued, “not just for the benefit of their own physical condition, but for basic human rights.”
Accordingly, he promised, “Our commitment to human rights must be absolute…”

1092

The Carter Administration had recently, and somewhat unexpectedly, discovered that
human rights could serve as the cure to the widespread malaise that characterized American
1093

politics – and especially U.S. foreign policy – in the 1970s.

Human rights could manage the

legacy of Vietnam by shifting everyone’s attention away from the horrors of that war, redefine the
U.S. government’s role in the world after Richard Nixon’s realpolitik, and, above all, restore
American virtue. Yet the different currents that came together to make Carter’s Presidency
possible had different ideas about exactly how human rights could be used to offer Americans a
way to finally feel good about their country, its ideals, and its role in the world. For some
conservatives, which included both Democrats and Republicans, human rights could help
reestablish the legitimacy of America’s war on international Communism, offering the perfect
weapon to circumvent a politics of isolationism, guilt, and compromise after the debacle of
Vietnam. For some liberals, on the other hand, human rights offered the United States a way to
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recover the country’s honor after a period of Cold War immorality that included not only the
Vietnam War, but also continued U.S. support of brutal dictatorships.
Because of these different impulses, human rights came to play a highly ambiguous, and
at times contradictory, role in the Carter Administration’s foreign policy. Figures like Patricia
Derian, head of the State Department’s Bureau of Human Rights, regularly criticized pro-U.S.
1094

dictatorships for human rights violations.

Derian, for example, pushed to ban the sale of tear

gas to the Shah of Iran, who used it to crush demonstrations against his autocratic rule. Other
figures, like Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
proved very reluctant to openly criticize such allies. For instance, Holbrooke personally deleted
1095

criticism of the Shah from one of Carter’s speeches.

This conflict played out over different

areas of foreign policy, with partisans of each approach winning the upper hand in different parts
of the world. In some regions, especially Latin America, figures like Derian scored important
victories. With regards to Argentina, for example, the Carter administration worked to reduce aid
levels, cut off military assistance, and generate public pressure against the dictatorship. But in
Southeast Asia, one of the hottest spots of the Cold War, those who saw in human rights a
weapon against communism clearly seized the upper hand.
Vietnam, which played a very special role in American consciousness, became a prime
testing ground for the anti-communist variant of Carter’s human rights policy. Before his
presidency, “Vietnam” was practically synonymous with American dishonor, cruelty, and failure.
For the vast majority of Americans after 1975, sending troops to fight in Vietnam had been a
mistake. In the eyes of much of the international community, the United Sates had committed
egregious crimes: denying a people their right to self-determination, killing millions, and
completely dislocating all of Southeast Asian society in a war the United States could not win.
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A stain on America’s virtue, the Vietnam War had severely weakened the U.S. government’s
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claims to be the leader of the free world, the defender of democratic values, or the world’s
selfless policeman.
Since Vietnam lay at the very heart of the United States’ predicament, a central aspect of
President Carter’s plan to restore the United States’ positive image on the world stage involved
radically changing the way the world thought about the United States’ role in Southeast Asia.
Thus, only two weeks after his inauguration, Carter broached the question of normalizing
relations with the SRV. The greatest initial obstacle was the myth that there were still POWs in
Southeast Asia. Like Richard Nixon and the POWs before him, President Gerald Ford had
wielded the MIA issue as a political weapon, refusing to discuss the issue of normalization on the
grounds that Vietnam had not accounted for all the soldiers missing in action after the war.

1097

Carter, by contrast, hoped to move past the matter. After the “Woodcock Commission” returned
from Hanoi in 1977, President put the issue to rest by declaring publicly that the Vietnamese “had
done their best to account for the service personnel who are missing in action.”

1098

Negotiations

could begin in earnest.
The Vietnamese, for their part, were eager to establish diplomatic relations, and talks
began in earnest on May 3, 1977. Discussions, which involved several Congressional visits to
Vietnam, culminated on September 27, 1978 when Holbrooke secretly met with Deputy Foreign
Minister Nguyen Co Thach. Both sides agreed to normalize relations without preconditions.

1099

But not everyone in Carter’s Administration assented. Zbigniew Brzezinski – Carter’s National
Security Advisor, a hardline anti-communist, a onetime member of Amnesty International’s board
of directors – argued that normalizing relations with Vietnam would complicate the
Administration’s primary goal of normalizing relations with the USSR’s enemy, China.

1100

In other

words, warming up to the Vietnamese, allied to the Soviets, would alienate the Chinese,
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undermining the United States’ geopolitical strategy of isolating the Soviet Union. Opposition to
normalization was seconded by anti-communist Democrats such as Senator Henry Jackson, one
of the strongest proponents of the conservative notion of human rights.

1101

For Jackson, who had

tried to preserve the anti-communist goals of American imperialism by grounding Cold War
discourse on universal human rights rather than “American values,” normalizing relations meant
1102

bowing to communism.

On the advice of Brzezinski, and with people like Jackson in mind,

Carter turned against normalization only two weeks after Holbrooke and Nguyen Co Thach
reached an agreement.

1103

Feeling betrayed, and increasingly concerned about China’s designs

on the region, the SRV turned completely to the Soviet Union, signing a twenty-five year
friendship and cooperation treaty on November 3, 1978.
Despite all the talk of moving past the Cold War, leading by example, and pursuing a
politics of morality, when it came to Southeast Asia, the Carter Administration’s lofty visions
ultimately came second to the geopolitical imperatives of the Cold War. Carter’s foreign policy
goal was to find a way to change how both Americans and the global community saw the United
States’ role in Southeast Asia. Although consonant with the rhetoric of healing that characterized
his Administration, the early strategy of normalization provided ineffective because it ultimately
contradicted the larger geopolitical goals of the United States in that region of the world. Thus, the
Carter Administration had to find another, more effective way to simultaneously erase the
memory of the war, make Americans feel good about themselves, and restore the United States
government’s global credibility without compromising U.S. imperialism.
Enter the boat people. It seems the idea of seriously involving the United States in the
boat people issue actually came from Holbrooke.
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Holbrooke, despite earlier efforts to

normalize relations with Vietnam, was also one of those figures in the Carter Administration who
praised human rights but felt they should always be subordinated to American foreign policy. As
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noted above, while he often turned to the language of rights, he applied them very selectively,
especially in Southeast Asia. For example, despite massive human rights violations, dictator
Ferdinand Marcos was frequently let off the hook because the Philippines were so important to
U.S. geopolitical interests in the region. This kind of hypocritical stance on human rights was not
lost on the public, and often created problems for the Administration. But with the boat people
fleeing the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, there was no such contradiction. For here was an issue
that was perfectly consonant with the Carter Administration’s emphasis on human rights, but did
not disrupt U.S. strategic interests abroad. In fact, when it came to the boat people, singing the
praises of human rights could the best way to further American imperialism.
There was, however, some resistance to the idea to throwing the state’s weight behind
the issue. The Pentagon felt it was out of its jurisdiction, some in the State Department argued
that embracing the issue would be tantamount to interfering with the affairs of a sovereign state,
and others in the National Security Council raised the question of money. Yet Holbrooke had a
strong ally in Vice President Walter F. Mondale, who had visited a refugee camp in Thailand in
the spring of 1978. Mondale did not see the issue as simply another refugee problem, but as “a
sinister and largely racist plot, putting people to sea in something that approached genocide and
1105

a form of revenge for their support of the United States during the Vietnam War.”

But he also

thought the issue could provide an excellent opportunity to rectify America’s image abroad. “Quite
apart from the humanitarian case, I saw an important foreign policy argument,” Mondale
explained.
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That proved enough to convince Secretary of Defense Harold Brown as well as

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.
Beginning in late 1978, the United States took a series of well-publicized steps to
alleviate the refugee crisis. On February 28, 1979, President Carter created the post of U.S.
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.
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President Carter pledged to double the number of Indochinese refugees to the United States from
7,000 to 14,000 a month. “We can and will work together,” he promised, “to find homes and jobs
for Indochinese refugees.”

1108

To handle the influx, the U.S. Department of State created a new

Office of Refugee Affairs on July 30, 1979. That month, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
suggested moving 20,000 refugees to a refugee processing center in the United States itself,
possibly Fort Chaffee in Arkansas. While only “symbolic,” he argued the project would
nevertheless make for a dramatic gesture on the international stage.

1109

President Carter

ultimately nixed the plan, but by the end of September of 1979, the United States could
nevertheless boast that it had admitted a total of 248,436 refugees since the spring of 1975.

1110

Mondale proved correct: by acting on this issue, the United States had stumbled onto a way to
restore its virtue in the very part of the world where it had so recently been associated with
dishonor.
This remarkable transformation was best captured at the International Meeting on
Refugees and Displaced Persons in Southeast Asia called by United Nations Secretary General
Kurt Waldheim for July 20-21, 1979. Sixty-five governments accepted his invitation to Geneva,
including Vietnam and the United States. To prove its commitment, the United States sent a
“high-level delegation” to the Meeting, which included Mondale, the Attorney General,
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs Richard “Dick” Clark, the Governors of New Jersey and Iowa, a
number of Congressional representatives, and Elie Wiesel, the Holocaust survivor, author, and
1111

humanitarian.
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Mondale’s speech in Geneva was a coup.

With rhetorical subtlety, he reminded his

audience that “Forty-one years ago this very week, another international conference on Lake
1113

Geneva concluded its deliberations.”

He spoke of the Evian conference, where thirty-two

countries gathered to find a solution to the plight of Jews fleeing persecution from the Third
Reich. Yet no agreement was reached, he lamented: “At Evian, they began with high hopes. But
1114

they failed the test of civilization.”

He then transitioned to the refugee crisis in Southeast Asia,

warning, “Let us not re-enact their error. Let us not be the heirs of their shame.”

1115

In effect,

Mondale implicitly compared Vietnam to the Third Reich, the flight of the boat people to the
Holocaust. Mondale then slammed Vietnam for its “callous and irresponsible policies,” charging
the SRV for “failing to ensure the human rights of its people.”

1116

After depicting the Vietnamese as the villains, he made the United States the hero:
The United States is committed to doing its share, just as we have done for generations.
“Mother of exiles” it says on the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty at the port of New York.
1117
The American people have already welcomed over 200,000 Indochinese.
Beyond taking them in, he added, the United States “is acting vigorously to save refugees from
exposure and starvation and drowning and death at sea.” “[T]he President of the United States
has dramatically strengthened his orders to our Navy to help the drowning and the desperate,” he
told his captivated audience.

1118

Most importantly, Mondale hoped to convince the world that the

United States was worthy of once again leading the international community. Unlike during the
Vietnam War, which, despite some allied assistance, the United States led on its own, blind to
international pressure, Mondale now called for a truly united, multilateral effort.
Mondale lived up to the Administration’s highest goals by appealing to moral conscience.
In respect to Vietnam, Mondale had substituted morality for politics and history. His speech did
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not make a single substantial reference to the Vietnam War. In fact, listening to his speech, one
would have never known the Vietnam War had ever happened. And yet Mondale’s words
received thunderous applause. As Mondale later recalled, he felt the campaign to save the boat
people campaign, of which his famous speech was an integral part, “changed the way the world
looked at America – after some pretty difficult years for us abroad – and I’m proud of it.”

1119

Thus, only four years after the Fall of Saigon, the United States had managed to rebrand
itself as a virtuous nation. Astonishingly, when it came to Southeast Asia, the United States
redeemed itself not by making a lasting, meaningful peace with Vietnam, but by using the peace
to launch another offensive. The Carter Administration would help Americans move past the
Vietnam War not by making amends, paying the reparations it promised, or normalizing relations
with the country it had devastated, but by using the issue of the boat people, and the language of
human rights, to turn Vietnam into a villain and the United States into a hero.

Responding to Human Rights
Two words had accomplished what eight million tons of bombs never could. A decade
earlier, despite the U.S. government’s best efforts, Vietnamese revolutionaries enjoyed the
solidarity of antiwar movements across the globe, counted on the support of numerous foreign
governments, and felt comfortable knowing they had secured the moral high ground. Now,
despite having triumphed against an immoral war, the SRV watched as friendly governments
turned their backs, a new kind of international activism took aim, and the United States emerged
as the moral conscience of the age. It is ironic that the Vietnamese revolutionaries, who always
argued that the war would have to be won not only in the jungles, but also in the minds of people
everywhere, would face their worst defeat not in the battlefield, but at the level of ideas. Having
won the ideological war in the 1960s by couching its struggle in the ideas of anti-imperialism and
national self-determination, the Vietnamese revolution would be defeated in the late 1970s by the
idea of human rights.
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Vietnam finally realized the gravity of the situation and mounted an ideological counteroffensive in 1979. Since the flashpoint of the debate over human rights was precisely the refugee
crisis, the SRV began by defending itself on the boat people issue. In 1979, after having issued a
number of rather dubious arguments in its defense – that those fleeing were simply “economic
refugees,” impatient with the extreme poverty of the country; that many of the Hoa refugees were
actually agents working with China to subvert Vietnam from within; or that many of those trying to
escape had collaborated with the old regime but had been unable to flee with the U.S. military
back in April 1975 – the government presented an official, and in many respects more convincing,
response in the Vietnam Courier pamphlet, Those Who Leave: The “problem of Vietnamese
refugees.”

1120

Here, the SRV claimed that the present refugee crisis was not an isolated issue
disconnected from history, as the U.S. government tried to argue, but had deep roots in the
region’s past, above all the legacy of three decades of war:
It is clear that a problem of this kind, owing to its human and political implications, cannot
be treated in a simplistic way by means of a few humanitarian tirades sprinkled with
political slogans on human rights. It can only be grasped within the present context of
Vietnam, which is facing multiple problems left by several decades of war and more than
1121
a century of colonization.
After all, between 1954 and 1973, when the Paris Peace Accords were finally signed, the
combined effects of war and forced relocation had displaced ten million Vietnamese. By the time
Saigon fell in April 1975, “nearly half the entire South Vietnamese population had been uprooted
at least once in the previous two decades.”
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To make matters worse, the Vietnamese

government explained, approximately 65 percent of these southerners flooded into cities, leaving
agricultural production in the countryside in disarray.
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When the United States withdrew,

overcrowded metropolises like Saigon, which had come to depend parasitically on the U.S.
military, risked becoming unsustainable. Vietnam was left with an enormous demographic crisis
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on its hands. In a very direct sense, the SRV charged, the refugee crisis really began with the
Americans.
But the SRV knew that to win the ideological battle, it could not just spread the blame, but
also had to try to resolve the issue.

1124

Indeed, despite what Vice President Mondale’s speech in

Geneva suggested, the SRV had taken some positive steps to alleviate the refugee crisis in
Southeast Asia since early 1978. For example, after the Vietnamese military freed prisoners from
Pol Pot’s camps, nearly 150,000 liberated Cambodians streamed into neighboring Vietnam,
prompting Vietnam to ask the UNHCR to help manage situation. In fact, the SRV had absorbed
far more refugees than neighboring countries, putting paid to the idea that the government was
deliberately trying to thin its population by expelling undesirables. Vietnam, in other words, was
actually involved in major humanitarian relief efforts.
As for Vietnamese nationals hoping to leave, Vietnam showed itself open to finding a
collective solution, even with the United States. In August 1978, for example, the Vietnamese
government, after having invited Senator Ted Kennedy to send another delegation to the country,
assured the American representatives that Vietnam “considered it its duty to act positively on
legitimate family reunion cases.”

1125

During an international meeting on the refugees in December

of that year, Vietnam agreed to collaborate with other countries, as well as the United Nations, to
find “[m]ore regular and orderly procedures … in order to facilitate humanitarian solutions.”
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Then, on January 12, 1979, the SRV announced that: “In accordance with its humanitarian policy
and the laws in force, the Government of the Socialist Republic if Vietnam is prepared, as of
today, to grant exit visas to all Vietnamese who, by written request, express the desire to
leave.”
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On May 30, 1979, about a month and half before Mondale’s speech comparing

Vietnamese to the Third Reich, the SRV, in collaboration with the UNHCR’s Deputy High
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Commissioner, Dale de Haan, signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Orderly Departure,
which promised that “[a]uthorized exit of those people who wish to leave Vietnam and settle in
foreign countries – family reunion and other humanitarian causes – will be carried out as soon as
possible and to the maximum extent.”

1128

Thus, by the time of the Geneva conference in July 1979, Vietnam had already taken
significant steps to resolve the issue. At the conference, Vietnam worked with other countries to
develop a new set of measures such as third-country resettlement, regional processing centers,
and an agreement to promote orderly departures. In addition, after Geneva, the SRV assured the
international community that “for a reasonable period of time, it would make every effort to stop
illegal departures.”

1129

Vietnam kept its word. The numbers of refugees fleeing Vietnam dropped
1130

from 59,941 in June to 17,839 in July to a 9,734 in August.

By the end of the year, writes W.
1131

Courtland Robinson, “arrivals averaged only 2,600 per month.”

As for resettlement, soon after

the conference, Vietnam, the UNHCR, and other countries led by the United States implemented
the Orderly Departure Program, which allowed for a direct transfer of refugees from Vietnam to
countries of resettlement. Resettling over 650,000 people over the next fifteen years, the ODP,
Judith Kumin writes, became not only the UNHCR’s “first attempt to use orderly migration to solve
a refugee crisis,” but the “first effort at preventative action.”
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While these multilateral efforts helped contain the flow of refugees, they did little to
exonerate Vietnam in the eyes of the international community. Some argued that Vietnam’s very
solution to the crisis – halting illegal departures – was itself a violation of human rights. After all,
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed unequivocally, “Everyone has the
1133

right to leave any country, including his own …”
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Others, such as the United States
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government, argued that despite the attenuation of the crisis, the fact remained: Vietnam still
violated human rights.
The SRV therefore felt obliged to challenge the idea of human rights directly, since it was
precisely through the idea of human rights that the United States was able to turn the boat people
issue into a concerted campaign against Vietnam.

1134

Human rights, the SRV began to believe,

could be used to make a moral issue out of anything, putting countries like Vietnam on the
defensive. This was precisely how bellicose governments like the United States, or international
human rights groups, which had never been elected by anyone, had no independent funds to
their name, and could claim no jurisdiction in Southeast Asia, could somehow judge, and
condemn, sovereign nation states such as Vietnam. Today, it was the boat people; tomorrow it
would be something else. To win the ideological war, Vietnam had to respond to human rights
itself.
Vietnamese representatives mobilized a series of related, though at times contradictory,
arguments against the idea of human rights. One major argument was to show that human rights
had become a kind of weapon in the hands of imperialist countries like the United States. Several
Vietnamese commenters very perspicaciously suggested that the United States had effectively
embraced human rights as a way to resolve its major crises in the 1970s. For example, in a
speech called, “Defence of Human Rights or U.S. Policy of Interference in the Internal Affairs of
Other Countries?” Ngo Ba Thanh, who had earned a masters in comparative law at Columbia,
completed PhDs in Paris and Barcelona, and worked at the Legal Affairs Office of the UN
Secretariat, argued in December 1979 that the combined effects of domestic strife, economic
recession, Watergate, and the Vietnam war had not only created a profound moral crisis in the
United States, but called “into question US leadership of the modern world, to which the US
leaders have been aspiring to ever since the Second World War.”

1134
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Faced with the danger of
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losing its international standing, she argued, Americans “decided to take defence of ‘human
rights’ as the starting point for regaining this leadership.”

1136

Human rights, according to this argument, were simply part of a duplicitous strategy to
regain American hegemony after the failure of Vietnam. As Ngo Ba Thanh put it, the new doctrine
of human rights allows countries like the United States to “set themselves up as international
judges empowered to hand down judgments on the conduct of other countries, on their internal
affairs.”

1137

And of course, she concluded, “Washington unilaterally claims for itself the right to
1138

declare where, when, how, and by whom human rights have been violated.”

The Socialist

Republic of Vietnam’s official statement on the boat people was even more blunt:
This campaign is no novelty. It has indeed started in Washington where the American
leaders, unable to use Vietnam’s tribulations to erase from people’s minds the immense
responsibilities of their government and stubbornly refuse to honour their air pledge, seek
to give a good conscience to the American people. Jimmy Carter has found the method:
human rights. Vietnam, the victim of American barbarity, will thus find itself in the dock
while the USA will smartly join the ranks of the defenders of law and justice. There have
been former friends of Vietnam who had lent a hand to this legerdemain trick; some in
good faith and without being aware that t hey are being manipulated; others
1139
knowingly.
In other words, human rights were a one-sided weapon used by countries like the United States
and therefore had to be completely opposed.
Instead of rejecting human rights outright, another line of reasoning tried to relativize
them. According to this view, human rights did not have a singular, universal meaning, but
necessarily meant different things in different contexts. For example, just as anti-imperialist
revolution had to unfold differently in Western Europe or North America than in Vietnam, so too
did human rights. For a society freeing itself from the ravages of over a century of colonialism,
occupation, and war, human rights meant, above all, struggling to build a functional, independent
society. Human rights meant repairing communications lines, combatting illiteracy, setting up “a
health care system which reaches down to the village,” “helping clear large tracts of land mines,”
or giving “jobs to hundreds of thousands of unemployed people.” It was therefore absurd to hold
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Vietnam, a war-torn country of peasants, to the standards of a developed country like the United
States. According to this materialist argument, human rights, whether the Vietnamese or the
Americans wanted it or not, had to unfold differently in Southeast Asia. And if the situation were
properly historicized, it could be shown that far from violating human rights, Vietnam was their
greatest upholder.
A final, major argument against allegations of human rights violations contended that
human rights actually constituted a terrain of struggle between different social forces. There were,
according to this view, two distinct interpretations of human rights, the bourgeois and the
proletarian, the capitalist and the socialist, the individualist and the collectivist, the purely juridical
and the more broadly socio-economic. As Ngo Ba Thanh put it, the new proponents of human
rights, with the United States at the head, only championed the rights of the abstract individual,
and above all, the right to private property. Thus, she continued, “the ‘free world’ calls ‘free’ one
who is without a job, does not have enough to eat, lives in poverty, is constantly threatened by
unemployment, is deprived of the most elementary medical assistance, or sleeps in a hovel.”
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The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, on the other hand, advocated a view of human rights that
placed primacy on more “fundamental” socio-economic rights, such as the right to selfdetermination, to work, social security, and education. The two interpretations, she argued,
represented a broader “ideological struggle” on a global scale. Partisans of the collectivist
interpretation of rights had, she suggested, scored a tremendous victory in 1948, when they
included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights not only “civic and political rights,” but also
key “socio-economic rights.” Since then, however, partisans of the individualist conception of
rights, led by the United States have not only tried to limit the Declaration’s scope, but are sparing
“no efforts to make this Universal Declaration of Human Rights into a purely formal legal
document with no concrete provisions to guarantee the effective exercise of human rights.”
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According to this argument, Vietnam not only promoted a different idea of human rights,
but one that was more expansive and therefore qualitatively better. Indeed, if taken to its logical
1140
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conclusion this argument suggested that in emphasizing basic socio-economic rights, Vietnam
was providing the best guarantee for the civil rights with which the United States was so
obsessed. The rights of the individual could never guarantee the rights of the collective, but a
collectivist emphasis on socio-economic rights ensured the growth of the essential rights of the
individual. “History has shown,” Ngo Ba Thanh argued, for example, “that by freeing the workers
from exploitation and the oppressed peoples from arbitrary rule on the national and social levels,
socialism has effectively ensured genuine freedom and democratic rights for the individual.”

1142

The problem, however, was that the collectivist interpretation of rights championed by socialist
countries like Vietnam had in fact not only failed to ensure the rights of the individual, but was in
part responsible for their violation. Why else would hundreds of thousands risk everything to
escape?
While the refugee crisis was in part caused by the war with the United States, the
Vietnamese government bore the brunt of the responsibility. The government’s solution to the
massive demographic and economic dislocations caused by years of war was forced relocation.
For example, the Second Five-Year Plan, announced in December 1976, inaugurated massive
demographic transformations, with the government planning to move some ten million people. By
1978, the SRV, hoping to reclaim lands through collectivized agriculture, had resettled over four
million people to what were called “new economic zones” or NEZs.

1143

While they were given the

necessary tools, along with a six-month grain supply, to survive, this often proved inadequate.
Many of these NEZs failed, the reduced agricultural output further crippled the national economy,
which in turn prompted many Vietnamese to flee. Not only had many Vietnamese been stripped
of their civil liberties and forced to relocate, or be re-educated, they were now poorer as per
capita income actually declined since the start of the Second Five-Year Plan.
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completely unraveled the government’s claims that by guaranteeing socio-economic rights it
could ensure individual freedoms. Sadly, it could do neither.

1145

Yet the problem could not be reduced to a few mistaken policies; the nation-state itself
seemed to set the Vietnamese communists down this path of repression. As theorists such as
Nicos Poulantzas argued in the late 1970s, one of the primary functions of the state is to maintain
cohesion within a given social formation.
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In capitalist social formations, the state

disaggregates heterogeneous social forces and potentially antagonistic dominated classes within
its territorial borders into individuals, recomposes their unity as a more or less homogenous
“national people,” while necessarily marking some individuals as outsiders. At the same time, the
state allows the dominant classes to not only organize themselves, but to articulate their interests
as those of the entire nation. In this way, the state reproduces a given social formation in a way
that preserves the power of the dominant classes.
Although this function of the state was understood to be a function of the capitalist state,
the events in Vietnam confirmed that even when the nation-state is coded as socialist, the same
process of homogenization holds. Indeed, while radicals felt that the nation-state produced by the
national liberation struggles of the oppressed would be the best way to fight imperialism, protect
the interests of the oppressed, and allow them to transcend their heterogeneity by composing
themselves into a unified subject, they soon watched as the socialist nation-state embarked on
the same violent process of homogenization and exclusion.
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On the one hand, building a

unified Vietnamese people meant oppressing the many ethnic minorities, including the Moung,
Tay, and Hoa, within Vietnam’s new borders. Indeed, on December 29, 1975, less than a year
after liberation, the victorious Vietnamese communists, who, as good Leninists, had always paid
lip service to the right to self-determination of the many oppressed minorities, officially dissolved
1145
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the national autonomous regions of Vietnam, creating a fully unified nation-state.

And it is not

without significance that the vast majority of the refugees were ethnic minorities. On the other
hand, building social cohesion meant targeting all those who threatened the specific socialist idea
of national unity, hence the suspension of civil liberties, the persecution of dissenters, and the
establishment of re-education camps to produce proper national subjects.
Radicals saw how, in the context of the Third Indochina War, the nation-state became
imperialist, even when those in the government had been the leaders of anti-imperialist struggle;
now they watched as the nation-state, thought to be the vehicle of emancipation, almost
immediately began to turn on its own subjects. The repressive nature of the Vietnamese state in
turn raised serious problems since it grounded the entire notion of collective rights, which the
Vietnamese firmly counterposed to that of individual rights. For if the state was the guarantor of
collective rights, but had inherent tendencies towards violent homogenization, exclusion, and
repression in the name of social cohesion, did this mean that collective rights were themselves
inherently oppressive? Did this mean that collective rights, within the context of Vietnam’s
socialist nation-building project, precluded genuine individual rights?
Lastly, not only had Vietnam clearly violated those basic civil rights, such as the freedom
of speech or movement, that North American and Western European radicals themselves had
struggled for in the 1970s, it did so in an intellectual climate where the rights of the individual
were increasingly taking precedence over that of the collective. If we are to accept the SRV’s own
definition of human rights as a terrain of struggle between two distinct views, by 1979, the
individualist conception of human rights championed by groups like Amnesty International or
states like the United States was beginning to win. In this changed context, the violations of
certain civil liberties in Vietnam seemed especially egregious now that everyone had developed a
heightened sensitivity to them. Thus, whatever its criticisms of the limitations of the new human
rights rhetoric, Vietnam could not possibly explain away its own behavior, and after the
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intellectual transformations of the 1970s, no legitimate emancipatory politics could afford to
countenance such violations.

Anti-Imperialism on the Margins
Although responses to the rise of human rights varied by country, the anti-imperialist
radical ;eft in North America and Western Europe found itself on the defensive everywhere. This
was especially the case in France, where the campaign against human rights violations in
Vietnam achieved hegemonic proportions. There, even committed anti-imperialists such Laurent
Schwartz, the main organizer of the Comité Vietnam National and the Front Solidarité Indochine,
signed onto the Boat for Vietnam operation. Yet Schwartz simultaneously took great pains to fight
what he saw as a “political campaign filled with hatred against the Vietnamese government” led
by “left-wing intellectuals who now hated the same Viet-Nam which they had adored and
idealized before.”

1149

Indeed, in spite of his strong support for the boat people, Schwartz became

probably the most visible, and credible, public defender of Vietnam in France. He wrote a
response to Paringaux’s provocative Le Monde article, gave regular interviews on the topic, and
co-authored a highly publicized piece in Le Monde with veteran antiwar organizer Madeleine
Rebérioux defending Vietnam.
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His efforts elicited very sharp polemics from Doan Van Toai,

Jacques and Claudie Broyelle, and Jean-Pierre Le Dantec, among others.
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Significantly, however, in trying to vindicate Vietnam, Schwartz and Rebérioux found
themselves deploying the language of human rights, concluding, for example, that they had to
simultaneously “help the third world and defend human rights throughout the world.”
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In fact,

Schwartz and Rebérioux proposed that one major solution would be for the Vietnamese
government to accept an investigation by an objective mission, preferably led by Amnesty
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International. Not only was this the same solution proposed by Baez and the champions of the
rival human rights internationalism, the suggestion revealed how Schwartz and Rebérioux – along
with other French radicals – still believed that Amnesty International was somehow unpartisan, or
as Schwartz later put it, “ apolitical and neutral.”

1153

In other words, they could have conceivably

admitted that Vietnam had violated civil liberties without making recourse to conceptions of
human rights, or relying on humanitarian groups. In this, they revealed how even many of the
critics of human rights in France had to accept its terms, proving just how hegemonic, in the
deepest sense of the word, human rights had become.
Other French radicals, such as the militants of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire –
who had been the strongest backers of the Front Solidarité Indochine, and the Comité Vietnam
National before that – tried to combat the language of human rights, but in so doing only revealed
the incapacitation of the anti-imperialist left as a whole. Their initial response to the boat people
campaign, which was typical of much of the organized anti-imperialist left, was to simply ignore it.
In fact, their paper, Rouge, did not run a single article on the refugee crisis until the very end of
June 1979, something pointed out by an irritated reader in a letter to the paper. Rouge finally
published a few articles on the topic by Michel Thomas, which strongly opposed the boat people
campaign as a new form of imperialist intervention. The campaign to save the boat people,
Thomas argued, is in fact nothing but “a very large-scale anti-communist political operation,”
inspired by “Mister Carter’s conception of human rights.”
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As for the crisis itself, it is a direct

result, in fact another episode, of the war, first waged by the French, then by the Americans,
against the Indochinese people. Thomas ended by blaming Giscard d’Estaing, Carter, and
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt for each refugee killed, drown, or starved, calling on them to accept
more refugees, organize an airlift, and above all, pay Vietnam reparations.
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While briefly criticizing the Vietnamese Communist Party, the paper said little about
Vietnam’s rights record, an attitude that prompted a major debate, as a number of readers,
including members of the Ligue, took issue with the official line of the organization. One reader,
“Jean-Francois B.,” a former member of the Comité Vietnam National, began by arguing that
today, in 1979, it was very difficult, “if not to say impossible,” to think politics without confronting
the issue of the Indochinese refugees, in the same way that it was impossible to have thought
1156

politics in the 1960s outside of the war in Vietnam.

For this reason, he found it inexcusable

that, first, Rouge had ignored such a vital issue, one that cut to the heart of the anti-imperialist
left, and second, that when the Ligue finally confronted the matter, it did so with platitudes. For
“Jean-Francois B.,” Rouge’s answer just boiled down to exclaiming that it was all “imperialism’s
fault.”
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But what was imperialism? What was the left’s responsibility? What did this say about

internationalism? In avoiding these questions, the radical anti-imperialist left was revealing its
theoretical and political limits.
Another reader, “Gabriel M.,” a member of Ligue, began by arguing that Thomas’ article
on the refugee crisis was basically “Stalinist,” that is to say, in some respects, Rouge’s line on the
boat people was very similar to that of the PCF and the Soviet Union.
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This was a serious

charge precisely because one of the defining traits of the radical left in the 1960s and 1970s had
been a criticism of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the radical left in France emerged in large part
because Vietnam allowed it to present a distinct, internationalist and revolutionary alternative to
the position of the Communists. But now, over a decade later, one of the most important voices of
the radical left in France seemed to assume a position on Vietnam very similar as that of its
existential rival. Where did that leave the radical left?
Lastly, “Gabriel M.” echoed a crushing point made by “Jean-Francois B.” “Thomas’
attitude,” he charged, “is a bit like that of someone passing by a woman being raped and explains
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that her rapist is only a product of society and then scampers off.”

1159

While certainly an

exaggeration, his point was that, in the face of a crisis, one that demanded some kind of concrete
internationalist response, all that the radical left had to offer was an abstract argument about
imperialism. While true in some respects, bromides such as these only exemplified the real crisis:
anti-imperialist internationalism had run out of solutions. Thus, while some radicals managed to
resist the rising human rights internationalism, they not only had little to offer in its place, their
criticisms of human rights made the radical left in France as whole appear impotent, unable to
provide anything but empty, formulaic criticisms that resolved nothing.
The boat people campaign received a very different response from American radicals,
although in the end, anti-imperialists in the United States found themselves in the same quagmire
as their French comrades. Because of its unprecedented role in popularizing the issue in the
United States, much of the debate over human rights violations in Vietnam focused on Joan
Baez’s public letter against Vietnam. Some, mostly pro-Chinese radicals, opportunistically
defended Baez in order to attack China’s geopolitical rival in Southeast Asia. Indeed, the
Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), the official pro-Chinese party in the United States and one of
the most vocal defenders of the Khmer Rouge, ran a full-page interview with Baez over human
rights violations. When other radicals excoriated Baez, CPML radicals such as Carl Davidson
rose to her defense, even though, they admitted to readers, the letter “didn’t reflect a socialist or
Marxist view.”
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In fact, most antiwar radicals in the United States roundly condemned Baez’s letter, and
with it, the campaign’s broader allegations of human rights violations in the SRV. Some, such as
noted antiwar journalist Wilfred Burchett, who had recently spent ten weeks in Southeast Asia,
questioned the veracity of Baez’s sources. “To the best of my knowledge,” he wrote in The
Washington Post, “all the accusations in the Joan Baez letter and their imputations are
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baseless.”

1161

He showed that much of the information presented in the public letter was in fact

based in rumor and generalizations, and concluded that the “‘open letter’ reveals complete
ignorance of the realities of today’s Vietnam.”
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Indeed, Doan Van Tai turned out to be a far less

credible source than assumed, and Sagan had to concede that, regarding the number of
prisoners in Vietnam, “I really don’t know. The number was arrived at by mathematical
approximation.”
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Others, such as Don Luce, who had been instrumental in bringing the plight of the
political prisoners under Thieu to public attention in the early 1970s, took issue with the invocation
of human rights. The best way to resolve the immense tragedy of the boat people, Luce argued in
an article in The Progressive, was to start by properly historicizing the refugee crisis, rather than
using the language of human rights to score political points. “When the ‘boat people’ are
discussed in the United States, it is often in terms of the human rights issues they represent,” he
wrote. “That is a convenient way of ignoring American complicity in creating conditions that
produced this enormous mass of refugees.”
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As Luce’s article implied, one of the main reason why most American radicals, in contrast
to their French peers, strongly opposed the campaign against human rights violations in Vietnam
was because human rights had become the doctrine of the United States government. While
French President Giscard D’Estaing eventually sympathized with activist efforts to save the boat
people, U.S. President Jimmy Carter had made human rights the cornerstone of his entire foreign
policy. For American radicals, then, supporting human rights in the United States meant
complying with U.S. imperialism. This is precisely why many radicals took such a vociferous
stand against not only Baez, but also human rights as a whole. While in France, even many on
the radical left accepted the language of human rights in some way or another when discussing
the boat people, in the United States, many radicals tried to decouple the two. As radical lawyer
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William Kunstler, who had defended the Black Panther Party, the Weather Underground, and the
Attica Prison rioters, put it, “I do not believe that the existence or nonexistence of violations of
human rights in Vietnam is relevant to this discussion.”
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But precisely because of the high stakes of human rights in the United States, some on
the American left bent the stick too far the other way, practically denying that anything was wrong
in Vietnam. Kunstler, for example, went on to add: “I would never join in a public denunciation of a
socialist country.”
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One group, which counted some people close to the Communist Party,

challenged Baez with their own open letter in the New York Times. Outdoing the Vietnamese
government itself, they boasted: “Vietnam now enjoys human rights as it has never known in
history as described in the International Convenant [sic] on Human Rights: the right to a job and
safe, healthy working conditions, the right to join trade unions, the right to be free from hunger,
from colonialism and racism. Moreover, they receive—without cost—education, medicine, health
care, human rights we in the United States have yet to achieve.”
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Some radicals, such as the Revolutionary Communist Party, tried to take a more
nuanced approach. On the one hand, the RCP argued that the “classless view of ‘human rights’”
only served American imperialist interests. In this, the U.S. government received “valuable aid
from people like Baez and groups like Amnesty International.”
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On the other hand, the RCP

equally criticized people like Kunstler, Fonda, and the author of The New York Times letter for
pretending that the government of Vietnam was free of blame. For the RCP, the Vietnamese
Communist Party had in fact undermined the revolution. “That the betrayal of the struggle for
socialism by Vietnam’s revisionist leaders has led to actions and policies that deserve
condemnation is beyond condemnation,” the RCP admitted.
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The problem was that those

honest enough to accept this fact, like Baez, had done so in a way that only furthered U.S
imperialism. “Many who opposed the war in Vietnam are now disgusted with actions of Vietnam’s
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present rulers, and justly so. But the Baez letter attempts to channel this disgust in a direction
which is not only favorable to the U.S. imperialists but is even supported and verbalized by
them.”
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The solution, in other words, was to articulate a left-wing criticism of events in Vietnam

that did not resort to human rights.
But the RCP did not offer much of an alternative. In 1984, the party, along with seventeen
Maoist organizations across the world, did create a new kind of international – loosely Maoist, but
independent of China – that attempted in part to resist the idea of human rights. The most
significant member party of this Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) was the
Communist Party of Peru, also known as the Sendero Luminoso. Speaking for the RIM, the
Sendero Luminso, deliberately opposed their internationalism to human rights:
We start by not ascribing to either the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the
Costa Rica [the American Convention on Human Rights], but we have used their legal
devices to unmask and denounce the old Peruvian state. . . . For us, human rights are
contradictory to the rights of the people, because we base rights in man as a social
product, not man as an abstract with innate rights. “Human rights” do not exist except for
the bourgeois man, a position that was at the forefront of feudalism, like liberty, equality,
and fraternity were advanced for the bourgeoisie of the past. But today … it has been
proven that human rights serve the oppressor class and the exploiters who run the
imperialist and landowner-bureaucratic states … We reject and condemn human rights
because they are bourgeois, reactionary, counterrevolutionary rights, and are today a
1171
weapon of revisionists and imperialists, principally Yankee imperialists.
Yet, the RIM was extraordinarily marginal, virtually nonexistent as a force in the United States.
And in Peru, the only place where it carried any weight, its anti-human rights vision was
completely undermined by the Sendero Luminoso’s extremely violent trajectory.
Thus, while the radical left in the United States, and to some degree in France, could
occasionally voice sharp criticisms of human rights internationalism, it had little else to offer.
Some blindly defended Vietnam in spite of clear evidence of civil rights violations. Others
criticized Vietnam, but had no other viable alternatives to present. Still others resisted the
campaign against human rights violations in Vietnam yet still accepted its basic terms. Thus,
while many radicals could point out the dangerous role of human rights interventionism, when it
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came to acting on concrete issues, such as the refugee crisis, they fell back on bromides,
blaming everything on “imperialism.” The hard truth was that when it came time to move from
theoretical criticisms to effecting viable international solidarity, the anti-imperialist left offered no
real alternative to that of human rights. And this is precisely why human rights emerged as the
dominant form of international solidarity – it survived when its rivals burned out.
Thus, while it is true that a number of former radicals, above all in France, turned coat,
abandoning anti-imperialism for human rights, on the whole, the decline of anti-imperialism and
the concomitant rise of human rights had less to do with individuals from the old guard switching
sides en masse, than with newer activists flocking to human rights as the most effective form of
international solidarity. The diehard anti-imperialists, in other words, stayed firm, but in the face of
the major historical transformations in the 1970s, and the resulting inadequacy and incoherency
of anti-imperialist international, they could no longer recruit young people in the way they did in
the 1960s. Future generations of activists would instead find a home in the “human rights
international.”
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CONCLUSION

On February 6, 1980, about 150 human rights activists attempted to force their way into
Cambodia to help put an end to the humanitarian crisis rocking the country. Despite the perilous
situation, where the combined effects of famine, genocide, and war displaced hundreds of
thousands of starving, homeless, and sick Cambodians, the Vietnamese authorities, suspicious of
outside intervention after nearly a century of colonialism, occupation, and war, refused to allow
foreign relief organizations to enter the country. In response, humanitarian activists condemned
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for violating human rights and organized a massive international
campaign against Vietnam, in which the United States government, a number of human rights
organizations, and Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge curiously all found themselves on the same side.
While the United States government organized punitive international sanctions against the SRV,
and the Khmer Rouge waged guerilla warfare against the occupying Vietnamese army,
international human rights organizations raised awareness, collected money, and flocked to the
Cambodian border to provide relief.
Although the situation had begun to improve by early 1980, a number of human rights
groups – led by the American International Rescue Committee and the French Médecins Sans
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Frontières – decided to escalate the campaign to “revive flagging world interest” in the issue.

In February, they organized a march to Poipet Bridge, the main checkpoint between Cambodia
and Thailand, to force open a land bridge into Cambodia. Carrying a banner that read, “Please
allow us to help the people of Cambodia,” the marchers – which included such noted figures as
Elie Wiesel, who was now chairman of President Carter’s Commission on the Holocaust; Leo
Cherne, chairman of the International Rescue Committee; Bayard Rustin, the civil rights leader;
Claude Malheurt of Médecins Sans Frontières; Alexander Ginsburg, the Soviet dissident poet;
Fernando Arrabal, the Spanish playwright; a number of French politicians, including the mayor of
Paris; and Joan Baez, a key organizer of the West Coast branch of Amnesty International USA,
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and now the director of her own human rights organization, Humanitas – hoped to use the bridge
to transport doctors, nurses, relief workers, and a convoy of twenty trucks filled with food,
medicine, and supplies into the country.
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“This is a major effort to persuade people of the

urgency of doctors, nurses and medical supplies being brought into Cambodia,” Joan Baez
explained. “It does not address itself to politics or warfare.”

1174

The “March for Survival” was an odd spectacle: a handful of North American and Western
European human rights activists with tacit support from the French and U.S. governments but no
real jurisdiction were effectively attempting to invade a sovereign country in the global South on
the grounds that they had a duty to protect the fundamental human rights of individuals against
governments. Although the activists ultimately failed to reach their objective, the campaign
marked the culmination of a decisive shift in international solidarity. Instead of emulating the
heroic guerilla, activists now saw only third-world victims; instead of mass mobilizations, human
rights groups now relied on celebrities, politicians, and philanthropists; and instead of bringing the
ideas of what was then called the “Third World” home, North American and Western European
activists now imposed their own notions on those abroad. Just over a decade after the Tet
Offensive, the high point of anti-imperialist internationalism, international solidarity now involved
pressuring foreign governments to conform to international law, sending relief workers to save
victims in poor countries, and collaborating with western governments to levy sanctions against
third-world states.
Compared to the disasters of anti-imperialist internationalism in the 1970s and 1980s,
human rights internationalism promised to offer a new way forward. Indeed, a number of
important campaigns have been won under the sign of human rights. But on the whole, the record
of human rights internationalism has not been stellar. Despite some important exceptions, in the
second decade of the twenty-first century human rights internationalism has largely come to
mean lobbying governments, making impersonal financial donations, taking spring break off to
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build a school in a random foreign country, or going to war. Let us not forget that President
George W. Bush justified the Iraq War in part by appealing to human rights. Looking back, we are
in a good position to evaluate the results of that war: the United States’ mission to stop
“outrageous human rights abuses,” has now resulted in untold devastation, over half a million
deaths, perhaps four million displaced persons, irreparable environmental damage, the
destruction of cultural artifacts, complete political dislocation, mass poverty, and the rise of the
most vicious jihadist organizations. While we cannot reduce human rights to the actions of the
U.S. government, we cannot ignore the connection – in the same way that we cannot turn a blind
eye to anti-imperialism’s relationship to certain dictatorships.
Given the fate of human rights, as well as the continued existence of imperialism, there is
a temptation to return to the idea of anti-imperialism. But as this dissertation has shown, while
anti-imperialism, at least in its specific form in the 1960s and 1970s, no doubt helped millions
liberate themselves from imperialism, it also brought immense sorrow. In many countries, antiimperialist revolutions led to military dictatorships, massive indebtedness, the destruction of
democracy and self-management, internal repression, the impoverishment and oppression of
working people, sexual and gender oppression, forced relocations, xenophobia, ethnic cleansing,
and even other imperialist wars. The causes are manifold, and obviously differ according to each
national context. But a central claim of this dissertation has been that anti-imperialism’s equation
with national liberation – that is, the struggle for a sovereign nation-state as the specific vehicle of
emancipation – had a part to play. My argument is that whatever the intentions of those leading
the revolution, the nation-state has in-built oppressive tendencies. Of course, the insitutitional
materiality of the nation-state in question matters – different states are oppressive in different
ways. But historical experience clearly indicates that on the whole, the nation-state cannot be the
subject of any truly emancipatory politics.
The experience of anti-imperialism in Southeast Asia, where socialist revolutions
dedicated themselves to abolishing all forms of oppression, is a perfect example. The fate of
those revolutions reconfirmed, for example, that one of the central functions of the nation-state is
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to reduce the heterogeneous multitude residing within its borders into the singular “people,” which
always involves the identification, and elimination, of “others.” No nation-state is exempt from this
process. In Vietnam, the government repressed the rights of ethnic minorities, particularly the
ethnic Chinese. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge took this logic to its ultimate conclusion:
genocide. But just as states tend to homogenize internally, they also possess a tendency to exert
power externally. Immediately after the liberation of Vietnam and Cambodia, the two went to war
over borders. In this way, the Third Indochina War showed that far from serving as the bulwark
against imperialism, the nation-state possesses deeply imperialist tendencies. Whatever the
politics of those in power, national governments will always seek to extend their power by
influencing other governments, expanding their borders, or playing diplomatic games. Indeed, we
should not limit imperialism strictly to the actions of the United States government; we must
recognize that all states can be imperialist.
Of course, while anti-imperialism’s foundational assumptions were shaken to the core,
this did not mean that individual anti-imperialists ceased to exist. Indeed, they lived on, even into
the present. But without a serious assessment of its failures, anti-imperialist internationalism has
become either meaningless or a kind of zombie. Almost like the concept of fascism, it has little
real meaning anymore. When it is given a specific political content, it is often ludicrous. Indeed, if
millions experienced anti-imperialism’s collapse as a tragedy, today it lives on as a farce. One
now sees sectarian groups waving North Korean flags at demonstrations, arguing that antiimperialist internationalism means defending North Korea’s right to nuclear weapons as a
defense against U.S. imperialism. Others, rightly critical of U.S. intervention in Syria, nevertheless
bend the stick the other way, defending Syrian President Bashir al-Assad as an “anti-imperialist.”
The list goes on.
Thus, if we are to return to the idea of anti-imperialist internationalism, we must rethink
and reinvent it. That means, first and foremost, decoupling anti-imperialism from national
liberation. What would a non-nationalist anti-imperialist internationalism look like? In answering
this question, we must recall that even though it became orthodoxy, the alliance between anti340

imperialism and the right of nations to self-determination was contingent, not inevitable. After all,
before the October Revolution, many Marxists, like Rosa Luxemburg, advocated other ideas.
Later, when nation-states came to replace crumbling empires, other polities could have been
possible. Overthrowing imperialism, in other words, need not always mean fortifying the nationstate. In fact, today, in the twenty-first century, for anti-imperialism to survive, it must mean
something other than the national project.
Of course, political projects cannot be invented by myopically looking to the past. They
must be reinvented based on the conditions of the present. In the case of anti-imperialist
internationalism, this means careful investigations into how imperialism has changed since the
1960s and 1970s. How has the end of the Cold War, the rise of multinational corporations, the
consolidation of supranational institutions, the transformation of nation-states, or shifts in regimes
of capitalist accumulation changed imperialism? What forms of internationalism are apposite
given the changed historical conjuncture? This is, of course, a project that extends well beyond
what a history dissertation can deliver. Nevertheless, the value of this project is that it has traced
the history of anti-imperialist internationalism, analyzed its rise in the 1960s, uncovered its basic
assumptions, surveyed its repertoire of forms of solidarity, tracked its transformations over time,
and explained its collapse. In this sense, it has helped clear the path for a revived anti-imperialist
project. The real work has only just begun.
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